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
# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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VOL. VII — NUMBER 4.

**ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF UKRAINE**



LOWER LIGHT: PRE-WAR TERRITORY IN RUSSIA      UPPER LIGHT: BOUNDARIES OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

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## FIVE YEARS OF OUR CONTAINMENT POLICY

*Editorial*

The indecisive war in Korea, the difficulties in the carrying out of the plans of the defensive Atlantic Pact and the obvious successes of Soviet propaganda among the Asiatic peoples, especially in the Arab world, are compelling those circles responsible for American foreign policy to review its bases and the means of executing it. It is now openly stated that America is beginning to lose the "cold war" with the Bolsheviks.<sup>1</sup> The nation which is the spokesman for the freedom of the individual and for humane ideas not only in words but in fact is unable to convince the world that its political plans are correct and that Communism is the foe of humanity. This is a proof that something is wrong in the American foreign policy and especially in its work of propaganda.

It has been five years since the present American policy toward Moscow was defined by our officials under the name of *Containment Policy*. This was proclaimed March 12, 1947 as the Truman Doctrine in the President's address to Congress in connection with military assistance for Greece and Turkey. After five years of this policy the crisis in it is compelling America to review it.

The American Containment Policy was intended as a political defense against the further growth of Soviet influence beyond the boundaries planned in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Another step in this Truman Doctrine was the Marshall Plan, the economic upbuilding of Western Europe and the Atlantic Pact as a defensive military alliance of the Western powers against a possible attack by the Bolsheviks.

There is no doubt that the direct result of the American plan of arming itself and its allies was to postpone the immediate danger of an attack by the Bolsheviks on Western Europe. There is no great probability at present that the Bolsheviks will try by military force to hasten the final struggle with the democratic world on its chief Western European sector. Moscow will not start a great and open war on the democratic world, instead by its propaganda, by the spreading of confusion in the

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<sup>1</sup>"U.S. Challenges the Soviets in Battle for Men's Mind", *The New York Times*, December 10, 1951.

world and by small wars, as that in Korea, carried ostensibly by its satellites, it will try to keep the democratic world under constant pressure and in a state of preparedness for war which must undermine the economic system of the Western states and result in such a serious economic crisis that a Communist revolution can be the only outcome.

There is no doubt that the international situation is becoming more and more complicated and that the American Containment Policy against red Russia still has not produced important results. The Bolsheviks have been weakened neither absolutely nor relatively. They have not yet made any concessions as the makers of this policy had expected. In its essentials the defensive policy of America has resulted only in the stifling of the underground anti-Bolshevik movements, carried on by the natural allies of America.

The Containment Policy did not seek to liquidate the anti-Democratic Soviet system. It left to the Bolsheviks all their spoils taken in World War II and confirmed by the agreements in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. The boundary line of the Soviets from Uzhorod in Carpatho-Ukraine along the Curzon line to Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad) on the Baltic Sea, on the west and the Kurile Islands taken from Japan on the east marked the territory where the Kremlin could practice without control its rule by tyrannical methods without any intervention, while the USSR was still a member of the United Nations.

Constantly during the war America and England acknowledged the moral right of the Soviets to have on their borders countries "friendly to Russia." It was said: "Russia had never in history carried on wars of aggression and within our memory had been twice the victim of aggression from the west and so especially on the west there should be governments friendly to peace-loving Moscow." The agreement in Yalta set up such governments in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The Politburo also saw to it that a government "friendly to Moscow" was established in Budapest and in Prague. These governments were to be established by the mutual agreement of the allies in a democratic way according to the will of the people and according to the definition of Abraham Lincoln.

Whoever in 1945 had any conception of the history of eastern Europe of the 18th century and especially the history of Polish-Russian and Ukrainian-Russian relations, or whoever studied the history of the past 30 years and the creation of the Soviet Union, had no illusions as to what would happen to these governments "friendly to Moscow" or that anything would be different from what it has been. But the words

of warning from the spokesmen for the Eastern European nations enslaved by Russia were thanks to the influence of the red and white Russians in America ignored as the anti-Russian propaganda of the Ukrainians and other anti-Russian nationalists; we know that in America nationalism, even of the finest type and patriotism, was regarded then and now as inimical to the interests of their native land, and as a result did not enjoy a good reputation.

Everything that these distrusted nationalists said in 1945 has been carried out to the letter and in a few years the Bolsheviks advanced from the Uzhorod-Koenigsberg line to the line of Trieste, the Elbe and the Baltic. Greece, Turkey and Iran were to become the normal satellites of Moscow and only the Truman Doctrine stopped them on the west and south but not on the east. As it was to be foreseen in 1946, the Bolsheviks controlled Manchuria and were communizing the whole of China, thus increasing the human material in their orbit to a third of the human race and at least doubling their material resources.

The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact stopped the peaceful penetration of the Bolsheviks to the West. The Communist parties in Italy and France were expelled from the governments, although their actual influence was only slightly reduced. This was the only success of the American Containment Policy.

The American Containment Policy counted on the fact that the Bolsheviks once confined to their own sphere of influence would break or at least be inclined to concessions, especially in the dominated by them satellite countries contrary to the decisions of Yalta and Potsdam. The Russian advisors of the American foreign policy promised that Bolshevism thus compressed would fall by an internal revolution, for they all rejected war with Bolsheviks as the greatest evil, which would bring inevitably the fall of the Soviet Empire.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately it did not happen. Bolshevism not only did not fall; it grew stronger. It opened up the great spaces of Asia and gained the possibilities of attacking the democratic powers, especially America, by its planes from the boundaries under its influence while its centre was thousands of miles from the American bases.

The American Containment Policy was truly peace-loving and strictly legalistic in its attitude to its opponent who was both aggressive and

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<sup>2</sup> David Dallin in his book *The New Soviet Imperialism* consoles the American people and carries on the propaganda for the preservation of the Russian Empire in its entirety by saying that the America-hostile Bolshevik government will be replaced by an internal revolution. See also: *From Bolshevik Stalin to Menshevik Dallin* in this issue.

lawless; it could produce no other results than it has done. In its result it had to be a policy of appeasement, which differed from the appeasement of the times of President Roosevelt only by the fact that that allowed the Bolsheviks to advance in Europe beyond the limits agreed upon by the leading allies. This held them to the lines of the Yalta agreement but allowed them to spread in a broad stream through central Asia and of more importance to consolidate internally and recover their strength after the war which had weakened them physically and morally.

The leaving of the enlarged territory of the Soviet Union to the autocratic experimentation of the Kremlin and its russifying policy toward all enslaved nations and its genocide, created among the underground anti-Soviet forces a mood of complete hopelessness and the conviction that America was not interested in them. These forces in the Soviet Union at the end of the war were quite active. If they had been supported by the West, they could have been a great factor in the shattering of the power of the Kremlin. Millions of young Soviet men had been in German prisons or of the occupying Red Army; they had seen life abroad and on comparing it with the poverty of the Soviets they realized the folly of their government and how the Politburo had been treating them for dozens of years.

During the war, when the armies of Hitler had been in Moscow and Stalingrad, the Politburo made important national concessions, especially in Ukraine. They again awoke the national feelings of the Ukrainian masses which had been numbered by the terror of Yezhov. In the territory of the Soviet Union, especially in the western parts of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania and the Caucasus, strong underground movements had been organized, the most active of these was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in its organization, numbers and the assistance which it gave to the population and continued to act until the beginning of 1951. Powerful underground existed in Poland as well.

All these anti-Bolshevik forces, actual and potential, placed all their hopes on America and the democratic world. Knowing the Soviets by long experience they excluded the possibility of a co-operation of the Communist and the democratic worlds. They were all waiting for the new collision of the two forces and wanted moral and material assistance from America. They hoped that a victorious America would emerge as the leader of the world with a broad universal program for a free world which would so shatter the enfeebled Soviet Union that the slightest blow would lead to the shattering of the Politburo and the Stalinist Russian Empire, the prison of nations. They hoped for this but the American



Containment Policy brought them full disillusionment. It took away the moral forces from the anti-Bolshevik groups and became the beginning of their voluntary liquidation.

The American Containment Policy began to operate with the aid of the official agency of the American information service, *The Voice of America* and the non-official *Free Europe*. The policy formulated in the conference halls of the State Department began to be spread through the world by *The Voice of America*. This was given to the press by Walter H. Wagoner, a Washington reporter of the New York Times. Commenting on the policy of the State Department expressed through *The Voice of America*, he defined it in these words:

"Other experts on European politics call attention, meanwhile, to the fact that the strategy of distinguishing between 'oppressed peoples' and their 'oppressive Governments' is not now being applied with any force to the Soviet Union. It is believed that while this policy might have the effect of dividing people from Government in the satellites, it would be likely to weld them more tightly together in Russia.

"The Russian people, it is argued in this quarter (the Department of State), have felt the effects of more than one generation of thought control and Communist party orientation. The people as a result more often than not, identify themselves with the Government and identify this, more often than not, with the Soviet Communism."<sup>3</sup>

This policy was repeated by the the *Voice of America* in all the languages of the Soviet Union in the most orthodox form during the first years not only to the great disillusionment of all the anti-Communist forces in the Soviet Union, but above all to the great confusion of the underground movements in non-Russian territories. Echoes of this confusion came from behind the Iron Curtain to Western Europe, to America and even to the State Department. The American official information service, which was supposed to work for the weakening of the Soviet power which was opposed to our country, strengthened it.

The authors of such an original policy about which Mr. Wagoner was speaking were the secret Communophiles, the unoriented American Russophiles or also Russian patriots in the American service, working for the preservation of the unity of the Russian Empire, it is only fair to say. The fact is that the American propaganda rejected the aid of the anti-Bolshevik forces, even broke their morale and made them submit to the power of Kremlin. We found echoes in the Bolshevik press that the

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<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, March 12, 1950.

Kremlin had profited by these five years which it obtained from America to strengthen the inner stability of its regime, thanks to the American Containment Policy. In the lands of Great Russia, the Bolsheviks carried on the struggle with those elements which praised Western Europe, the cosmopolitans. We received news of mass settlements in Asiatic Russia of the younger generation of former members of the Red Army, especially those who had returned from prison.

The Bolsheviks threw enormous forces against the underground movements, especially in Ukraine and Lithuania. They revoked all their concessions in the field of Ukrainian culture. We received word of their struggle with the Ukrainian scholars, authors, writers. Recently they condemned the Ukrainian poet Sosyura for his patriotic verses, — "Love Ukraine," written during the war and widely circulated by them among the Ukrainians in the Red Army.<sup>4</sup> It is natural that the Bolsheviks would have hesitated to do this if the *Voice of America* had been a herald of freedom for all peoples including those enslaved in the Soviet prison of nations.

The same legalistic position was taken by the *American Committee for Free Europe* which with the aid of its information service is carrying on a "crusade of truth". But this ends its campaign strictly at the Curzon Line and delivers its flaming words only to the residents of the satellite states usually without positive success. Every one who has any knowledge of the Bolsheviks understands that despite the formal existence of the satellite states as independent nations, their fate is closely connected with the fate of the peoples in the USSR and that they cannot be liberated without the shattering of the power of the Russian Red empire. The drawing of an artificial distinction between the satellite states and the peoples of the Soviet Union by American policy is a direct proof that the former need not hope for liberation through anti-Communist speeches, for every attempt at anti-Communist action on their part is checked not only by their local police but by those of the Soviets.

There is no doubt that the reason why America is not attacking Bolshevik Russia in its most vulnerable spot, the nationalities question, is because America is still hoping that it can effect some compromise with the Bolsheviks and that by mutual concessions America can live peaceably with them.

This is what we can consider the balance as a result of five years of the Containment Policy. It is greatly to the disadvantage of America.

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<sup>4</sup> See: "Ten Days of Ukrainian Art in Moscow", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3.

America has checked the Bolsheviks in Greece, Turkey and Iran. It has checked them in Berlin and not allowed them to advance in Europe. It has succeeded in strengthening Western Europe and laid the beginning for a joint armed force in Western Europe.

On the other hand during the same time America has permitted the Bolsheviks to destroy the underground movements in the USSR and to strengthen the government and authority of the Soviet regime. We can see with our own eyes the lack of support for all anti-Bolshevik forces behind the Iron Curtain in the satellite states and the weakening of the influence of America as the future liberator. What is most important, the Bolsheviks have taken China with the aid of the Chinese Communists and have made their regime twice as strong. They have rendered impossible American air bases in China near the Russian borders in Asia which have been removed a distance of several thousand miles and have secured enormous reserves of both men and materials.

Finally, the Soviets have been able to convince by their propaganda the peoples of Asia that they are not worse neighbors than the Americans, that America will not bring them liberation from the colonial exactions of the capitalistic powers however that the Soviets can.

The net balance of our Containment Policy shows that the Soviets during the five years of its existence have become both absolutely and relatively stronger than they were five years ago, and that Kremlin, the most brutal government in the history of humanity by its policy of political lying has also secured the moral superiority over America as the champion of a free world especially among peoples previously subjected to European colonial exploitation.

*What is the reason for this? It is because the American Containment Policy has been purely a defensive policy not only in the physical but also in the moral sense of the word, and it has not been a political offensive. The second reason is that America has not revealed to the world a great universal program for liberating all enslaved peoples in the world and especially those enslaved by the Soviets. Hope in the possibility of a compromise with the Soviets has stopped America from a general moral challenge to the Kremlin for the leadership of the whole world.*

There is no doubt that all the peoples enslaved by the Soviets or any one else are now afire with their own nationalisms. It is not a nationalism of an evil Nazi type but a noble nationalism or rather patriotism for their own land which they wish to see free and independent and an equal partner in the universal family of nations. The nationalism of enslaved

peoples is basically democratic, a mighty lever, the only one able to shatter Communist tyranny in the world and the strongest ally of America, if we will but use it.

This dynamic power of nationalism in the enslaved nations is not fully understood to-day in America thanks to the propaganda of those interested in continuing the enslavement of these peoples. In reference to these failures of American policy, former President Herbert Hoover in his address to the youth at the 9th forum arranged by the Daily Mirror, on December 1, 1951, said:

"It was the nationalism of the countries forced behind the Iron Curtain that would ultimately redeem them from the Communist tyranny of the Kremlin. The cooperation of independent nations is the only foundation upon which international peace can be permanently built and sustained. In self-government lies the safety and guaranty of individual rights".<sup>5</sup>

If America wishes to crush the Kremlin morally, it must become the protector of the liberating movements of the enslaved peoples and the protector of their rights. The Bolsheviks have issued a universal call for economic equality, which appeals to millions of the needy, especially in the previously exploited colonial lands. *America against this appeal of a purely material character must issue a universal call for liberation and the self-government of all the peoples of the world, adding national liberation to economic liberation.*

Such a universal call for liberation of peoples will be especially painful to the Soviets, who are maintaining a true prison of nationally developed nations who have been struggling for tens of years against the policy of Moscow.

Unfortunately the American policy toward the nations enslaved by Moscow is an abandoned waste; and a sector which is doing the most harm to America. On the formation of the national policy toward Russia in America Russian emigres still have an enormous influence and they understand Russian patriotism not as the liberation of their own Russian people from the century old tyranny of white and red tsars and the leading of it to the democratic way of living, but as the preservation of the Russian Empire, i. e. the enslavement of other peoples. The American Russophiles are under the undisputed control of the Russian reactionaries who are now assuming the name of democrats and they see the national questions of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR only through

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<sup>5</sup> *The New York Times*, Dec. 2, 1951.

the Russian prism of the indivisible Russian Empire. These people have never noticed the thirty year struggle of the oppressed nationalities against Red Russia and this is the greatest mistake of the American policy for in their theoretical formulas they have made America no more progressive than is the national policy of the Bolsheviks.

The Bolsheviks have most brutally annihilated the non-Russian peoples of the USSR but they still have to reckon with the accomplishments of the national revolutions of 1917-1921 and they still preserve the 16 national republics which possess the theoretical constitutional right to be independent. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic as the largest and most dangerous to the Soviet Union has secured its own special privileges, its own flag, its own national hymn, its own ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of war. Ukraine and Byelorussia have become members of the United Nations. The Kremlin would never have done this, had it not been compelled by the revolutionary dynamics of Ukrainian nationalism which is still desperately struggling.

When we compare with these facts the views of George Kennan, a prominent member of the American State Department as expressed in his last article *America and the Russian Future in Foreign Affairs* (April, 1951) we can see how reactionary these views are. Will not such reactionary views of an American diplomat turn the enslaved peoples against America? They enrage the enslaved peoples even more than does the Soviet tyranny for they come from a member of a nation which has written on its banners the words from the American Declaration of Independence that every people has the definite right to freedom.

The truth of this is shown by the Ukrainian emigre press in Europe which is more and more losing faith in America as a possible champion of their national liberation. Without understanding the official American policy or the difference between the government and private groups of journalists there are even being raised extreme voices that in case of a Bolshevik-American war the Ukrainian underground must be prepared for a war on two fronts, against both the Bolsheviks and the Americans, if the latter try to build on the ruins of the Soviet Union a Russian Empire.<sup>6</sup> This is a great tragedy for the whole civilized world and for America, to which Americans of Ukrainian descent are legally and morally bound to call the attention of all American people.

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<sup>6</sup> These extreme views were expressed by the well-known Ukrainian journalist Zenon Pelensky in the Paris weekly *Ukrainets-Tchas (L'Ukrainien)*, No. 35, 36, 37, September 1951. We must add that this paper is the organ of those Ukrainian nationalists who are closest to the Ukrainian Underground in Soviet Ukraine.

We must not deceive ourselves with the hope widely expressed by the Russian emigres that the Russian people will as a mass oppose the Kremlin, if America will protect the indivisibility of the Russian Empire. The Russian people will remain with Stalin, for they are accustomed to obey dictators.<sup>1</sup> The Russian people in the Soviets for past 30 years became accustomed to the existence of the Ukrainian republic and there will be no advantage or hostility, if it becomes free.

America cannot accept as its own the reactionary policy of the Russian emigre imperialists of 30 years ago and reject the majority of the population of the Soviet Union, their natural allies, the non-Russian peoples. *The American national policy toward Russia must be progressive and recognize the accomplishments of the national revolutions of the last 30 years. It must at least take its start from 1951, i. e. the existence of 16 republics in the USSR, two of which are members of the United Nations, with the constitutional right of each to become independent.* Starting from this position America must help them to turn their written rights into reality just as she must help the satellite states to become true independent nations.

The national policy of America towards Russia must become part of a universal American program for the liberation of all peoples of the world. The information service of the *Voice of America* must be attuned to this function. So must the *Voice of Free Europe* and all American propaganda. It is only by such a program of freedom that America can successfully oppose the lying propaganda of the Politburo in the Kremlin.



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<sup>1</sup> See: *The Portrait of Soviet Russia by Russians*, by Alex Inkeles and Raymund A. Bauer, especially the end of the article. *New York Times Magazine*. Nov., 1951.

## GEOPOLITICS OF UKRAINE

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Although control of Ukraine (now occupied by the U.S.S.R) was the primary goal of Germany during World War II, and although the country might provide the "soft underbelly" of Stalin's *Fortress Sovietica* (as Italy proved to be the soft "underbelly" of Hitler's *Fortress Europa* during World War II), little has been said, lately, about the strategic importance of Ukraine. In fact, if anything, all recent writings in this field pay no attention at all to the "Ukrainian" aspects of global planning, due probably to the fact that the strategic aspects of Ukraine have been lost in the evaluation of the U.S.S.R. as a dynamic factor without noting the comparative importance of the various component parts of the Soviet Union.

In general terms, the importance of Ukraine lies in the fact that it is the pivotal area of Eurasia for it offers a gateway to aggressor and it is likewise a defender of the region which allows the expansion into Europe or Asia. Historically, this has been demonstrated by the course of events affecting the European-Asiatic relations from the very beginning of history.<sup>1</sup>

As an introduction it is sufficient to state that Ukraine has served the Russian masters of the Russian state, expanding in the east-south directions, as a jumping-off base for their encroachment on the neighboring countries. In the process of this expansionism Ukraine became a province of Russia's imperialistic ambitions; it helped Russia to dis-

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<sup>1</sup> For the relation of Ukraine to the Russian people see: Oliver J. Fredericksen, „The Ukraine,” Chapter XVII, pp 346-366, in L. I. Strakhovsky, Ed., *A Handbook of Slavic Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949). For more systematized and relative studies, see the numerous articles relating to Ukraine in Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Slavonic Encyclopaedia* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), and also the related articles in the *Ukrainian Quarterly* (by: M. Andrusiak, Vol. III, 1., W. H. Chamberlin I., 1, N. Chubaty, I., 1, 4, II., 1, 4, III., 3, IV., 1, V., 3.; W. Dushnyck, II., 4, III., 1, A. Dombrovsky IV., 4, S. Hordynaky IV., 4, V., 1, O Hornovy V., 4, B. Krupnitzky VI., 3,4, C. A. Manning I., 3, III., 1, IV., 2, I. Mirchuk III., 3, M. Mishchenko IV., 3, A. Ohloblyn IV., 1, I. Ohienko V., 3, S. Protsiuk V., 2, P. Radchenko, VI., 3, M. Seleshko IV., 3, R. S. Stocky IV., 3, 4, N. Chubaty: *Ukraine between Poland and Russia, Review of Politics V., VIII., 3.*

member Poland, to direct her march toward the Black Sea and the Caucasus and promoted the way for the disruption of the Turkish Empire.

#### GEOGRAPHICAL REALITIES

Ukrainian area is three times larger than Italy. (In 1946 only the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic covered an area of 225,000 sq. miles or the size of France. Outside of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic remained an area of 63,000 sq. miles of the Ukrainian ethnic territory). It is the territory bound by the Black Sea on the south, the Carpathian Mountains on the west, and the Don River on the East. The northern boundaries of Ukraine merge into the marshes of Polisia, southern part of the neighboring areas inhabited by the Byelorussians in the West and Great Russians in the East. The core of the country covers the southwest of the great belts of land that "stretch across Europe and Asia on the great plain of the East. That is the belt of the steppes, wide expanses of level rolling country with the celebrated and enormously fertile black earth regions which have been cultivated more or less continuously for over three thousand years."<sup>2</sup> While the southern and central parts of Ukraine are the prairie and wooded-steppe regions, the area north of Kiev is in the region of mixed forest, and floored with glacial clays and sands.<sup>3</sup> Therefore in the east-west direction Ukraine is divided into three regions: (1) a small mixed-forest belt in the north where conifers predominate; (2) the wooded-steppe in the centre; and (3) the true steppe or prairie in the south. Without Ukraine Russia would be practically deprived of the access to the warm sea, the Black Sea. The possession of Ukraine by Russia is credited with the peace-endangering problem of Dardanelles. The same circumstances enabled the Tsarist Russia as well as Red Kremlin to exert pressure on the Balkan-peninsula and organize a large scale pan-slavistic movement.

Up to World War I, Ukraine was not only the most important agricultural region of the U.S.S.R., but also the most important industrial section. This was due to the great Donets coal-field, stretching from west to east on the southern side of the Donets river. Of big importance are also the rich iron deposits in the crystalline complex at Krivy Rih and the manganese ore near Nikopol, to the west of the Dnieper River, together with the salt in the Permian rocks near Slavyansk, north of the coal-

<sup>2</sup> Clarence A. Manning: *The Story of the Ukraine*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Margaret R. Shackleton: *Europe, A Regional Geography*, New York: Longmans, Green, 1934, pp. 471-477.



field, and the mercury near Artymovsk. The Donets coal-field has numerous industrial towns: Slavyansk, Voroshilovsk, Artymovsk, Stalino and Voroshilovgrad. There are industrial parts of Ukraine elsewhere; ferrous metallurgical works at Krivy Rih, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, and the ports of Odessa, Mykolaiv and Mariupol; Kiev and Kharkiv have heavy engineering plants. The harnessing of the Dnieper River by the great dam near Zaporozhe has been utilized since the 1930's to form new industries in the middle Dnieper area. The Donets coal-field (or Donbas) produced some 60% of the total Soviet output of coal in the late 1930's.

In 1939, Ukraine had four cities of over half a million inhabitants: Kiev and Kharkiv were the third and fourth largest cities of the U. S. R. R.; the port of Odessa is the third largest city of Ukraine (and the 7th in the U.S.S.R.) and is an export centre for lumber and grain; Rostov-on-Don is a collecting centre for goods from the Donets coal-field and from the fertile and oil-producing Caucasus foreland.

One of the most densely populated regions of the U.S.S.R., Ukraine has undergone, during the Soviet domination, the rapid process of industrialization, decreasing the rural population; a process favored by the Soviet government also for political reasons because the peasantry is a bastion of Ukrainian independence. The Soviet estimate that the Ukrainian density averages 180 people to the square mile, while the Donbas shows a density of 260 to 390 people.<sup>4</sup> The Ukrainians, in fact, are the second most important ethnic group in the U.S.S.R and number approximately one quarter that of the whole Soviet Union population. About one-third of them live in artificially russianized urban centres.

The railway network of the area between Kiev and Kharkiv compares favorably with the Middle West of the United States around Chicago. Both areas are farming regions, interspersed with industrial centres.<sup>5</sup>

The Ukrainian rivers—Dnieper, Don, Dniester, Boh, Kuban—are very important not only from the viewpoint of communication and general economics, but also as a source of power tentatively estimated at a million kilowatts.<sup>6</sup> The Dnieper River is so deep and wide that it is navigable for its entire length of 1,400 miles; it has the longest navigable season of any Soviet river. The Black Sea coast is frozen only for a comparatively short time.

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<sup>4</sup> Theodor Shabad, *Geography of the U.S.S.R.*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1951., p. 445.

<sup>5</sup> G. D. B. Gray, *Soviet Land—the Country, Its People and Their Work*, London: Morrison, 1947, p. 272.

<sup>6</sup> D. T. S., "Ukraine in the Economy of the U.S.S.R.," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 3, (Spring, 1947), pp. 215-230.

2 Economically, Ukraine is one of the few regions in the world that has all the raw materials to develop an autonomous economy. "This land of immense distances and wide horizons with no natural barriers, yet requiring continuous defense, blessed with the fertile black soil of the Ukraine attracted the more daring and more rebellious spirit of Russia where at first they won and enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than the serfs of the zone of mixed forests."<sup>7</sup> Before 1937 approximately nine-tenths of Russia's grain export came from here. The Donets Basin is estimated to have a coal deposit estimated to shave a coal deposit of 79 billion tons; it occupies 7th place among the coal deposits of the world. In Europe, only the Ruhr and Saar basins are larger. Most of the industrial economy of this region is based upon a marriage of the iron ore of Krivy Rih and the coal of the Donets basin. This has produced the greatest ferrous metallurgical industry of the Soviet Union responsible before the war for more than half of the total production. In fact, the Donets-Dnieper district has 25% of the total installed power capacity of the U.S.S.R, but in power production it exceeds all other regions—including central Russia.<sup>8</sup>

#### HISTORICAL TRENDS

The right of the Ukrainian people to their national independence has been definitely established. The eventual liberation of Ukraine from the Russian domination is the most urgent problem of international policy, which must be solved at the future settlement of peace-loving world.<sup>9</sup>

The historical destiny of the Ukraine started with the establishment of the old Kiev State on the Dnieper river which had to fight the semi-nomadic tribes of the Pecheneg and Polovtsi the invaders of East Europe. Thereafter the history of Ukraine is often confused with that of Poland or Russia. Ethnically different from the Russian people, the Ukrainians favored separatist trends; their history can be described in three distinct historical periods: (1) the old Ukrainian Kievan state, known also as Kievan Rus (from 9 to 14 centuries); (2) the Ukrainian Kozak State (from 1648-1783); and (3) the Ukrainian National Republic (from 1917 to 1921). Geopolitically, Ukraine's history was a struggle against the invading forces

<sup>7</sup> George Goodall, Ed., *Soviet Russia in Maps*, London: George Philips Son Ltd., 1943, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> Eric Thiel, "The Power Industry of the Soviet Union," *Economic Geography*, XXVII, 2, April 1951, pp. 107-122.

<sup>9</sup> For special studies, see such works as: Clarence A. Manning, *The Story of the Ukraine*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1947.

of the Mongols, then of the Russians, the Poles, and the Turks, with Kiev always remaining the centre of the national life.

The political history of East Europe has shown the centrifugal and centripetal forces competing for allegiances between Muscovy and Kiev. In some periods Kiev actually surpassed in greatness its northern and younger rival and was therefore able to develop a culture distinctly different from its northern competitor. The great factor which led the Ukraine to a closer connection with the Western Europe was its geographical location as the guardian of the gates through which the Asiatics entered Europe. This was already shown during the Mongolian and Tartar domination, when Ukraine sought alliances with the West, while Muscovy, on the other hand, surrendered to the Mongolians, cooperated with them and thus entered into the sphere of Asiatic culture and became an Eurasian state.<sup>10</sup>

The pushes and pulls of the international cross-currents continued to influence Ukraine's history. Soon after Ukraine passed under Tsarist domination, it became a bone of contention between Poland, Lithuania and Russia. The Russian advance to the Black Sea crossed the eastern part of the Ukraine. The western part was owned by Poland until the Second Partition in 1793.<sup>11</sup>

While, during the 19th century, Ukraine was used as a base for Russian attacks on the declining and weakening Turkish Empire, the turn of the 20th century proved its significance to a remarkable degree as one of the most determining, if not the most important cause, of both World Wars.

#### UKRAINE IN WORLD WARS

During the 16th century, the Turks had become a very important factor in European politics; thereafter, up to around 1923, Europe tried to eliminate the Turkish danger—and succeeded—by pushing the Turk into the Middle East and the Turkish homeland. The process of eliminating the Turkish attacks against Central and Eastern Europe took centuries; it started to reach its peak during the 19th century, and was completed only in 1923—after the Greco-Turkish war.

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<sup>10</sup> For more interesting details, see: Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York: The MacMilan Co., 1944, p. 715.

<sup>11</sup> For more details, on all aspects of Ukraine, see, "History: Ukraine," by O. J. Fredericksen and others, pp. 492-502 in Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Encyclopaedia Slavonica*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1949; see also: O. J. Fredericksen, "The Ukraine," Chapter XVII, pp. 346-365, in L. I. Strakhovsky, *A Handbook of Slavonic Studies*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1949.

During this time, Tsarist Russia exploited the Turkish troubles by pushing, gradually, by way of Ukraine, to the Caucasian mountains and the Dardanelles; at the same time it tried to conquer the Turkish possessions by way of the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan regions. It employed money and propaganda to excite Russophile trends among the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary without evident results. In the Balkan lands Pan-slavism was the instrument which was to weaken Turkish domination in the Balkan peninsula.

At the same time, Austria-Hungary became the jumping-off place for the German advance along the "transverse Eurasian Axis," which German geopolitical planners drew from Hamburg via Prague, Budapest, Constantinople, Alexandretta to Basra on the Persian Gulf.<sup>12</sup> This Axis was flanked by the Ukrainian territory through which runs the shortest overland connection between the Atlantic Ocean (North Sea) and Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf). The route Paris—Berlin—Kiev—Teheran—Basra as a railroad and air route is able successfully to compete with the southern route planned by the German geopolitics of Kaiser period.

Evidently Hitler's plan to dominate Ukraine was but an extension of the plans of the Kaiser's brain-trustees. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* propounded clearly the idea that the "Third Reich" was set on a great expedition to the East in search of that living-space which he saw on the territory of the Soviet Union. The domination of Ukraine was Hitler's goal in starting World War II.

Direct advance overland on this "Transversal Eurasian Axis" was handicapped by the Black Sea, which could be passed either on the south via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, or on the north along the southwestern slopes of the Caucasus. In other words, Ukraine was in the way of the Nazi plans for accomplishing their goals. The Ukrainian territory was the pivotal area of Eurasia as the gateway to the aggressive Nazi Germany anxious to conquer Asia. When Munich opened the way for the Nazi penetration of the Balkans and the East, the oil and grain fields of Ukraine were placed within easy reach of Nazi aggression.

"If mystery shrouds the timing of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, the event itself translated into action the supreme declared objective of Nazi aggression."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Emanuel Moravec, *The Military Importance of Czechoslovakia in Europe*, Prague, Orbis 1938, pp. 35 ff. and passim.

<sup>13</sup> Army Service Forces Manual, M 103-3, *Geographical Foundations of National Power*, Section I (Concluded); Sections II and III, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1944 p. 61.

The Nazi offensive conquered a great area: grain-growing Ukraine, the iron mines of Krivy Rih, the priceless manganese of Nikopol, the coal of the Donets Basin, and a long list of Ukrainian territories. The acquisition of the Ukrainian region was to lead to the conquest of the Caucasus and the capture of Stalingrad, which would open a road to the unlimited oil supply of Baku—Iran and to the shores of the Indian Ocean; conversely, the conquest would block Russia's Middle Eastern supply line from overseas, and stop the flow of oil to the farms, factories, and armies of the Soviet Union. Finally, with the dissolution of Soviet resistance in the south, the invaders could wheel north through Voronezh, sweep to the rear of Moscow, and trap the Soviet armies on the central and northern fronts. The collapse of the Nazi offensive in Ukraine, where Ukrainian nationalist resistance played an important role, led to the Allied victories not only in East Europe, but also in Africa and the Mediterranean.

The strategic aspects of Ukraine, proved by the course of the events of World War I and II, have been appreciated fully by the planners of the "Grand Design," both Russian and German. Lenin was quick to admit that "without the grain from the Ukraine we cannot maintain our power" and that "the struggle for grain was the struggle for socialism." General Haushofer, Hitler's geostrategist, admitted that Ukraine "plays a part in the long range aim of some great power against the Soviets."<sup>14</sup> The speed and precision with which the Nazis reorganized the conquered Soviet territories, especially Ukraine, indicated a long-prepared and minutely elaborated plan of seizure.<sup>15</sup> Alfred Rosenberg a native of Tallinn (Reval, Estonia), as "Reichsminister fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete" (Minister for the Occupied Territories in the East), had one section, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, headed by Erich Koch; the Ukrainian general regions (Generalbezirke): Zhitomir, Kiev, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Volhynia and Crimea (Part of Taurien district) which paralleled the territory of the former Ukrainian S.S.R., adding only the Crimea, autonomous Soviet republic, (geographically a natural section of Ukraine). The Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions had been placed by the Nazis under military administration.

After World War I, the geopolitical importance of Ukraine as an independent political unit was overlooked by the leaders in London and Washington. It was only after World War II that the age-old Polish-U-

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<sup>14</sup> Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942, p. 151.

<sup>15</sup> Joachim Joesten, *What Russia Wants*, New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944.

kraianian struggle for the border territories reached an end due to the Soviet victories, and because Red Russia has united all the Ukrainian lands, even Carpatho-Ukraine, which had never been united with Kiev. The Ukrainian problem has been transformed from an international problem into an apparently internal affair of the Russian State now called Soviet Union, despite the fact that outside of the name, there is no federalism in the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup>

The unification of all West Ukrainian lands under the Soviet domination increased simultaneously difficulties of the Soviet government in Ukraine. Basically different in spirit the Ukrainians, oriented toward the cultural viewpoints of the West had to be exterminated only by the use of brutal force. The struggle with "the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" as this trend is called in Soviet semantics is the most important problem of the internal policy of the Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. "The struggle against the western mentality of Ukraine was taken over from White tsardom to Red tsardom which is continuing it by the same methods. The destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is helping to spread the conception that Ukraine has always been in spiritual affinity with Moscow."<sup>17</sup>

When the Soviet armies re-occupied Ukraine during World War II, airfields to service American planes were constructed to help the shuttle-bombing raids between American bases in England and Europe; this shuttle bombing started in June 1944 and continued almost uninterruptedly up to the end of the war. One of the most important of these bases was located near the historic city of Poltava. It proves the importance of Ukraine in aspects of geopolitical strategy.<sup>18</sup>

Since World War II, the Soviet rulers, sensing the danger that the Ukrainian people might present in case of a new world war, have followed a policy of dispersing certain elements of the Ukrainian people to even as far as Sakhalin Island (near Japan).<sup>19</sup> The rest of the population, together with these people who had been moved here in order to take place of the exiles, had to be kept under persistent supervision of the Communist

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<sup>16</sup> Nicholas D. Czubatyj, "Ukraine—Between Poland and Russia," *Review of Politics*, VIII, 3 (July, 1946), pp. 331-353. — Idem, "The Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Oct. 1944.

<sup>17</sup> Nicholas D. Czubatyj, "Ukraine and the Western World," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, III, 2, (Winter, 1947), pp. 145-158.

<sup>18</sup> Edmond Stevens, *Russia is no Riddle*, New York: Greenber, 1945, p. 268.

<sup>19</sup> Ivan Spector, *Soviet Strength and Strategy in Asia*, Seattle Superior Publishing Co., 1950, p. 11.

party. Communist party agitators had to be used in great numbers. In 1949, for instance, there were in Ukraine "764,000 agitators, yielding a ratio of one agitator to approximately every 50 persons in the population."<sup>20</sup>

At present, Ukraine is destined to be a key point of attack, if the "shooting war" should come against the Middle East and the Balkans, not to speak of Central-Eastern Europe. Or, "Ukraine can be a most valuable ally behind the Iron Curtain if the possibilities of its nationalist movement are fully realized and exploited in America." Furthermore, the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Danubian Basin, by the acquisition of Carpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II, "is one of the most significant developments in the political geography of the New Europe. It must immensely increase the authority and strategic advantages of the Soviet Union in Central Europe."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 68.

<sup>21</sup> William H. Chamberlin, "Ukraine: Ally Behind the Iron Curtain," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IV., 1, (Winter, 1948), pp. 10-18.

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#### PRAM FACTORY IN BUDAPEST

"The factory 'Pioners' Pram' was fulfilling the target laid down by the Five-Year Plan by 100.2 per cent. Shockworker Ivan Makal was on the records as having a 160 per cent output; moreover he was expecting an addition to his family. The factory council was pleased with shockworker Comrade Makal and passed a resolution stating that he deserved much credit for the good factory results and therefore he would be presented with a pram which he could assemble at home.

"Six weeks later, Mme. Makal was seen carrying a baby in her arms and Comrade Makal seemed to be in rather a bad mood.

"Well, well,' said Comrade Duras, Chairman of the Workers' Committee, — 'where is the pram, Comrade?'

"'Sorry, Comrade Chairman,' replied shockworker Makal, 'but when I try to put the pram together, no matter what I do it always makes a machine gun.'"

## THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA-USSR

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

It has been a favorite device of the American Russophiles to point out the striking similarities in the history and development of both the United States and Russia. This is not surprising for until recent years there has been little clear knowledge of events in the colossus of the north and throughout much of the nineteenth century there were isolated occurrences which nourished this idea of the traditional friendship of the great republic and the great empire.

Even the misconceptions on both sides aided, for as was said in a journal *Russian Empire* which appeared in New York with the support of the imperial government on the very eve of the revolution: "On unreliable evidence Americans still believed in the stories of wild Russian bears and wolves promenading in the best streets of modern cities and of the incredible doings of the still wilder Russian cossacks. As to Russians, America was in their eyes a country where scalp hunters flourished and skyscrapers could be built in three days."

It cannot be denied also that under the Empire it was possible to cite certain similarities which would hold true if one equated the will of the tsar expressed of himself with the decisions of the American people. To name but a few: both the United States and Russia had expanded with lightning speed, the one to the west, the other to the east. Both were countries with a large population that for some years largely did not speak the language of the country. In both lands the railroad system had served rather as an instrument for developing the country than as a medium of transportation to supplement already existing systems between already developed terminals. Finally it was the American pioneers and explorers who made their way toilsomely and dangerously across the entire continent.

These were all superficial generalizations which owed their value, if they had any, to a firm conviction that the tsarist regime was beneficent and civilizing. This point of view was never stressed, as can well be imagined by the representatives of the Russian revolutionary parties or by any of the non-Russian groups that reached the United States prior to World War I and we must add, by those Americans who came under their influence.



The accession to power by the Bolsheviks changed the picture materially. Many of the former liberals who had opposed tsarism now changed their tone very basically. For these people the broad Bolshevik use of something that could be denoted as electoral colleges for the purpose of contradicting the will of the majority seemed to them a principle something like that of the American use of the electoral college in the election of a president and the liberal provisions (on paper) of the Stalinist Constitution were sufficient to convince many of those who wished to believe in the purity of the Bolshevik intentions.

It has remained, however, for the present time when the American people are beginning to understand the real workings of Russian-Bolshevik imperialism for the Russian emigres of all schools of thought to dig up and refurbish the arguments of the tsarist days, even though they pretend to be the last to accept that view of Russian governmental institutions which alone gives them even a dubious significance and meaning. Following the careless statement of Mr. Kennan that Ukraine is the Russian Pennsylvania, these emigres are able to construct an entire picture of the United States and Russia out of their own imagination. They are able to describe the meaning of the American Civil War in Russian terms and they are able to argue themselves into the position that Russian opposition to independence for any of the oppressed nationalities is the same as the American refusal to allow secession in 1861. If they were reasoning logically they would rather find themselves on common ground with those Americans who fondly believed in 1775 that Canada was at that time waiting to join the newly established country and were greatly disappointed when the invading American forces did not meet the expected welcome.

It requires only the most cursory consideration of any of these assumed analogies to see that they utterly lack any foundation except in the efforts of the explorers and the hardships which they had to undergo but these were a necessary and inalienable part of exploring and colonizing anywhere in the world under any known system.

Let us think of the essence of the state building. From the time when Moscow first appeared as an ambitious and growing power, it was under the iron control of the Grand Prince who regarded all the territory which he acquired as his own special possession. From Ivan Kalita through Ivan III, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Catherine II down to the last tsars, the history of Moscow-Russia has been marked by a steady reduction in the rights of fully developed nations coming into federal ties with Moscow. The tsar was above the law and the history of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (be-

tween Ukraine and Moscow 1654) in its Russian interpretation shows that the tsar of Moscow, when he accepted under his beneficent sway another partner like Ukraine liberated by Khmelnytsky was not bound in the slightest degree to make any effort to carry out his terms of the agreement, since he was the law and above all law. The same can be said of his relations with all the other countries which passed within his orbit.

Furthermore, as territory after territory was scooped into the prison of nations, such local institutions as had prevailed were wiped out. The democratic Republic of Novgorod the Great became the first victim (1478). Moscow was entirely centralized. So thoroughly was this true that when the Patriarch of Moscow took over the control of the Church of Kiev, his first act was to demand the removal of the printing presses which the Ukrainian bishops had set up in their own communities, for nothing could be valid which did not have the prior approval of the all-powerful centre. It is only necessary to see how thoroughly this has been done in the formal or informal project of russification to realize that the entire spirit of the Russian Empire as that of the USSR was the creation of as near a dull uniformity as it was able to achieve. Where was the old Siberian government built up by the efforts of the Siberian pioneers? The new cities were well supplied with every form of official imagined by Moscow and blessed with an endless stream of circulars poured out with unceasing speed to arrange for the administration of areas which the directors knew only by official reports.

When we compare with this the American method of development of the West, any similarity falls at once to the ground. As soon as a group of settlers in any area became sufficiently numerous to exercise control over their own governmental affairs, they began of themselves to erect state governments which received but the slightest examination before they were admitted into the union as equal and independent states. It is only necessary to glance at some of the vagaries of these early constitutions drawn up to put an end to the previous lack of an official government to realize that the kernel of the American development in the past proceeded from the community upward and not from the central authority downward. Even to-day there are states in the Union which are officially bilingual because of circumstances in their original settlement just as there are communities in which for various reasons another language than English was almost, if not completely, accepted as the norm of private relations and government.

With the possible exception of Florida, Louisiana, and parts of the southwest, the United States was built up in relatively unsettled regions,

as the Marxian philosophers are never weary of boasting in their efforts to explain away American history. There were few sections with a large and settled Indian population and the only real parallel that may be drawn is between the American handling of the separated and warring tribes and the Russian treatment of the aboriginal peoples of north Siberia.

Elsewhere Russia advanced by taking over by force or by treaties fully established entities that had had a long and cultured history, in many cases far longer than her own, for instance such old nations as Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and others. They were at once subjected to the Russian system and anything in their lives that disagreed with the usages of St. Petersburg and Moscow were oppressed and banished, while the Russian authorities tried to falsify history and rewrite the past as well as mold the present and the future. The only justification for it could be the omniscience of the all-powerful tsar or of the still more omniscient Stalin, but neither of these have any contact with the free institutions and democracy as they are known not only in the United States but in the western world.

A further corollary of this was the fact that within the Russian Empire in each new area that was brought in, the Russian officials came to represent the dominant class. They were superimposed upon the already existing social order, another group to make their living at the expense of the overburdened peasantry. The former leaders were compelled to take a subordinate position and their only hope for maintaining even a shadow of their past rank lay in assimilating themselves to the new order and in accepting Russian view of their past.

Again the American attitude was different. It has been the tradition of a century and a half in the United States that each new wave of immigration has come in to fill the lower posts left vacant by the rising of those who came in a previous wave. It created a great uncertainty in American life. It probably imposed great hardships upon the new immigrants who saw themselves all unprepared, thrown into the maelstrom of American life. It subjected them many times to exploitation but within fifty years each new wave had found its own method of organization, whether through ecclesiastical bodies or fraternal organizations and was meeting the crises in its existence and rising in the social, political and economic scale. In a sense it was a heartless and a wasteful process but he would be rash who would venture to say that this process has not given to the United States a fuller loyalty and a more complete development of the potentialities of the immigrants than the nation has ever received from the more highly cultured propagandists who have been

able to come to America and be received as the most cultured representatives of their people.

It has been this emphasis on the development of democracy from the local unit with its delegated authority to still larger units and so on to the government that has allowed the American system to expand from the Atlantic seaboard to embrace a continent and has tended to increase the national unity. It has been the Russian policy from the rise of Moscow to commence with the centre and decline to consider the needs of any special part of the Empire except in connection with the needs of the centre that produced the impasse in which the last tsar found himself. It was the nemesis of the Russian liberals in the Provisional Government and sooner or later if the trend of democracy is not completely checked, it will be the bane of Communism and of Russia in any form, except as the country of the Great Russians, the land of Moscow. It explains why any upheaval in Russia is and must be attended by a convulsion among the non-Russians, so long as they are not absorbed and the methods of Moscow, while they have been fantastically successful, have throughout the ages shown their failure by the fury of the revolts which they have had to encounter, as they drove people to desperation.

That explains why there could never be in Russia or in the USSR a movement similar to the American Civil War. It was a complicated struggle. On the one hand it involved the right of states which had voted themselves into the Union to secede, even though there were no distinct clauses put in the American Constitution as there are in the present Stalin Constitution of the USSR and it must never be forgotten that in the earlier history of the Republic more than one state at various times had threatened such a move.

Then the question of slavery was involved, a question of human liberty, and of the spreading of certain new ideals in areas that for economic and sentimental reasons did not wish to accept them.

There were southerners who believed in the right to secede and not in slavery; there were northerners who believed in slavery and not in the right to secede. The draft riots and the general disorders in New York during the struggle pointed up the inconsistencies in the positions of both sides, once the hotheads had their way.

How could such a situation occur in Russia past or present? On Russian theories, we might consider Mazepa and the Kozaks advocates of the right to secede and to resume the liberty that they had as an established government at the time when Khmelnytsky made his treaty with Tsar Alexis. But at the same time, it was the same Mazepa and the Kozaks who

were protesting against the newly introduced abuses of the Tsar who had violated the old treaties that of course had no validity in the eyes of a sacrosanct monarch. In other words the revolts against Moscow have been idealistic revolts just as to-day the much condemned bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism is a struggle for human rights and values that are recognized throughout the civilized world except by the Russians of Moscow.

We might have had a parallel to Russian modes of thinking if as Count Leo Tolstoy analyzed the situation the north had seceded from the union in a protest against the forcing of slavery upon it by the south and the central government. It was his idea that it was the Christian dislike for government that influenced the northern abolitionists and fantastic as it was, it showed a keener appreciation of reality than the attempts to equate opposition to the policy of St. Petersburg and Moscow with that of the south, but that carries us into the hypothetical realm without any basis in national psychology or historical fact.

The men who wrote the American Constitution may not have been in all cases paragons of virtue or of wisdom. At every step they were keenly aware of the measures that were necessary if they were going to weld — thirteen colonies bound together in a temporary alliance into a coherent whole. They knew and understood the differences that existed in temperament and in practice between the states, even though they were all fundamentally based upon similar institutions. They found it in the reaction of the citizens to general problems, while in the founding period they left as much as possible to the individual citizen, the individual community and the individual state.

The tsars of Russia and now the Soviet leaders likewise were well aware of their goal, to leave as little responsibility as possible to the individual, the community, and the region, to ignore and to deny the existence of differences in various parts of their broad Empire and to centralize everything in their own hands in their capital city. It was their aim to crush all traces of national or regional differences, to convince the world that here was a homogenous mass of people, because they said so. It was their intention to coerce or to punish until they had reached their goal and they could only do that by expanding, expanding, expanding.

The historian Karamzin, after boasting that Moscow had turned into the Russian Empire without bloodshed and had spread peaceably throughout two thirds of Europe and half of Asia, wrote in his *Letter of a Russian Citizen* a protest to Alexander I against the formation of a separate King-

dom of Poland under the Russian Tsar; "There are no old rights in history". He pointed out that in doing this the tsar was breaking his coronation vows, even though he retained complete control of the new creation. There was the true spirit of the Russian Empire, the craving for uniformity, for centralization, the distrust of the individual unit as well as the individual, which has resulted in annihilation of nationalities trusting in possibility of living in a federation with Great Russia.

It was the reaction to that spirit which produced the Russian revolutionist of the nineteenth century, the men who finally profited by the overthrow of the tsar but they too were Russians. They thought of the universal revolution, the universal application of a changed order, and they could not conceive of the situation where the people of a special land of an absorbed country, of a special class, would desire anything that they did not, would crave a type of freedom that they did not crave.

As Shevchenko remarked in the *Caucasus*, it was the crime of the natives that they had not received their homes from the tsar. What right had any one to have anything without his permission? To Pushkin, "all Slav rivers must flow into the Russian sea or it will dry up". There is the spirit of the non-Russian and the Russian.

We can now understand the similarities and differences between the United States and Russia—USSR. They are like the meeting of two trains passing within sight of one another but going in different directions. Both have organized continents. Both have been faced with similar problems but they have solved them in diametrically opposite ways. The one has started from the foundations, from the individual, the community, and has worked up. The other has started from the dominant power and worked down with steadily sharpening supervision. They can only meet when one side or the other is thoroughly converted. It was possible in 1918 when Russia was reduced to its own territory, while the subjugated peoples were aiming to regain their liberty and renew their lives as they saw fit.

The world did not realize it and allowed the Bolsheviks to unify the country, while they expended their own efforts on maintaining Russian unity on various pretexts. The world needs to beware lest when the Bolsheviks fall, the anti-Bolshevik Russians will bob up as they are now doing with the argument that they must revive the universal, monolithic Russia, prepared to repeat the entire process. To-day when empires built from above are ending, there is no place for a Russian imperialism red or white or any other color. There is abundant room for the cooperation of separate countries emerging from the Russian empire within a great democratic organization of the world.

## HUNGER IN THE USSR IN THE NEXT WAR

By K. KONONENKO

It is very natural that with the growing tension between two worlds, great attention should be paid to everything that concerns the military potential of the two rivals. The tremendous military forces of the USSR naturally claim the first significance. Less attention is paid to the study of those internal forces such as the movement for the liberation of the nations oppressed by the USSR which might weaken its military power in a crisis. Still less attention is paid in the press to the economic situation but from the first days of World War II, the economic system of the USSR showed such defects that even the local war with Finland seriously strained them and it was only American preserved food that rendered possible the defense of Stalingrad.

The Bolsheviks have never failed to boast of the superiority of their economic system over that of the capitalists and they have published far and wide statements that "Our army never suffered from lack of food, nor did the workmen and the officials, for our industry supported our economy" (*Planned Economy*, No. 5., 1949). Any one who had any opportunity for personal observation is well aware that this is false. Any one who has seen in the first few days of the war the bands of mobilized reservists dressed in old military uniforms, begging in the shops or from the civil population for a piece of bread or a bit of tobacco will recognize the inaccuracy of the Soviet publications.

Who has not heard of the cases of desertion and marauding? Even the Bolsheviks in their post-war literature reveal the terrible conditions under which their soldiers were living and it is therefore of the greatest importance to study this as a possible weakness of the USSR.

It is easy to understand that modern warfare with its elaborate technical machinery and its armies of millions of men is quite beyond the resources of any nation, except perhaps the United States. Every nation therefore has to pay attention to three methods of financing it: the use of reserves, foreign loans and the increase in the money secured from the payment of taxes by the still productive portion of the population and by industry.

If in World War II, the United States was the great supplier of money and supplies to the USSR, this will not be true under the present conditions. The USSR will have no external source of supplies for neither the satellite states nor China have the capital and the resources necessary for this task.

We have no data available for estimating the present reserves of the USSR in the matter of food. We can only observe that those which had been acquired during the years before World War II were not sufficient to sustain the Soviet army even during the first months of the war. It could then not store up much in view of the post-war situation, the diminution in the amount of land sown and the great famine of 1946. The Bolsheviks admit themselves that they had reached the pre-war production of agriculture only in 1949 and the number of cattle has not yet reached the level of 1940. As a result it is safe to assume that the Soviets in case of a war in the near future will be compelled to finance it out of that portion of the supplies which have been set apart for popular consumption.

This is true in all countries, and we realize it when the free world is again rearming against the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless their problem has quite a different character from that prevailing in the USSR. In the free world it will take the form of a shortage that will render it impossible to satisfy the desires of the population. In the USSR where it is impossible to satisfy the physical requirements of the population, there will be a reduction below the level that was reached during World War II and this will mean a famine which will affect primarily the peasants as the producers of the agricultural supplies.

People who realize that the USSR is an agricultural country cannot easily understand what changes can be brought about in a country that exports agricultural products, by a war when the number of users remains unchanged. However we need only make one calculation to see how the balance of food will affect the USSR in the next war. According to the reports of the *Derzhplan* the harvest of grains exceeded that of the pre-war level by 4%. The Soviet economic journal *The Planned Economy* (No. 5, 1949) gave an absolute figure for the grain production, seven billion puds or 114,700,000 tons. From this we must deduct 15.6% for seed and the reserve seed stock. Up to 15% for fodder for the kolhosp (kolkhoz) cattle (this figure varies according to the year between 15% and 13%) and not less than 3.5% for the private cattle of the members of the kolhosps (for their cattle do not receive concentrated foods). All this amounts to 34%. There is then left 75,500,000 tons for



the nourishment of the population which is estimated at 203,000,000 or one kilogram a person a day. This is sufficient to insure against the danger of famine but it is necessary to reduce the amount further by deducting the amounts used for the distilling and brewing industries and for various purposes as the making of macaroni, etc., for they require the use of grain. Unfortunately we have no accurate figures on the amount but they certainly require a considerable quantity. Besides this figure not only includes bread grain but also peeled barley, beans and oils. We have to remember that this oil is almost the only kind of fat used by the population of the USSR. Butter is entirely lacking except in Moscow, Leningrad and a few industrial centres. So we have to subtract the amount of oil grains as the basis for the oil industry. We have not taken into account the amount of grain that passes into the export trade for this would vanish in case of war, although we need to be certain that the USSR has not accepted some obligations of this sort toward China. As it is, it reduces the daily supply of the average citizen to 600-650 grams. This would be sufficient if it were used in conjunction with other articles of diet but in the USSR bread and barley products are the chief foods of the population. The consumption of meat in the USSR is only about 6 grams a day per person. The city population receives through the government stores a wretched amount of potatoes and garden vegetables. As a result the consumption of bread is several times larger than in the Western world. In 1926 the average use of bread by the village population was about 1000 grams without taking into account the fact that potatoes were more widely used then than now. Vegetables were used three times more, oils 7 times more and meat 6 times more than now.<sup>1</sup>

This makes it clear that, although the USSR has more than once proclaimed that the grain problem has been solved, there remains even in peace times a severe shortage of bread. This explains the continued existence of a black market in it. The Soviets balance the insufficiency of the grain supply by the establishment of various categories of diet. The first of these are for the 15-20 million slave prisoners who are fed in proportion to their completion of their labor norms and whose food can drop to 716 calories daily i. e. below the norm of a dog which is 1184 calories. Then there are the members of the kolhosps, the producers of grain and also the urban population who do not receive sufficient food through the public service and are compelled to buy in stores from their own funds but their use of bread is in fact limited by a planned system of

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<sup>1</sup> See *Budget of the Narkomzem of the UkSSR, 1928, Budgets of the Kolhospniks*, Kiev, 1937.

distribution. From time to time the Bolsheviks make further limitations. Thus in the period from 1932 to 1935 they allowed to a non-worker only 200 grams and to a worker from 400 to 800 grams daily depending upon his service rank. During the war with Finland, each family regardless of its size received 2 kilograms a day.

Let us return now to the peasantry for there in the highest degree and in the first place in time of war will be the hunger. This will be caused by the system which already exists. The economic position of the peasantry under the kolhosps (kolkhoz) system is entirely different from anything that we have hitherto known in history. When we remember that a member of the kolhosps does not own his own instruments of production and merely uses those furnished by the government we must compare his position to that of the proletariat. But he is not one, for he does not depend upon the conditions of labor set by an employer. That rests upon compulsion on the basis of the ownership by the employer of the means of production and he sets the norms from his laboring energy. The state establishes by law the norms for the kolhosps without giving the member any chance to refuse (Law of March 17, 1933 and subsequent laws). The returns to the peasant are commensurate neither with the amount of energy expended or the value of the product.

There have been hitherto in the agriculture the following methods of pay for work: either the full support of the slave or the granting to him of a certain amount of land sufficient to provide for his personal needs as in the time of serfdom. There was also the granting of a part of the crop or a payment for that part either in money or in money and crop for a definite period of work. *The present payment system in the kolhosps of the USSR does not correspond in any way to any of these for it rests upon the system of payment for labor days.*

In the beginning the labor day had its equivalent in working time. By a law confirmed February 17, 1946, a labor day is defined as follows: "For each work there is assigned at the general meetings of the members of the kolhosp norms of work actually valid for every member with the inclusion of calculations of the conditions of the cattle, the machines and the soil." This meant that the normal work of the average peasant was accepted as a labor day. However these units were determined and varied with it according to importance or the quality of the work. Thus a machinist on a complicated machine was given credit for two labor days, if he only worked one; a girl who worked in bringing in the harvest

received only 0.5 of a day. The labor day now has no relation to the time spent in labor.<sup>2</sup>

A labor day now represents the performance of a specified amount of work without regard to the time spent in its completion.


The Soviet economist Haponenko defines a labor day as follows: — "A labor day is a measure of the expenditure of time of the members of the kolhosps in public work and at the same time a unit of the part of the member in the receipt of that part of the income of the kolhosp which is being divided for private use."<sup>3</sup> Thus it is not a unit of time. The total number of working days is the unit by which the total amount of products divided among the members is apportioned and the amount of products has no relation to the number of days used in producing them. The products may be lacking and then the amount of labor expended upon them will not be paid. A change in the conditions defining a working day will have the effect of artificially raising or lowering the general payment for a labor day. Besides the arbitrary assignment of the amount of work forming a labor day makes it possible to increase without limit the amount of work required to reach the prescribed norm of 120 labor days a year. As we shall see further, this makes it possible to reduce the actual payment for work done to a minimum. This will be set during the war by the Bolsheviks and will reduce the peasants to famine. At the same time the Bolsheviks can maintain the same or almost the same pay for a working day. They are now preparing for this. Before the last war there was issued an order setting the norm of work not on the norm of the average peasant but on that of the Stakhanovist. Now even more significance is given to this. The Central Committee of the VKP(b) in February, 1947 pointed out the equalization in the kolhosps and the low, antiquated forms which led to a loss of working days. So it was ordered that there should be a raising of the norms of the working days with the consequent reduction of the amount which each member of a kolhosp received. The raising of the norms of work was again to be based upon the work of the Stakhanovists. H. Talov, criticizing in 1949 the book of Salnikov, *Planning in the Kolkhozs*, wrote: "Bolshevik planning in every field of work must be made in advance and must rest upon previous experience and thus mobilize the workers in that branch to utilize this former experience.

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<sup>2</sup> *Report of the Narkomzem of the USSR*, May 28, 1933.

<sup>3</sup> "The organization of work in the kolhosps," *Planned Economy*, September-October, 1949.

To illustrate the meaning of this instruction to base the norms of work on previous experience, we introduce a graph of the working day of Malev, a Stakhanovist combine operator.<sup>4</sup>



Graph of the work of the Stakhanovist Malev on the combine Stalinets, Aug. 13, 1936.

In this diagram each square represents 15 quarters. The filled squares represent an hour spent in this or that category of work. As we see Malev began to work at 5 o'clock and stopped at 23 o'clock, i. e. a working day of 18 hours without a pause for rest or food. Thus in one or another artificial way are set the limits and the norms are constantly raised. They have been carried now to such a height that the average member of a kolhosp must spend 15-16 hours to fulfil the norm and keep his work on the level of one labor day.

To give another example; in 1948 there was established the norm for planting potatoes behind a plough, 1.2 hectares with a count of 1.25 labor days. This means that a woman during the official 10 hour day had to walk 25 kilometres, carry at that time 1.8 tons of potatoes in the field and even pick up 3 potatoes at a time, bend and straighten up not less than 15,000-16,000 times. It is obvious that this will take the average woman on a kolhosp far more than the official 10 hours. But if the harvest is not as planned, for every percent less there will be deducted from her pay a similar percentage of labor days (Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, April 19, 1948). Besides this, according to the same decree, the kolhosp must at the beginning of every year form a plan for the use of work for every crop. If later as a result of actual conditions (and this can easily happen in agriculture) the plan is broken, the number of excess working days will be deducted.

<sup>4</sup> Tikhomirov, *Norms of Work in the MTS and the Kolkhozs*, Moscow, 1938.

We think that this will show how little possibility the Soviets will have for reducing marginal work in agriculture and for a supplementary expropriation of the work which they can apply at the outbreak of war, since they are prepared for it and on which they will rely during it. There is no more possibility of reducing the part of the production distributed for the labor days. As is known by the law of August 2, 1933, the kolhosp had the right to divide among their members only that part of the production which was left after the satisfaction of all grain deliveries — to the state, the machine tractor stations, forrage and other funds. When all of these were calculated in absolute amounts, the pay was proportioned on the balance and it could be reduced to zero, if the harvest failed or did not surpass the obligations laid by the kolhosp (all grain remains in the stores of the kolhosps after the settlement of the above mentioned obligations and the establishment of the specified funds shall be fully divided among the members in proportion to the number of labor days).

A resolution of April, 1950 again changed this to make the deliveries dependent upon the amount of arable land at the disposal of the kolhosp. By this means in case of a lack of sowing or a poor crop, the burden will lay entirely upon the kolhosp which is compelled to satisfy the same requirements to the government as if all had gone well. However with a bumper crop the part allotted to the members might increase. To prevent this there was added in 1948 a new obligation of "sale to the state and a tax as grain delivery" "after the fulfillment of state obligations, the payment of machine tractor stations, the establishment of all funds and also funds of sale to the state and cooperatives, on the kolhosp market, all the other products are left to the kolhosp for distribution according to the number of labor days."

Thus we see that the state has a completely free hand as to the amount that is to be given to the members of the kolhosps. By the amount of grain which the kolhosp must sell to the state above the grain delivery, the state can reduce the actual pay to the members to any amount which it wishes. Thus the state has prepared for war by transferring the entire burden to the peasant at the cost of hunger and that hunger is inevitable.

Before the war this was the average receipt of a Ukrainian member of a kolhosp in products according to the proportion of labor days per day:<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *The Kolhosps of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*, State Printing House of kolhosp and radhosp literature, Kiev-Kharkiv, 1940.

From grain, bean and oil crops in kind .....	660 grams
Potatoes .....	190 grams
Garden crops and food beets .....	16 grams
Meat and fat including group meals .....	2 grams
Milk and eggs .....	—
Fruits .....	0.5 grams

As we see, here was a peasant even before World War II, living on a diet that no one, much less a hard working person, can exist upon. This is a diet of 2045 calories a day, if we count the grain in the meal oil and barley. Actually the great mass of the members of the kolhosp received less for this average included the tractor drivers who receive a fixed norm of a kilogram of grain a labor day and the administration of the kolhosps whose labor days are not counted by the usual norm but by a special formula which gives them two and half times more than the average member.

A certain amount of other foods as vegetables the member of the kolhosp could secure from his own garden plot but as is known, by the law of July 28, 1939, these plots were reduced to 0.25 hectare and now with the increased size of the kolhosps they have been still further reduced.

From the first days of the war there will come a further reduction of the proportion of the products that are distributed to the peasantry. This is because in the first place the twenty millions of peasants who will be taken into the army will receive 2 or 3 times more grain, barley, and oil than they received in the kolhosps. This will be taken out of the part allotted for the labor days and this will mean that the peasants who still work the land will receive at least 20% less than they do now.

It will not stop there. In the first year of the war, there will be a great reduction in the amount of land sown and this will be true not only of the areas in the theatre of military operations but throughout the entire USSR. This will not be merely because of the mobilization of millions of peasants but especially because hundreds of thousands of tractor drivers will be taken for the mechanical services of the army.

Under the present system of land use in the USSR this will mean the complete ruination of the rural economy. According to the calculations of Benediktov (*Bolshevik*, No. 5, 1951) tractors will plough 95% of the ploughed land, sow 80% and only harvest 58% with combines. He expressly states that the productivity of the tractor depends principally upon the qualifications of the tractor driver. The reduction in the number of trained drivers or their replacement by less well prepared persons will react upon the amount of repairs necessary and upon their productivity.

This will lead to a great reduction in the amount of land sown. Another factor will be the shortage of oil for the tractors. As is known the USSR receives from all its territories, satellites included, only 44.7 million tons of petroleum a year which is completely used. For the work of the tractors in the fields, without including harvesting by combines, the station work in grinding, etc., there is used 5.6 million tons yearly. It is obvious that the increased demands of the army will at once be reflected in the lowering of the supply for the tractors and this in turn will lead to a reduction in the sown area.

Every reduction in the amount of land sown will be taken out of the portion assigned to the division for labor days. As we have seen, the demands for delivery are based upon the amount of arable land possessed and not on the amount of land actually sown. This is not a tax on production but a land rent of a type that was common in feudalism. The amount of the grain deliveries required will remain unchanged. Of course there may be a reduction in the payments to the Machine Tractor Stations or of the contribution to the seed fund but the government will have the right to demand this amount for the fund for sale to the state.

Thus the portion assigned to the members of the kolhosps will be again reduced but this can only mean famine.

This situation which intimately concerns the internal situation in the USSR cannot be changed. Famine in the village can serve not only to destroy the morale of the army but can easily become a rebellious force in the population and lead to mass uprisings.

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#### NOT FAR ENOUGH

A Soviet judge had just sentenced a peasant to ten years in a concentration camp in the Far North and asked the prisoner if he had anything to say.

"Yes," the man answered, "Is that place also under Soviet rule?"

"Oh, of course," the judge readily replied.

"Well then, if it isn't too much trouble, please send me a little farther away."

## HOW THE SOVIETS WRECKED ARMENIA'S INDEPENDENCE

by JAMES G. MANDALIAN

The editors of the *Ukrainian Quarterly* are very glad to print this article by the editor of the *Armenian Review*, Mr. James G. Mandalian, on the position of the Armenian people under the Soviets. We earnestly desire that the Armenian people, creator of old Christian culture, may be liberated from the domination of Moscow and secure again that national independence to which they aspire.

The settlement of Armenian merchants in Ukraine as a friendly minority group had its beginning from the 14th century and we are glad to do our part in making the cause of our good neighbors known and understood in the Western democratic world.

We are fully aware that there are serious differences between the peoples threatened or oppressed by Soviet imperialism. One of these is the relation between the Armenians and the Turks who have shown themselves for about three centuries the friends of the Ukrainians. We are convinced, however, that in a free world these local misunderstandings can be solved in a spirit of international justice, self-determination and the brotherhood of nations.

When on March 15, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne of the Tsars the event marked something far more consequential than the mere termination of a dynasty. It marked the beginning of a great imperial disintegration. Within the brief space of 14 months a host of subjugated nationalities of the Russian Empire seized the opportunity created by the interim of Alexander Kerensky's Provisional Government and the ensuing Bolshevik Revolution to declare their independence. These included the new Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the Ukrainians and the Byelo-Russians and the Caucasian peoples of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia declared her independence on May 28, 1918.

Practically all these nations once upon a time had been independent. They were not Russians but they had been incorporated in the Russian *body politic* by conquest. Some of them traced their origin to remote antiquity, antedating the Russians by one or two milleniums. Each of them was a distinct ethnic group, with its unique language, history and culture. Some of them were related to the Russians by racial kinship,



while others, such as the Armenians, the Georgians and the Azerbaijanians, were wholly unrelated. They all possessed all the requisites and the qualifications which go into the making of a nation and were entitled to all the rights and privileges of a nation. They all had a right to be independent. Their secession from Russia in the hour of opportunity, therefore, was not an act of desertion, or treason, but an assertion of their natural rights.

How the Armenians, one of the oldest and noblest nations of history, with a rich historical and cultural background, after six centuries of slavery to the foreigner, came to recover their independence is an entirely different story, clearly beyond the limitations of this essay. How they happened to lose that recovered independence within the brief period of two-and-a-half years is, however, highly important, because the manner of that overthrow, the factors which contributed to it, and the authors of Armenia's execution, constitute the gist of the Armenian Question.

#### THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

The Armenian Question has best been summarized by a policy slogan of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation — the nationalist-democratic Armenian patriotic organization which was chiefly instrumental in the creation of the Independent Republic of Armenia in 1918. This slogan calls for *a completely free, united, and independent Armenia*. For an adequate understanding of the Armenian problem it is necessary to bear in mind that, after the advent of the Ottoman Turks in the Fourteenth Century, historic Armenia was partitioned among three major powers: The Turks, the Persians, and the Russians. With the steady conquest of the Caucasus by the Russians in the 18th and 19th centuries, Persia eventually was crowded out and Armenia proper was partitioned between Turkey and Russia, the former being known as Turkish Armenia, and the latter, Russian Armenia.

The Federation's ideal of a free, united and independent Armenia came to a successful consummation with the signing of the Treaty of Sevres on March 10, 1920, by Turkey, Armenia, and the belligerent Powers. The Turks recognized the independence of Armenia and agreed to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States the determination of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia in the disputed provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. On November 22, 1920, President Wilson rendered his verdict, assigning to the Independent Republic of Armenia a territory approximating 40,000 square

miles including Russian Armenia and the above mentioned provinces of Turkish Armenia.

The Treaty of Sevres, however, was never destined to be carried out. A new Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, which refused to recognize the central government in Constantinople and eventually took over the power, took a firm stand against the dismemberment of Turkey, refused to recognize the Treaty of Sevres, and openly defied the League of Nations.

Meanwhile the victorious powers began to show signs of war weariness, their wartime solidarity had long since disappeared, and they were torn apart by mutual jealousies and conflicts of interest. The Italians and the French had ambitions in Asia Minor, the British threw their weight on the side of the Greeks in their adventure in Asia Minor but later refused to go the limit and betrayed the Greek army, culminating in the debacle of Smyrna. The United States played a lone hand in trying to assist the Armenians but the United States Senate rejected President Wilson's proposal for an American mandate over Armenia. The League of Nations passed laudable and high-sounding resolutions in behalf of Armenia but was unable to enforce them because of the lack of an effective enforcement agency.

It was under these gloomy circumstances that in the fall of 1920 Turkey, with the connivance and the active support of the Soviet Government, attacked Armenia. The tiny Republic, abandoned by her wartime Allies, was no match for the combined Turco-Soviet armies, and after a valiant but futile resistance, was compelled to capitulate.

The Treaty of Alexandropol, signed on December 2, 1920, between Turkey and Armenia, reduced the Armenian territories from the Wilsonian boundary of 40,000 square miles to a puny 12,000 square miles. Yet, even before this treaty, the Soviet already had sold out Armenia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed with Germany on March 3, 1918, which was later confirmed by the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, and still later by the Treaty of Kars signed with the Turks on October 13 of the same year. The final chapter of this painful deal was written by the Treaty of Lausanne signed between the Allies and Turkey on July 24, 1923, which scrapped the Sevres Treaty and left the Armenians stranded. With the signing of the Lausanne Treaty the case of Armenia was closed.

#### THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE ARMENIAN REPUBLIC

When in the spring of 1917 the Provisional Government took charge of Russia the remnants of Turkish Armenia were enjoying a brief breath-

ing spell. The Turkish deportations of 1915 had worked havoc among the Armenians. From a total native population of approximately two-and-a-half million, over one million had perished by the sword, the epidemic, and starvation, while the remainder had been forced to seek refuge in friendly neighboring countries. In the easternmost provinces there was a huge army of refugees which had been rescued by the providential arrival of the Russian armies which at the time occupied the Turkish Armenian provinces.

At the time the idea of independence was far from Armenian minds. During the preceding two years the Armenians had been fighting for their very survival and they were in desperate need of protection. The presence of the Russian armies, therefore, was imperative to their safety until the peace and the final settlement of the status of the Armenian people. In view of these considerations, on April 26, 1917, the Provisional Government decreed that, "until the final settlement of the fate of the Turkish Armenian provinces, the conquered territories would enjoy an autonomous status, independent of the regional Caucasian Government, and directly subjected to the central Government in Petrograd." The Russian Bolsheviks vehemently opposed this measure. Having for their slogan "No indemnities, no annexations," they criticized Kerensky's Government for ulterior, imperialistic motives. "Withdraw the Russian armies from Armenia," they clamored, "or else you will be no different than the Tsarist Government."

"We must first satisfy the Ukrainians and the Finns," Lenin wrote, "and insure for them and all the alien races of Russia absolute freedom, not even excepting their right to secede. And we must do the same in regard to the whole of Armenia. We must withdraw our troops from Armenia and the occupied Turkish territories."

The Armenians themselves begged the Russians not to desert them and leave them at the mercy of the Turks. But Lenin was obdurate. It is obvious therefore that Lenin's primary motive was neither the preservation of the Armenian people nor their independence. For the sake of the world revolution he was ready to leave the Armenians without any protection.

When the Bolsheviks took over the power they lost no time in evacuating the occupied territories, and the defense of the vast eastern front from Van to Erzinga was left to the hastily-formed Armenian divisions and volunteer units who faced a revamped and freshly reinforced Turkish army. The Armenians were unable to defend the long front, and

within a few months the forces of Vehib Pasha reoccupied the whole of Turkish Armenia, spreading fire and destruction in their wake.

#### THE TURCO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP PACT

In evacuating the Turkish Armenian provinces without regard to the peril of the Armenian people Lenin and his associates had a special motive. One of the major aims of the early Bolsheviki in combatting the so-called Western Imperialists—an appellation to which they have tenaciously clung to this day—was winning the support of the Moslem nations, for the vast Moslem world, if rallied to the banners of the world revolution, could be an effective force in breaking the back of Western Imperialism. In this respect, Turkey which was the seat of the Caliphate, offered a special attraction to the Bolsheviki leaders in their design of winning the sympathy and the cooperation of the entire Moslem world. They knew that the presence of the Russian armies in the Turkish provinces naturally would be resented by the Turks whom the Bolsheviki intended to use as a lever in the execution of their Pan-Islamic plan.

It was no wonder, therefore, that the very next day after Turkey's defeat the Soviet established friendly relations with the Ittihadist leaders Enver and Talaat, Djemal Pasha, Dr. Nazim, Bahaeddin Shakir, Bedry Bey, Djemal Azmi, Dr. Faud, Kutchuk Talaat, Khalil Pasha, Djavid Bey and others—all enemies of the Armenian people who had been condemned by the Allies. The Soviets gave them sanctuary in Moscow and wide opportunity to develop ardent activity, to issue Pan-Islamic manifestoes and to promote revolutionary conspiracies in the Transcaucasian countries, Afghanistan and Caucasus.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Caucasus became the center of Turkish activity. It was here that Nouri Pasha with Soviet funds and equipment organized his Islamic Army which later featured in the massacre of the Armenians in Baku in September, 1918. It was also here that Khalil Pasha organized his Turkish army which later joined the forces of Mustafa Kemal to give the death blow to the Armenian Republic. There is a voluminous amount of literature on the subject of Turco-Soviet collaboration by Bolsheviki, Turkish and neutral sources, but the most authentic and devastating of them all were the confessions of the Ittihadist leaders which were brought to light in the famous Ankara trials of 1926.

### THE ARMENIAN BOLSHEVIKS

After the October Revolution the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities created an adjunct called The Armenian Division which was headed by a notorious Armenian Bolshevik by the name of Avanesov. This was the first official recognition of the Armenian Bolsheviks by Moscow and paved the way for the Communist infiltration into Armenia. By 1919 Communist cells in Armenia had attained to such strength that, although not a serious menace, they presented quite a problem to the Government with their underground subversive activities. In the summer of 1919 the Communist Transcaucasian Regional Committee held a conference in Erivan, the capital of Armenia, attended by responsible comrades from all the regions. This formulated a basic policy of action for Armenia and created a central executive body called The Committee of Armenia, The Armenkom. The motto of this conference was: "The establishment of a Soviet Republic in Armenia."

The Armenkom maintained contact with Moscow through the Transcaucasian Regional Committee which supplied funds, literature, instructions and field workers to Armenia. Meanwhile the Armenian Bolsheviks impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russian Army in order to raise the banner of rebellion against the Government of the Republic.

Insurrectionary uprisings occurred in several regions in the beginning of May, 1920, culminating in a manifesto issued by the Revolutionary Committee of Alexandropol declaring Armenia a Soviet state. The Government of the Republic had long since been aware of these Communist machinations but in view of its eagerness to avoid a civil war, and considering the pitiful numbers and the unpopularity of the Communists in Armenia, it had followed a policy of moderation, hoping to avoid needless bloodshed. The open revolt left the Government no other alternative but to snuff the movement in the bud.

Meanwhile, the Government of the Republic, eager to improve its relations with the Soviets, on May 20, 1920, sent a delegation to Moscow headed by the noted Armenian educator Levon Chanth to negotiate a friendship pact. Chicherin and Karakhan at first were inclined to sign such a pact with Armenia when a second delegation of Armenian and Turkish Bolsheviks prevailed upon them to remove the negotiations to Erivan. Accordingly, the Moscow Government sent a new delegation to Erivan headed by Legran the plenipotentiary, to resolve the entire Armeno-Turkish controversy.

Legran took his time about arriving in Armenia, thus provided ample time for the Turkish and Soviet armies to prepare their contemplated attack on Armenia. With his Islamic Army which had been equipped by the Soviets, Khalil Pasha started for Turkey to join the forces of Mustafa Kemal. Meanwhile divisions of the Russian 11th Army marched on Armenia from the north and by August of 1920 Russian troops were in possession of the Armenian region of Zangezour. Desirous of putting an end to the useless bloodshed, the Armenian Government appealed for the mediation of Moscow, and on August 10, in Tiflis, a temporary peace agreement was signed between Legran and the representatives of the Armenian Government whereby the Armenian-populated regions of Zangezour, Karabagh, and Nakhitchevan were ceded to Azerbaijan.

#### THE ARMENO—TURKISH WAR

When on October 11 Legran finally arrived in Erivan Armenia already was at war with Turkey. Obviously he did not come to Armenia in order to help the Armenians. He had deliberately procrastinated to enable the Turks to attack and defeat Armenia in order to pave the way for the Soviet intervention which would be tantamount to Armenia's sovietization. And that is precisely what happened.

The Armeno-Turkish war was of short duration. The army of the tiny Republic was no match for the combined Turko-Soviet armies. Armenia had been deserted by all, her Allies gave her no aid, Georgia being friendly to Kemalist Turkey remained neutral, the Azerbaijanians were openly hostile to Armenia, and so were the Soviets which helped the Turk in every way possible. By the end of November the Turkish army was at the gates of Erivan and Kiazim Karabekir was threatening to occupy the city unless the Republic accepted his harsh terms.

Thus the Republic of Armenia, betrayed by her Allies, deserted by the whole world, and defeated in a hopeless war, was caught between two fires. On the one hand was the Turk with his ultimatum, on the other hand was the Soviet with her ultimatum. Finally, in desperation, the Government of the Republic appealed to Legran. The latter, who had done his utmost to bring about this catastrophe, now took full advantage of his opportunity. On December 2, 1920, an agreement was signed between the Soviets and the Government of the Republic whereby Armenia was turned over to the Soviets.

The Soviets had been pacified, but there still remained the Turk who was well advised of what was going on in Erivan and was bent on enforcing the harsh terms of his ultimatum. If these were not met, he

threatened to march on Erivan. The Government of the Republic realized the fearful consequences of such a contingency which would mean fresh massacres and the possible extermination of the remainder of the Armenian people. To prevent the catastrophe, the Government finally authorized its delegation which for several days had been negotiating with the Turks in Alexandropol to accept the Turkish demands.

On the same night (December 2, 1920) was signed the Treaty of Alexandropol between Turkey and the outgoing Government of the Independent Republic. By this Armenia was forced to renounce the Sevres Treaty, to declare the Armenian regions of Sharour and Nakhitchevan under Turkish protectorate, and in addition to surrender to the Turk the Russian Armenian regions of Kars and Ardahan.

#### WHAT THE SOVIET HAS COST THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE

This record of the Soviet dealings with the Armenian people proves the following incontrovertable facts insofar as they effect the fate of Armenia since the emergence of the Bolsheviks.

1.—That the Soviet pose as the champion of small oppressed peoples in their struggle for independence is false, insincere, and a consummate fraud. This was demonstrated in 1917 when the Soviet withdrew the Russian armies from the occupied Turkish Armenian provinces, at a time when the Armenian people were in certain danger of extermination, and yet returned these armies in 1920 to overwhelm the Independent Republic with her at that time Turkish Ally.

2.—The Soviet was willing to sacrifice the entire Armenian people for the sake of the world revolution and the so-called Cause of the Workingmen.

3.—When at the end of World War I the Turk was prostrate, the Soviet bolstered him up, assisted in his recovery militarily and diplomatically, enabled him to crush Armenia, and at Lausanne helped him scrap the Sevres Treaty, stripping Armenia clean of what she had won in the war at a colossal sacrifice.

4.—By supporting the Turk, by connivance, and by force of her own arms, the Soviet despoiled Armenia of her natural territories of Kars, Ardahan, Akhalkalak, Nakhitchevan, Surmalu and Zangezour, thus reducing the Wilsonian Armenia of 40,000 square miles to the pitiful 12,000 square miles of present day Soviet Armenia.

5.—Through infiltration, conspiracy, sabotage, intrigue, deceit and armed force, she undermined the democratic morale of the Armenian

people and their army and eventually brought about the downfall of the Independent Republic.

6.—Finally, the Soviet brought to Armenia the worst evil which could befall any people—Soviet slavery. Like all enslaved peoples within the Iron Curtain, for the past 31 years the people of Armenia have been groaning under the worst tyranny the world has ever seen. They tasted the dregs of the disastrous collectivization of the farmer and the artificial famine of the Twenties. They went through the horrors of the repeated purges of the Thirties. They saw the product of the labor of their hands shipped elsewhere while they lived undernourished, underclad, and under-sheltered. For 31 years they have been trembling under the dread Cheka and NKVD. Their moral fabric, their self-respect, their human dignity, their faith in mankind and their spiritual fortitude has been shattered by the abominable system of universal espionage. Their church has been destroyed, their clergy exterminated, their civil rights abrogated, and their sense of dignity debased. The people of Soviet Armenia are not the masters of their souls. They see no hope, no ray of light, no source of inspiration. The people of Armenia are in need of liberation.

Patriotic Armenians everywhere in the world regard the Soviet ideology as a foreign importation which was imposed on the people of Armenia against their wishes and will. They regard the Soviet regime as a tyranny which was forcibly enforced on Armenia. They look upon the Soviet as the chief obstacle on the path of Armenia's liberation. They regard the Soviet as a world evil, a destroyer of human freedom, and a menace to world peace.

To them the Case of Armenia is still unfinished and unsolved. The Armenian dream of centuries for a free, united and independent homeland is in as much need of realization today as it was in May, 1920. They see no way of realizing this dream unless the Soviet regime is destroyed and freedom with justice to all peoples of the world will be reassured.

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#### COMMUNIST "HOUSE OF CULTURE"

For misusing the "House of Culture" the local Council of Dombovar in Hungary was severely censured by Budapest radio on 5th September (1951). It had permitted the village crier to announce that the compulsory inoculation of dogs against rabies would take place in the House of Culture. Worse still, the Council had accounted for this curious procedure by explaining that the House of Culture was empty anyway.



## FROM BOLSHEVIK STALIN TO MENSHEVIK DALLIN

By Prof. ROMAN SMAL-STOCKY

(Remarks on "The New Soviet Empire", by David J. Dallin).

*The New Soviet Empire*, the latest book by David J. Dallin, is heralded in the publisher's blurb as the work of a "leading world authority" and "one of the most far-sighted historians." Further, we read the claim that Dallin "predicted" everything in the United States and now that he has discovered the "Soviet Empire." This last, we feel, is something short of sensational, inasmuch as the fact that Russian communism is Russian imperialism was recognized and described by Dallin's non-Russian Socialist comrades as early as 1922-23. Hence it is unfortunate that despite the fine writing in such chapters as "The Growth of the Soviet Empire," "Power and Prestige," "How Cold Wars End" and "The Six Wars of the Soviet Union," they contribute nothing that is new to present-day discussion of the Soviet state and power.

What is new about Dallin, however, is revealed by such chapters, as "The Hundred Nations in the USSR," and "Nationalism Old and New." This distinguished Russian politician, representing Russian Menshevism, has at last discovered the nationality problem in the USSR. In his other book, *The Real Soviet Russia*, he was completely oblivious to this Achilles' heel of the USSR.

In point of fact, Dallin has been always unaware of this signal feature of the Soviet colossus. From 1922 to 1939 he did not mention—much less predict—the rise of the many Titos of the non-Russian republics of the USSR nor the centrifugal movements of the non-Russian peoples, a phenomenon which was and is still the most feared by Russian imperialism.

Against this background, his discovery of the nationality problem must have been very much like a bombshell. More, it must have been a searing revelation so devastating in its effect as to disrupt thoroughly the disciplines and standards of Dallin the historian.

For we are treated to an incredible exhibition of mistakes, distortions and misrepresentations on page after page, the whole weighted down by

an obscure, well-nigh incomprehensible terminology. The special chapter devoted to the nationality problem is nothing so much as a desperate but losing attempt to face something one dreads, an attempt which, inevitably, ends in utter fiasco.

In a kind of Menshevik upside-down language, as if designed to promote confusion rather than understanding, Dallin broaches the information that "two hundred languages are spoken in the Soviet Union," only progressively to reduce the peoples speaking such to "sixty ethnic groups," then "51 nationalities with their own statehood" and, finally—stopping just short of erasing the entire problem—"seventeen larger minorities."

Through a series of semantic slips and slides Dallin finds himself transforming the national majorities of the non-Russian territories into national "minorities," for he at basis can not admit that the Great Russians, despite their falsifications of the census announced themselves a minority of 43% per cent of the whole population of the USSR.\*

Dallin's collapse as a responsible historian is so complete that we cannot but limit ourselves here to the chief mistakes committed, mistakes of so gross a character as will undoubtedly make many a reader inclined to believe that either Dallin, as a historian does not know the facts or he is so much the Russian imperialist and champion of Russian colonialism as to consciously falsify his material.

It is not true that "Old Russia ignored the (nationality) problem" (p. 86). For long decades Russia had pursued a program of complete Russification of all the non-Russian nationalities with a systematic persecution of their languages and literatures. It is not true, furthermore, that "before the Soviet revolution only Finland and Poland had tried to separate themselves from Russia" (p. 86); the true fact is that Ukraine from the very beginning of World War I exerted efforts, through the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," to separate herself from Russia. Thousands of Ukrainians, both those under Russian domination and those from Austria-Hungary, joined the Ukrainian legions which fought against the Russians in the armies of the Central Powers. The same might be said about the Lithuanians, Georgians and some Moslems of old Russia. Dallin's statement that the Ukrainian National Council "did not declare definite separation of the Ukraine from Russia until after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed in March 1918" (p. 87) is wholly false. The independence of Ukraine was proclaimed by the Fourth *Universal* on

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\* G. M. Chekalin, *The National Question in the Soviet Union*, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1941, (Communist booklet!).

January 22, 1918, while the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Ukraine and the Central Powers was signed on February 9, 1918. He does not mention the great revolt in Turkestan which took place before 1917.

Furthermore, it is not true that "the Soviet system of government in effect since the early twenties was a system of political oppression but not the oppression of national minorities." The actual fact is that in the case of Ukraine, the Russian Communists embarked immediately upon a Russification of the country by developing and adopting the "theory of two cultures." It was only because of the unanimity of the nationality opposition to Russification that the non-Russian peoples gained a breathing spell in the years 1924-1928. It is not true that "the discontent among national groups... was directed against communism... not against Russian occupation" (p. 88). In Ukraine there were several political trials of Ukrainian patriots, notably one held in Kharkiv in March-April 1930, in which several prominent Ukrainian leaders and members of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" were accused of attempting to sever Ukraine from the Soviet Union and organizing a free and independent democratic republic. Similar anti-Russian and anti-communist organizations were uncovered in other non-Russian republics of the USSR.

For Dallin the "intense Russian nationalism" in the USSR started only as a "result of the second World War" (p. 89), but the fact is that Moscow in the name of Russian imperialism has been conducting a virtual pogrom of all the non-Russian nationalities since the years 1928-1930.

Now comes some writing by Dallin, the effect of which, were it planned, would compel acknowledgment as a triumph in ingenuity. The keynote is struck at once in the title of the chapter: "The German Solution of the Problem." In this he characterizes a solution on the principle of self-determination as embodied in the American Declaration of Independence, as a "German" invention. The reader is told that this solution is not only "German," but "Hitlerite" at that! Taras Shevchenko, the foremost poet of Ukraine, who in the dark age of the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) called on the Ukrainians to wait for a Ukrainian George Washington, with a "new and just law," could not have anticipated that in 1951 a Russian "democrat" on the free soil of George Washington would indirectly condemn him as a partisan of "German" and "Hitlerite" ideas... But at this stage of his analysis Dallin apparently has recovered from his blinding discovery: the peoples and nationalities have disappeared and once more, only powers swim across his ken. Thus "the separation

of Poland and the whole Ukraine from Russia" during World War I was an "Austrian plan"!. .

During World War I the various nationalities promptly organized their revolutionary centers and their national armies and tried to fight for freedom and independence. Thus it was not Germany who "desired" to separate Finland from Russia, but the Finnish youth, fighting in the Finnish batallions alongside Germany, who tried to establish the free republic of the Finnish people. The same may be said of the Ukrainians who fought in the Ukrainian legions alongside the Austrians, Lithuanians, Caucasians and the Polish legions under the socialist Josef Pilsudski. The nationalities had a common political program: the destruction of the Russian prison of nations and the establishment of national republics on the basis of national self-determination. How can such a program of the oppressed peoples, based upon Wilson's principles, conceivably be called "German"?

Dallin further speculates on the fear entertained by the Western nations with respect to what would have happened if Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey had won the war in 1918, yet says nothing about the fact that his socialist and Menshevik friends paved the way for the establishment of the tyrannical power in Moscow.

We must draw attention to Dallin's new semantic Menshevik trick here. The term, "Soviet Union," is suddenly replaced by "Russia," although Russia was then only one of the 16 national republics of the Soviet Union. Even these republics have specific if formal guarantees by the Soviet constitution to secede at any time from the USSR. How can Dallin term this constitutional right a sinister "German plan" of dismemberment? Is not the Soviet Union a "voluntary union of equal Soviet Socialist Republics"? As a matter of fact, the "dismemberment" of the Soviet Union is incorporated as a program in the Soviet constitution. Dallin's old Russia ceased to exist with the introduction and ratification in 1922-1924 of the constitution of the Soviet Union, which provided for the "voluntary" dissolution of the USSR before the rise of Nazi Germany.

Dallin is obviously trying to link the liberation movements of the non-Russian peoples with Hitlerism, so as to discredit them in the eyes of the Western world. His allegations that Nazi Germany had plans for "liberating" the non-Russian countries of the USSR are completely without foundation. The first edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* clearly defined Nazi Germany's Eastern policies: the acquisition of the territory up to the Dvina and the Dnieper area as territory to be colonized by the German *Bauer*, as a compensation for Germany's lost of colonies. True, Hitler

used some short-sighted Ukrainians for purely tactical reasons against Poland and Czechoslovakia, but later on he imprisoned and killed them, and, he effected a unique partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory among Hungary, Rumania, the Polish Government-General and the Reichscommissariat of Ukraine, a planned German colony on the Dnieper.

Dallin grossly slanders the Byelo-Ruthenians by his false statement that their demand for independence was "created artificially" by Hitler asserting: "In Byelorussia... where there was practical no national trend toward separatism from Russia, the idea of secession was magnified, fostered and encouraged by the Nazis" (p. 91). Perhaps Dallin has only forgotten that after 1918 Byelo-Ruthenia also did proclaim her independence and that this subsequently "incorporated Soviet Republic" maintained an unrelenting struggle until 1939 against Soviet Moscow as the source of oppression. It is highly questionable whether the Nazis "promised to Kalmuks, Tatars" their national independence; there exists not a single statement by either Hitler or his government to support this statement which Dallin advances as a proved fact.

With similar incorrectness Dallin presents the attitude of France and England after the outbreak of the revolution of 1917 towards the so-called "Russia's minority problem." They made mistakes in not going further than they did. But Dallin is apprehensive of their future attitude toward the nationality problem of the USSR, for he suspects that these countries will not fight for the preservation of the "national organism of Russia." Britain and France undoubtedly would put it far more accurately as being unwilling to fight for the continued enslavement of the non-Russian peoples.

But Dallin does not lose hope getting the support of the United States for his Russian Menshevik imperialistic program. Towards this end he employs with upside-down logic the argument of the future menace of a recovered Germany which would play "an outstanding role" in Europe. He advises Americans "to look beyond current events and problems, to remember there will be a tomorrow quite different from today." He neglects to mention that if there is a "different tomorrow" for Germany, there will also be a "different tomorrow" for the USSR and the non-Russian peoples whom it enslaves.

We are forced to conclude regretfully that the Russian Mensheviks are twin brothers to the Bolsheviks, who are against colonialism outside the Soviet Union only. The Germans were mercilessly castigated by these pseudo-liberals for their aggressive policies, but if the Russians practice

the self-same aggressions on the non-Russian peoples, lo! —this is necessitated by the demands of the “national organism of Russia.”

Dallin now attempts to intimidate the United States by the prospect of a “Balkanized” Eastern Europe, once the non-Russian nationalities obtain their right of self-determination. Again, he seems to forget that the Baltic States and Finland, without Russian “protection,” achieved a great degree of self-sufficiency and economic stability between the two wars.

The further arguments of Dallin to convince the Americans of the desirability of the preservation of the “Russian” territorial integrity are simply unacceptable in view of the fact that our soldiers in Korea are paying the price for the existence of the very Russian imperialism which Dallin ardently champions. What is of supreme importance is the fact that the USSR, bloated with its non-Russian victim nations, presents an ever-growing menace to us and to the rest of the world and has the backing of the Russian Mensheviks and liberals in the USA. The United States, Great Britain and France must soon decide whether they will back up the non-Russian peoples who fight against Kremlin and Russian imperialism for their liberation, or follow the program of Dallin in preserving and defending the Russian empire to benefit ultimately Stalin and his terroristic government.

In presenting the Ukrainian problem Dallin scales the heights of misrepresentation when he writes that “in the two decades before 1941... whatever other conflicts arose, clashes among nationalities were rare... the Russians and the various minorities lived together with almost no dissensions arising out of racial, national, or religious differences.” This statement is a pernicious falsification of the whole Soviet history of the two decades, replete with struggles of the non-Russian peoples against the policies of Russification and Russian exploitation, struggles which the Russians countered with their mass trials, mass executions and mass deportations into slave labor camps. This policy of Moscow was and still is especially drastic in Ukraine. Dallin almost gloats over the fact that the large cities in Ukraine are more than 50 per cent non-Ukrainian. However, this is not due to any aversion of the Ukrainians for the big city, but to the special policy of Moscow of importing ethnic Russians into Ukraine and simultaneously deporting Ukrainians. Dallin is pleased that Russian engineers and workers should have been dispatched *en masse* by the Politburo to the areas of the “national republics,” but we do not have his reaction to the deportation of Ukrainian engineers and workers beyond the borders of Ukraine. On page 96, however, Dallin contradicts his

analysis of the "amicable" relations between the Russians and the non-Russian peoples by stating that "the mixing of nationalities was furthered by the government's policy toward a number of minorities, which often approached the pattern of genocide."

In basing his "scientific" deductions with respect to the nationality problems of the USSR on misinformation and half-truths, Dallin indirectly attacks Prof. James Burnham, author of *The Coming Defeat of Communism* and one of the few authoritative American writers who have approached the problem of Russia and the non-Russian peoples from a viewpoint opposed to that of the Russian imperialist school, as entertained by both Stalinist and anti-Stalinist Russians.

In rejecting Burnham's arguments that Ukraine stands in relation to Russia as India did with regard to the British Empire, Dallin writes: "India ardently strove to achieve independent statehood and the same is true of many other colonies... Of the nations of Russia, however, it is likely that only the three Baltic countries genuinely want and expect immediate separation from Russia; to them freedom is identical with complete independence."

For one who obviously pretends to be an authority on the nationality problems of the USSR to make the above statement is either to profess complete ignorance of the subject or to be deliberately misleading.

After their experience with both Russian Bolshevism and Russian Menshevism the non-Russian nationalities can and will never accept Dallin's "Swiss Solution" for the problem of the USSR. After the downfall of communism every non-Russian nation in the USSR will strive for the establishment of its own free and independent republic under the supervision of the United Nations. All the victims of Russian imperialism—the Ukrainians, Byelo-Ruthenians, Tatars, Kalmuks, Ingushes and others—who were deported from their native countries will be allowed to return to their homelands to assist in the reconstruction of their free countries.

Summing up Dallin's political conceptions and thinking which for a decade has profoundly influenced the planners in the State Department in their attitude toward Russian nationalities, it is our inevitable conclusion that these conceptions are purely imperialistic Russian.

We firmly believe that the American people will sooner or later support the plight of the non-Russian people and their aspiration towards freedom not only because such is the essential tenet of Americanism, but also because in supporting the victims of Russian imperialism America would be protecting herself against the danger of Moscow.

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## THE WHINING CULT OF MOTHER RUSSIA

by LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

With due regard to the charitable efforts and liberal thoughts of all concerned, at the very outset it can be justly admitted that the preparation of this essay was largely inspired by the stimulating and intelligent comments received through divers media from numerous informed observers who in the course of the past several months have had the unique opportunity of witnessing the fozzled political antics of what may be appropriately designated as *The Whining Cult of Mother Russia*. The specific events causing this display were, of course, the remarkable testimony of Mr. Acheson on June 26 before the House Foreign Relations Committee, in which he soundly underscored the pernicious historical phenomenon of 500 years of Russian imperialism, the resultant penetrating editorial in *The New York Times* issue of June 28 on *Realism About Russia*, delineating the acute insularity of American policy toward Russia these past thirty years, and, lastly, the vigorous controversy that ensued in various publications which saw fit to devote ample space to this important subject.

It is surely not my purpose to dwell on the multiple impressions created by some of the participants in this public discussion, as gathered chiefly from the many communications sent to me at the university. It is sufficient that the suggestive caption of this writing conveys some idea of the general tenor of these impressions. As in my replies to the innumerable inquiries made, our sole preoccupation here is to concentrate exclusively on the variety of arguments and rhetorical techniques employed by the disgruntled cultists of Mother Russia who of late have seemed to spurn certain basic rules of sound evidence and consistent reasoning in what appears to be a frantic endeavor to sustain the faith in eternal Russia.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the creed of this feudalistic complex, see the editorial in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Summer, 1951, Vol. VII, No. 3.



**THE MAIN BUTT OF THE CULT'S EXECRATIONS**

If by virtue of nothing else, certainly by that of the factor of constant reference, the chief source of unpardonable blasphemy against the *fata morgana* of Mother Russia is evidently the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, in actuality one of the earliest American anti-Communist groups to inveigh against the Soviet brand of traditional Russian imperialism. Significantly enough, the recent frontal attacks on the UCCA and its vigorous political operations have produced the most salutary results in bringing to public knowledge the real intentions and motives of the Mother Russia cult. They have furnished an excellent opportunity for countless observers and objective students to appraise the prime arguments and underlying sentiments of those few, non-representative cultists on this side of the Atlantic who tremble and quiver at the mere mention of the necessary dismemberment of the unnatural Russian empire, in whatever shape, form or color. It is, above all, encouraging to observe that there are only a few, perhaps incorrigible, dotterels left to swallow the galimaufry of fallacious opinions and untruths concerning so-called Russia which the inveterate and somewhat senile cultists have peddled for too long a period in the United States. Against the extending background of authentic information and solid interpretation, these execrable political assaults, which are plainly intended to discredit the educational work and accomplishments of the nationally representative UCCA, have been critically evaluated along the lines of the following analysis.

Beyond any question of doubt, the membership of UCCA takes special pride in being selected as the main butt of the cult's execrations. Certainly the nature of these indiscriminate attacks upon it may be rightly viewed as a reliable measure of the fear and disturbance disquieting the minds of the cult over the reactions of the interested American reader to certain fundamental truths regarding despotic Russia and the numerous non-Russian nations it has seduced and shackled. After all, was it not the selfsame cult that only a few years ago contributed so heavily to the popularization of the fabulously false notion that the vast populace east of Poland was Russian, and by the use of semantic suggestion posited in its balderdash of today, endeavors to persuade its dwindling audience that the problems besetting the fettered non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union are basically different from those of the so-called satellite nations, for are not the former mere "national minorities of Russia?" The long tradition of political Russian obscurantism may have been nurtured in the autocratic environment of Czarist Russia, as it is today in that of Soviet Russia, but the democratic surroundings of America, affording an easy

exchange of ideas and the spread of valid data, do not further the successful suppression of truth. To the known extent that the UCCA has made a gaping breach in the intellectual iron curtain which has long surrounded important circles in America, to that extent it has contributed to the security of our country, and the prospects of its further success are bright, indeed.

#### SHRIVELED VOICES OF THE PAST

The characterization imbedded in the caption of this section is by no means intended to cast slight or disdain on the august figures whose passionate defense of the cult's cardinal faith, namely the territorial preservation of the Russian empire, or otherwise misnomered "Russia," is placed under critical examination here. On the contrary, the sole basis for it is one of empirical understanding of the symbolic significance of most of the names affixed to the two letters published this past summer in *The New York Times*, in which the latter was criticized at length for its sacrilegious editorial on the practical adoption of a new realism in American policy toward Russia. The voices raised were indeed those of the dead past: voices of aged men who miserably fumbled their political opportunity well over thirty years ago and with virtually no contact with the bloodstream of Soviet political life, with no base of representation other than themselves, have in real political effect shriveled and dried up since. Beyond any shadow of doubt, their *raison d'être* in the political realm, as expressed so often in their Russian language organs which the average American intellectual does not follow, has been reduced to the maintenance of the faith in eternal "Russia," and this unquestionably is well rooted in the murky past.

However, what is actually of importance and pertinence to us is the intellectual quality of the array of arguments used by this part of the cult in its defense of the faith. The contents of the first letter to *The New York Times* essentially consist of four arguments, if each of them may be properly so called.<sup>3</sup> The first of these I shall refer to as the argument of conventionality. According to the signers of the letter, there is nothing specially unique about the phenomenon of Russian imperialism when it is related to the imperialist enterprises of other nations, and consequently the emphasis placed upon it by Mr. Acheson is unwarranted. Then, with the obvious intention of enshrouding the significance of this phenomenon further, certain extremely weak historical points are advanced to have the

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<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times*, July 8, 1951.

reader believe that the intensity of Russian imperialism was really on the wane at the turn of the century. The false character of the supposed historical evidence offered was amply demonstrated in my reply in *The New York Times* issue of July 15 and in that of Professor Sharp of the American University in the July 22 issue.

By use of the argument of conventionality, the advocates of eternal "Russia" seem to be staking their position in part on the common fallacy of two or more wrongs making a right. Are we not in essence being told not to view Russian imperialism as an evil political tradition because of an imputed right of conventionality supported by the similarly evil enterprises of other states? Moreover, the argument cannot be allowed to obscure the outstanding fact that as regards the subjugation of civilized nations, the record of even pre-Soviet Russian imperialism is exceptionally unique, and far surpasses the conventional limits of other imperialist ventures. The consistent practice of national genocide and the proverbial depositories of desolate Siberia furnish adequate qualitative distinctiveness to this imposing record of unexcelled barbarity. Concrete historical instances of this were amply cited in my testimony on genocide last year before a Senate group conducting the hearings, and there is assuredly no dearth of additional evidence in support of this observation.<sup>3</sup>

Although the cult apparently feels free to capitalize on the ignorance of many regarding these prominent features of Tsarist Russian imperialism, it is, to say the least, rigorously bound to respect the impressive facts of contemporary Soviet imperialism which need not be extracted from history books. To surmount this obstacle in the undying interests of Mother Russia, it promptly introduces two more general arguments which stand in close interpretative relation to the preceding one on conventionality. The first of these, which may be termed the argument of fighting with shadows, is twofold in character, for it involves both historical and semantic elements. The historical element consists of the intellectually crude contention that the rise of the Bolshevik state represents an historical mutation producing an entirely new political species that negates the traditional interests of the Russian nation. Then, once this is set forth, the semantic element is advanced to establish the proposition that what we are really fighting against is not traditional Russian imperialism but the aggressions of international communism.

Now, with these essential parts of the argument of fighting with shadows clearly before us, it definitely requires little intellectual effort

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<sup>3</sup> The Genocide Convention, hearings, U. S. Government Printing Office, — Washington, 1950, pp. 324-325.

to perceive the hollow content of a position which basically bids us to engage in a battle with the shadows of the Kremlin. In the first instance, the theory of mutational forms may have its place in the biological sciences, but to attempt its application on the higher level of social phenomena and thereby create a grotesque hiatus in the institutional development of any given social organism is, one regrets to say, a mark of scientific amateurism. A sweeping revolution did take place in Russia, but it by no means erased all the institutional and despotic habits and propensities formed in the course of centuries. In this vein it plainly necessitates a high level of intellectual integrity and objectivity for a Russian scholar to declare that "through its rule by government fiat, the Soviet regime is the continuation of a tradition that has been the curse of Russian history since the unification of the country under the Grand Dukes of Moscow and perhaps even earlier."<sup>4</sup>

Second, the diversion of the reader's attention from the substance of Soviet imperialism to its nominal ideological form is obviously an expedient technique in the persuasion of a general audience unmoved by concrete and detailed analysis. Those who have bothered to seek the facts on Stalin's extensive Russification program enforced throughout the entire non-Russian area of the Soviet Empire, on the systematic perpetration of national genocide in this area, on the unceasing play on chauvinist Russian patriotism, and on the pathetic disillusionment of sincere Central and East European communists with the maniacal force of Russian imperialism masked in the trappings of ideological communism, can scarcely be deceived by such furtive methods of disputation. In addition, a realistic orientation toward the actual conditions prevailing behind the Iron Curtain points in blunt terms of flesh and blood to a gigantic struggle against the countless millions who form the farflung apparatus of Soviet Russian imperialism, implement its diverse operations, and wallow in vicarious glory over its global advances. To grapple with international communism, which in reality left the world scene with the planned demise of the old Bolsheviks, means simply to indulge in the cult's sciamachy.

As an obvious buttress to the preceding thesis, another standard argument—the third—is offered with an unmistakable sentimental appeal. Quite fittingly this may be called the argument of humanism. In substance it is urged that we cultivate through every accessible means an effective friendship with the Russian people, marked by a sympathetic understanding of their plight and aimed functionally at a cleavage between the

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<sup>4</sup> Florinsky, Michael T., *Towards An Understanding of the U.S.S.R.*, rev ed., 1951.

people and the Soviet government. Surely, aside from certain practical considerations and stated separately, this argument cannot but be regarded as unexceptionable in the minds of all who are untainted by any theories or biases of race inferiority, national vengeance and the like.

Unfortunately, the argument is consistently subordinated by the cult to the foregoing arguments in general support of the overall objective — to preserve securely the territorial framework of the Russian Empire. As such, whether the cult's exponents are aware of it or no, this combination engenders the strong implication or logical admission that the Russian populace in its entirety is truly bent on achieving the same end, which, to say the least, is most questionable from an empirical viewpoint. What in reality the cultists are propounding is the warped notion that a policy for dismemberment of the Russian Empire, which, in other words, means one for the liberation and freedom of the enslaved non-Russian nations, would align the Russian people with Stalin's regime and thus deprive us of a valuable ally. For the common masses of Russia, who suffered as much under Tsarist Russian imperialism as under the present form, the reverse is more likely true. In short, as a program of counter-revolutionary action, the argument of humanism can easily be accepted on its own merits, and its application to the Russian people would involve liberation from its communist government, while in regard to the non-Russian nations within the Soviet Union and without, it would consist of liberation from the foreign yoke of Soviet Russian imperialism.

This last observation, although firmly founded on proved facts, could scarcely escape the arbitrary censure of the cult which can be facilely gleaned from its final general argument of qualified self-determination. Only a few years ago the cant of the cult poured anathema on the very term, but under pressure of successful propaganda it has recently been deemed advisable to give lip service to it, at least before an American audience. The cult really let the cat out of the bag and divulged its insincere construction of the meaning of the term when it solemnly declared "that the future Russia, freed from communism, should be transformed into a federation of free and equal nations, with the right of every nation to claim its statehood through the democratic process, by peaceful means and democratic plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. In this way a peaceful coexistence of all peoples in Russia can be assured."<sup>6</sup>

This confused statement represents about the best example of the mystical Great Russian complex to be found anywhere. As used here, the term "Russia" bears no reference to the true ethnic Russia but rather

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

to its territorial empire, and the intention obviously is to have "self-determination" exercised within this prejudged framework. Moreover, it is clearly evident that the cult feels reasonably sure that if its condition of plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations is observed, then "In this way a peaceful coexistence of all peoples in Russia can be assured." As one of its members has already indicated, the chief and sole reason for this air of confidence is that the cult is banking heavily on the genocidal and deportation policies of the present regime to replace the Ukrainian population in Ukraine with Russians so that "all those Ukrainians outside Ukraine would not be allowed to take part in the election."<sup>6</sup> The statement reveals also a striking political immaturity concerning the forces of national liberation in this day. When the glorious occasion arises, there will not be in Ukraine Russian monarchist armies supported by a few Western powers or an analogue of Trotsky's Red Army which destroyed the national Ukrainian government in 1920. The mass urge for self-determination in the concrete form of self-government will be as spontaneous as it was in Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939, in Western Ukraine in 1941, and in Eastern Ukraine throughout the German occupation. A plebiscite recommendation is by far more incongruous in Ukraine than it would have been in Israeli, and in the face of this evidence is tantamount to an insult to a civilized nation which is slated to play a crucial role in the defeat of Soviet Russian imperialism. Last but not least, the process of genuine federalization, which brought our own Union into being and which is contemplated for Europe as a whole, presupposes the existence of equals, in other words independent, sovereign states.

#### A SINGLE VOICE IN FRENZY

To this array of general arguments on the part of the currently whining cult of Mother Russia could be added the one fashioned by a more agitated member of the cult. In ostensible reply to my criticism of the above defense of Russian imperialism, Mr. Kerensky frantically raises the argument of hatred.<sup>7</sup> As shown in my rejoinder to his discursive communications, anyone who presumes to support the national liberation movements among the captive non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union is by definition an "enemy of the Russian people" and a "Russian-hater."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> S. M. Schwarz, "Regarding the National Question in Russia," *The Socialist Courier*, June-July, 1951.

<sup>7</sup> *The New York Times*, July 30, 1951.

<sup>8</sup> *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. IV., No. 17, Sept. 1, 1951.

There is little for any rational person to say regarding the now frequently used argument of hate, except that it serves as a reliable measure of the paucity, desperation, and even insincerity of thought engulfing some representatives of the cult. This single voice in frenzy has certainly earned its place in the tradition of Gromyko, Vishinsky, and Malik. Such affinity could hardly be said to stop here. For instance, on the issue of self-determination Mr. Kerensky set the course of chicanery adopted by the Soviets in their spurious constitution two decades later. As one close student of the subject observes, "It was difficult to believe that these Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, who before the March Revolution of 1917 had ardently supported the right of self-determination, could have undergone such a complete change of heart."<sup>10</sup> The argument of hate is evidently necessary when counterfeit is detected.

#### AMERICAN SPOKESMEN FOR THE CULT

The cult is not without its small cabal of American spokesmen who in underwriting the above general arguments appear to specialize in the selfdefeating art of factual distortion. A close inspection of their propaganda wares, which are usually displayed in so-called liberal magazines that do not bother to seek the appraisal of competent critics, reveals an uncritical acceptance of the many false arguments in the manner of adopting certain sacrosanct precepts for which facts, no matter how mangled, must be supplied. Within the limited space available, let us scan some of these choice specimens of crass misrepresentation.

One of these, who incidentally professes progressive leanings, virtually berates Acheson for aiding Stalin by his naughty remarks on 500 years of Russian imperialism.<sup>11</sup> The argument of conventionality is dutifully parroted, only to be followed by the misused argument of humanism. Then (this is really choice), frightened by the possible consequences of the Acheson policy, he plaintively asks, "Where, in all conscience, does that leave patriotic Russians who abhor communism but love their country?" The simple answer is in Russia—ethnic Russia, not Ukraine, Georgia and other non-Russian areas ravaged by Russian imperialism. The questioner apparently holds a very low esteem for the intelligence of the readers of the political data in which his misleading article appeared. The argument of hate soon makes its appearance, along with the astounding revelation

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<sup>10</sup> Arnold D. Margolin, "From A Political Diary", Columbia University Press, New York, 1946, p. 50.

<sup>11</sup> Eugene Lyons, *The Freeman*, August 27, 1951.

that some imaginary "Ukrainian 'separatists'" have "some energetic lobbyists in the capital." No proof of this is furnished from the lobbyist register since none can be given; but then such untruths are palatable to his despised readers. Similar distortions of fact abound in this irresponsible presentation, but the colossal joke, as interpreted in many Washington circles, is seen in this reckless assertion: "Mr. Acheson should be reminded that in the early stages of the Nazi invasion the Russian people, eager to believe that the foreigners were coming as liberators, welcomed the Germans with open arms." In Mr. Lyons' book, the Ukrainian people are extinct. Strange that more truth can be obtained on this score from Soviet sources than from a professed American progressive.

A second illustration of willed ineptitude in behalf of the cult appeared soon after under a pseudonym referred to us a "former U. S. intelligence agent and veteran student of Soviet affairs."<sup>13</sup> One should expect accurate reporting on the part of a former intelligence agent, but he does not even seem able to report accurately the name of the organization of which I am referred to as chairman. Not only is the "Ukrainian National Congress" a myth, but also his awkward characterization of it. These facts are obtainable here, not from behind the Iron Curtain. In addition, his futile and vicious attack on the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations can be best evaluated by the reader after perusing the professional article by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller on "What the Kremlin Fears Most" (*The Saturday Evening Post*, October 27, 1951). This known expert does not hesitate to declare that "the aim of the Western powers should coincide with the aim of the A.B.N." When in the face of all the imposing evidence on the activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army this former U. S. intelligence agent shamelessly asserts the non-existence of this underground movement, the informed reader can well surmise the reliability of his other jumbled observations, and pathetically jumbled they are. Need more be said, except that the whining cult of Mother Russia certainly attracts its own kind.

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<sup>13</sup> Fred Forrest, "Allies We Don't Need," *The New Leader*, Sept., 3, 10, 1951.



## THE FOUR VALUES OF THE SOVIET RUBLE

by M. PAVLIUK

It is not only the people under Soviet rule who are prevented from breaking out from behind the Iron Curtain. The Soviet ruble, Soviet currency, shares the same fate. By every device that is at the disposal of the Soviet police state, the Soviets try to limit the amount of Soviet currency which can reach the foreign financial exchanges. Methods of an economic and police character have been and are employed to maintain on the foreign market a high exchange value for the Soviet ruble. We see from observation that the value of the Soviet ruble is maintained in foreign exchanges at approximately the value of the pre-revolutionary ruble which was supported by the always favorable trade balance and covered by the gold supply in the state bank of tsarist Russia.

On the other hand our observations show us how approximately from 1929 the Kremlin has sought and achieved by its financial policy its own methods of maintaining the value of the ruble. In fact the Soviet ruble has four distinct values: 1. its uniformly high value on the foreign exchanges; 2. an approximately similar value in the so-called firm prices in the domestic market; 3. the value in the so-called commercial prices of the government trade and finally — 4. the value on the domestic black market.

It would be wrong to think that this system of four values has been brought about by the pressure of events and that the Kremlin is constantly trying to achieve a normal, stable and firm value of the ruble. The existence of the four values for over 20 years shows that the system is necessary and convenient for the Kremlin and that the maintenance of this system is a basic task of the Kremlin financial policy at home and abroad. To become convinced of this it is only necessary to consider the function of each of the four values during the past years. This is what we find.

1. — Naturally, the steady, firm and quite high value of the Soviet ruble in the foreign market brings many advantages in the calculation of the Soviet foreign trade and supports the financial prestige of Moscow abroad, which is an important thing in itself. But along with that this

strong and firm value has a great importance in propaganda. It is easy to see what an effect it has had and is having upon the workmen of the democratic countries, since the average workman learns of it through the press, and the Soviets through their own papers and those of their fifth columns stress to the workmen of the democratic countries the real wages in the Soviet Union and especially those of the Stakhanovists. It is not hard for the workman to figure out that the Soviet Stakhanovist earns almost double that of the workman, let us say, of America. Every two or three years it is necessary to explain and convince the workers that in fact the workman under the Soviets receives three or four times less in real pay than the American workman. The American workman is accustomed to believe in the value of his own and foreign currencies as shown in the markets but until recently no one has attempted to give them accurate information about the real value of the Soviet currency and the deceptive character which it assumes as a factor in the inhuman exploitation by the Kremlin of the workers under its control. During the last two or three years the new emigration from under the Soviets has constantly stressed the true condition of the Soviet pay of the workman and this has given to the workmen and officials of the democratic countries a better idea of the beggarly life of the Soviet workmen, peasants, and officials. For 20 years the Kremlin has been able to take advantage of this artificially high value of the ruble in foreign markets to spread its propaganda as to the high real pay of the Soviet workman. This deceptive trick has greatly aided in strengthening the Communist fifth columns in the democratic countries among the workers and the smaller officials.

2. — The second value of the Soviet ruble is the value in the so-called firm prices. This approaches the value of the ruble in foreign currencies but never quite reaches it. This exclusively internal value the Kremlin maintains and constantly supports to simplify the calculations for the state enterprises in the Soviet Union and it has also one other important function. It is with this ruble that the Communists buy the raw material and products from the kolkhozy, its individual members and the very few individual enterprises. The firm value of the ruble here allows the Soviets to buy at really very low prices, so that the Kremlin really pays almost nothing for the majority of the products of the peasant work. Thus this ruble enables the Soviets to force out of the hands of the peasant all their products and food for a very small percentage of their value.

While the foreign value of the ruble is set for foreign trade, this ruble is used by the state enterprises but it is used as little as possible in dealings with the final traders.

3.— The two preceding values are almost constantly maintained at a high level for the foreign and domestic markets and maintained by the political and administrative system of the Soviets. The third value, the value on the price of government trade, like the others has been artificially made by the Kremlin but unlike them it can be regarded as the value of the ruble under permanent inflation regulated by the Kremlin financial policy. This inflationary ruble was first noticed in 1929 and has been steadily supported by the Kremlin since not at the identical value but always artificially. Especially in 1934 it became possible to secure a real picture of this inflationary value of the ruble in connection with the two preceding values. To hide the Soviet interference with the values, the authorities constantly raise the pay of the workmen and officials but the inflation of the ruble in trade prices always remains at a level where not only the amount of the pay cannot approach the value of the ruble in trade but the difference between the cost of the wares and the commercial prices allows the Soviets to secure a clear profit of not less than 1000% on the value.

It is very characteristic that this inflationary ruble has continued during more than 20 years, for the Kremlin, had it desired, could have established a normal and secure value of the ruble during this period, but it did not desire it. Since the one goal of the Kremlin is the greatest possible exploitation of the peasants, workmen and officials for their purposes of spreading Communism, the Soviets have worked out and maintain this inflationary ruble on commercial prices. It is characteristic that this inflation of the ruble has not been produced by an increase in the amount of currency but by a reduction in the amount of wares, the lowering of its value by the sale of faulty products or goods made of substitute materials. The methods of supporting the inflated value of this ruble by reducing the amount of goods put into the market, has also the advantage that they can meet the demand differently in different places. *Thus Moscow and indeed all of Great Russia always receives more goods and wares and the Soviet ruble has greater value. On the other hand, the colonies of Moscow, let us say Ukraine, always receive less wares and food; its value is lower and so is the real value of wages.* The Kremlin of course understands well the meaning of its policy of inflation but this does not prevent the Bolshevik propaganda from weeping over the fate of the workmen in those countries of the democratic world, where the value of the ruble

fluctuates, and there is a threat of inflation, while the Bolsheviks at home through their policy of inflation are inhumanly exploiting both the peasants and the workmen.

In the general circulation of the Soviet currency, this ruble based on the prices of state trade, holds a very important place, for it is the value in which is calculated the sale of all widely used articles of food and clothing and the other necessities of the people of the entire Soviet Union.

4. — Finally the Soviet ruble has a fourth value, that on the speculative black market. This began approximately in 1928 and is used for all articles of widespread use, food, clothing, shoes, etc. It dominates the so-called "kolhosp bazaars". The prices here are established by the law of supply and demand and the value of the ruble here is usually 75-100% lower than in the prices of the government trade. It is again characteristic that the Soviet government has not been disturbed by the development of this market and only forbids the sale of certain kinds of goods in it. It is obvious that the government has important reasons for this treatment. Let us look at some of them.

At these kolhosp bazaars the men and women of the kolhosp stand in long lines with their tiny supply of wares in a basket. They sell by the cup, the bottle, the glass, the piece, carefully hiding in their basket the wretched little amount that they have to sell. For more than 20 years they have been listening to the bitter reproaches of their individual purchasers, the wives of the Soviet officials. These women go out quietly from the state stores, if they do not find in them what they want or quietly stand in line for four or five hours for the lacking goods, but in the bazaar they give vent to their feelings and when they come home, they storm for a long while at the speculating members of the kolhosps for the high prices that they charge. In this way Kremlin skilfully directs the attention of the officials and workmen of the city and transfers the responsibility for their miseries to the "speculators" of the kolhosp bazaar. This has not a little political importance for the Kremlin, for it directs the hate of a free market against the "speculators" among the officials and workmen, though the latter feel it less. In this way the Kremlin is able to direct the attention of the urban population quietly away from the real cause of their misery — the grandiose speculative enterprises in billions, the financial machinations controlling the value of the the ruble, carried out by the Communist Party of Moscow. It is obvious that the urban dwellers who are compelled to buy articles at the kolhosp bazaars reduce their real earnings, but these sums are insignificant

when compared with the tens of billions extorted from the city people by the system of the inflated ruble and the maintenance of the real earnings at a low level of purchasing power.

By these kolhosp bazaars and the black value of the ruble, the Kremlin aims to satisfy the petty bourgeois element of the peasants and allow them to realize in a free market some surplus of their own minute poultry-raising, dairying and gardening. Nevertheless these concessions to the peasants are not at the expense of the Communist government but at the cost of the real earnings of the city population.

For the privileged upper strata of Soviet society and those who are materially well off, the kolhosp bazaars give them the opportunity when they need or desire, to buy, even at a high price, — let us say a well fed chicken, while in the state stores one can scarcely be found. The kolhosp bazaars with their black ruble appeal also to the lowest classes of the population for they have the opportunity to sell at free prices their worn clothing, for even a much patched pair of trousers is in demand and brings a high price. Thus the black value of the Soviet ruble performs various functions for the different classes of the population and also benefits the Kremlin. That may explain why the Communists have tolerated them and the black value of the ruble ever since 1929.

In summing up this review of the financial policy of Bolshevik Moscow ever since the ending of the financial policy of the times of the NEP, it is clear that this system of allowing four values of the Soviet ruble has been carefully worked out by Moscow to produce the maximum inhuman exploitation by the state of its subjects.

By its establishment of state capitalism the Moscow government has found a useful system of a financial policy and will not give it up. That system will exist as long as there exists a Moscow Communist government and a Communist upper class, favored by Politburo Great Russia and her non-Russian colonies of the USSR.

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### A HORSE OF SOVIET RAISING

A Soviet citizen who had been reading in the numerous newspapers of the Soviet's wonderful achievements in zoology was dumbfounded upon encountering a camel in the zoological gardens.

"Just look at what the Communists are capable of doing to a horse!"

## I WAS IN SIBERIA

by NICHOLAS PRYCHODKO

In the open forum of the United Nations, and other world conferences, Russian delegates deny the existence of concentration camps on Soviet territory. Upon being pressed with heavily-documented proof they admit only that they maintain corrective labor camps in which criminals are retrained for useful citizenship. This picture of an advanced and reformed penal system in the USSR is one of the carefully contrived hoaxes ever put over on credulous visitors to the "workers paradise".

I myself witnessed one such travesty. In the prison on the Shevchenko Boulevard in Kiev, the bars were replaced with white curtains, the beds were made with clean linen, white cloths were put on the dining tables—even artificial flowers. Workshops were set in the back yard. Then a delegation of foreign tourists and sympathizers was led in to see the show.

They were told that the prisoners worked only a regulation 8-hour day, "relaxing" the rest of their time in these pleasant circumstances. Many of these visitors returned home to extol such a humane system. No doubt, you have read their stories.

From this show prison it was only ten minutes' ride to a real prison where one could have seen how people really live in the prisons of the NKVD in the Soviet Union. In this prison I was held for 21 months. Not only did the windows have bars but even iron shutter to exclude every ray of sunlight and breath of fresh air, and to prevent the prisoners from even seeing the yard of the sky.

It was during one of the several waves of terror in the period of the Great Purge, 1936—1939, that I was thrown in here. Our cell, 30 or 40 square metres in area, was jammed with 100 to 140 prisoners. For their bed they had, not clean linen, but the filthy cement floor.

From 11 o'clock at night until dawn we were called in groups for questioning (very rarely is any questioning carried on in the daytime) and brutally tortured to extract from us confessions to unheard-of crimes. Myriads of bed bugs were a further torture which drove the prisoners to the verge of despair.

These prisons the gullible visitors to Russia have never seen, nor ever will see. Nor will they see the real conditions of life of the Soviet people for that would destroy the myth of the "great leader of the people's democratic bloc." Even less will delegates of the U. N. ever be permitted to inspect the North Russian or Siberian concentration camps—no matter how many declarations of human rights the bosses in the Kremlin may sign.

After my 21 months in prison I was shipped to one of these camps—the Ivdellag. Our train was made up of about 50 small freight cars with steel bars on the windows. Each one carried 42 men. In the middle of the train and at either end were special guard cars provided with machine guns and blood hounds. Our food was salt fish, mouldy black bread and two pails of water to a car per day.

At the longer stops the guards would test the sides with long-handled mallets, while others ran over the roofs to detect any loose boards where prisoners might break through. In this way the train rolled on for 14 days rarely stopping at the larger stations lest the citizens see its ghastly, scarcely human cargo. This train "bound for a special destination", rolled from Kiev to Siberia in November, 1939. From every corner of the mighty "Fatherland of the Proletariat" similar trainloads of serfs were rolling to the impenetrable taiga and the mines of Siberia and the Far East.

They were destined to replace the thousands who were dying of cold, of hunger and unbearably hard labor quotas. The Kremlin's Five-Year Plans came before all human considerations.

We passed over the Ural Mountains at night and with the dawn saw on either side of the railroad throughout the taiga, the watchtowers, which reminded us of the time of Ivan the Terrible.

The guards in long sheepskin coats, armed with mounted bayonets, kept constant vigil. A picture of such a watchtower, with an armed guard, would make an appropriate Soviet emblem.

These watchtowers were set around a double barbed wire enclosure and beyond were the low, wooden, gloomy barracks. At some railroad stations we saw hundreds of filthy, emaciated beings, in tattered rags loading freight trains with lumber. It was frightful and horrifying to watch these caricatures of humanity, although our plight was in no way better.

In their eyes we read hopelessness and despair. Whenever they could evade the eagle eye of the guard, who constantly yelled "davay, davay!" they would ask us where we came from and what news we brought and

beg for a piece of bread or a smoke. We could give them nothing, for we had nothing, not even any good news to cheer them up.

After we had passed several such camps, a heavy silence settled over my companions on the train. Only the wheels clicked their monotonous song over the rails. Ragged and dirty we sat in sombre dejection, thinking of the loved ones we left behind, whom we would never see again. We had seen with our own eyes the fate that awaited us: forced labor, cold and hunger.

Now we began to meet endless trains on their return journey, emptied of their freight of misery and now loaded with lumber and ore, produced by the sweat and blood of such as ourselves. Finally, we reached Camp Sama.

Camp Sama is the port of admission to the Ivdellag Concentration camps, one of the smallest of the camp administrations in Siberia. It holds only some 350,000 prisoners! At Sama the new arrivals are assigned to the different work camps of the Ivdellag.

Over a railroad branch from Sama (the railroad station), which runs for several miles into the depths of the taiga, we were brought almost to the gate of our camp and ordered to get off. We jumped off into deep dry snow which reached to our waists, but at least we could breathe clean air again.

We were herded inside the wire enclosure and into low wooden barracks, 200 men to each one. Inside there were only bare, double-decked beds of boards and an iron stove in the middle. There were no sheets, no blankets. The beds were infested with bed bugs which gave us no rest at night, or even during the day.

Our only comfort was the privilege of being able to walk about inside the double wire enclosure and breathe the fresh air. For food we received 1½ lbs of heavy, black bread a day and two bowls of balanda, a stinking liquid that resembled slops more than anything else.

At camp Sama there were over a hundred prisoners from Southern Georgia. In this demoralizing environment they still held themselves proud and aloof; the look of hatred never left the eyes of these unbowed sons of Caucasia. They were given no work for almost to a man they suffered from tuberculosis. Coming from the hot southern climate, they had no resistance against the terrific frosts, and each day three or four of them were carried into the forest to eternal peace.

There were also at Sama barracks reserved for criminals. The guards were very friendly with them, calling them "socially close" and



entrusting them with many administrative duties of the camps. These duties they executed with the most inhuman brutality, but were never reprimanded for looting or beating the prisoners.

Our contingent stayed at Camp Sama for only a short time, then was driven off under guards and blood hounds to another camp in the taiga — Palkino.

Here the conditions were no better. Only when a prisoner completed his full quota of work could he receive his daily allotment of food. Each man was expected to cut from 2,5 to 12 cubic metres (roughly a cord) of wood a day, depending upon the size of the trees. These had to be cut not higher than 7 inches from the ground—though the snow was waist deep. The branches were trimmed off and burned and the trunk sawed into pieces 4, 5, or 6 metres (12 to 20 feet) in length.

Many of my fellow-prisoners sickened and died quickly from the heavy work, carried out under relentless pressure, on poor food in the bitter cold. In Palkino which housed some 3,000 unfortunates, during the worst periods, 10 to 15 men died each day. But these were as quickly replaced with new arrivals.

The dead were deposited in communal graves holding 200 to 300 corpses. Only when the graves were filled to the top with victims were they covered with frozen clods and snow with an attempt to level them carefully with the surrounding ground. The graves were still prominently noticeable, however, and I saw many of these around Ivdellag. Often, bodies would be dragged out into forest by wolves.

And this was only a "small" camp. There are, in the USSR, around 50 larger concentration camp sites, in Siberia, on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, on the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The largest of these are: Sibltag, Kraslag, Carlag, Uzhiblag, Vorkutlag, Tobalsklag, Sievurlag, Viatlag, Sievostoklag and the dread Kolyma gold camp. Besides these there are great building projects in the North and throughout Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Far East, developed by slave labor, which was also used to build the White Sea and Moscow-Volga canals, and the famous Moscow Subway.

According to the lowest figures and such facts as I possess, there are never less than 15 million slaves held as a labor pool in the concentration camps. This slave labor system represents the ultimate weapon of the regime in suppressing all discontent, criticism and opposition.

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# GEORGE KENNAN AND RUSSIA'S AGGRESSIVE WARS

## HISTORICUS

It was surprising when during a hearing before the Internal Security Congress Subcommittee, Mr. Stassen quoted from a speech by George F. Kennan at a conference of prominent Americans in the State Department pertinent to the situation in the Far East after the defeat of the government of Chiang Kai Chek on the Chinese mainland. Mr. Stassen was at this gathering, Autumn 1949, and the *New York Times* quoted him on September 13, 1951 as saying:

"Mr. Kennan said: 'I think there is a distinction between these Russian leaders and the people like Hitler and the Japanese leaders of the Twenties and Thirties. *Never in Russian history have Russians ever, that I can remember, been enthused about any deliberate aggressive action of their own outside Russia.*'"

Mr. Kennan is considered in America an outstanding authority on questions of Russia with a deep scientific background, but he cannot recall any aggressive wars which Russia has waged. On the other hand Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State in his well known talk on 500 years of Russian aggression spoke of the way in which the Russian empire was built up. It might be worthwhile for Americans interested in red Russia to see whether George Kennan or Dean Acheson is correct.

Due to the lack of space, we merely list the definitely aggressive wars which the Russian Empire and its predecessor, the Grand Principality of Moscow, has waged:

1478. Ivan III, Grand Prince of Moscow conquered the free Republic of Novgorod the Great, took away its liberties and deported to Moscow the most prominent representatives of the citizens of the Republic.

1485. Ivan III conquered and annexed to Moscow the Grand Principality of Tver.

1492. Ivan III provoked the first war with Lithuania (to 1494) for the border lands.

1499. Ivan III provoked the second war with Lithuania (to 1503).

1507. Basil III provoked his first war with Lithuania and in 1508 concluded an "eternal peace" but —
- 1512 he provoked a second war with Lithuania (till 1522).
1510. Moscow finally conquered and annexed the Republic of Pskow and took away all its republican freedoms.
1517. Moscow annexed the independent Grand Principality of Ryazan.
1552. Ivan IV (the Terrible) conquered the tsarate of Kazan.
1556. Ivan IV conquered the tsarate of Astrakhan.
1581. Ivan IV conquered the tsarate of Siberia.
1654. Alexis Mikhaylovich began a war with Poland for Ukraine.
1658. Moscow began a war with Hetman Vyhovsky of Ukraine, because he wished to become free of Moscow.
1667. Moscow renewed war for Ukraine.
1687. Peter I began a war with Turkey and the Khanate of the Crimea (until 1700).
1700. Peter I began a war with Sweden (which lasted until 1721) for the Baltic coast (a Window into Europe).
1722. Peter I began war with Persia (until 1723).
1733. Empress Anna interfered in the war of the Polish Succession.
1756. Russia interfered in the war with Prussia (the Seven Years War, — until 1763).
1769. Catherine II began war with Turkey (until 1774). War for the Black Sea coast.
1772. Catherine II attacked and made the first division of Poland.
1775. Catherine II ruined the Zaporozhian Sich, the semi-independent Ukrainian Military Republic.
1787. Catherine II began the second war with Turkey.
1793. Catherine II made the second division of Poland.
1794. Catherine II attacked Poland which was struggling for its independence under Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Brigadier General of the American Continental Army.
1795. Catherine II made the third division of Poland.
1799. Paul I interfered in the war with France (until 1800).
1805. Alexander I interfered in the war with France.
1806. Alexander I interfered in the war with France (until 1807).
1806. Alexander I began war with Turkey.
1813. Alexander I began war with Persia.
1816. Russia began to conquer Caucasus.
1826. Nicholas I began war with Persia (until 1828).
1828. Nicholas I began war with Turkey (until 1829).  
He continued to conquer the Caucasus.
1853. Nicholas I began war with Turkey (the Crimean War) until 1856. —  
Russia began to conquer Turkestan.

1855. Alexander II (a new tsar) finished the conquest of the Caucasus and finally conquered Turkestan.
1877. Russia began war with Turkey (until 1878).
1904. Nicholas II began war with Japan (until 1905).
1918. The attack of Russia on Ukraine, the independence of which it had recognized.
1920. The attack of Russia on Georgia, the independence of which it had recognized.
1939. The attack of the USSR on Poland with which it had a non-aggression pact.
1939. The attack of the USSR on Finland.
1940. The annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

A more careful survey of Russian history would vastly increase the number of unprovoked attacks of Russia on its neighbors but the above are sufficient to justify the remarks of Dean Acheson, that the Russian Empire grew by the aggression and the seizure of the lands of its neighbors.

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### SOVIET SPECIALISTS

#### *A Yugoslav satire*

"A most elegant traveller arrived in Tirana and demanded to see the chief of police. He wore a Polish shirt, a Czechoslovak tie, a Hungarian suit, a Rumanian pullover, a Bulgarian overcoat, and Russian boots. Thus it was easy to see that he was a Soviet specialist.

— I am, he said, a distinguished Soviet documentary film producer. I have come to make a picture about "Happy Albania" and I want you to supply me with 300 happy faces for me to photograph.

— I beg to report, Comrade, that this will not be easy, replied the police chief. — You see these people are so perverse that they refuse to recognize their own happiness!

Taken aback, the specialist said: "Well, bring me the members of the Government and Central Committee — they ought to look happy."

— They, too, are perverse, Comrade. They think too much of their former colleagues who are no longer so desirably situated.

Still trying, the specialist remarked: "Well, you must have some actors, people who are trained to adopt any required facial expression."

— The trouble is, Comrade, our actors have been playing in all the latest Soviet plays, which are so much like "Pravda" leaders that they have forgotten how to act.

The specialist had had enough. "Look," he said, "I don't care how you find the 300 people with happy faces; just get them." — The police chief found them: — they were all Soviet specialists."

## BOOK REVIEWS

**CRACKS IN THE KREMLIN WALL.** By Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press, 1951., 279 pp.

In a lucid and calm manner Edward Crankshaw, English historian and novelist, deals here with the enemy of "men and women everywhere, of all parties and all religions, who believe in a liberal and liberalizing tradition... and in the need for the rule of law based on certain moral standards." This enemy is the Soviet Union.

For all of its modest size, Mr. Crankshaw's book is surprisingly comprehensive. The author, a former member of the British Military Mission to Moscow, first defines the enemy; and then examines in turn the Russian national character, the nature of the present Soviet distatorship as it is qualified by that character, and the origins and prospects of the cold war.

Mr. Crankshaw clears the air once and for all by irrevocably establishing the enemy: "It is not communism as an international revolutionary movement that we are preparing to resist; it is the government of a foreign power bent on undermining our security." Communism as a species of socialism, he points out, would no doubt exist today if there were no such place as Russia. Thus, at the very outset, Mr. Crankshaw does much to dispel the dangerous identification of communism with Russia, an identification which the Kremlin has gone to great lengths to foster in order to exude an aura of formidability, if not invincibility.

However, the Bolshevik regime is a natural product of Russia. To see this relationship we need only study the Russians and their institutions, in terms of the Russian people who created them. Nothing could be more false, Mr. Crankshaw warns, than to think of Russian institutions in terms of our own. For example, a scrutiny of the Russian character reveals that the idea of individual freedom—which we regard as the *sine qua non* of existence and which, as we realize it, accommodates extreme points of view—for the Russian means *absolute* freedom, or anarchy. For the Russian is an absolutist; if he cannot have absolute freedom, he does not care what he has. In this light therefore, it is not surprising that the Russian should always have a detested regime. In fact, "they find it hard, if not impossible, to conceive of a society without a secret police; and they are only outraged when the police overstep themselves even by Russian standards." It is this trait and others—such as the passion for orthodoxy and lack of common sense and the sense of compromise—that make the Soviet regime a Russian response to a Russian situation.

Since Stalinism has an organic connection with the Russian people (there is no such connection with the East European peoples, or China, "to say nothing of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR"), it is important to note that although the Russians have always believed in their holy duty to expand in all directions,

they do not like to fight wars if they can avoid them. This characteristic viewed against the weakness of the Soviet regime leads Mr. Crankshaw to the conclusion that there will not be a major war with Russia "at least in this generation."

Mr. Crankshaw etches a picture of the Soviet Union which is a welcome relief after some of the lurid and misleading accounts that have appeared inspired by both communist and White Russian propaganda. The national spirit of the opposed non-Russian peoples, he points out, remains a great menace, e. g. *Ukraine is "a fortress of resistance to the central Moscow government."*

The Red Army may look overwhelming on paper, but its 175 divisions are "extremely mixed" in quality and fighting power. Behind this questionable force is a creaking economy, decades behind the United States in industrial production. And the Politburo itself, he reminds us, is composed of mortals, not supermen, hard put to keep the Soviet organism going, much less execute grandiose, infinitely far-sighted schemes.

When we add to all this the weariness of the people owing to war and the endless five-year plans, the Soviet Union as a power assumes its true stature. It remains an enemy to be feared, but as this acute and diligent student of Russia points out, we must be more afraid of fear itself. We must not, for fear of the enemy, transform our own society into an apparatus of totalitarianism in order not to damage national unity—"the unity of the grave."

This excellently written book with its refreshing approach to and analysis of the Soviet Union merits the close perusal of both the American policy-making circles and the public at large.

W. DUSHNYK.

COMMUNISM AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST, by Fulton J. Sheen, Ph. D., D. D., LITT. D., LL. D. The Bobbs-Merrill Comp., Indianapolis-New York, 1948.

This book of the eminent Catholic writer and lecturer who was recently assigned a bishopric, is a synthesis of the fundamentals of communism, from the Catholic point of view. The work offers brilliant chapters on the decline of historical liberalism and the rise of the antireligious spirit, on communism as the enemy of the Western World. The philosophy and basic defects of communism, and other problems are written on the basis of first hand Soviet materials. One of the most interesting and at the same time most controversial chapters treats about Russia and the faith. The author shows in figures the terrible destruction of the church perpetrated by the Russian communists, its present state where the bishops, although MVD agents, remain nevertheless "successors of the Apostles." The communist fanaticism of the Russians convinces Msgr. Sheen that "the very endurance, readiness for sacrifice, and power of faith that are revealed in the Russian Communists are a proof that they come from a dynamism of a soul more intense than that of the dechristianized and disillusioned modern man of the Western World." Thus, the author finds that "the Russians, who, though presently delayed in the totalitarian drive of communism, are nevertheless on the way to that Communism where Christ is the brother of all men and God their heavenly father." In conclusion Msgr. Sheen writes that "*Soviet Russia is today regarded as the last hope of the Western man who lives without God*" (the author's underlining).

It is not difficult to find the source of all these author's convictions: it is a phalanx of Russian "bogoiskatels" (searchers of God) whose names appear throughout the entire book. Here we find Khomyakov and Dostoyevsky, Solovvey and Berdayev, Nekrasov and Blok, Fedotov and Helen Isvolksy and other promoters of the "Holy Russia" which in the end will reveal to the world the true God and the true faith... There is no reason whatever to doubt the sincerity of their convictions but the question is if and to what extent the Western author can uncritically accept their views. This remark is more than justified by the fact that the author does not seem to be too well acquainted with many cardinal matters important in his problem of the conversion of the East. For example, the author estimates that there are "about 200,000,000 people in Russia," that means that he considers as Russian the peoples enslaved by Russia, although he hardly ever would have made the error of calling the Nazi-occupied Czechs or Poles — Germans. The author is not always sure as to the Catholic conditions in East Europe; he writes, for instance, separately about the liquidation of the Catholic Church in "Eastern Poland" and in Ruthenia. The uninformed reader will learn nothing from these lines about the martyrdom of the Eastern rite Catholics in Ukraine, especially in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine, where an Archbishop-Metropolitan, nine bishops and about one thousand priests were imprisoned, exiled or tortured to death. Nothing is mentioned about the existence of their Catholic churches in catacombs.

The author is searching for dynamism of true Christian souls in the atheistic Russia, whose bishops are often members of NKVD, but he is unable to find it in the catacombs of Ukraine. This is the tragedy of Catholicism in Eastern Europe. Prominent representatives of the Western Catholic mind are more interested in a few Russian converts, of course religious idealists, — practically isolated from the Russian people, strongly anti-Catholic, than in the millions of their Catholic brethren of Eastern rite in Ukraine, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia fighting for preservation of their faith with the vigor of the confessors of the first Christian era.

We cannot fail to mention that in the reviewed book there is no clear picture of the national relations in the USSR, still a federative union of 16 nations. Ignoring by the author of the very existence of 15 non-Russian nations can not favorably incline for the Catholic cause the non-Catholic readers, members of those nationalities living at present in the West.

All these remarks are founded on our deep conviction that the Catholic world will have an important role in the inevitable conflict with Russian (there is no other) communism, and therefore all these matters should be made clear. The moral justification of the enemy might weaken the only front which is indispensable against the fanatical ruthlessness of the Russian communism. Peter the Hermit or Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux when calling for the liberation of the Holy Land, hardly preached that only the Mohammedans are evil infidels but that the Arabs themselves were good and pious people. In the political circumstances, as they are now, the first problem is not the conversion of Russia—which could be the ultimate sign of the spiritual victory of the West over the East—but the survival of Christian civilization (Catholic included) in the coming universal conflict. If the Western World should fall ("Are we to blame when your spine cracks in our tender

and heavy paws?"—*Al. Blok*) it is doubtful if a triumphant Moscow, "the Third Rome", would want to accept the faith of the adversary which she will be trampling under foot.

S. HORDYNSKY.

*Corliss Lamont*: THE INDEPENDENT MIND. Essays of a Humanist Philosopher. Horizon Press, New York, 1951.

The overwhelming majority of readers will regard this book as the eccentricity of a rich man, who can afford extravagances, such as, for instance, leaving a million in his will for his poodle. However, there is no reason to suspect that Mr. Lamont is insincere in his convictions, or that he is an agent of alien ideas. He has no need of that; on the contrary, he himself can afford to hire agents for the propagation of his humanistic philosophy and political views. Once his convictions are his convictions, they should be accepted as such.

The first impression of a reader who has personal and first hand knowledge of the facts treated by Mr. Lamont is that the author lacks vital experience. Both his philosophical and political convictions are the philosophy and the politics of abstractions. The humanism which Mr. Lamont uses as a basis for his philosophy, in its readiness to compromise between good and evil—becomes a farce. There exists a certain indivisibility in the moral code which makes it impossible to be a true humanist (or democrat) if principles are not applied with justice to all sides concerned. The reader frequently finds himself in a dilemma for, he wonders if the author really does not know the actual state of things, or if perhaps he simply does not have the good will to show them in their proper light.

For example, he believes in such a thing as "Soviet civilization". In reality no "comprehensive evaluation" of the Soviet complex, where, as the author states "so far the good vastly outweighs the bad", can cover up the fact that the USSR is a state based on slave labor, in spite of all its declarations of democracy. There is no doubt that ancient Egypt also had a civilization built by slave labor, but no one thinks of talking about ancient Egypt in terms of democracy. Mr. Lamont is highly enthusiastic over the Soviet "ethnic equality and racial democracy" and compares them with "grave American shortcomings and backslidings in these fields,"—but he does not mention one instance where in a single sweep 2 or 3 million people were liquidated anywhere in America while Soviet Russia deported or murdered entire non-Russian peoples. This is by no means a secret or anti-Soviet propaganda. These facts may be surmised from the Soviet Encyclopaedias itself from which there suddenly disappeared entire Caucasian peoples and where the Ukrainian population instead of increasing in the last two decades is dropping alarmingly. The Soviet post-war policy of making satellites of free East European countries does not disturb Mr. Lamont, to him it is clear that in this case the Soviets are merely "doing business with other countries"... Certainly, Soviet Russia has many economic achievements, and those who uphold the regime without doubt are well fed and properly clothed. But the Nazis were fed even better and all other Germans were privileged in comparison with the Nazi-dominated peoples; all this, however, does not prove that their regime was not criminal. Mr. Lamont is a thinker — why doesn't he use more logic in this case too?



The author's position in philosophy and politics is the purest product of his era, to be more specific, the era of capitalism. No one can deny that the Western World willfully or unwillfully patronized by capitalism—is facing a spiritual crisis: it simply lacks an idea. All the old ideas came to a halt, and all too often they are not worth fighting and dying for. No material values will ever fill the lack of a living idea. The Western culture is undeniably ill because of this lack, and the peoples enslaved by the dynamic communism look with anxiety toward the West from which they expect help in their fight for liberation. This means that the task of Western thinkers should be above all to aid in finding and formulating this idea. No doubt Mr. Lamont has realised the gravity of this crisis. As an antidote he became enraptured by the opposite idea. He can not accept it completely (he would be hanged on the first lamppost as a bourgeois) and he is fed up with his capitalistic surroundings in which he has lost faith but is unable to run away from his own soul. The result: a Hamlet-like duality of the Alyosha Karamazov type.

The "Independent Mind" is written by the representative of a class faced with a dilemma of either undergoing a fundamental change or being beaten in the clash with a more dynamic world. This book with its philosophy of surrender will add nothing to the comprehension of the problem—it will remain what it is: an emanation of spiritual schizophrenia.

S. HORBYNSKY.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, by George F. Kennan (Chicago, Ill, 1951).

Mr. George F. Kennan, a scholar with an outstanding diplomatic career, the former first head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, the former counselor of the State Department, the expert on East-European and Russian affairs, the known author and chief architect of the "containment" policy, who recently was slated to go to Moscow as US ambassador to replace Admiral Alan G. Kirk, has written a very interesting book on American diplomacy since 1900.

The book consists of two parts. The first part comprises six lectures given by Mr. Kennan at the University of Chicago as follows: The War with Spain, Mr. Hippisley and the Open Door, America and the Orient, World War I, World War II. Diplomacy in the Modern World.—The first part has little direct bearing on the problems of Soviet-American relations and the present tensions between the West and East. For this reason the author included in this volume two articles previously printed in the journal *Foreign Affairs*: The Sources of Soviet Conduct, America and the Russian Future. These two articles form the second part of the volume.

There is no doubt that Mr. Kennan is a great American patriot with a creative mind. The first part of his volume is vividly described and presented. His plain-spoken appraisal of this country's foreign relations over the last fifty years is to a large extent proper and keen. It is true that American diplomacy since 1900 has been vague, isolationist, inadequate to the real power of the US, that politics should stop at the water's edge. Some observations of Mr. Kennan and his advisors are very stimulating and useful for the future conduct of American foreign policy. His condemnation of "diplomacy by dilettantism" is one of these. The background and origin of the American Open Door policy in China and its realization as presented by Mr. Kennan are very interesting and truly revealing.

According to Mr. Kennan "the most serious faults of our past policy formulation lie in something that we might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years." (p. 95). Mr. Kennan feels that the US have exaggerated the role of moral and legal principles in international relations and have accordingly neglected the realistic analysis and pursuit of American national interest. Mr. Kennan asserts that US foreign policy should be based upon a careful appraisal of power factors in the world, on the old European policy of balance of power. Therefore he advocates the "realistic" approach in foreign relations. Mr. Kennan suggests that United States foreign policy objectives should be somewhat less ambitious than they have been in the last few years and that the US rely more on diplomacy to achieve those objectives. According to Mr. Kennan it is essential to recognize the realities of power and try to adjust our policy to them; he thinks that in the present modern times there is no such a thing as "total victory."

But Mr. Kennan basically repeats to a large extent what Mr. Walter Lippman so brilliantly already said in his book: *US Foreign Policy—Shield of the Republic*, written in 1943. In the comparison of both the book written by Mr. Lippman and the book written by Mr. Kennan on the same subject that is on US foreign policy we have to give the first place to Mr. Lippman's book. That is clear, precise, logical, frank, without any sophistication and philosophizing. Mr. Kennan's book—on the contrary—is in many places vague, with many contradictions, full of philosophizing, pessimism and hopelessness. Sometimes Mr. Kennan seems not a statesman and diplomat but a pessimistic philosopher. In another place he seems very cynical and his advice is highly amoral.

His two articles on Soviet-American relations reprinted from the journal *Foreign Affairs* are already known and have been challenged by many people. Especially the second one: *American and the Russian Future* — is the most controversial and we would say—dangerous from the point of view of the American national interest and of the "realistic" approach so vigorously advocated by Mr. Kennan himself. This "realistic" approach of Mr. Kennan toward the Soviet Union and future Russia is highly "unrealistic", sometimes naive, other times highly amoral so far as nationalities subjugated and exploited by the Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union are concerned. It is full of defeatism, escapism and hopelessness. Here Mr. Kennan shows himself as a definite Russophile and by his underestimation of the national problems of the Soviet Union it is evident that he does not understand much about Eastern Europe, Russian imperialism and Russian mentality.

In the article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" we find a true characterization of the Soviets and the rulers in the Kremlin but that you can find in many manuals in this country written on the same subject. Here Mr. Kennan reasserts his "containment" policy. It is true that the "containment" policy was proper as a temporary measure in the years 1945-1951. But now a "containment" policy is not enough. Now it is obsolete and inadequate. It is a negative, a defensive policy. It is to a great degree a policy of appeasement, or quasi-appeasement. As we know from history (remembering the policy of appeasement of Great Britain toward Hitlerite Germany) a policy of appeasement has always failed and led to a war. The present very dynamic imperialistic policy of the Soviet Union where the old Russian nationalism and imperialism is merged with the international Communist idea of world revolution has no limits to its expansion. No *modus vivendi* in the long run as

well as no establishment of spheres of influence, no "adjustment" and new "realistic" approach by new modern diplomacy could satisfy the Muscovite bear.

Mr. Kennan in advocating a "realistic" approach condemns the idealistic policy of the US in the past and cynically proclaims amorality and the obsolete European balance of power. Thus he tends to remove the very essential, most valuable and important part of the American mentality and American conduct in foreign relations which is deep rooted in the American consciousness. Therefore he tends to change the most valuable part of American character. It is impossible to do this as well as very dangerous for the US. The United States is now the leading power in the world; thus the proper conduct of its foreign affairs is crucial to national security and world peace. The US as a World Power has to assume world leadership. World leadership is at the same time world responsibility, it is a great honor but at the same time a great burden, a moral duty. Thus the US in challenging the Soviet power which uses its Communist idea as a powerful propaganda weapon has to have a world-wide, long range positive program, highly moral and just, better than the Communist idea. The US should have a positive foreign policy. This policy should be the universal application of the self-determination of nations, and of the liberation of oppressed peoples. "We must be revolutionists in this age of Marx, and prove that where Marx was wrong in his approach to a fundamental problem—Thomas Jefferson was right in his approach to the same problem". (See the letter to *The New York Times* by Robert W. Hill, Berkeley, Cal., Nov. 18, 1951).

V. VASYLIV.

*Hugh Seton-Watson, THE EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION. Fred A. Praeger, New York, 1951, XV, 406 pp. \$5.50.*

Among the many books which have appeared in the past decade on Eastern Europe, this work holds a special place. Eastern Europe in the conception of the author is the area between the Baltic Sea on the north, the Mediterranean on the south, the borders of Germany, Austria and Italy on the west and the borders of the Soviet Union on the east. By these he means the present boundaries and he excludes from consideration the Baltic states as well as West Ukraine and West Byelorussia which have been taken into the USSR. The digestion of these relatively small areas by the great body of the Soviet Union has hidden and is hiding a great mass of problems and is also a problem of itself, but the author does not go into that. He sets forth broadly, impartially and objectively the problems connected with the sovietization of the "independent" nations of Eastern Europe, without leaving out the exceptions as Greece and to a certain degree Yugoslavia.

The author who lectures on modern history at University College, Oxford, and who published some years ago a basic work, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941*, is excellently acquainted with his subject. He uses sources in the Slavic languages as well as in Hungarian and Rumanian. He has recently been in the countries which he discusses here. He passes over no question in silence or by generalization, but he seeks out the problems, discusses them exhaustively and draws the correct conclusions. He has preceded the main part of the book with an introduction in which he traces the political, social and economic position of the

different countries up to World War I and later. Here he has not hesitated to make some bold generalizations on all the countries of Eastern Europe beginning with Poland and Czechoslovakia and ending with Albania and Greece.

These are only side values of the work. We consider its main value to lie in the systematic presentation of the events after World War II and in the definite conclusions which the author draws. It is a structurally difficult task to put in a connected narrative, without the use of tables or other graphic representations a mass of material which deals with 12 nations without repetitions or omissions and the author has solved the problem in a masterly manner.

The author as an Englishman does not conceal the fact that the Western great powers, more ignorantly than deliberately, aided the Soviets in strengthening their position in Eastern Europe. He shows expressly that the Americans handed General Vlasov over to the Soviets for execution as they did to the Communist Hungarian government such Hungarian statesmen as Szalasi, Sztojai, Imredy, Barossy, etc. He does not blame the English and American statesmen. "That leaders and public in Britain and America took an optimistic view of their Soviet co-belligerents was due to the general ignorance of the nature and aims of communism for which the main responsibility must fall on those who ruled the democracies between 1917 and 1939. Western policy from 1941 to 1945 was neither very clever nor very noble."

From his brief mentions of Ukraine and the Ukrainians, we can see that the author is well oriented in this problem, although it largely is outside the framework of his book. He knows, for example, that the treatment of the Ukrainians in Poland and Rumania up to 1939 was worse than the treatment of the Germans in those countries. He knows that the Greek Catholic (Uniat) Church in Galicia was a Ukrainian national church and as such had to be liquidated by the Bolsheviks in 1945. He is well informed about the UPA and even quotes (p. 110) the publication of Mykola Lebid *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*, 1946, which he regards as "of considerable interest", although the statements of Lebid "must be taken with some caution." The author also discusses at some length the Curzon Line, although he does not cross it.

The views of the author on the nationalism of the Eastern European countries are very valuable. This he calls "defensive nationalism." It is the feeling of nations whose national culture and individuality is threatened with extinction." (p. 383).

*"Westerners should be careful in their denunciation of East European nationalism. The dreary rivalries and territorial squabbles of small nations should indeed be condemned as a nuisance to peace and a tragic waste of national energies. But defence of national individuality against an alien totalitarian Moloch is neither ignorable nor ridiculous. Western nations have never faced such a threat. No one questions their nationality, they do not have to defend it. The Eastern European nations have their back to the wall. If the West cannot help them, it need not insult them."* (p. 384).

J. FEDYNSKYJ.

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## RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM OR COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

(Remarks on the margin of the articles by Prof. M. Karpovich published  
in *The New Leader*, June 4 and 11, 1951).

by Prof. ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

Over three years ago Isaac Don Levin, a critical student of Soviet affairs wrote the following statement: "It has finally become self-evident... that Russian imperialism is as much a part of the Soviet order as German imperialism was part of National Socialism and there never was a chance of preserving peace in equal partnership with the Soviet Union." (*Plain Talk*, Nov., 1947, p. 3). Russian patriotism forced Karpovich into the front line to separate the old Russian imperialism from the present Soviet imperialism. The editors of *The New Leader* put in a note for the discussion with a question misleading for Americans formulated as follows: "Are we fighting Communism of the Russian nation." In our opinion the Russian nation is one thing and Russian imperialism another. The best friends of the Russian nation (I regard myself one of them) uncompromisingly fought and will continue to fight Russian imperialism in the very best interest of the Russian nation itself. What special privilege for its preservation can Russian imperialism claim in comparison with English, German, French or Italian?

Prof M. Karpovich gives a whole series of splendid parallels between the imperialisms of European powers, but they all "limp" on one foot or both; all his arguments are aiming to substantiate the following theses (used immediately by professional defenders of Russian imperialism in their articles, cf. Eugene Lyons, *Freeman*, August 17, 1951):

"Pre-revolutionary Russian imperialism was essentially no different from the imperialisms of the other great powers. The Russian Empire was a conventional one; its policies were traditional imperialist policies. Neither its emergence nor its expansion needs to be explained by allusions to "Russian messianism" or to peculiar traits of the "Russian character." If there is an illusory identity between pre-revolutionary and Soviet foreign policy, it stems from the objects of expansion... One can hardly conclude from this that the aims, methods and general character of both imperialisms are the same."

All these dogmatic theses, for the defense of Russian imperialism, are quite debatable and "contain a great deal of historical stylization." Unconvincing also are Karpovich's attacks on Prof. Jan Kucharzewski, whose book "*The Origins of Modern Russia*" brought into the Russia-worship of the current American research some objective approach to the subject, based on documentary sources. In our opinion, there is no doubt that old Muscovy must be placed outside "Europe" and

therefore it is a question whether "the rise of Moscow is a chapter in the modern history of Europe as a whole," or whether it is rather the rise of an Asiatic force against Europe as a whole. We doubt that Russian messianism and character can be disregarded in the rise of Russian imperialism. The works of Dostoyevsky penetrated the whole Russian intelligentsia and even Alfred Rosenberg and Nazism. Some Russians did not need the advice to lie, Asia gave them earlier and better Machiavellis from Chinese sources through the practice of the Tatars, their teachers. (*The History of Diplomacy*, Vol. 1., Moscow, A. Svechin, *Evolution of Military Art.*, 2. Vol., Moscow, 1927-28). Is it really true that "the Soviet Union still occupies the same space as the Russian empire did before it"? What about the satellites and Mongolia which in fact belong to the Soviet Empire? Prof. M. Karpovich concealed the essential problem of all imperialism, the modern nationality and colonial problem—in order not to give full support to Mr. Dean Acheson's statement. Every imperialism has two faces. Prof. Karpovich limits himself, and he does it deliberately, to the exterior, outside face, to the aims, methods and general character of the foreign policy; but has not every imperialism also an inside content, aims, methods and general character regarding the victims of imperialism? Is it, from the historical point of view, methodically right not to take this interior side into account in a comparison of imperialisms?

The whole discussion can not be limited to the point of view of the Russian historians, representing the Russian patriotic schools, but we must hear the historians of the non-Russian nationalities who represent the victims of Russian imperialism, and can compare the practice of Russian imperialism with, let us say, the British. In answer we say: European imperialism embracing gradually the whole globe contributed to the Europeanization of the whole world.

Russian imperialism which annihilated the statehood of Ukraine, and subjugated civilized peoples on her western borders the Poles, Ukrainians, Byelo-Ruthenians and Karelians, and later the highly civilized Armenians and Georgians, de-Europeanized these nationalities and forced them to a lower cultural and spiritual level by separating them from the Western European family of nations and their civilization. Consequently, Russian imperialism was essentially anti-European, anti-Catholic, anti-Protestant, anti-Jewish and it played the same role in Asia.

Why is this? —

M. Gorky may be right in declaring cruelty to be a special fault of the Russian common man (for which perhaps the climate is to blame). Gorky's statement can be applied, in our opinion, only to a part of the Russian peasantry. (In 1923 M. Gorky published a special article about the cruelty of the Russian peasantry). Russian imperialism remained in a state of stagnation in its ideological evolution, as primitive brutal force. Russian imperialism represents the antithesis of the European.

What European power gave to history in modern times such a monster as the hangman Muravyov, or such an ideology as the falsified *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (from a French source), or organized such pogroms of the "alien" non-Russian nationalities, their cultures, languages, churches?

On the contrary, the European, the English imperialism in fact contributed to the cultural development of the peoples of the Empire. Unlike European imperialism, Russian imperialism never respected the individuality of the non-Rus-

sian nationalities, their languages, cultures, traditions, churches. Russian imperialism was totalitarian and the idea of a multinational Empire was absolutely foreign to its policy. This totalitarianism aimed at the complete Russification by terror of all "aliens," of their culture, languages and churches. Intolerance, a complete absence of any respect for law and the rights of the non-Russian peoples characterizes it. Russification is the primary aim. Its secondary purpose is the economic exploitation of the non-Russian elements.

To sum up: Russian imperialism is essentially different from European; the Russian Empire was not a "conventional" one; its policies were not of the "traditional" European type. Its rise and expansion require special explanation.

Have we really after the World War I to do not with Russian imperialism, but with Communist aggression? In our opinion this thesis is at least debatable, but we respect the Russian patriotism of Prof. M. Karpovich in finding a difference between Russian and Soviet imperialism.

We stress the fact that present Communist imperialism is essentially as anti-European as pre-war Russian was. The Eurasiatic ideology played an important role among Russian intellectuals in exile between World War I and II and Stalin's proved statement to the Japanese foreign minister during World War II: "I am an Asiatic" states the same ideology.

As once Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Ingria, Finland, Karelia, Byelo-Ruthenia were de-Europeanized by terror behind a Russian Imperial Iron Curtain, so now in the same way are de-Europeanized the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, East-Germany and East-Austria behind a Russian Communist Curtain. These peoples are forced down to a lower cultural and spiritual level by Soviet Moscow, being separated from the Western European family of nations and their civilization. Communist imperialism is essentially anti-European, anti-Catholic, anti-Protestant, anti-Jewish.

The attack of Prof. Karpovich on the United Nations action in Korea shows his real feeling. America and England act with the United Nations in the interest of freedom and European civilization, but at the same time the Russian Soviet satellites undergo barbarization.

This example brings us to the next point. The present Communist imperialism is faithful to the old methods of Russian imperialism and only increases the use of brutal force to an incredible degree, even beyond the cruelty of oprichniks.

The Communist policy toward all non-Russian nationalities is a refinement of the old policy of Russian imperialism, aiming at the Russification of all non-Russian peoples, including their cultures and languages, which are put under Russian strict censorship.

To sum up: Communist imperialism was and is essentially the continuation of the old Russian imperialism. And now we ask: can there be any doubt that this Communist imperialism was and is conducted by Russians and as a Russian imperialism?

Any imperialism has its bearer — a nation, functioning as a dynamo of expansion and aggression. The Communist imperialism is directed by Russians and Russian "neophytes."

The Russian proletariat under the leadership of a large part of Russian intelligentsia gradually proclaimed themselves the heirs of the old Russian empire, of the classical Russian language and of the old Russian culture and literature.

The Russians in the Soviet Union, developed the "big brother" theory, with the "great" Russian nation including Ivan the Terrible, and Peter I, and the "great" Russian language and finally proclaiming Russian as the language of the world proletariat and advanced humanity. Was and is all this not Russian imperialism? All the Communist oppositions in the national republics accused the Russian party of fostering old Russian imperialism and not of "Communist aggression."

"Leninism, according to the classic definition of Comrade Stalin, is the highest achievement of Russian culture, the peak of development of Russian social thought. In Lenin's doctrine every individual's dreams of freedom are verbally realized. Leninism is the heir of everything created by Russian culture and Russian social thought... Leninism is the highest expression of Russian patriotism..." (*Bolshevik*, No. 2. Jan. 1944) .

After the war this Russian political and cultural imperialism was imposed now on all satellites, Russian language, literature (with the old classic one), art and music are forced by terrorism upon all the non-Russian satellites and all their ties with Western Europe are forcibly broken. All this is not Russian imperialism but Communist aggression? Why does international "Communist" aggression not force upon them English or Esperanto?

There can be no doubt that this Russian imperialism is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Russians inside the Soviet Union, and also outside. The obstinate refusal of the Russian emigres to grant programatically independence to the victims of this Russian imperialism, to the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, is the proof of it.

We fully agree with the opinion of the Russian philosopher Berdyaev, who regards Bolshevism-Communism as the third form of Russian Imperialism (after the first form, Muscovy and Russia, the Second). Since it is blended with the old Russian messianism, it is at the same time nationalistic and universal. Russian imperialism is merged with Communism into one whole; Communist aggressions were and are the expressions of Russian imperialism. The Russian nation, its dreams of world conquest and aspirations, are the basis of this political phenomenon, (which has now restored to Alaska the name of "Russian America") excellently formulated in the saying: "Moscow is the head of the whole world." Without the Russian nation and its mentality Communist aggression would be impossible.

Let us finally review the arguments of Prof. Karpovich, with which he attempts to show that a difference exists between the old "Russian imperialism" and its present continuation in Russian Communist form, terming it "Communist aggression."

The activities of the Politburo are "global," the activities of the old Russian imperialism were limited: What about the Ukas of 1821, which closed the entire North Pacific from the Bering straits to the fifty-first parallel to the trade and navigation of any foreign power, provoking the Monroe doctrine? Did not Russia extend her feelers towards Siam? What about the activities of Ashinov and Leontyev in Abyssinia under Alexander III? Russian imperialism was global, the



difference between the old and new Russian imperialism is not in its "extent" but in its intensity, dependent on the fact that then the world still lived in the age of the horse but now of the aeroplane and technocracy, used in modern propaganda.

The old Russian empire was not an "ideocracy" and can, therefore, not be compared with the present Soviet Union with its "Marxism-Leninism." All attempts of Prof. Karpovich to minimize the importance of the Third Rome idea, of Pan Slavism, in reality, Pan-Russianism, of Russian Messianism, are unconvincing. Writers like Dostoyevski strengthened that imperialistic tendency among the whole intelligentsia and nearly all great Russian poets have dark pages in treating the oppressed non-Russian nationalities, the Ukrainians, Poles and the Caucasians and their struggle for liberty against Russian imperialism. We do not deny the existence of "liberal" trends among the Russian elite, but they were foreign to the Muscovite soul and led to no positive results.

Prof. Karpovich states that with the Communist "fifth column" something fundamentally new appeared on the historical scene. A great mistake! Old Russian imperialism systematically used the "fifth column" method during the partitions of the Polish Commonwealth, against Turkey in the Balkans, and against Austria-Hungary, where it developed a special Russophile group for combating the Ukrainian independence movement; the Russian Orthodox priests worked to this end even on the American continent. ("*Svoboda*", Jersey City, N. J., Sept. 22, 1901 informs us that the Russian Orthodox priests demanded from Ukrainian Catholics the following oath: Do you believe in the holy Synod? Answer: I do. Do you promise to obey the Tsar? Answer: I do.)

There can be found no basic difference between the old Russian imperialistic concept of security and that of the present Russian Communist. The old Russian concept aimed not only "at the territorial security of the nation, but at the political security of the regime in power." The present Russian Communist regime considers it necessary for security reasons to "Stalinize" the neighboring satellites, as the old Tsarist Russian regime used the same method toward the previous neighboring states, the Ukrainian Kozak State, the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, Finland, Caucasus. Both regimes stand a common ground in their security concepts, that is: Fear of freedom.

The further we study the remarks of Mr. Acheson the more we realize the truth of his analysis and the weaknesses of the arguments of Prof. Karpovich. As the crisis grows steadily deeper we have hopes of greater depth of understanding but we see few signs of this in the arguments of the distinguished professor.

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## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

**"WHAT THE KREMLIN FEARS MOST,"** by Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller.  
*The Saturday Evening Post*, October 27, 1951, Philadelphia, Pa.

A studious reading of this exceptionally instructive essay by one of Britain's leading military authorities causes one to wonder why some of our own intelligence experts have failed to present to the public a similar account of the prevailing situation behind the Iron Curtain. In essence, what the Kremlin fears most is a new revolution, not so much a Russian revolution as a non-Russian uprising among the many subjugated nations in the Soviet Empire. As this well-informed writer puts it, the Soviets wage a cold war because they can't wage a hot one, and the salient facts he assembles to justify this sound thesis are impressively solid and firm.

With a striking clarity of thought and observation, this prominent authority is careful to distinguish between the substance of traditional Russian imperialism in its contemporary Soviet make-up and the outward form of ideological communism, "for as the Pan-Slavism of Czarist Russia was but a catch-word for Russian imperialism, so today Communism is but the catchword for Bolshevik imperialism—the most ruthless the world has ever known." His familiarity with the uneasy explosive relation of the non-Russian peoples to the Kremlin imperialists is plainly intimate and substantial. The practice of national genocide, the 42% non-Russian composition of the Soviet army, the economic and military significance of intractable Ukraine and many other preeminent features of the East European situation are completely treated in this remarkable article. The frank evaluation of our narrow defensive policy, as given at length by the author, certainly goes a long way to explain why the initiative has been consistently left in the hands of the Kremlin.

The concrete proposal to which this daring and enlightening analysis finally leads is this: "Because from past history there is no reason to suppose that a change of regime in Moscow will call a halt to the age-old urge of Russian expansion, the aim of the Western powers should coincide with the aim of the A.B.N." This in short, means the liberation and independence of all the non-Russian nations now in Soviet

Russian bondage. It is somewhat odd that European observers should have a keener perspective of these East European matters than some of our publicly extolled "Russian experts" at this stage of our development. One is reminded of another European's reflections in the last century, De Tocqueville who, in his "Democracy in America" (Part I, Ch. XIX), well observed: "The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the other by the sword."

"MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS (1951 A. D.)," by the International Rescue Committee. *The New York Times*, October 30, 1951, New York.

In one of its periodic appeals for public support of its momentous work, the I.R.C., under the able direction of Mr. David Martin, commences with this telling statement—"Upwards of 3,000,000 peasants in the Ukraine, their women and children, were murdered by the Soviet regime in the man-made famine and mass deportations attending the farm collectivization program in the early 1930's. The crime was beyond belief. It was not believed. Few authoritative voices in the civilized world were raised in protest and indeed, those who called attention to this immense crime were vilified." Now the pattern is repeated elsewhere, and this organization, which deserves every measure of unstinting support, aims to extend its operations in aiding the victims of Soviet tyranny. Unfortunately, there are countless Americans yet who wax skeptical when confronted with this or similar information on what has been transpiring in the Soviet prison of nations.

"WEAPON AGAINST RUSSIA," by Leonard J. Snow. *The Sign*, National Catholic Magazine, March, 1951, Union City, New Jersey.

The sub-caption of this remarkable and enlightening article on the character and national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples imprisoned in the Soviet Union conveys the essence of the general theme developed by this obviously well-informed writer. "Not a super atom bomb nor a powerful jet plane, but the principle of self-determination for miscalled Russians is the weapon to beat the Kremlin." This claim is securely founded on the basic facts brought out in the article. The erroneous identification made by many indiscriminating American readers of the "Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics" and "Russia" is scored at the very beginning. The substantial continuity of Russian imperialism in its contemporary Soviet garb receives due emphasis, and the dominant factor of nationalism among the restless Ukrainians, Georgians, Byelorussians etc. is expertly treated.

The writer demonstrates admirably his appreciation of this cultural and political factor in the general anti-Soviet campaign, which cannot be said of the many "fuzzy-minded" observers, to use the words of former President Hoover, who argue that nationalism is an evil. As the latter declared recently at the ninth annual youth forum of the Daily Mirror in New York, "lasting peace must include full maintenance of the independence and self-government of nations. The cooperation of independent nations is the only foundation upon which international peace can be permanently built and sustained. In self-government lies the safety and guarantee of individual rights." With this essay serving as an excellent background, the chief point made by Mr. Hoover as to nationalism being the ultimate source of redemption of the enslaved peoples from the tyranny of the Kremlin becomes doubly meaningful.

**"THE SOVIET UNION AS REPORTED BY FORMER SOVIET CITIZENS,"** report No. 1. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of STATE, August, 1951, Washington, D. C.

This interesting report is based on interviews with former Soviet citizens who naturally remain unnamed sources of information. As in all such spot interviews, the reader must discount much for the technique itself, as a poor substitute for historical knowledge and logical perspective, is subject to considerable criticism regarding the nature of the questions, the people interviewed, the scope of sampling, the subjectivity of many evaluations etc. However, the content of pages sixteen and seventeen in the report is quite revealing, for it supports in many respects the factually founded interpretation taking hold today with respect to the non-Russian problem in the Soviet Union. The spurious display of Great Russian superiority, the non-Russian hostility toward the Great Russians, the official Russification of Ukraine, and Soviet Russian fear of maintaining armies of non-Russians without the extensive mingling with Russians are clearly brought out in the course of this particular interview, the character of which strongly suggests that the interviewed was not a Ukrainian nationalist.

**"THE GLOBAL PROPAGANDA WAR AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE,"** by Hon. Pat. McCarran. *The Congressional Record*, August 6, 1951, Washington, D. C.

The dominant ideas incorporated in this speech by the distinguished Senator of Nevada are not only powerful but bluntly realistic. His emphasis on a well-planned propaganda offensive, the realization that we are in a war with the Soviets, the necessary divorce of ourselves "from the lingering illusions that we can placate or buy off the Kremlin gang," and on the forthright use of our allies behind the Iron Curtain certainly constitute a veritable contribution toward the growing American realism toward Russia.

The force and strength of these ideas are, unfortunately, reduced by the obviously poor selection of alleged facts advanced to base his theoretic observations. In his opening sentences the Senator discloses that the source of his information is the testimony that was given before his Appropriations Subcommittee and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. It is unnecessary to review some of the names that figured in these testimonies in order to account for some of this so-called information. Let it merely be said that the Senator, in informing himself on East European issues, could have profited immensely from several of the hearings these past two years before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

For instance, we are told that "Our propaganda will be wasted effort unless it makes a clear distinction between Russia and the Soviet Union; between the subjects and their masters." It is clear what the Senator intends to convey here, as regards the Russian people and their regime, but why does this necessitate a distinction which can only be predicated on sound ethnographic grounds? Ethnically Russia is not synonymous with the Soviet Union, and the application sought for above is nonsensical unless one is fanatically or ignorantly imbued with the baseless notion of Russia in the tradition of Russian imperialist usage. It is evident that the Senator is unaware of all this in view of his constant reference to the "Russian peoples," which, again, is nonsense. His confusion is further magnified later when he makes mention of Ukrainians. Are they Russians? It would seem so from the Senator's account for he presumes to tell us "of the extent to which the Russians at first welcomed the German invaders as liberators" and after the war "about half a million typical Russians... chose not to go back home." As described, no such events ever occurred. It is well established factually and statistically that Ukrainians did welcome the Germans and that the chief bulk of Soviet refugees

is made up of Ukrainians. Moreover, the Senator evinces little understanding of the national liberation movements on the part of the majority of non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union, but one could scarcely anticipate this when apparently for him only Russians exist in this political entity. Surely any advancement of ideas for psychological warfare presupposes an essential knowledge of at least the peoples you plan to appear to.

**"SITUATION IN FORMER EASTERN PROVINCES OF POLAND DESCRIBED,"** by *The Christian Democratic News Service*. The Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, October 15, 1951, Washington, D. C.

Obtaining this account from the Polish weekly "Polak," published in the British Zone of Germany, this organ reports that up "until 1948 Polish-Ukrainian guerilla units were still very active in the Bialowieza Forest and in the Carpathian Mountains..." The cessation of this combined activity since then is attributed to the deportation of the population in that vicinity by the Russians. Most illuminating is this overall observation that "In contrast to the period of Nazi occupation, relations between the Polish and Ukrainian populations are excellent. The attitude of the Russian authorities towards the Poles and the Ukrainians is the same, and, in consequence, these peoples have developed an attitude of complete tolerance toward each other joining their efforts to resist Communization and Russification." This spirit of cooperation has been amply reflected in numerous quarters of Polish political leadership in Western Europe. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Polish-American leadership which from time to time sees fit to satisfy the chauvinist desires of its rank-and-file that is so pathetically out of touch with the above developments by reviving petty territorial differences in these moments of mortal danger.

**"THE SOVIET UNION IN AMERICAN ENCYCLOPAEDIAS,"** by Roman Smal Stocki. *The Educational Reviewer*, July 15, 1951, New York, N. Y.

The learned author of this first of two articles analyzing the accounts given of the Soviet Union in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 19, 1950, unquestionably pulls no punches. Armed with extensive historical knowledge and logical insight, he demonstrates, in effect, the existence of an intellectual racket in the field of scholarship on the Soviet Union. It is not possible here to recount his many significant criticisms of this

spurious display of scholarship, but a few notable examples can be cited to establish the general point.

"Russia is synonymized with the "Soviet Union," and the term "Russians" is employed to embrace "all the citizens of the Soviet Union." The terminological hodgepodge by no means ends here. In the article on Defense we are told of the appearance of the "Russian" fleet in 860 A. D., despite the fact that no political entity called "Russia" even existed then. And as our powerful critic stresses, "It is incredible, but it is a matter of fact, that the whole history of Russian modern imperialism and aggression is here summed up under the title "Defense." As concerns the majority that non-Russian peoples have in the Soviet Union, the reader of these encyclopaedia articles is left with as much knowledge as he started with. It is a sad commentary, indeed, that this valuable source of general knowledge should be marked by a mass of misinformation, bias, and perhaps even calculated misrepresentation.

"THE SOVIET UNION IN AMERICAN ENCYCLOPAEDIAS," by Roman Smal-Stocki. *The Educational Reviewer*, October 15, 1951, New York, N. Y.

In this second vitally interesting analysis dealing with twenty-seven articles devoted to the Soviet Union in the *Encyclopaedia Americana*, Vol. 27, 1951, the pungency and force of the author's well directed criticisms are even more impressive. He is evidently so confident of the correctness of his facts that he ventures to assert in a challenging mood: "If a freshman at Marquette University were to write something of the sort in an examination for the course 'Survey of Slavic Nations,' he would hardly earn a passing mark; but in the *Encyclopaedia Americana* this information appears over the signature of Ernest J. Simmons, Executive Officer, Department of Slavic Languages, Columbia University, and he confers Ph. D. degrees on American students." This statement, based on the latter's amateur treatment of the Russian language in relation to others, might well be applied to the other names cited in this remarkable expose.

"COMING: A RUSSIAN REVOLUTION?," by Boris Shub. *This Week Magazine*, July 15, 1951, New York.

A rapid survey is presented here of several private bodies aiming to sow the seeds of a coming Russian revolution by producing a cleavage between the Russian people and their Moscow government. Doubtlessly the objective is a commendable one if it could be realized. The imposing evidence against this hoped-for outcome is not difficult to assemble.

So long as the author refers to the "Russian people" as such, one can follow his account clearly; but when he begins to speak of the non-existent "Russian peoples," he begins to confuse the issue. A revolution on the part of the more numerous non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union, for which conditions are by far more ripe, will assuredly not be "A Russian Revolution."

"PATRIARCHS USE RELIGION AS "THE OPIATE," an editorial. — *America*, August 11, 1951, New York.

The caption of this editorial captures the spirit of the novel appeal issued last July 23 by the Orthodox Patriarch of "Moscow and all the Russians" to Christians of the whole world in the defense of peace. Despite the high moral tone of the appeal and its frequent recourse to the authority of Holy Scripture, it unmistakably betrays the pathetic subservience of the Orthodox Patriarch to the will of the Kremlin, much in the manner of their predecessors to the White Tsars of the past. The opiate represents Russia and its non-Russian satellites as the champions of world peace, while—can you guess?—the United States is the diabolical spirit of our times. This is the measure of sacred pollution in Russia, *per se*.

"EUROPEAN NATIONS NOT REPRESENTED IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE," a report. *Europe, Today and Tomorrow, International Bulletin of the European Movement*, June, 1951, Brussels, Belgium.

In this report of the European Movement toward a United Europe, special cognizance is given to the problem of Central and East European refugees with the obvious intention of establishing and maintaining relations with organized exile groups toward the general objective of aiding the movement. Resolution one of the Assembly significantly states, "That the Special Committee enter into relations with the organizations which are competent to study and report on the internal problems of the States cut off from the Western world, in order that the knowledge, experience, documentary material and suggestions of such organizations may be made available in connection with the activities of the Council of Europe." The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, which is a member of the American Committee on United Europe, has consistently urged such close relations for the real possibility of a united Europe entails by definition all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea.

L. E. D.



