


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UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



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
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PICTURE ON THE COVER: Every summer, since July, 1959, millions of Americans have been observing "Captive Nations Week," in accordance with the Congressional Resolution which subsequently became the law of the land (Public Law 86-90). When the Resolution was signed into law by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959, it provoked rage on the part of Nikita S. Khrushchev and his communist minions throughout the Soviet Russian communist empire. Since 1959 the three Presidents of the United States of America: President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the late President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson—have issued special Presidential Proclamations of "Captive Nations Week" on the third week of July, recommending that the American people re-dedicate their efforts towards the final liberation of all the captive nations of the world. The photograph shows the public observance of "Captive Nations Week," sponsored by American organizations dedicated to the cause of the captive nations, held on Sunday, July 14, 1964 at the United Nations Plaza in New York City.

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE:

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Professor of Economics at Georgetown University; President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the fifth consecutive term; Chairman of the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D. C.; former faculty member of the National War College; author and lecturer; in November, 1964, he took part in the annual conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) in Taipei, Taiwan; recipient of Shevchenko Scientific Society medal.

LEO HEIMAN, an Israeli correspondent of several European and American newspapers and magazines, and contributor to such reviews as *The National Jewish Monthly*, *The Reconstructionist* and *Maariv Lanoar*, and others. His present article is based on a review of a Soviet film with an anti-American and anti-Ukrainian theme, which is being extensively shown throughout the Middle East by the Soviet Embassies.

M. MELNYK, Ph. D., is Assistant Professor of Economics at Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. He studied in Germany and Belgium, where he obtained a doctor's degree in economics at the University of Louvain. He is the author of *Les Ouvriers etrangers en Belgique* (Foreign Labor in Belgium). He is the author of many articles on Soviet affairs in the Ukrainian and English languages.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Ph. D., author, co-author, editor and co-editor of some 90 books, has written articles for leading American and foreign periodicals; was Visiting Professor in numerous American, Canadian and European colleges and universities; at present is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology, University of Bridgeport.

GEORGE SAVOR, is the pen name of a prominent Western businessman who recently spent several months in the Soviet Union, negotiating export-import contracts on behalf of his firm. Born in 1902 in Kishinev, he is an astute observer and accurate reporter of events behind the Iron Curtain. His first article, based on his impressions of Ukraine, appeared in the Spring, 1965 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*. Now his article, as related to Mr. Leo Heiman, our correspondent, deals with the Soviet Russian exploitation of Moldavia.

TOWARD ESCALATION OF FREEDOM

Editorial

A few months ago, in our editorial, "The Self-Destructive American Foreign Policy" (cf. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 4, Winter, 1964), we analyzed critically some of the major trends of U.S. foreign policy, specifically as it pertains to the Soviet Union and the captive nations. We noted that it had all the characteristics of the well-known phrase, that of *appeasement*, although the essence and inner meaning of the world is now couched more euphoniously, such as "peaceful coexistence," "accommodation" and *detente*, all of which is meant to arrange a makeshift settlement with the Communist world and to continue the normal course of life. Officially America remains totally oblivious of the ultimate objective of Moscow and Peking—our total destruction as a free nation and as the bulwark of the free world in the fullest sense of the word.*

But much has happened since last fall, when these words were written. Despite overwhelming pressures in this country to "negotiate" with the North Vietnamese communist puppets, and despite the clamor of timid allies in Europe and elsewhere, the United States has managed an upright posture and has shown a surprisingly powerful determination to uphold its commitments in South Vietnam, and for that matter, in the whole of Southeast Asia. This American determination was eloquently expressed by President Lyndon B. Johnson recently:

Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary. In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires. We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we

* This editorial was set in print before the developments in Santo Domingo and the landing of U.S. troops on that island.

do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of meaningless agreement...¹

These strong words were followed by equally meaningful action on the part of the United States: the stepping up of air raids against the Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam and against strategic targets in North Vietnam; the beefing up of U.S. troops by sending in several thousands of combat-trained U.S. Marines, and also a proposal to help Southeast Asia in its economic development once the threat of Communist aggression from Hanoi, Peking and Moscow is permanently removed from the area.

CLAMOR FOR "DESCALATION" OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

It is to the credit of the Johnson Administration that the U.S. posture as a powerful nation in the world and as the leader of the free countries has regained its proper strength and perspective in the eyes of the world. True, here and there appeasers and apologists of Communism are making much noise in denouncing U.S. actions in North Vietnam. It is also true that among these vehement critics are people who could not at any time be defined as Communists or even sympathizers. Their stand on Vietnam, however, is identical with that of Communist Russia, Hanoi and even Communist China.

Such informed men as U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or U.S. Senator Ernest Gruening, Democrat of Alaska, continue their pressure for a let-up on Hanoi, the source of aggression against South Vietnam. Likewise, the leftist Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) is also very vocal in the new drive for "descalation" of U.S. action in Vietnam, and so is the Rev. Martin Luther King. They are making pathological appeals for withdrawal to the United States Government without so much as a mention of the Viet Cong as the principal culprit of aggression and the tool of Red China and Moscow. Recently Secretary of State Dean Rusk bitterly denounced such vociferous critics, especially the shameless agitation among some of the foremost U.S. universities and colleges where American students, in-

¹ *Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia*. President Lyndon B. Johnson. Address delivered at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on April 7, 1965.

stead of denouncing the communist escalation of war in Vietnam, condemn the U.S. Government for trying to prevent the communist-takeover of Southeast Asia.

Speaking before the American Society of International Law recently, Mr. Rusk vehemently stated:

I continue to hear and see nonsense about the nature of the struggle there. I sometimes wonder at the gullibility of educated men and the stubborn disregard of plain facts by men who are supposed to be helping our young to learn—especially to learn how to think...

Let us be clear about what is involved today in Southeast Asia. We are not involved with empty phrases or conceptions which ride upon the clouds. We are talking about the vital national interests of the United States in the peace of the Pacific. We are talking about the appetite for aggression—an appetite which grows upon feeding and which is proclaimed to be insatiable. We are talking about the safety of nations with whom we are allied—and the integrity of the American commitment to join in meeting attack...

But underlying the general principles is the harsh reality that our own security is threatened by those who would embark upon a course of aggression whose announced ultimate purpose is our own destruction.

Once again we hear expressed the views which cost the men of my generation a terrible price in World War II. We are told that Southeast Asia is far away—but so were Manchuria and Ethiopia. We are told that if we insist that someone stop shooting that that is asking them for unconditional surrender. We are told that perhaps the aggressor will be content with just one more bite. We are told that if we prove faithless on one commitment that perhaps others would believe us about other commitments in other places. We are told that if we stop resisting that perhaps the other side will have a change of heart. We were asked to stop hitting bridges and radar sites and ammunition depots without requiring that the other side stop its slaughter of thousands of civilians and its bombings of schools and hotels and hospitals and railways and buses.

Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to a sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action and be saved from the frightful miscalculation that brings all to ruin. It is the purpose of law to guide men away from such events, to establish rules of conduct which are deeply rooted in the reality of experience.²

The internationally-minded and sophisticated *New York Times* has also been advocating a “descalation” policy. Its editorial of April 25, 1965 openly suggests that a proposed conference on Cambodia be utilized for peace talks, where “Americans, North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, Chinese Communists, Russians and others could talk quietly about Vietnam without commitment.”

One is at a loss for words to explain this sentence. What is the purpose of such a gathering if not to express something that no

² “Rusk Explains Why U.S. Must Stay in Vietnam,” by David Lawrence. *New York Herald Tribune*, April 26, 1965.

thinking person could believe in as feasible and logical. Of course, if India's Prime Minister Lal Shastri voices such a suggestion, his viewpoint is readily understandable in view of India's well-established position as a "neutral" country. But what of the spectacle of a great American newspaper advocating such a policy now, when young Americans are dying daily at the battlefronts of Vietnam, the battlefronts of freedom?

VIETNAM AND MUNICH: A PARALLEL

On February 23, 1965, U. S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut made a penetrating address in the U.S. Senate on the emerging U. S. "isolationism" and defeatism.³

In 1938, he pointed out, at the height of Hitler's power in Europe both Chamberlin and Churchill wanted peace. But Churchill maintained that if the free world should fail to draw the line against Hitler's aggression at an early stage, it would be compelled to draw the line under much more difficult circumstances later on. Chamberlin maintained that a confrontation with Hitler might lead to war, and that in the interests of peace Czechoslovakia had to be sacrificed. And so on.

In Vietnam today the United States is confronted with an even more hungry aggressor. If South Vietnam goes down, all of Southeast Asia would be open to Communist takeover and the "wars of national liberation." Then the Philippines and Australia would be directly threatened, and so would be the entire U.S. defense system in the central and north Pacific.

Another fallacy vehemently propagated by U. S. appeasers is that the war in Vietnam is a "civil war," and that no "foreign aggression" has been committed. Yet this aggression was conceived in Hanoi and Peking, and perhaps Moscow at an earlier stage. Khrushchev is the author of the communist strategy known as "wars of national liberation," which is now being fully implemented by Hanoi against South Vietnam. Evidence of this is the great amount of captured Russian and Chinese arms, which were sent to North Vietnam by Moscow and Peking.

U.S. CONFRONTATION: GLOBAL-SCALE DANGER

Recently, on April 13-14, 1965, the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters was held in Washington under

³ *Vietnam and the New Isolationism*. Speech of Hon. Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut in the U.S. Senate, February 23, 1965. U.S. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

the auspices of the State Department, at which high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Government thoroughly assessed U.S. foreign policy in every part of the world.

On the whole, the image of the United States is improving in the eyes of the world, although the United States is confronted with a number of eminently great dangers. While a *nuclear war* or *mass aggression* à la Korea by the Communist states is ruled out, both Moscow and Peking are pursuing a relentless policy "of wars of national liberation," which is the principal weapon of communist aggression. Moscow has tested it in a number of areas, including Cuba in 1962, and found it workable and effective in realizing the communist objectives short of all-out war.

A powerful weapon in the hands of the United States is its foreign aid program through the Agency for International Development (AID), through whose help many countries have become able to stand on their own feet, such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines. In Latin America the "Alliance for Progress" is making satisfactory headway. In many parts of the world there arise critical disputes over boundaries; these and other areas of conflict become the targets of Communist infiltration. Here collective security arrangements and dependence on U.S. power are still the best assurance against Communist takeover.

In Europe the principal issues confronting the United States are the Berlin situation and reunification of Germany, Eastern Europe and the problem of the France of President de Gaulle.

As of late, President de Gaulle has been aligning himself with anti-American forces. He has recognized Red China, and he is violently against U.S. policy in Vietnam. He is flirting openly with Moscow. General de Gaulle also threatens to disassociate himself from the NATO and SEATO systems. Recently, *The Yorkshire Post* aptly analyzed what President de Gaulle is relying on in his rebellion against the United States:

(France) will walk apart from NATO and SEATO—preferably at the head of a European grouping. In reality, however, de Gaulle is able to do this not because of French strength—which is not equal to sustaining a truly independent role—but because he knows that if it came to a crisis involving France, America could not and would not let France down.⁴

The problem of Berlin and German unification is complicated by a number of important factors, specifically, the intransigent attitude of some of the communist satellite countries (Poland and

⁴ "Awesome Moment," by William Randolph Hearst, Jr., *New York Journal-American*, April 25, 1965.

Czechoslovakia), who refuse to return to the 1939 status of the frontiers with Germany.

U.S. POSITION UNCHANGED ON CAPTIVE NATIONS IN
COMMUNIST SLAVERY

While there is notable improvement in U.S. foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia and the decisive measures taken by the United States towards securing the independence of South Vietnam, there has been no noticeable change regarding the captive nations in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

As regards the satellite countries there is curious thinking in our State Department. Specifically, circulating is a new theory that the satellite countries are well on the road to self-expression and political independence. Rumania and Poland are pointed out as examples of this trend. U.S. Eastern European experts are maintaining that in Rumania there is a strong trend coursing against Moscow, and that resistance to Russification is openly mustered by the communist government in Rumania. In Poland, these experts declare, similar processes are in evidence.

Thus the State Department is now very careful not to upset this alleged situation. In fact, U.S. officials give the impression that they do not want to try to change the situation in Eastern Europe in any way, so as not to provoke any drastic action on the part of Moscow. All this means that the Kennan doctrine of the *status quo* is being assiduously cultivated.

It so happens that the U.S. Congress holds a diametrically opposed view. This summer will see the sixth anniversary of the passage of the "Captive Nations Week Resolution," enacted by the U.S. Congress on July 17, 1959. The resolution calls on the people of the United States to dedicate themselves to the cause of the captive nations "until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world."

The resolution spells out clearly that "the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others."

It was clearly evident to the U.S. Congress that Communist Russia was the principal instigator of the enslavement of these countries. The State Department has chosen to ignore the Congressional Resolution, now Public Law 86-90, although the Resolution

made a powerful impact on the Kremlin leaders at the time. The Soviet press still wages a blistering campaign against the Resolution and the United States Congress for enacting it. Surprisingly enough, the same line is maintained by our former Ambassador to the USSR, George F. Kennan (cf. article by Lev E. Dobriansky appearing elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*—Ed.).

**
*

In standing firm in the defense of South Vietnam, the United States is not escalating a war, but is escalating the prospects of a meaningful peace in that area of the world. But a total victory over the forces of aggression and enslavement requires even more. It requires constant escalation and expansion everywhere of the powerful ideal of freedom. This ideal is of transcending importance to peoples everywhere, especially to the captive nations inside the USSR and in its outer empire.

President Johnson is to be supported wholeheartedly on his firm determination as expressed by his latest policies in Vietnam. On the other hand, the shortsightedness of U.S. policy-makers in the area of captive nations in Europe and Asia leaves much to be desired. The policies of "wars of national liberation" so expertly utilized by Moscow and Peking, should be countered by a policy of "escalation of freedom" behind the Iron, Bamboo and Sugar Curtains. Only when the potential dictators and aggressors will feel threatened by the explosive forces of freedom will they give second thoughts to continuing "wars of national liberation"—or to protecting their own hides at home.

It is to this alternative—the escalation of freedom—to which the United States must come back time and again in order to assure its victory over the creeping tyranny emanating from Moscow and Peking.

OUTSTANDING U.S. MYTHS ON THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

“This country must never recognize the situation behind the Iron Curtain as a permanent one, but must, by all peaceful means, keep alive the hopes of freedom for the peoples of the captive nations”—JOHN F. KENNEDY

In the spirit of these words uttered by our 35th President, the National Captive Nations Committee in Washington, D. C. has initiated and conducted activities that are designed to prevent any such disastrous recognition from ever coming to pass. It has guided what has come to be known as “the broad captive nations movement.” The movement has been in existence in this country since July 1959, when the U.S. Congress passed the Captive Nations Week Resolution.

For six years now this resolution, in the form of Public Law 86-90, has been the basis of steadily expanding Captive Nations Week observances each year. It has also precipitated considerable discussion and increasing thought about all the captive nations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Written material on the subject is now quite voluminous. However, there still are numerous outstanding U.S. myths on the captive nations.

An analytic review of these outstanding myths can serve a most instructive and educational purpose. In many instances it shows how petrified and warped are the various preconceptions held by some of our opinion-makers. When these are viewed objectively and dispassionately, one cannot but wonder about the extent to which their readers and listeners are misled by their groundless and, in several cases, foolish observations. A periodic examination of this kind also demonstrates the blind indifference of many commentators to developments of the most basic significance. It appears for whatever reason that superficial and transient events are of greater moment to them than are evidences of penetrating import to the adversary. Doubtlessly, the latter demand a greater measure of expended intellectual energy, both for some necessary research and detailed analysis.

To appreciate the nature and scope of these myths on the captive nations, it is necessary to consider them against a short background of recent events surrounding the Captive Nations Week observances and of certain well-founded perspectives on the captive nations. Every year since the passage of the resolution notable events regarding the observances have been recorded and elaborated upon.¹ It is sufficient here to take a brief look at some of the highlights during the period of 1963-64. The solid growth of the movement has apparently disturbed a few observers whom we shall consider later. In addition, this concise background will afford many points of contrast and comparison to the mythical notions entertained by these observers.

CAPTIVE NATIONS IN THE RECENT PAST

Months before the 1963 Captive Nations Week was proclaimed, Moscow continued to display its displeasure over the observance of the preceding year. At the very beginning of the year a Soviet Russian weekly raised the question, "Is it not high time to discontinue the 'Captive Nations Week' in the United States?" Its ostensible reason was "That is just as much a dead horse as the 'Hungarian Question.'" ² It is unnecessary to argue the merits of this position for there are none. The suggestion was part of an uninterrupted campaign to bring about a cessation of Captive Nations Week in this country. The Soviet Russian totalitarians thought they would be able to persuade President Kennedy to do this, but they hardly made a dent. The 1963 observance surpassed all preceding years.

Up to that year, for the first time the President issued his proclamation—the fifth since 1959—before the very eve of the Week. Quite appropriately, the Week was proclaimed immediately after our own Independence Day. Moscow reacted swiftly and sharply. Its Communist Party organ claimed that "the President of the United States, losing his sense of reality, has declared a 'week of the Captive Nations' and is trying to turn attention away from the struggle of the negroes for their liberation." ³ In this particular year Moscow's propagandists attempted to confuse the captive nations issue with that of civil rights, which is like mixing ice cream with sauerkraut. A Negro Radio Moscow was even set up for the purpose.

¹ E. g., see Dobriansky, Lev E. "Soviet Russian Imperio-Colonialism and the Free World," *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August-September 1963, pp. 92-97; also "Captive Nations Week 1964," *Washington Report*, American Security Council, Chicago, Illinois, July 13, 1964.

² *The New Times*, Moscow, January 23, 1963.

³ *Pravda*, Moscow, July 8, 1963.

The so-called government newspaper in this imperio-colonialist capital also gave vent to the Kremlin's feelings about the observance. The Week, it complained, "is a propagandistic trick of the American enemies of the freedom and independence of nations." ⁴ A Russian tyrant is a lover of peace, and an American patriot is an imperialist in this topsy-turvy semantics. Among the underlings in the Red Empire, North Korea was about the most vicious that year, smearing the President as a "third class clown" for proclaiming the Week and over the same Pyongyang Radio calling Captive Nations Week "a despicable animal campaign of the U.S. ruling circles." One of the comical aspects after all this and more was the release on July 15 of a letter by Andrei A. Gromyko to the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant concerning the 1965 International Cooperation Year, which had been voted upon by the 1962 U.N. General Assembly. According to the Foreign Minister of the world's worst imperio-colonialist system, 1965 should become the year of "the complete and final liquidation of the disgraceful system of colonialism." Captive Nations Week, with its emphasis on the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialist system, was already under way then!

What was the Week like in 1963? Briefly, following the President, over one half of our State Governors and four dozen Mayors proclaimed it. Congressional interest in the movement was the most enthusiastic ever, with over one-third of the House and close to a third in the Senate becoming active members of the advisory section in the National Captive Nations Committee. As in previous years, press coverage was nation-wide. *The New York Times*, *The Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Dallas Times Herald*, *The Pittsburgh Press* and numerous others carried the activities of the Week. Observances were held across the country, from Boston to Los Angeles, Washington, D. C. to Seattle. Programs in all the major cities were covered by radio and TV. Even internationally, the entire Republic of China observed the Week, and Senator Dr. Fetki Tevetoglu submitted the Resolution in the Senate of Turkey. Outstanding examples of the Week's activities were recorded in successive issues of the *Congressional Record*.⁵

The 1964 Captive Nations Week was even more impressive. First, let us note some representative comments from the totalitarian Red Empire, particularly their chosen propaganda twist for the year. Moscow radio blurted comments about a "passive" observance

⁴ *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 14, 1963.

⁵ See. e. g., "Captive Nations Week," *Congressional Record*, July 15, 1963, pp. 11823-11839.

in the United States, and *Izvestia* had this to say: "With every passing year 'Captive Nations Week' becomes a nuisance."⁶ A constant reminder of the existence of the captive nations and the hypocrisy of Russian "peaceful coexistence" is, of course, a "nuisance" from Moscow's viewpoint. The commentary even went on to say that "the reactionary American press does not make any mention of it." It also pointed out that "The stupid situation in which the Washington legislators and rulers found themselves is becoming evident even for those who earnestly propagate the imperialistic policy of the USA." Making good propaganda use of an immature editorial that appeared in *The Washington Post*, which apparently in Moscow's eyes is not a part of "the reactionary American press," Moscow compliments the paper for its "realistic understanding of the matter" and for realizing that "in a situation where the relation of power has shifted to the side of Socialism, the U.S. cannot force the peoples of the Socialist countries to adopt its standards without risking the holocaust of a world war."

We'll observe the character of the *Post* editorial later. It is a prime example of myth-making and plain ignorance. Curiously, after all this *Izvestia* ends with a longing question, "How long do the Capitol and the White House intend to amuse the world with their absurd plans?" Indeed, how they would like to get rid of the Week. Even several weeks after the observance Khrushchev couldn't restrain himself when, in a speech in Czecho-Slovakia, he shouted, "in the United States a farce entitled 'captive nations week' is held every year. The people's democratic system has been in existence for 20 years but the imperialists still ramble on with nonsensical ideas of 'liberating' the nations of eastern Europe."⁷

As indicated, the 1964 Week surpassed all others. President Johnson set a new record by issuing his proclamation on June 20. The proclamation read as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE

CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK, 1964

**
*

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212) authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue

⁶ *Izvestia*, Moscow, July 15, 1964.

⁷ *Reuters*, Banska Bystrica, Czechoslovakia, August 29, 1964.

a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS the cause of human rights and personal dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

WHEREAS this nation is firmly committed to the cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the people of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.

(SEAL)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

By the President:

DEAN RUSK
Secretary of State

In addition, for the first time the Republican National Convention held a unique and highly successful observance of the Week in San Francisco. The time of the convention was coincident with the Week. Had the Democratic Convention been held then, doubtlessly it too would have staged a fitting observance. Again, as shown by various examples in *The Congressional Record*, most of the State Governors and dozens of Mayors proclaimed the Week.⁸ The press across the Nation publicized the event, e. g., *The Los Angeles Herald Examiner*, *The Miami Herald*, *The Chicago Tribune*, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, *The Boston Globe*, *The San Francisco Chronicle*, *The Buffalo Courier-Express* and so forth. Radio and TV also covered it as, for example, the Georgetown University Forum, NBC, the *Daily News* station in New York and numerous others. And internationally, the Republic of China witnessed the largest observance ever, and later at the 10th Conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League

⁸ See "The 1964 Captive Nations Week and House Resolution 14," *Congressional Record*, August 20, 1964, pp. 20048-20062; also "U.S. Observance of Captive Nations Week..." August 21, 1964, pp. 20156-20164.

in Taipei, delegates and observers from over forty nations unanimously passed a Captive Nations resolution, calling for a World Congress of Captive Nations.⁹ In short, the observance was so "passive" that some six weeks after the observance even Khrushchev kept lambasting the event.

SOME GUIDELINES ON THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

A prime objective of Soviet Russian diplomacy and propaganda is the systematic deprivation of this powerful weapon to our use and development in the cold war. As the ultimate and decisive power center of so-called world communism, Moscow has for years persistently sought the complete acquiescence of Free World interests to the permanent captivity of nations and peoples brought under its imperial yoke and influence since the early 20's. Non-aggression treaties, the abuse of non-interference in "internal affairs" principle, and sheer ignorance on the part of foreign statesmen have been some of the avenues in Moscow's operational approach to this objective. All three, coupled with the exaggerated threat of thermo-nuclear war, are methodically employed today. So is Moscow's deceptive strategy of "peaceful coexistence," to which Rudyard Kipling gave the answer many decades ago:

"When he stands up as if pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise;
When he veils the hate and cunning in his little swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer;
That is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!"

Essentially, the tremendous strategic importance of the captive nations to U.S. and Free World interest rests on three requisite considerations: (1) a vivid understanding of the total captive nations concept, (2) a consequent appreciation of the most basic source of weakness and vulnerability in Peiping's and Moscow's totalitarian imperia, and (3) a developed recognition of the opportunities provided by the captive nations for para-military, cold war operations beyond the patched-up wall of containment. These three considerations are organically related in the given logical sequence, the full efficacy of one being dependent on its precedent. They make up a structure of thought predicated on the genetic development of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and lendable to a ready absorption of new evidential data, including the current Sino-Soviet rift.

Considering the first requisite, the captive nations concept encompasses all the nations that directly or indirectly owe their present

⁹ "Resolutions of the 10th APACL Conference," *Free China and Asia*, Republic of China, December 1964, pp. 32-43.

state of captivity to Soviet Russian imperialist influence. These include the so-called satellites in Central Europe, the numerous non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, those under Red totalitarian control in Asia, and now Cuba. The concept may seem to be blurred by certain phenomena of state classification, independent action, or geographical distance, but both historically and logically it easily accommodates these apparent qualifications. It also helps to point out critically certain errors of thought made by our officials. For example, in an excellent address delivered by the President the mischaracterization of North Vietnam as a "country" and the omission of the North Vietnamese desiring the genuine unified independence of the Vietnamese nation, one free of the Red Empire, are cases in point.¹⁰

On the matter of political classification, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia are not nations but rather, like the Soviet Union, states composed of distinct national entities. The nations within are captive to a totalitarian apparatus imposed originally by Soviet Russian sources. As to independent action, the cases of Yugoslavia and mainland China are often brought forward, although inter-Party struggles have characterized Poland, Albania, Rumania, Ukraine, Georgia and others in the past. Regardless of the degree of "independence" shown, none of these totalitarian apparatuses could endure for long without the ultimate power maintained by the Soviet Union and its Soviet Russian base. Finally, distance may separate Cuba from the captive nations of Eurasia, but the Castro apparatus is increasingly dependent for its survival on Eurasian totalitarian resources. As Castro's sister has pointed out, "we could see as the days passed how the country was being delivered to Russian imperialism."¹¹

An outstanding American misconception is that the only captive nations are those in Central Europe. In fact, they constitute less than a third in the growing family of captive nations. This grave misconception is being steadily corrected by the observance of Public Law 86-90 (the Captive Nations Week Resolution) which advances the above concept. There is an increasing awareness, too, of the reasons behind Khrushchev's unprecedented explosion in July, 1959, over the passage of this resolution in the U.S. Congress. For the first time we officially recognized the complete family of the captive nations and also placed emphasis on those in the Soviet Union, which

¹⁰ Address on Vietnam, Johns Hopkins University, *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C. April 8, 1965.

¹¹ Castro Ruz, Juana. "I Accuse My Brother Fidel," *Free Front*, Manila, Philippines, October-November, 1964, p. 17.

alters radically the picture most Americans have of this power complex.

The development of the conceptual requisite inevitably leads to a cultivated appreciation of the most fundamental weakness and vulnerability in Moscow's totalitarian imperium. This is the invincible force of patriotic nationalism rampant throughout the entire empire and firmly rooted in the hearts and minds of the captive peoples. When the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee speaks of "Communist countries... beginning to free themselves from the blinders of Marxist-Leninist ideology and to look at the world and at their own societies in somewhat more realistic terms," his thinking is forty years late and, at that, on a beam of misinterpretation.¹² Since the inception of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism there has never been in reality a monolith of Soviet Russian dominion, whether in the Soviet Union, Central Europe, or Asia. The supposed fragmentation of the empire today is just another phase in the continuum of nationalist expression and determination that are even strongly reflected in the various totalitarian apparatuses.

Moscow's foremost problems today are the manifest result of a whole decade of captive nations' opposition and resistance to Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and the respective totalitarian regimes. Whether in East Germany in 1953 or Ukraine '50-51, Hungary '56 or Turkestan '54, Poland and Georgia '56 or mainland China '57, the story written by the people is the same. The Cold War has more than one dimension; and the captive nations vs. the totalitarian apparatus, ultimately supported by the power of Soviet Russian leadership, is a vital one in the total cold war picture. To the degree we thoroughly explore this dimension, to that extent we shall discern the many opportunities open to us for success in the dimension of our struggle with the combined totalitarian adversary. Involved also in this, as the Holy Father sagely has pointed out, is the condemnation of systems "which deny God and oppress the church, systems which are often identified with economic, social, and political regimes, amongst which atheistic communism is the chief."¹³

Such exploration and detailed study cannot but prepare us for prudent cold war operations beyond the patched-up wall of containment. It is no wonder that every year Moscow and its totalitarian allies condemn the Captive Nations Week observance. For during this time popular attention is focused on this need, on the ultimate pow-

¹² Fulbright, J. W. "The Basic Issue in Foreign Affairs," *Congressional Record*, September 8, 1964, p. 21018.

¹³ Pope Paul VI. "Ecclesiam Suam," First Encyclical Letter, *The New York Times*, August 11, 1964.

er of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, and on the necessity of exposing this power, particularly in the Soviet Union itself. With a fixed orientation toward all the captive nations, we can develop and use economic, diplomatic, cultural and other instruments, designed to increase the political leverage of individual national assertiveness among these nations and thus intensify the centrifugal forces of nationalism within the empire. In this, the prime target would be the USSR itself.

Thus, why Captive Nations Week? It is legally provided for in Public Law 86-90; as President Kennedy stressed, it is a tremendous moral symbol signifying that we Americans will never forget or acquiesce; it concentrates on our nuclear spiritual weapons; it is an effective educational medium about all the captive nations, Sino-Russian imperio-colonialism, and the Cold War; it affords a wholesome national forum for the discussion of most pressing security issues; and it consistently leads to the crystallization of concrete measures of action. Need one wonder why Moscow and its coterie seek the elimination of the Week.

THE OUTSTANDING MYTHS

Over the years there have been some rather strange and fanciful notions expressed with regard both to the resolution and the captive nations. For example, we'll never forget the grandiose interpretation given by one columnist: "When I was in Moscow during the October Party Congress, Khrushchev once again vehemently denounced the innocuous Captive Nations Week Resolution which Congress passes every year to attract minority votes."¹⁴ In one sentence the ingredients of truth, illogic, and fiction are intermixed. True, the past Russian dictator did vehemently denounce it again; illogical, to have earned such repeated denunciations the resolution could scarcely be innocuous; fictional, the self-renewing resolution doesn't have to be passed each year, and it never had anything to do with minority votes.

Do you think this is bad? Just consider the new crop of myths that has recently sprung up—this by writers who are supposed to enlighten the American public. In a critical article on the views of the Republican presidential nominee in 1964, a well-known columnist wrote: "The Senator is historically wrong to imply (April 25, 1963) that Soviet arms seized Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Turkestan,

¹⁴ Alsop, Stewart. "The Berlin Crisis: Khrushchev's Weakness," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 16, 1961.

Georgia, the Ukraine and North Caucasus.”¹⁵ For the purpose of disinforming the American public, Soviet Russian propagandists couldn't have done better. There is no intelligent controversy about the Soviet Russian conquest of these countries. The historical record is clear and substantial. Aside from a vast bibliography of scholarly works on the subject, if the columnist had even bothered to scan the official reports of Congress' Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, he would realize that his statement makes as much sense as saying Nazi arms did not seize Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and so on. One's patent ignorance is no test of historical validity.

Another choice example of myth-making is furnished by two editorials of a Washington newspaper, written probably by a person who until 1963 never knew a Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national hero, ever existed. In an intellectually irresponsible attack against the resolution, the first editorial stated, “it also includes ‘Cossackia’ and ‘Idel-Ural’ which never have existed as nations except for intervals of German invasion. They are about as much ‘captives’ of the Soviet Union as Anacostia and Cleveland Park are ‘captives’ of the District of Columbia. As far as that goes, ‘White Ruthenia’ and ‘Ukraine’ are political concoctions that describe aspirations more than a national entity.”¹⁶ How erratic and even immature some writers can be is easily gauged by reading, for example, this paper's editorial on Shevchenko on September 23, 1963. It speaks of “Ukraine's national poet” and states “We yield to no one in our esteem for the Ukraine and that country's poet and hero...”¹⁷

Here, too, a knowledge gap prevails. Cossackia and Idel-Ural have traditions in name and reality long preceding any German invasion, and this history of White Ruthenia or Byelorussia is known by many a college undergraduate today. The paper's subsequent editorial commenting sarcastically on these three countries in the USSR is evidence enough of the emotional instability of the writer.¹⁸ The positive aspect of all this is the solid evidence we now have justifying the urgent, educational need for a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the U.S. Congress.

For a salmagundi of confused thoughts the next example is exemplary. The article states the following: “a nation needs an ideology

¹⁵ Sulzberger, C. L. “Barry's Brinkmanship,” *San Francisco Sunday Chronicle*, July 19, 1964.

¹⁶ “Captive Nations,” *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1964.

¹⁷ *Shevchenko, A Monument to the Liberation, Freedom, and Independence of All Captive Nations*, USGPO, 1964, p. 11.

¹⁸ “Betrayal,” *The Washington Post*, August 17, 1964.

—a common enthusiasm that gives it cohesiveness and unity of purpose. Strangely enough, the ideology that holds the Soviet Union together is not communism, but the 'Mother Russia' concept. For 'Mother Russia' is the common pride of White Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians, all of whom have ample historical reason for mutual hate. The Soviet leaders have been tireless in identifying communism as the agency which has glorified Russia."¹⁹ Whether this was written in a state of inebriation or not, it demonstrates a typical looseness of thought regarding the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union is not Russia or a nation, nor have the White Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Georgians any "historical reason for mutual hate," and that the empire significance of the "Mother Russia" concept is anathema to them. The only force that holds the Soviet Union together is the military occupation of these non-Russian nations by the expediently mixed USSR armed forces and the KGB.

These few examples are sufficient to indicate the necessity for observing Captive Nations Week. What within a short time books cannot accomplish, popular observance and discussion can. Actually, we don't have much time. The myths conveyed by these examples will rapidly disappear. So will those in these further examples of our cultural lag.

One writer, whose position changes in cycles and whose record is a succession of errors in judgment and prediction as, for instance, close Soviet-American friendship in the post-war era and the permanent captivity of the enslaved nations expressed on the very eve of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, provides us with additional fables on the captive nations. A recent work shows him to be as irritated by the resolution as Moscow has been. "Certain of the national groups," he writes, "whose names appear in the Captive Nations Resolution as those nations thirsting for a lost independence never existed at all in this quality... The Ukraine never was really independent."²⁰ According to this fable, the Russian Empire has been eternally in existence and the periods of Ukrainian independence in the form of Kievan Rus, the Kozak Republic, and the National Republic never existed. Under pressure from within the USSR, even Moscow continually refers to "independent" Ukraine today. This kind of blind thinking would have precluded even the new independence of any Afro-Asian people.

¹⁹ Jones, Jenkin Lloyd. *The Evening Star*, July 23, 1964.

²⁰ Kennan, George F. *On Dealing with the Communist World*, New York, 1964, p. 13.

Here are more fables made to order for Soviet Russian propagandists: "I can think of nothing more catastrophic than that the policy of our government should be committed to the break-up of the traditional Russian state. Remember that nothing of this sort could be carried forward except at the cost of the violent and total estrangement of the Russian people."²¹ He goes on to say that this would mean the "dismemberment of Russia."²² This fable ignores the fact that Russia is only one part of the USSR, which no one seeks to dismember. To identify Russia with the USSR is patent nonsense; to invoke the Russian people, most of whom have no vested interest in the Soviet Russian Empire, borders on the ridiculous. It is like saying that we should never have helped the different peoples of the Austro-Hungarian or the Ottoman Empires, "traditional states" as they were, because the Austrians or Turks would not like it. The muddy character of the writer's concepts and thoughts is further illustrated by his conception of Yugoslavia as a "nation," with a "desire for national independence."²³ Apparently his stay in Belgrade profited him little.

Before leaving this case for the remaining examples of U.S. myths on the captive nations, we might take note of the shallowness of thought exhibited by this Russian expert. He asserts, "The Captive Nations Resolution has freed no captive nations, nor is it likely to do so... My charge is that, uncorrected, unchallenged, and permitted to have the currency it has in this country today, it cripples the hopefulness of any other approach."²⁴ Now, just a modicum of common sense is needed to perceive the fact that, like proclamations, no resolution will free anyone anywhere. As I've pointed out often, by its very nature a resolution is an ideational commitment that necessitates action and implementation; and things of this kind—"Needless irritations, such as the Captive Nations Resolution and various antiquated trade restrictions, are still permitted to impede the development of Soviet-American relations"—the faculty of common sense demands priority.²⁵

Examples of this type, short in knowledge and lacking in common sense, can be multiplied. In a recent work on *Propaganda*, Arthur Larson, a former Eisenhower official, views the resolution as "bad" subversive propaganda, inciting the peoples of Eastern Europe to

²¹ Ibid. p. 13.

²² Ibid. p. 14.

²³ Ibid. p. 50.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 19.

²⁵ Kennan, George F. "A Case for Sparing the Spurs," *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1965.

overthrow their present governments. A columnist, who uncritically inserted into his article a fantasy that was fed him, sees Ukraine as having "been a part of Russia longer than Arizona has been in the Union."²⁶ An expensive study prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency makes this profound observation: "Whether we admit it to ourselves or not, we benefit enormously from the capability of the Soviet police system to keep law and order over 200 million odd Russians and many additional millions in the satellite states. The breakup of the Russian Communist empire today would doubtless be conducive to freedom, but would be a good deal more catastrophic for the world order than was the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918."²⁷ Observing all this, one wonders if these writers and many like them have ever bothered to scan the resolution, which reads as follows:

PUBLIC LAW 86-90
86TH CONGRESS, S. J. RES. 111
JULY 17, 1959

JOINT RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the greatness of the United States is in large part attributable to its having been able, through the democratic process, to achieve a harmonious national unity of its people, even though they stem from the most diverse of racial, religious, and ethnic backgrounds; and

WHEREAS this harmonious unification of the diverse elements of our free society has led the people of the United States to possess a warm understanding and sympathy for the aspirations of peoples everywhere and to recognize the natural interdependency of the peoples and nations of the world; and

WHEREAS the enslavement of a substantial part of the world's population by Communist imperialism makes a mockery of the idea of peaceful co-existence between nations and constitutes a detriment to the natural bonds of understanding between the people of the United States and other peoples; and

WHEREAS since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which poses a dire threat to the security of the United States and of all the free peoples of the world; and

WHEREAS the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led, through direct and indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, and others; and

²⁶ Drummond, Roscoe. "Captive Nations Cause," *New York Herald Tribune*, August 19, 1964.

²⁷ "Special Committee on the Captive Nations," *Congressional Record*, September 23, 1964, p. 21967.

WHEREAS these submerged nations look to the United States, as the citadel of human freedom, for leadership in bringing about their liberation and independence and in restoring to them the enjoyment of their Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist, or other religious freedoms, and of their individual liberties; and

WHEREAS it is vital to the national security of the United States that the desire for liberty and independence on the part of the peoples of these conquered nations should be steadfastly kept alive; and

WHEREAS the desire for liberty and independence by the overwhelming majority of the people of these submerged nations constitutes a powerful deterrent to war and one of the best hopes for a just and lasting peace; and

WHEREAS it is fitting that we clearly manifest to such peoples through an appropriate and official means the historic fact that the people of the United States share with them their aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence: Now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week" and inviting the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities. The President is further authorized and requested to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world.

THE 1965 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK

In the period of July 18-24, the Seventh Captive Nations Week Observance will be conducted throughout the Nation. Its major themes will be: (1) full support for the President's action in Viet Nam (2) a poltrade policy, no slipshod trade liberalization, toward the Red Empire (3) the complete exposure of Sino-Russian imperio-colonialism in the United Nations and throughout the Free World (4) the creation of a Special Committee on the Captive Nations in the U.S. House of Representatives (5) the establishment of a Freedom Commission and Academy, and (6) the issuance of a Captive Nations Freedom Stamp Series.

Captive Nations Week is the citizen's way of letting the captive nations—the peoples themselves as against their oppressive totalitarian states and governments—know that we will "never recognize the situation behind the Iron Curtain (and the Bamboo and Sugar Curtains) as a permanent one." The realization of the above themes would give further concrete expression to this. Until certain things that must be done for Cold War victory and the avoidance of a hot global war are done, we cannot but still raise the haunting question—

THE CAPTIVE NATIONS—WHO'S NEXT?

<i>Country and People of Communist Domination</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Country and People of Communist Domination</i>	<i>Year</i>
Armenia	1920	Bulgaria	1946
Azerbaijan	1920	Outer Mongolia	1946
Byelorussia	1920	Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc. in	
Cossackia	1920	Yugoslavia	1946
Georgia	1920	Poland	1947
Idel-Ural	1920	Rumania	1947
North Caucasia	1920	Czecho-Slovakia	1948
Democratic Republic of		North Korea	1948
Far East (Siberyaks)	1920	Hungary	1949
Ukraine	1920	East Germany	1949
Turkestan	1922	Mainland China	1949
Estonia	1940	Tibet	1951
Latvia	1940	North Vietnam	1954
Lithuania	1940	Cuba	1960
Albania	1946		

WHO'S NEXT?

South Vietnam? Algeria? Colombia? Congo?
 Laos? Tanzania? Bolivia? Thailand?

RACISM AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

A century ago European explorers staked out parts of Africa for their governments as colonies. For the most part these colonies have just gained their independence. By 1963, however, another round in colonization had begun. The Soviet Union, which spearheaded it, and now Communist China are engrossed in a struggle to gain the ideological fealty of the new African states.

Premier Chou En-lai, heading a delegation of 50 which included Foreign Minister Chen Yi, began, in December, 1963, a two-month tour of Africa with a visit to Cairo. The coolness of his welcome reflected the question uppermost in African minds: Just what is this mission's real objective? To many Africans, it was obvious that it was not merely a journey of peace and good will. It was patently a search for allies, and perhaps for new lands to colonize.

Yet the Chinese propaganda has effectively stressed its unity with Africa against the white man—including the Russians. With the Chinese visit to Africa, the Soviet Union was confronted by a dire menace in its drive for world domination that was virtually unforeseen in its dogma—the menace of racism.

Former Premier Nikita Khrushchev in turn promptly visited Africa, hoping to demonstrate that the wave of the future did not entail color of skin, but that of the orthodox Marxist vision of "haves" and "have-nots."

RACISM AND COMMUNISM IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE

In the past, Moscow has always featured a "holier-than-thou" attitude toward racial problems and conflicts in the non-Communist world, pointing a finger of shame as though nothing of the sort could ever occur in the Soviet Union.

But the publicized incidents of 1963, including the disorders of Ghanaian students in Moscow, caught the Soviet propagandists off guard. Soviet spokesmen weakly accused the West of whipping up the racial incidents.

Even an implied racial issue is, however, of especial embarrassment to Russia for reasons that transcend its global ambitions.

Vast areas of the USSR were acquired by Czarist imperialism from weak Asian rulers in precisely the same way that significant areas were acquired by other imperialist nations. The salient fact to be noted, however, is that other imperialistic nations have, in recent decades, been relinquishing such domains. The Russians have not.

In the current ideological battle between Moscow and Peking, the issue of "racism" has assumed considerable importance. Moscow's Red Chinese "brothers" have been playing up the issue of race in an effort to bring the non-white world into Peking's fold. At the Afro-Asian conference in Tanganyika in February, 1963, Chinese delegates emphasized that "Russians are white-skinned like the imperialists. We are your brothers."

For this the Chinese received a sharp rebuke. Premier Khrushchev said: "The militant call 'Proletarians of the World, Unite!' means that at the basis... lies class anti-imperialist solidarity, not nationality, color, or geographical principles. We consider it important to emphasize this and hope that the Chinese Central Committee shares this attitude."¹

MARXIST CLAIMS CONTRA HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

Russia has never forgotten the Golden Horde of Genghis Khan, which swept west from Mongolia in the 13th century, conscripting Volga boatmen into the Khan's Army and forcing local Princes into subjection. When, after 200 years, the Mongol Empire collapsed, the Russians lost no time in retaliating. "Where is China?" asked Czar Mikhail Romanov. "Is it rich? What can we lay claim to?" Russian claims (Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang) have made for friction for centuries, down to the present. As late as 1949, when the Chinese Reds had virtually conquered the mainland from the Chinese Nationalists, Moscow was still dickering for territorial concessions.

The Chinese, on the other hand, still sneer at the Russians as "Big Noses," viewing them every whit as alien as other Westerners. Moreover, the population pressure along the Sino-Soviet border is a constant menace to Moscow: by 1980 there may be one billion Chinese.² (When not long ago a British visitor suggested to Khrush-

¹ Quote in: "Soviet Union: The Color Bar." *Newsweek*, LXI, 24, June 17, 1963, p. 51.

² "What Are They Fighting About?," *TIME*, LXXXII, 2, July, 12, 1963, pp. 24-25. For the historical background of these territorial conflicts, see: Jackson, W. A. Douglas, *THE RUSSO-CHINESE BORDERLANDS: ZONE OF PEACEFUL CONTACT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT?* D. Van Nostrand Co., Princeton, N. J., 1962, & bibliography, pp. 119-121.

chev that the Chinese masses would eventually explode north into Siberia, or south to Australia, Nikita replied grimly: "I'm in favor of Australia," reported *Time* magazine).

From the start, Russian national interests also shaped Moscow's attitude toward the Chinese Communists. In the 1920's, Stalin ruthlessly sacrificed Mao's Communist movement to Chiang Kai-shek, whom he supported because he considered him a strong Soviet ally who would fight both Western and Japanese threats to Russian power. Decimated by Chiang, the ragged Chinese Communists survived in the caves of Yen-an and eventually went on to conquer China, despite Stalin's warning that they were backward and not ready for revolution. After the War, Stalin sent Mao a Russian handbook of partisan strategy against the Nazis. Mao passed it to an aide, who snorted: "If we had this as our textbook we would have been annihilated ten years ago." Thus for his victory Mao was beholden to no one, least of all to Stalin. Yet, ironically, the first open ideological break in the Moscow-Peking partnership came over Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin.

THE POTENCY OF APPEALS TO RACISM

It must be made clear that, in the following discussion, the term "race" is used rather loosely. While the scientists agree that all men belong to the same species, *Homo Sapiens*,³ in common parlance there is a great deal of loose talk about race. Some of it has scientific value, but most of it, especially that part which has the greatest vogue among ardent nationalists, is largely nonsense.

Nevertheless, for our purpose we must accept here the concept of race as used by the Russians, Africans and Chinese, who tend to classify races on the basis of characteristics determined by variable genes. The attributes most commonly used to classify men into races are skin color, height, nose form, head shape, type and distribution of hair, and like characteristics. And what is even more important is the fact that the spokesmen of such "races" also talk about being "superior" or "inferior." Thus, during the opening years of the present century, Lord Bryce stated in a lecture at Oxford University his belief that one of the most pressing problems of the modern world was the relation between the advanced and backward races of mankind;⁴ here Bryce was expressing the growing consciousness of the importance of the racial problem in the world.

³ Montagu, Ashley, *STATEMENT ON RACE*, Henry Schuman, New York 1951, 11.

⁴ Bryce, James, *THE RELATIONS OF THE ADVANCED AND BACKWARD RACES OF MANKIND*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1902, pp. 6-7.

MARXISM AND RACISM

At the time of the *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx expressed himself on the question of race in the most definite manner. In one article he lumped many races, and principally the Slav race, into a group which he characterized as "ethnic garbage." He was congratulatory of the Hungarians for the long containment of the Slavs, attributing this to the superiority of the Hungarian race.

The two important articles on Pan-Slavism published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in January and February, 1849, are known to have been written by Engels.⁵ These articles contain most of the doctrinaire characterizations of the minor Slav nations—the Poles always excepted—which were explicitly abandoned in later Marxist literature.⁶ Furthermore, we must not overlook Engels' residual Pan-Germanism in 1848-49.⁷ In fact, although Engels and Marx gradually became more hopeful of the Russians, Engels refused to retract his unfavorable opinion of the Western Slavs. (Perhaps personal factors were involved, and "in the 1860's and for some time thereafter, Marx saw no reason to take Russian emigrants seriously."⁸)

Karl Marx, son of Hirschel Marx, a converted Jew, stated in his booklet, *Zur Judenfrage*:⁹ "A proletarian revolution will emancipate the world from the Jew and his usury." Marx was imbued with that peculiar kind of anti-Semitism which can be noted in many converts. A clever German humorist once said: "The Jews are the worst anti-Semites; the worse the Jew, the worse his anti-Semitism."¹⁰ Runes explains it as deriving from Marx's "terrible inferior-

⁵ Mehring, Franz, Ed., *GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN VON KARL MARX UND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, 1841-50*, Stuttgart, 1913, Vol. III, 269; Mayer, Gustav, *FRIEDRICH ENGELS, A BIOGRAPHY*, A.A. Knopf, New York, 1936, Vol. I, p. 326.

⁶ Blackstock, P. W. & Hoselitz, F. B., Eds., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE*, London, 1935, pp. 246ff.; Bloom, Solomon F., *THE WORLD OF NATIONS: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE WORK OF KARL MARX*, New York, 1941, especially pp. 134-150; Doerig, J. A., Ed., *MARX VS. RUSSIA*, Frederick Ungar Publ. Co., N.Y. 1962; Willoughby, Maj. Gen., Charles A., "Karl Marx: Apostle of Communism: Feared and Hated Russia," *THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY*, XXIX, 2, Summer, 1963, 133-140;

⁷ Mayer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 325-30.

⁸ Lichtheim, George, *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study*, F. A. Praeger, N. Y. 1961, p. 111.

⁹ For the full text, see: Runes, Dagobert D., Ed., *A WORLD WITHOUT JEWS*, by Karl Marx, Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1959.

¹⁰ Quoted by Runes, Dagobert D., *THE SOVIET IMPACT ON SOCIETY, A RECOLLECTION*, Philosophical Library, N. Y., 1953, p. 127.

ty complex." Runes writes: "All his life he tried hard to get out of his Judaism. He married into the most reactionary family of his town. The brother of his wife, Jenny von Westphalen, was a reactionary Prussian official. His pride at being a Protestant was almost tragic-comic. On the tombstone of his wife he had had inscribed: 'Here lies Jenny von Westphalen, the wife of Karl Marx.'" ¹¹ In fact, Runes continues, "his relation to Gentile aristocracy was quite a factor in molding Mr. Marx's opinion of the Jews as an inferior people. His reference to the Jews as usurers, and his statement that the world will be free of them through proletarian emancipation because it will be free of usury in general—well, even Hitler could use that reference as quotation."

Marx extolled conquest by "racially superior" peoples, and belittled the nationalistic efforts of "inferior peoples." It is ironic that many given the latter designation should have risen from the mire of his contempt to worship his memory.

RUSSIFICATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Much has been written about the Russification of the USSR's non-Russian peoples, and hence we need note here only the most glaring "racial" aspects.¹²

The Soviet regime inherited, from its very beginning, the ancient Russian problem of handling the diverse and hostile national minorities. Czarist policy in general was expressed in its slogans: "One Czar, One Religion, One Language!" and "Russia, One and Indivisible!" But, contrary to the desired effect, it left a heritage of bitterness and resulted in an increase of nationalistic political consciousness as well as the rise of a national intelligentsia who, in one way

¹¹ Runes, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹² For details, see: Smal-Stocki, Roman, *THE CAPTIVE NATIONS: NATIONALISM OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION*, Bookman Associates, New York, 1960, pp. 42, 50ff., 56ff., 65, 75, 77, 83; Goldstein, Anatol, *THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRITORIAL MINORITIES AND THE JEWS*, Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York, 1953; Kolarz, Walter, *RUSSIA AND HER COLONIES*, George Philipi, London, 1952; Schlesinger, R., *THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM AND SOVIET ADMINISTRATION*, London, 1956; Schwartz, M., *THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION*, Syracuse University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1951; Roucek, Joseph S., "Fictions Vs. Facts of Life in the Policies towards the Non-Russian Peoples in the USSR," *THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY*, XV, 2, June, 1959, 145-152; Roucek, "Soviet Union's Non-Russian Nations, *IBID.*, XIV, 4, December, 1958, 327-44; Roucek, "Communist Policy in Asiatic Russia," *PHI DELTA KAPPA*, XXXIX, 3, December, 1957, 234-242; Roucek, "Soviet and Russian Educational Imperialism," *JOURNAL OF HUMAN RELATIONS*, IV, 1, Autumn, 1955, 26-44, IV, 2, Winter, 1956, 35-60; etc.

or another, have remained a key element in the nationality problem down to the present.

The view of the early Russian Marxists on the nationality question deprecated national sentiment as a serious political force and favored its adaptation to the class criteria of socialism—a view which led to a concept of ultimate unification and amalgamation of the ethnic groups under socialism. Lenin and his followers, however, in considering the nationality question before the Revolution, favored self-determination insofar as it did not lead to the breakdown of ethnic groups into self-governing bodies.

Nevertheless, despite this realistic attitude about nationality sentiment, the strength of the centrifugal forces unleashed among the nationalities and races following the Revolution was a surprise to the Bolsheviks, who had believed that these minorities would rally around the banners of the socialist revolution. Lenin and his group quickly relaxed their earlier opposition to federalism and promulgated a new policy which has three proclaimed objectives: 1) assurance to the Russians that their national geographic heritage would be preserved; 2) assurance to the non-Russians that they would not be discriminated against; and 3) assurance to the non-Russians that the Czarist program of forcible Russification had been abandoned.

The grant of linguistic autonomy was considered to be a responsive answer to the cultural demands of the minority peoples. But the various forms of apparent political self-expression were effectively nullified by one circumstance: the minorities could operate only through the Communist Party.

Then (from about 1927 onwards) Stalin gradually executed a definite shift of policy regarding cultural autonomy and relations between Great Russians and non-Russians. This racial policy led to the purges of national leaders beginning in the late 1920's and continuing on until 1938. Stalin's policy was a throwback to Czarist Russification, with emphasis of Russian as the second language of all nationalities. Russian officials, particularly in the late 1930's, were sent into the non-Russian areas as more "reliable elements" to assume leading positions. The program for cultural uniformity was given new impetus with the rise of the concept of "Soviet patriotism." This doctrine gave priority to the Soviet state, dominated by the Russian element, at the expense of the local allegiances of the non-Russian peoples. But the underlying genocidal resentment of this policy was revealed by the Great Purge, wherein the non-Russian peoples, including Communist Party leaders themselves, were ruthlessly exterminated.

World War II experience with non-Russian unrest occasioned a Soviet policy of breaking up and of diluting the population of the minority areas by cross-migration and other means. Since 1945, except for a brief period in 1953 attributable to Beria's influence, Soviet policy has sharply strengthened the trend toward Russification on all levels of political, social and economic life. We have had a steady stream of reports on mass (or individual) purges of the governments of the non-Russian republics and of their communist parties, on mass purges of professors and students, on mass arrests and mass exile of the national intelligentsia, on liquidation of scholars, writers and journalists and on liquidation of writer-organizations and theatres. To boot, a systematic Russification of all non-Russian languages has been carried on.

This applies not only to the Captive Nations in Europe, but also to what goes on in what can be called "White Colonialism" in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Empire.¹³

The Amur Valley north of the river was taken from China in 1689, south of the river between 1802 and 1917. Vladivostok was founded as late as 1860, and it still looks like an ugly frontier town. The showplace and capital of the Russian Far East, Khabarovsk, was built up and modernized by the forced labor of German prisoners of war, including Red Cross nurses, between 1945 and 1949. The native Mongols of the Khabarovsk Province are almost extinct.

This leads to the plight of natives in general in Siberia and northern Russia. On paper, the local tribes handle their own affairs, living in autonomous areas, having their own parliament. Actually, this is a liberal front according to Russian rules as the areas were simply carved out so as to contain more Russians than tribesmen. The language in "parliament," schools and trade is Russian anyway. Thus the likelihood of survival of the minority as a distinct group does not look promising. The percentages of various autonomous minorities in this area are as follows: Bashkirs (Ural Mts.), 23.5%; Kazan-Tartars, 44.9%; Buryat-Mongols (east shore of Lake Baikal), 43.8%; Mari (Finns north of Pensa), 37.8%. The total percentage of the several non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union is 48%, of which 19% is made up of Ukrainians.¹⁴

Beginning with Lenin at the Prague Congress of his party, Communists have orated tirelessly about colonial exploitation, complain-

¹³ Joseph B. Dogber: " 'White Colonialism' in the Soviet Empire, November, 1961," speech delivered before the UN General Assembly on November 16, 1961.

¹⁴ Spaderna, Conan H., "The Russian Colonies in Asia," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 30, 1963.

ing vociferously that the income of a colony was not in proportion to the mineral wealth taken out of it. Whatever the Western colonialists may have done, it certainly does not measure up to the ravages of Russian exploitation. We need only point to the qualities of gold extracted from northeast Siberia, the fortune in pelts taken from native hunters for a fraction of the world's market price. Leningrad's industry ticks because coal, dug out near the Arctic Circle in the Komi area, comes in steadily by rail and by boat. The slave labor in the Vorkuta works in one of the richest areas on earth; it has enough hard coal to fill the U.S. demand or the almost equal European (including Britain) demand for 250 years—100 billion tons. But the Komi tribe has received nothing approaching its proper share of the net income; its capital, Syktibkar, sports but a few modern buildings among its rude log huts.

ANTI-SEMITISM

Historically, there have been several periods in the history of the Jews in the USSR. Between 1917 and 1930, during the "good day," Jews were very active in the Party and held high positions in government. A Yiddish press, publishing houses, theaters, etc., flourished. At the end of that period, however, a number of "old Bolsheviks" (among them Jews) were liquidated (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev). During 1930-41 the unsuccessful Birobidjan community (Jewish "national home") was experimented with—leaving behind only about 35,000 still living there. Another "good period" was that of 1941-48, when Jews played a distinguished part in the Army, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was very active in propaganda, and the great actor Michoels and the well-known writer Fedder were sent to the U.S. in 1943 to promote good will for the Russian war effort.

The worst time occurred between 1948 to 1953, when Michoels was openly murdered as the real architect of Yiddish culture in the USSR. With the rousing reception given to the first Israel Ambassador, Mrs. Golda Meir, by a few thousand Jews on her arrival to Moscow, Stalin became convinced that the "Jews" were a foreign body in Soviet society. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was dissolved, the Yiddish press proscribed along with the Yiddish theater and publishing houses. In 1948-49 began the mass deportations of Jews, and, in 1952, 24 Jewish writers were tried and shot. This was followed by the "Jewish Doctors' Plot."

In the post-Stalin period, a "thaw" came. Some of the executed ones (like Isaac Babel) were rehabilitated and some exiled Jews were allowed to return. But anti-Semitism and discrimination have

continued and culturally the Jewish autonomy has been lost. Today, Communism denies the existence of a Jewish "nationality" or "race" in the USSR, though passports use the designation "Jewish." Since 1948, the anti-Yiddish and the anti-Zionist campaigns have been merged into one; the Russians are strongly anti-Zionist and object to any Soviet citizen hankering for his "real country."

THE USE OF PAN-SLAVISM

Quite aware of the "racist" aspects of the ideology of Pan-Slavism, the Soviet ideologists threw this heavy propaganda artillery into the world propaganda arena only during the desperate days of World War II.

Pan-Slavism, in fact, had been used by the Czarist government in the 19th century as a convenient ideological weapon to conceal actual political and economic motives. The Czar strove to reach Constantinople and the Straits by sea, and also to win the friendship of Bulgaria and Serbia in order to be able to attack Turkey by a land route. The protagonists of Pan-Slavism were also advocates of the Eastern expansion of Russia; they were generally anti-Westerners and therefore opponents of industrialization. Pan-Slavism was also used as a unifying symbol for the Slavs or "near-Slavs" under the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Prussian Empires when they were needed to create "minority" diversions for their governments. In line with Pan-Slavist programs, Russification was sponsored in the border regions, in Poland, Finland, and the Baltic countries. Furthermore, the leaders of the Pan-Slavs, as political heirs to the Slavophiles, preached the collaboration of all Slavic nations, the common interests of all Orthodox peoples, and the "great civilizatory mission" of the Czarist Empire.¹⁵

¹⁵ For the best academic summary, see: Kohn, Hans, *PAN-SLAVISM: ITS HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY*, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1953, and bibliography, pp. 456-468. For the popular introductions, see: Chubb, Thomas Caldecot, *SLAVIC PEOPLES*, World Publishing Co., Cleveland, 1962; Fairservis, Walter A., Jr., *HORSEMEN OF THE STEPPES*, World Publishing Co., Cleveland, 1962. For more extensive treatments, see: Adamic, Louis, *THE NATIVE'S RETURN*, Harper, New York, 1934; Dvornik, Francis, *THE SLAVS: THEIR EARLY HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, 1956; Pribichevich, Stoyan, *WORLD WITHOUT END*, Reynald & Hitchcock, 1939; Strakhovskiy, Leonid Ivanovich, Ed., *HANDBOOK OF SLAVIC STUDIES*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1949; West, Rebecca, *BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON*, the Viking Press, New York, 1941; Rousek, Joseph S., Ed., *SLAVONIC ENCYCLOPAEDIA*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1949.

Up to 1934, for the sake of the preservation of the Soviet system in Russia and the spread of Communist ideology abroad, the Soviet Union had given up territorial aggrandizement, Pan-Slav ambitions, and imperialistic aims.

After 1934, however, a more traditional path was followed. Nonetheless, opportunities for the furtherance of communism were seized as they offered themselves, giving Soviet foreign policies a constantly changing and unfathomable appearance.

Thus Stalin and Hitler signed a pact in 1938, dividing between themselves Poland, a "Slav brother." Yet nothing was done to save Czechoslovakia from Hitler. But immediately after Hitler attacked Russia on the fateful day of June 22, 1941, Stalin ceased to look upon the war as a contest of rival imperialist powers; it became a war of "national liberation" in which Russia was fighting the battle of her Slavic "brothers" against the "Nazi Fascist beast."¹⁶

Although there is no visible record of any Communist-inspired national liberation movement among Slavic nationals on German-occupied territory prior to June 21, 1941, a far-reaching network of organizations was established subsequently for such agitation. On August 19-11, 1941, an all-Slav Conference was held in Moscow; it was formally greeted by the Red Army through its official organ, *The Red Star*. The All-American Slav Congress was formed in Detroit on April 25-26, 1942, in response to the appeal of the All-Slav Congress previously held in Moscow; it was a subsidiary of the All-Slav Congress in Moscow and of the activities in the U.S. of individual Communists operating in the Slav Congress through branches of the International Workers Order and other Communist-dominated fraternal organizations and Slavic groups.

From time to time, in recent years, Pan-Slavism has been refurbished when suitable occasions arise (such as the celebrations of memories of Cyril and Methodius). "What emerged in reality immediately after World War II," remarks Kohn, "was a Pan-Russianism of the kind preached by the extreme Pan-Slavs of the 19th century but never adopted by the Russian government and always combatted by liberal and humanitarian trends among the Russians themselves and by the nationalism of Ukrainians and Poles, Czechs and Serbs. Now, how-

¹⁶ Roucek, Joseph S., "Pan-Slavism: An Ideological Myth," *PROLOGUE, PROBLEMS OF INDEPENDENCE AND AMITY OF NATIONS*, II, 1, Spring, 1959, pp. 18-25; Roucek, "Soviet Nationality Policy: Pan-Slavism as an Ideological Weapon," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, III, July-August, 1954, pp. 20-28; Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, *REPORT ON THE AMERICAN SLAV CONGRESS AND ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS*, Washington, D. C., June 26, 1949.

ever, a new dimension has been added to the exclusive and all-inclusive state-religion of the Soviet Union. Before World War II, Soviet citizens had to worship the party of Lenin and Stalin and the great Stalin himself. After the war, a compulsory obsequious deference to the "great" Russian people has been imposed on all its "younger brothers," a category in which all non-Slavs had to enter. In that respect the Pan-Slav frame was broadened and racial equality throughout the Soviet empire maintained. All its peoples, whether white or colored, Slav or Turk, Christian or Mohammedan, have equally and continually to pay their deep respects to the Russian people and even to the Russian past."¹⁷

THE OPENING OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN ON
BEHALF OF RACISM

The Chinese campaign to rally colored races of the world against the white was launched on August 8, 1963, by one of the very rare statements issuing directly from Mao Tse-tung, and was followed by a slew of editorials, special articles, broadcasts, cartoons, and poems. Mao aimed his attack at "fascist atrocities," as he put it, committed by "American imperialists" against the Negro people. These crimes, he said, laid bare the links between reactionary policies at home and the United States' "policies of aggression abroad."¹⁸

Mao Tse-tung's statement was made to a visiting group of Africans: It ran: ¹⁹ "I call upon the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, enlightened elements of the bourgeoisie and other enlightened personages of all colors in the world—white, black, yellow, brown and so forth—to unite against the racial discrimination practiced by United States imperialism and to support the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination.

"The speedy development of the struggle of American Negroes is a manifestation of the sharpening of class struggle and national struggle within the United States...

"In the final analysis a national struggle is a question of class struggle."

Thus Mao dusted off the old Stalin dream of an all-Negro Republic in the U. S. ²⁰ It also appears that Mao has a small band of

¹⁷ Kohn, *op. cit.*, 326-327.

¹⁸ "Racist Madness," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 15, 1963.

¹⁹ Reprinted in *Christian Science Monitor*, August 15, 1963.

²⁰ For details, see: Draper, Theodore, *AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA*, Viking, New York, 1960, Chapter 15, "The Negro Question," 315-356; Glazer, Nathan, *THE SOCIAL BASIS OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1961, 176-184.

fanatical followers in the U. S. who have started to exhort Negroes to take up arms to "defend themselves" and to organize "militias to cope with organized racists."

They have already enlisted their own little hard-core band of Peking-oriented Communists, and "are actively attempting to infiltrate student organizations, capture control of left-wing labor unions, win over some of the unemployed, take over Chinese-American organizations. They are aided in their campaign by a steadily increasing onslaught of imported propaganda."²¹

The Chinese campaign appears to be directed by a tiny group of self-exiled Americans in Peking headed by Anna Louise Strong, whose pen is busy attacking the country of her birth, although the key men are Israel Epstein and Frank Coe. Coe followed the Red star in the East after leaving the International Monetary Fund. It is difficult, however, to tell how many American Communists follow Mao, since the majority have sided with the Kremlin in the Sino-Soviet struggle. But there are splinter groups looking to Peking for inspiration. One of these groups is the Progressive Labor Party which calls itself "Marxist-Leninist" rather than Communist, with a membership of 1,000. Its leaders are Milton Rosen and Mort Scheer, both of whom were expelled from the orthodox Communist Party for endorsing Mao's views. According to them, most of the membership is younger than 40; many are college students.

The Mao faction also has made attempts to woo labor and the unemployed. In one of the issues of *Progressive Labor*, it called for a labor federation based on "progressive" unions (i. e. left-wing), that have been expelled from the AFL-CIO. When miners went on strike in Hazard, Ky., the faction jumped in and, uninvited, espoused the cause and sent food to the miners' families.

Although the Red Chinese message is carried by *Progressive Labor* and by such publications as the *Marxist-Leninist Quarterly* and *The Militant*, much of the material peddling the Chinese line originates in China itself. Under U. S. regulations such material may enter the U. S., providing the addressee has asked for it; most of it goes for known left-wing groups, the remainder to scholars and libraries.

More open, however, is the sale of Chinese periodicals on U. S. newsstands. Such glossy English-language color magazines as *China Reconstructs*, *China's Sports* and *Chinese Literature*, which, collectively, extol the culture, sportsmanship and progress of the "New

²¹ Anderson, J., *Parade*, October 20, 1963, reproduces 3 of these propaganda tracts.

China," can be bought in most big cities. They present China as a land of plump and happy children, eager, athletic youth and dignified old age. A recurrent theme is friendship for all peoples. (One recent article gushed about Indian PW's who elected to stay in China after the recent border war.) Because commercial dealings with Peking are prohibited under the Trading with the Enemy Act, newsstand operators cannot buy such materials from China; but they apparently receive them free or obtain them through Hong Kong or British sources.

The Mao message is also spread by home-printed Chinese-language newspapers.²² The Reds have small undergrounds in the great Chinatowns of New York, San Francisco, and Chicago, with their own organs. One, the *China Daily News*, is published in a "dingy, musty office above a cheap clothing store in New York." Its late publisher, Eugene Moy, was sentenced to a year in prison in 1955 for trying to induce Chinese in the U. S. to send money to the Peking regime. Since his death in 1960, his widow has carried on. But the paper now publishes only twice a week. In San Francisco, the tiny *Pacific Weekly* also trumpets the Peking line.

Mao's agents feature especially the Chinese-American's sense of ancestry. They have encouraged a few American-Chinese scientists, technicians and students to return to the "motherland." Efforts are made to create contacts between American-educated scientists now in Red China and the scientists here they used to know. Proposals are being made for the exchange of information "for the sake of pure science."

There have also been dark undertones: the peddling of opium and the age-old evil of extortion. Opium, transhipped through Hong Kong, has reached the U. S. through underground Chinese channels, and at least one opium shipment, traced back to Red China, was smuggled into Florida by way of Cuba.

Families with relatives in China are harassed for money, food, clothing and medicines.²³ A stranger arrives with an appeal for help

²² For a good survey of the American-Chinese periodicals, see: Hunter, Edward, *IN MANY VOICES—OUR FABULOUS FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PRESS*, Norman College, Norman Park, Ga., 1960, IX, "In Asian Characters," 140-152.

²³ The income derived, from voluntary or voluntarily by pressures, from the overseas Chinese is quite heavy, since the Chinese living outside China as minorities seem to retain allegiance to their land of birth and have retained their Chinese institutions which is probably due to the persistent discrimination against them because of their visibility, their attachment to racial mystique, and a complex assortment of social ties; see such works; as: Karnow, Stanley & The Editors of Life, *SOUTHEAST ASIA*, Life World Library, Time Incorpo-

from relatives. To the family-minded Chinese, this is difficult to resist; and it becomes more difficult still when the stranger hints that failure to comply could have unfortunate results for the clan in China.

Anderson forecasts that there will be more propaganda efforts, particularly among Negroes. Claims are made, in fact, that the Maoists have already tried to infiltrate some far-out Negro groups, such as the Black Muslims, and have called for a Negro political party in their literature. They reportedly will try to infiltrate the more respectable Negro movements. As a straw in the wind, we may note the Red Chinese attempts to tie up with the August 28, 1963 march on Washington. Shortly before the march took place, its leaders received a cable from Peking signed by a group calling itself "The Chinese Peoples Committee for World Peace." The cable pledged Chinese "resolute support" for the marchers and attacked the "American imperialist policy of racial discrimination and oppression." However, observers consider the marchers' reply a still more important indication. The march leaders brushed off the Chinese

rated, New York, 1962, Chapter 8, "The Alien Sojourners," 121-144; and Chapter 9, "An Active, Elusive Enemy," 133-144; Lyman, Stanford M., "Up from the 'Hatchet Man,'" *PACIFIC AFFAIRS*, Summer, 1963, 160-171; Lyman, Stanford, "Overseas Chinese in America and Indonesia, A Review Article," *Ibid.*, Winter, 1961-1962, 380-389; Kung, S. W., *CHINESE IN AMERICAN LIFE: SOME ASPECTS OF THEIR HISTORY, STATUS, PROBLEMS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1961; Dillon, Richard H., *THE HATCHET MEN: THE STORY OF THE TONG WARS IN SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN*, Coward-McCann, New York, 1962; Gong, Eng Ying & Grant Bruce, *TONG WAR!*, Nicholas I. Brown, New York, 1930; Lee, Virginia, *THE HOUSE THAT TAI MING BUILT*, Macmillan, 1963; Purcell, Victor, *CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1951; Skinner, G. William, *CHINESE SOCIETY IN THAILAND*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1957; Thompson, Virginia & Adloff, Richard, *MINORITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*, Stanford University Press, California, 1955; Lee, Rose Hum, "American Chinese," 309-311, in Brown, Francis J. & Roucek, Joseph S., Ed., *ONE AMERICA*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1952; Glick, Carl, *SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DRAGON*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1941; Palmer, Albert W., *ORIENTALS IN AMERICAN LIFE*, Friendship Press, New York, 1934; Comber, L. F., *CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES IN MALAYA*, J. J. Augustin, Locust Valley, N. Y., 1961; Coughlin, Richard J., *DOUBLE IDENTITY: THE CHINESE IN MODERN THAILAND*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960; Elegant, Robert, *THE DRAGON'S SEED*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1959; Mitchison, Lois, *THE OVERSEAS CHINESE*, The Bodley Head, London, 1961; Skinner, G. William, *LEADERSHIP AND POWER IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY OF THAILAND*, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., 158; Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, *MINORITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*, Stanford University Press, 1955.

offer of support and explained that their type of protest was one of the privileges of living in a democracy. Then they added:

"We await the opportunity to send our felicitations to Chinese citizens gathered in a huge demonstration in your nation's capital to protest living conditions under your government and welcomed there by your heads of state."

As for the Soviet Union as a target, in October, 1963, in a 17, 000-character blast, Peking accused Moscow of resurrecting Kaiser Wilhelm's hoary theory of the "yellow peril."

"Having used up all their wonder-working weapons for opposing the national liberation movement, the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party are now reduced to seeking help from racism, the most reactionary of all imperialist theories," said a joint editorial of the *Peoples Daily* and *The Red Flag*.²⁴

This editorial, fourth in a series of lengthy Chinese rebuttals of the Soviet party positions, focused on Sino-Soviet differences over how to deal with the "national liberation movement." (This is the Communist term for various anti-colonial revolutionary struggles that have erupted since World War II in many parts of the underdeveloped world.)

Soviet leaders, the editorial said, "have inherited the legacy of German Emperor Wilhelm II of a half-century ago, raising a hue and cry against the yellow peril and a revival of the threat of Genghis Khan... Wilhelm II was a big-wig in his day. But in reality he proved to be only a snowman in the sun... It is hardly credible that today there should still be people who wish to step into the shoes of Wilhelm II."

Though racism is the most sensational charge, the main theme of the editorial is the oft-repeated accusation that Khrushchev and his colleagues have gone soft on revolution, that they have "betrayed the Communist stand of supporting just wars," that they "want to subordinate the national liberation movement to their general line of peaceful coexistence and to the national interests of their own country."

The last phrase appears to be the crux of the Chinese dissatisfaction. Their bitterness against Khrushchev was explicit in their charge that he invariably placed Soviet interests above those of the Communist bloc as a whole, and that the Soviet Union and the U. S. behave toward the rest of the world as two superpowers instead of as leaders of two opposing camps. Peking accused Khrush-

²⁴ Oka, Tahashi, "Peking Charges Soviet Racism," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 23, 1963.

chev of agreeing with the U. S. that the primary tasks of the emergent Asian, African, and Latin American countries is to build up their economies. It decried Soviet aid to India; it accused Khrushchev of supplying "opium for the people" by telling them to wait "until the imperialists lay down their arms."

"The primary and most urgent task facing (underdeveloped) countries" the editorial continued, "is still the further development of the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys. This struggle is still being waged fiercely in the political, economic, military, cultural, ideological and other spheres. And the struggles in all these spheres still find their most concentrated expression in the political struggle, which often unavoidably develops into an armed struggle when the imperialists resort to direct or indirect armed suppression.

"Important it is for newly independent countries to develop their independent national economy. But this task must never be separated from the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys."

Peking uses similar language in much of its propaganda toward Asian, African, and Latin American countries. In its present "racial" drive, an important factor is the utilization of some 13 million Chinese living in the countries of Southeast Asia. Many had been imported as coolie labor by rough colonial masters. In some countries they are still persecuted by the natives; but they have managed nonetheless to be remarkably successful. "Fiercely proud of their Chinese heritage, they have a diligence and a financial acumen that makes them, with their business and capital, essential to the economic growth of the nations they inhabit," writes a knowledgeable observer.²⁵

Meanwhile, a pro-Peking Communist newsheet, *Ritorniamo a Lenin* (Let us Return to Lenin), circulating in Rome, reported that the Chinese Communists are planning to set up shortly a "new Communist International."²⁶

It asserted that the Chinese Communists in their dispute with Moscow had the support of the Communist Parties of Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, Burma, New Zealand, Norway, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cameroons and Albania. It said that "strong minorities organized in the Indian, English, and Belgian Communist Parties" also supported Communist China. The Chinese Commu-

²⁵ Karnow, Stanley, & The Editors of Life, *Southeast Asia*, Time Inc. New York, 1962, Chapter 8, "The Alien Sojourners," 121-144, & bib. 154.

²⁶ n. a., "New Red International?" *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 5, 1963.

nist line would gradually supplant the "bureaucratic-revisionist line of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev" and the Communist parties backing him. "The Chinese comrades, preparing to set up a new trade-union center, a new Cominform, and new Communist parties in all the world, have put themselves decisively on the road to founding in a short time a new Communist international on revolutionary Marxist positions." The newssheet called on all "honest militants and revolutionaries" in the ranks of the Communist Party, the Nenni Socialist Party and the Italian pro-Communist trade unions, to form a united front in preparation for joining a new Communist International.

KREMLIN'S GROWING EMBARRASSMENT OVER RACIST ARGUMENTS

While always exploiting, on the propaganda front, the racial difficulties of the United States, today the USSR wishes the U. S. would quickly settle its racial integration problem. The reason is: Asia and Africa tend to see the basic world struggle in terms of whites vs. non-whites. Since the Chinese Reds are non-whites, there is a tendency for Asians and Africans to side with them. The Soviets, whose backbone is provided by the ethnic Russians, believe that the race struggle works against them, since as members of the white race they are in the minority.

Moscow's alarm is understandable. "It is not a long step from the present Peking position to the assertion that in Asia Russia remains a colonial power, oppressing Asian peoples and holding Asian territory stolen by force in the past."²⁷ And recently the Chinese also mentioned publicly—and disapprovingly—the unequal Russian-Chinese treaties of the last century—treaties under which Russia seized much Chinese territory that is today still part of the USSR.

Moscow also accused Red China of having made claims to more than 300,000 square miles of Soviet territory in Asia. "We are faced with an openly expansionist program with far-reaching pretensions," said an editorial in *Pravda*. The Soviet organ charged that the Chinese Communists are publishing maps showing vast areas of the Soviet Union as Chinese territory.

The editorial posed this question: "What would happen if all states should follow the Peking recipe and start presenting mutual claims to each other for a revision of historically formed borders?" It continued: "This road would mean an inevitable aggravation of international tensions and would be fraught with military conflicts."

²⁷ Editorial, "Racism and Communism," *New York Times*, May 1, 1963.

The Chinese have their own conviction of their own racial superiority. What the Chinese, like all Asiatics and Africans, have resented in their past relations with Europe and the United States has not been so much colonialism, or economic exploitation, as it has been the tendency, explicit or implicit, of white peoples to deal with non-whites as if they were, to use Kipling's phrase, "the lesser breeds without the law." The Chinese treasure their country's heritage as a cradle of Oriental civilization, just as the Egyptians treasure theirs as a cradle of Western Civilization.²⁸

Yet memories of colonialism in China are nonetheless bitter. It is true that China has never officially lost her sovereign independence. But during the century which ended in 1945 she was attacked and exploited by one Western or Westernized nation after another—the British, the French, the Russians, the Japanese.

The warmth of the Moscow reception for Fidel Castro in 1963 represented more than an effort to heal the wounds left by Premier Khrushchev's unilateral decision to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in October 7, 1962. The ramifications of Moscow's relations with Peking are also intertwined in the process of wooing Castro.

At the same time, Soviet publications have been displaying acute anxiety about the tendency in parts of Asia and Africa to see the basic world struggle as one between whites and non-whites, rather than (in Marxist terms) as one between workers and bosses. Soviet spokesmen fear that as whites they may come to be regarded by the non-white peoples of Asia and Africa as being as much the enemy of the former colonial peoples as the white non-Communists. The very fact that Chinese Communists are non-whites is one of their strongest advantages in competing with Russians for influence and control over the radical movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Another is that the experience of Peking is far more relevant to African problems than is the USSR's. The Chinese, still poverty-stricken and still trying to make the Great Leap Forward, presumably understand the Africans better and thus can help them more.

Until very recently, the Soviet reaction has been very cautious. There was an allusion to the racist issue in the Soviet note

²⁸ There was a note of antiquarian rivalry when Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai arrived in Cairo in December, 1963, to visit Nasser's United Arab Republic. Chou, who toured the Pyramids, the Sphinx and the Egyptian Museum, was a gracious guest. "We have dug up treasures in China as old as yours," he declared, "but after my visit I see you were more advanced than we were 4,000 years ago," (*NEW YORK TIMES*, December 22, 1963, "The Rivals").

of March 30, 1963 to the Chinese Communist Party. Some clues were provided by the Moscow speech of April 22, 1963 by Boris Ponomarev, a Soviet Party secretary, attacking racist deviations from Marxist-Leninism. Its key point was a warning against efforts to split the Communist movement on racial lines. Ponomarev pointed out that Leninism has no "racial limits" and recalled that Lenin had warned the colonial peoples not to exclude from the revolutionary forces "the proletariat of Europe and Asia."

This warning against Communist racism arises directly from the efforts of the Chinese Communists to form an Asian-African-Latin America bloc against the rest of the world. Peking has even gone to such lengths in recent months as urging the exclusion of Soviet delegates from various meetings of Afro-Asian radicals on the grounds that the Russians are really Europeans.

In the early days of Communism, the movement hoped to build its future on what then seemed to be an irreconcilable conflict between "haves" and "have-nots" or—in Communist terms—between "capitalism" and "the proletariat."

In the second half of the present century, the division between "haves" and "have-nots" within white Western society is much less marked. It is completely overshadowed by a global division between "haves" and "have-nots"—which coincides roughly with the division between whites and non-whites. It is on the global split that we may expect China to seek to build, in the future, its version of communism.

Ironically enough, in this contemporary view of the world, the Soviet Union is both a "white" and a "have." Khrushchev confirmed this fact when he taunted the Chinese in July, 1963:

"According to (Chinese) logic, if a person walks in shoes made out of rags and eats thin cabbage soup from a common bowl, that is communism. And if a workingman lives well and wants to live still better tomorrow—why, that is almost restoration of capitalism."²⁹

Thus *The Christian Science Monitor* reports that many people in Africa and Asia, too, wear rag shoes and eat thin soup (metaphorically, at least). In their eyes, Mr. Khrushchev had joined the club of fat, contented whites, too mean and jealous to share his material well-being and technological progress with others.

We can expect the Chinese to try to exploit any racial injustice imposed on non-whites by whites. But even in these aims, in time the Chinese may be thwarted by the Africo-Asian realization that it is the Chinese who consider themselves superior to all other races.

²⁹ "Century of the Color Line," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1963.

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS IN SOVIET FILM

PROFESSOR FIODOROV IS MOSCOW'S JAMES BOND

By LEO HEIMAN

In case one ever wondered what had caused the disastrous earthquake which devastated Alaska last year, the answer is provided by a new Soviet propaganda film which has been shown to select audiences in the Middle East, Greece, Cyprus and North Africa since January 1965.

Titled *Zdravstvui Solntse!* ("We Greet You, Sun!"), the 96-minute motion picture features such well-known Soviet stars as Mikhail Kuznetsov, Georgi Martiniuk, Valery Babatinsky and Nadezhda Fedosova. Produced by the "Mosfilm" studios in Moscow, it is the latest psychological warfare weapon in the Soviet Union's arsenal of so-called "black" propaganda.

This is propaganda which purports to be based on documents, photographs and newsreels from Western sources. Some of the documents, photos, etc., are no doubt genuine, others have been "doctored" to suit the needs of Moscow's *Agitprop* section, and most are out and out forgeries—some of them very crude. Alas, the audiences which are the targets of the Soviet Union's "black" propaganda drives are in nine out of ten cases, unable to tell right from wrong, see through the skillfully-woven fabric of falsehoods, expose the forgeries and unmask the lies.

Odds are, *Zdravstvui Solntse!* will never be shown to the general public, either in or outside the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is an "indoctrination film," designed to "expose" the methods of American espionage, with the alleged aid of Ukrainian Nationalists, while blaming the West for earthquakes, floods, droughts and other calamities have plagued humanity since times immemorial.

The film's plot is straightforward—"evil American imperialists" are charged with planning to blow up the world by artificial earthquakes, triggered off by underground nuclear blasts. Had the film been shown to the general public, the Kremlin would have been forced to admit that Peking is right in saying the "American imperialists" are a menace which must be eliminated before communism can triumph.

On the other hand, by showing *Zdravstvui Solntse!* to exclusive, select and carefully-screened audiences in private showings, Moscow can eat its propaganda cake and still have it, too. It can prove to the African and Middle Eastern Communists that it can be as "activist" and "anti-imperialist" as Red China, it can undermine whatever Western influence has been left in the Levant, Africa and Arabia, and—last but not least—set up a convenient scapegoat for all natural disasters, catastrophes and holocausts.

In Tel-Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Nicosia, Athens, Baghdad, Cairo, Khartoum, Algiers and Addis-Ababa, the film has been shown to hundreds of persons a night, at private screenings in Soviet Embassy compounds. It is estimated that over 10,000 communist activists, sympathizers, left-wingers and "progressive elements" saw the film in January 1965 alone. Admission was by personal invitation only, and suspicious Soviet security guards scrutinized the credentials of visitors. Under an international gentleman's agreement, each embassy is entitled to show as many films as it desires to its personnel and dependents, as well as invited guests. There is no limit to the motion pictures which may be brought in by an embassy, and the films are not subject to any censorship, entertainment tax or customs. They are brought in, and returned, by diplomatic mail and an embassy can show a different film every night in its screening room.

The Russians are misusing this right, utilizing the gentleman's agreement for their nefarious "black" propaganda purposes. But left-wing teachers, journalists, labor union leaders, writers, poets and actors who saw the film admit that it makes a deep and lasting impression, especially on the fertile imaginations of Arabs, Indians, Cypriots, Africans and other nationalities subjected to the Soviet propaganda drive.

The plot deals with the mysterious disappearance of Professor Sergei Fiodorov, a noted Soviet geologist and an international authority on volcanic research and exploration. It transpires that Fiodorov has been trying to harness the destructive force of active volcanoes to the benefit of mankind, by providing an unlimited source of cheap energy and limiting the effect of disastrous earthquakes.

The Soviet genius has been mapping out the underground rifts and fissures beneath the surface of the Soviet Union. He found out that several fissures were running west to east, beginning in the Carpathian Mountains in Western Ukraine, passing beneath the Black Sea to the Caucasus range, below the Caspian Sea to Turkestan and the Pamir Mountains, and across Siberia to the Kamchatka-Aleutian volcanic chain in the Pacific.

In the course of his exploration, the professor has made another important discovery: by blasting holes in the ocean bed, with the aid of nuclear energy, Pacific sea water could be induced to enter the subterranean fissures, seeping in at great depth under the surface of the Soviet Union. It would heat up while passing beneath the Kamchatka volcanoes, and come to a boiling point by the time it progressed westward to the Carpathian Mountains. En route, the subterranean fissures will be tapped, and the unlimited quantities of escaping steam utilized to turn the turbines of power stations, heat entire cities, change the climate of northern regions and offer countless other blessings to humanity. It won't cost a penny, because Mother Earth will heat Pacific sea water in its bowels free of charge, and send huge geysers of superheated steam erupting at pre-selected locations at regular intervals. Moreover, the sea water under the surface of the earth would also act as a giant cushion to absorb the shock of natural earthquakes and soften their impact.

After the Soviet experiment, Professor Fiodorov was planning to explore the possibilities of pouring Mediterranean sea water into subterranean fissures under North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans, do likewise with the Indian Ocean, and so on, until a communist millenium came about peacefully, in an era of peace and an age of plenty.

Alas, his dream was too good to be true. During an exploration trip to the Delatyn area of the Carpathian Mountains in Western Ukraine, Professor Fiodorov's party was ambushed by a band of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists," who are portrayed as bearded ruffians and uncouth sadists. His escorts are killed, the professor and some of his assistants taken prisoners and held for weeks in the band's hideout, in a labyrinth of caves honeycombing the mountain.

The Ukrainian guerrillas are portrayed as traitors, led by former Nazis, S.S. officers and Gestapo torturers. In the film, they "admit" having "changed bosses" and are working now for a sinister American espionage agency which utilizes the know-how of ex-Nazi experts.

Apart from a backhanded admission that Ukrainian freedom fighters are still active in the Carpathian Mountains and constitute a threat to Soviet security, the film also heaps mountains of abuse upon Western Germany and the United States, blaming an "unholy alliance" between "American capitalists" and "German militarists" for wars, starvation, and other calamities.

Professor Fiodorov is tortured by the Ukrainians and their "Nazi advisers," but refuses to talk. Unfortunately, one of his assistants is made of softer stuff. He breaks down when his fiancée

is tortured in front of him, and tells his captors what the exploration party was looking for in the mountains.

The Ukrainians set up a wireless transmitter and radio the information to their "American bosses." An unmarked American spy plane circles high over the mountains at night, and two parachutists plummet to earth, to be taken in hand by the Ukrainian reception committee. One of the arrivals is a cigar-smoking American who represents "certain Wall Street interests." The other agent is a hawk-faced Nazi, with a scar across his cheek, a monocle in his eye, who is the espionage agency's interrogation expert.

They pump the professor full of truth drugs and learn all technical details from him while he is in a hypnotic trance, believing that he is talking to his assistant whose tape-recorded voice asks the questions.

Back in New York, the "American warmongers" decide to devastate the Soviet Union and "people's democracies" by blasting through the Pacific ocean bed off the Aleutian islands. They assume that if the ocean water rushes into the underground fissures beneath the surface of the Soviet Union before the steam-escape holes are drilled along the route, the superheated steam will erupt in a man-made earthquake, causing a cataclysm all over Eastern Europe.

Fortunately for the Soviet Union and the "peace-loving progressive world," the Soviet security police are vigilant, while one of the Ukrainian "bandits" has not yet lost all his "conscience." Realizing that the devilish American-German plot will result in devastation of his beloved Ukraine, he kills a Ukrainian guerrilla guarding the entrance to the cave, helps Professor Fiodorov escape and guides him across the mountains to the KGB State Security station at Delatyn. He leads a hunter-killer group of police and security troops to round up the "gang of traitors without a country" and blow up their "snake pit" under the mountain. "How fresh and pure the air is now, how bright the sun is!" exclaims the turncoat, "now we can breathe air and greet the sun—*Zdravstvui Solntse!*"

Realizing that he cannot waste time, because the American "imperialists" and mad German scientists are getting ready for the Aleutian blast which will devastate the Soviet Union and East Europe, Professor Fiodorov shows that he is Moscow's own James Bond, minus the sex angle and the bedroom scenes. Accompanied by State Security Colonel Ivan Bogdanov, he rushes east to Kamchatka and descends into a fiery volcano to direct a counterblast across the Pacific. The Soviets are first with their hole which opens up a fissure running northeast towards the Aleutians. As the Americans set off their thermonuclear blast, the Pacific Ocean gushes into

the fissure, to find it occupied by water from Kamchatka. The giant cushion of Kamchatka water deflects the turbulence back towards Alaska, and the "warmongers" are cooked in their own frying pan, as the audience cheers and claps deliriously.

The film ends with original newsreel shots showing Alaska's devastation and the suffering of innocent people, who became the victims of mad "imperialist schemes" to conquer the world. Fiodorov is last seen embracing his faithful wife, and telling Colonel Bogdanov that the Americans have only themselves to blame for the calamity which befell them.

The plot may seem childish to sophisticated Western audiences, but there is no doubt that it appeals to the more immature and primitive minds of Africans, Asians and Levantines. But even sophisticated intellectuals who saw the motion picture were forced to admit that the science fiction subject was treated intelligently, and that in our age of tremendous scientific progress and technological achievements, "such things could happen indeed." If teachers, journalists and writers stress that the film made a powerful and lasting impression on them, and that they do not dismiss it as "exaggerated propaganda," no one can doubt the impact upon less sophisticated minds.

Moscow's aim in showing the film to selected audiences is twofold: *Zdravstvui Solntse!* is designed to enhance the Soviet Union's prestige and reputation, while showing that only Moscow—and not Peking—is capable of countering the "devilish plots" thought up by imperialists, capitalists, colonialists, militarists, etc.

On the eve of East German puppet Walter Ulbricht's visit to Cairo, the film makes clear that the future of the Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean depends on the strength and goodwill of the Soviet Union. An important subsidiary propaganda purpose is the blackening of West Germany's reputation as a haven for Nazis and unrepentant Hitlerites, and as a stooge of "American imperialism."

The only question which remains unanswered is why did the Soviets drag Ukrainians into their Fiodorov-Bond epic? They could have set up "Zionist agents" as the villains of the "dastardly plot" and reaped additional propaganda benefits in the Israel-hating Arab world. The only logical explanation is that the film is being shown to select audiences in the Soviet Union proper. If the international situation deteriorates, and relations between Moscow and Washington cool off, *Zdravstvui Solntse!* could be a powerful weapon of cold-war propaganda.

For the time being, the Kremlin propaganda experts prefer to limit the film's circulation to exclusive audiences of Afro-Asian stu-

dents in Moscow, Latin American and Arab Communists trained at the Lenin Academy for subversion and espionage, Red Army officer cadets, KGB frontier and internal security troops, and the like.

Moscow hesitates to unleash another wave of anti-Semitism. In any case, Soviet propaganda depicts Jews as speculators, thieves and embezzlers but not as guerrillas and kidnapers. It is more convenient for Moscow to zero in on Ukrainian Nationalists, depicting them as "the worst scum on earth"—in the words of Col. Bogdanov. But this can only mean that Ukrainian freedom fighters are still active in the forests of the Carpathian range, and continue to pose a serious problem to Moscow's security experts.

The film also provides food for serious thought—with so many science-fiction subjects becoming everyday reality by the time they appear in print, could it be that the Soviets are themselves planning a controlled-earthquake program, to dominate the world?

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION*

*By M. MELNYK ***

The neophyte in Soviet economics is warned very solemnly usually against Soviet dialectics and statistics. However, after having followed the more important writings by Western specialists, it seems that it is time to add considerably more warnings in this direction, too.

1. One of the most important omissions in Western literature is a really serious effort to relate the evaluation of Soviet economics to the political objectives of the Soviet ruling class. It must be remembered that these objectives have undergone fundamental changes over time.

We cannot forget that originally the Communist Party became powerful mainly because of "scientifically" founded ideas of surplus value of labor and economic crises caused by the "law" of economic concentration.

There was an effort during the First World War to fulfill some of the basic premises of Communist ideology, especially in the direction of equal incomes. However, this effort had to yield rather rapidly to more practical considerations. For example, it was soon found that the coal miners refused to work for the same wages as office clerks.

This was the phase of "war communism."

The second phase was the era of the Stalin rule. During that time the objective of Soviet economy was to become the basis for political and military strength of the first communist state. No effort was spared to accomplish this goal. All other considerations were brushed aside.

* In fairness to the author, we feel it is our duty to state that this article was completed several months ago, prior to the much-publicized CIA report on Soviet economy and subsequent events which occurred in the Soviet Union.

** The author wishes to thank Professor Bernard Hall for helpful comments in the preparation of this article.

The correctness of this economic policy seems to have been borne out during the Second World War.

After a short post-Stalin transition period, the Soviet economy has been given the third and certainly not less important objective. It was and it still very emphatically is to serve as the most important ideological lever of the communist movement. The communist political philosophy will have to be accepted because, among others, it created the most successful economic system as indicated by Soviet indices, especially the index of industrial production and national income.

This new role of the Soviet economy has been very clearly stated by Khrushchev, the deposed Russian dictator. In *The New York Times* of July 28, 1963, in an article by Harry Schwartz, we read: "... the real test of Socialism is (according to Khrushchev) the amount and quality of the food, clothing and other amenities and necessities provided to the people living under Socialist rule." And then he quotes Khrushchev directly: "If Socialism does not provide for all this and does not give advantages over capitalism, we shall be idle babblers and not revolutionaries..." Of course, equality of incomes or "withering away" of the state is either not mentioned or is relegated into the distant future.

More specifically, the economic argument is important because of two principal reasons. Externally, the underdeveloped countries are being encouraged to introduce the Soviet economic (and at the same time political) system. Internally, the Communist Party has a very important reason for its existence. If a general consensus were created that the performance of Soviet economy is not spectacular but average or even poor, then Soviet Russian "communism" would have relatively little to "sell" both at home and abroad.

2. Practically every major work on Soviet economics cautions the reader on the interpretation of Soviet statistics. In addition, a number of articles and even monographs appeared treating this subject exclusively. And yet, with the exception of more specialized topics, the most fundamental weaknesses can be quickly discovered by an intelligent economist. What almost invariably is missing in these warnings, are a little more far-reaching implications of certain Soviet statistical presentations.

Everyone notes that certain very crucial information (labor force, earnings, components of national income indices and information on the method of their computation) is not being published. But why is it so? Certainly not to cut the budget expenditures of the Central Statistical Office.

Or, everyone agrees that Soviet indices of industrial production and national income are exaggerated. In the case of the industrial production index, one blamed, before 1950, the use of high 1926-27 prices and the weights for new products. After the weights had been changed to 1952 and 1955 prices and the index continued to show about the same high rates of growth, one found some other reasons for it. One said, for example, that the new index should not have been simply chained to the old one but completely recomputed, etc.

Why do such things happen in the Soviet Union? Are there no economists or statisticians who would know how to compute an index number or who would understand what weights can do to an index number series?

Of course, there are very great amounts of data which are both correct and true. But there also are certain indices and data very vitally related to the objectives of foreign policies of the Soviet Union or political purposes of the Communist Party at home. Therefore, one should not try to explain the weaknesses in these statistics by reasons of economic or statistical rationale, as is so often done. One should finally create a concensus that certain most vital Soviet statistics serve as propaganda tools for certain objectives of Soviet domestic and foreign policies and that no amount of logic is going to change them as long as they can be even of relatively little use.

3. There is a general concensus among Western specialists on the Soviet economy that, although the Soviet indices are exaggerated, the economic growth of the Soviet Union is very rapid. This concensus has been established by a number of scholars who by very ingenious methods computed the first indexes of industrial production and national income. We are reproducing here the essentials of two tables contained in the book by Nicolas Spulber on *The Soviet Economy*. We might add that such tables are very common in general assessments of Soviet economy.

INDICES OF THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT: COMPARISON
BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN INDICES, 1928-1955
(1928 = 100)

	Index in 1955	Annual Rate of Growth
Soviet Index (Excluding munitions) -----	2055	11.8
Seton -----	1178	9.6
Jasny -----	775	7.9
Shimkin-Leedy -----	717	7.6
Kaplan-Moorsteen -----	585	6.8
Nutter -----	503	6.2

INDICES OF THE "REAL" NATIONAL INCOME OF THE USSR:
COMPARISON BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN ESTIMATES,
1928-1955 (1928 = 100)

	Index in 1955	Annual Rate of Growth
Soviet data (Soviet definitions) -----	1442	10.6
Jasny (National Income, corrected 1926/27 ruble prices) -----	374	5.1
Bergson (Adjusted ruble prices of 1950) -----	335	4.6
Clark (U.S. Dollar prices of 1950) -----	270	3.8
Wyler (Net national product U.S. dollar prices of 1940) -----	205*	6.3

As we can see, the period for which the annual rates of growth are computed, is 27 years. The respective ranges in Western estimates are: for Industrial Production 3.4 and for national income figures 2.5 percentage points. Since many people are accustomed to think in short period terms, they might think that the latter 2.5 range is not so large. However, as can be seen from the first table, after 27 years an index of 100 at 3.8 per cent annual growth becomes 270 and at 6.3 per cent—520. The difference is, of course, correspondingly greater for extreme estimates of industrial production. These facts alone might give us sufficient reason to question the statistical information which makes such considerable discrepancies possible.

Furthermore, it might be difficult for any economist to see how one can reconcile the following facts:

Everyone agrees that Soviet productivity in industry is less than in the United States. For example, Walter Galenson estimates it, in his book on *Labor Productivity in Soviet and American Industry*, at between 44 and 59 per cent of United States productivity for 1960. At the same time, according to estimates by Murray S. Weitzman and Andrew Elias, the agricultural labor force in 1959 was about 46 per cent of the total civilian labor force, or a rather slight decrease over the period of thirty years.

It is true that the Soviet civilian labor force constitutes a higher per cent of the population than, e.g., the American, meaning that relatively more people work in the Soviet Union than here. It is also true that fewer people are working in the service industries there. But in spite of this it is still difficult to explain how the industrial production of a country can grow at a rate of 10 per cent a year for such a long period of time with such small changes in the structure of its labor force.

* Index for 1940.

With regard to Gross National Product, we also note some figures which are difficult to reconcile. According to an estimate by Morris Bornstein in *The American Economic Review* for 1961, the Soviet GNP per capita in 1955 was 44 per cent of that of the United States. According to S. Kuznets (*Economic Growth*), at approximately the same time these were the respective percentages for some other countries: the United Kingdom 42, France 40, the Netherlands 27 and Italy 17 per cent. Even if we take into consideration the fact that Soviet consumer goods constitute a relatively smaller portion of the GNP, from observation of actual prices, wages and living accommodations in the Soviet Union the comparison of its standard of living with Italy would probably be much more pertinent than with England or France.

The Soviet Union has been industrialized and is growing at some speed but one must admit that there are quite acceptable reasons to doubt whether this growth is anything more than an average.

Believers in the very fast Soviet economic growth base their argument mainly on the ability of a completely planned economy to maintain a very high rate of gross investment (slightly less than 30 per cent of GNP) and on the "theory" of unbalanced economic growth, meaning that investment can be channeled rather at will into priority sectors determined by plan.

However, high investment rates are counterbalanced by very great amounts of waste. The principal cause of this waste is poor quality of both capital and consumer goods so that probably quite a substantial amount has to go for the purpose of replacement. (See Alec Nove's paper given at 1963 American Economic Association meeting.) Because of difficulties in planning and administrative inefficiency, there is also a very serious problem with regard to the misdirection of capital. Finally, one must be very suspicious of the "theory" of unbalanced economic growth, at least if we have in mind a long period of time.

Therefore, even a relatively fast rate of growth might not find its expression in correspondingly fast growth in the standard of living.

What the Soviet Union really achieved, was a very rapid transition from a semi-feudal to an industrial society. But this happened with such a tremendous amount of human suffering that many people hesitate to call it a success. Furthermore, it is not certain at all whether it happened because of the introduction of a new economic system or because of a political dictatorship which was able to destroy very quickly the old social and economic system. If the report in *The New York Times* of August 18, 1963 is true, then it is very in-

teresting to note, that this is exactly the idea expressed in the book on *The Historical Process of Economic Growth* by the Polish economist Stefan Kurowski.

Some concensuses on the Soviet Union based on suspicious or incomplete information should not be accepted unchallenged. It is very pertinent to say that people were wrong in the past with regard to individual estimates and whole concensuses.

A United Nations publication on "*Le revenue national et sa distribution dans les pays insuffisamment développés*" (1951) estimates the income per capita of a number of countries in Asia for 1949 at 30 dollars. If we assume a very modest amount of dispersion of 10 per cent for one standard deviation, than there were people in those countries who lived on an income of 21 dollars per year or not quite 6 cents a day. One must be able to think of quite a few qualifications to explain this sort of estimate.

Two years ago Edward Crankshaw complained in *The New York Times* and *The New York Times Magazine* (May 25, 1963) about a political concensus in the West maintaining that the communist camp is just one nationless family. This concensus coincided quite closely with the aims of Soviet domestic and foreign policy and it has been discredited not so much by the foresight of political scientists but by the events. Says Crankshaw: "Perhaps the most important and far-reaching consequence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, when it is fully recognized, will be that we in the West will be forced to pay more attention to reality and less to slogans—and, in consequence, start treating Russians and Poles, Czechs and Hungarians, Chinese and Yougoslavs... as Russians, Poles, Czechs... instead of faceless components of an imaginary unity."

4. Again according to *The New York Times* of November 16, 1958, "...Premier Nikita Khrushchev threw down the boldest economic challenge that Russia has yet made to the United States and the West. An official Soviet announcement planned to increase gross industrial production by 80 per cent in the next seven years. Mr. Khrushchev vowed that the Soviet Union would have the highest rate of per capita production in Europe by 1965 and in the world by 1970, giving the Soviet people a living standard second to none."

It is amazing how many people took this challenge seriously. Of course, as the "deadline" approaches, there are considerable shifts of opinion on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Soviet official propaganda is talking now about 1980, and some Western specialists start adding some more qualifications to their estimates. In any event, we certainly are going to witness more downward revisions of the rates of growth in question. Also the expressions of high praise concerning

the performance of the Soviet economic system are going to be heard less frequently.

However, the Soviet government seems to be quite at ease with this sort of about-face. We should not forget, that in the not very distant past the official party line for a very long time was that Western economies are going to collapse because of increasing severity of economic crises. So probably after the campaign of overtaking the United States economically loses credibility, they might find some other argument which would further their popularity and their political aims. In the extreme situation it is not unlikely that they will adopt principal features of the Yugoslav economic system.

In order to provide a more concrete idea about the above problem we did some very general and speculative computations and comparisons. Since everyone (including Russians) agrees that in 1913 the Russian GNP was about one-fifth of the American, we took this proportion as our basis. Using Kuznets figures, adjusted by Kendrick to conform to the Department of Commerce concept, the GNP of Czarist Russia was at that time approximately 12.7 billion 1929 dollars. From Colin Clark's figures in his book on *Critique of Russian Statistics* (1939) we assumed first that the Russian GNP increased, from 1913 to 1928, by a quite reasonable 15 per cent and then by 30 per cent. In other words, we assumed that in 1928 the then Soviet GNP was, respectively, 14.6 and 16.5. billion 1929 dollars. Then, applying the annual rates of growth listed in the first table above, we obtained the following two tables:

VERY GENERAL AND PURELY SPECULATIVE PROJECTION OF
SOVIET GNP FROM 1928 TO 1955 AND TO 1970
(Comparisons with Kuznets Estimates)

Projections from 14.6 billion 1929 dollars

Annual rate of growth (Per cent)	Soviet GNP in 1955 (in Billions)	Year in which Soviet & USA GNP's were equal	Soviet GNP in 1970 (in Billions)	Year in which Soviet & USA GNP's were equal
10.6 Off.	221.7	1954/55	1,004.8	About 4 times of USA 1960 figure
6.3 W.	75.9	1922	190.0	1950/51
5.1 J.	55.9	1910	117.9	1939/40
4.6 B.	49.2	1908	96.5	1926
3.8 C.	39.9	1900/01	69.9	1916

Projections from 16.5 billion 1929 dollars

10.6 Off.	250.5	1960	1,135.5	See note above.
6.3 W.	85.9	1923	214.7	1953
5.1 J.	63.2	1915/16	133.3	1940/41
4.6 B.	55.6	1909	109.1	1937
3.8 C.	45.2	1904	79.0	1922/23

Using the Soviet official rate of growth and assuming that it is going to continue at the same level, by 1970 the Soviet GNP would be four times as high as American in 1960.

A rate of growth of 6.3 per cent would bring the Soviet real national product by 1970 to the American 1950-53 level which is absurd. According to Alec Nove, it will take the Soviet economy generations to catch up with American housing space per capita. The Soviet Union would also have to reduce its agricultural labor force to some 9 per cent of the total in the remaining 7 years or to substantially overtake Western countries technologically, or to work day and night which is also impossible.

The truth might lie between the Bergson and Jasny rate and then the rate of growth of Industrial Production would have to be adjusted to this level, which means that Nutter's rate looks most reasonable. But in view of the fact that the Soviet Union had at its disposal all the technological advantages of industrialized countries, these rates can hardly be called spectacular. The situation might change quite substantially when that country will have to compete with the free economies of the West on its own.

MOLDAVIA: A RUSSIAN SATELLITE

By GEORGE SAVOR—*as told to* LEO HEIMAN

If any additional proof were needed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a veritable prison of nations oppressed and exploited by Russian imperialism behind the camouflage screen of communist ideology—a visit to the so-called Moldavian “republic” is in order to dispel any lingering illusions about the vicious nature of Moscow’s colonialism.

Moldavia is the Soviet Union’s private fruit orchard. Where enslaved Ukraine is Moscow’s breadbasket and top source of foreign currency income, Moldavia provides the luscious peaches, plums, pears, apples, grapes, apricots and cherries for tables of Soviet commissars and party activists. It produces excellent wine, plump chickens, and huge quantities of fresh milk, butter, cheeses, eggs and seasonal vegetables.

Western visitors to the Soviet Union, including veteran journalists, are unable to form balanced estimates because they lack an objective measuring stick to gauge the true state of the USSR’s economy. Thus, the fact that housewives in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad and other cities of the Soviet Union must queue up for hours to buy three kilograms of flour or one small bag of potatoes, does not mean that people are starving. Just as the fact that Moscow exports foodstuffs to Cuba and Algeria does not mean that Soviet agriculture has recovered from the slump which followed enforced collectivization in the 1930’s.

The population of the Soviet Union is growing rapidly, and its standards of living are rising slowly, but perceptibly. Although to a Westener life in the USSR appears drab and unexciting, the principal reason for dissatisfaction is not economic. There are few hungry or unemployed people, education is free and universal and while the clothes of village men and women still resemble burlap sacks, no one is running around naked or barefooted either.

And yet, there is more resentment and dissatisfaction in the Soviet Empire than ever before. It is very difficult to probe the roots and motivation of this elusive feeling. Obviously, no one is going to speak up and admit to a stranger (or even to a friend) that he hates the Soviet Union and desires its disintegration and downfall.

But it seems to me that the most negative attitude towards Moscow's iron-fisted rule can be found on the periphery of the Soviet Empire, in the areas inhabited by oppressed non-Russian peoples. The people in Moscow, Murmansk and Smolensk may gripe and grumble about shortcomings, shortages and red-tape bureaucracy, but they do not really hate the Kremlin big-shots. In many ways, they are proud of them, proud of being Russians in a Russian-ruled empire which controls one-fifth of the world and directly influences two-thirds of the Eastern Hemisphere.

In the interior regions of Russia, as well as in periphery districts inhabited by a Russian majority, one may encounter dissatisfaction, but seldom any real resentment or a genuine desire to replace the communist system which elevated Russia to the status of a great world power.

It is different in the "constituent republics" inhabited by Moscow's captive non-Russian peoples. There, the resentment is not directed against the administrative or political system, but against Russian rule as such. And nowhere is this attitude more evident than in Ukraine, Latvia and Moldavia.

I am sure the oppressed peoples of other "constituent republics" resent Soviet Russian domination too. But I have not yet visited the Trans-Caucasian and Central Asia areas, and do not wish to repeat hearsay, which is mostly inaccurate gossip or wishful thinking.

On the other hand, I am well acquainted with the state of affairs in Ukraine, Latvia and Moldavia, and feel myself qualified to comment on their psychological, economical, social and political problems. Moldavia is different from the other "constituent republics" in that it was designed as a false-facade booby-trap right from the beginning. All "constituent republics" of the USSR are phony in the sense that they do not enjoy an independent statehood, to which they are entitled under the United Nations charter.

Moldavia is different because it does not enjoy any nationhood as well. There is no Moldavian nationality, language, cultural heritage or historical destiny, simply because there is no Moldavian nation. Thus, the example of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic illustrates the hypocrisy, falsehood and criminal character of Moscow's colonial rule over exploited national minorities.

At a time when the Soviets cynically denounce "American war-mongers" for rescuing European women and children from an orgy of sadistic slaughter by communist-led rebels, castigate the "British imperialists" for helping Malaysia resist the communist-supported invasion by Indonesia's armed forces, and set themselves up as the self-styled champions of peace, liberty, freedom and anti-colonialism

—demanding immediate independence for primitive tribes of Dark Africa—at the same time the Soviets themselves deny basic rights and freedoms to 105 million non-Russian inmates of the Moscow-controlled prison house of nations.

Western diplomats, political leaders, information agencies and ordinary people have gotten used to the ease with which the Soviets warp words, pervert definitions and distort their meanings. In the long run, everybody lets Moscow get away with its own kind of doublethink, doubletalk and gobbledygook. In my humble opinion, Moscow is winning an important semantics victory by default. While it is true that action is more important than words, and semantics seems just a lot of empty talk and hard-to-pronounce phraseology, it can be an important weapon in the cold war struggle for the hearts and minds of men.

Used properly, semantics could speed up the process of the captive republics' liberation from Soviet colonial rule.

Moscow should be challenged to produce proof that the Moldavian nation does, in fact, exist and is not just an invention to justify Russian imperialism and colonial exploitation. Because there is no such thing as a Moldavian nation. The fertile area between the Prut and Dniester Rivers, which now constitutes the Moldavian republic, is inhabited by Rumanians, Ukrainians, Russians, gypsies and Jews. Even as a geographical expression, Moldavia cannot be applied to this area which was known as Bessarabia before the Second World War. The real Moldavia is in Rumania proper, along the Moldova River and Harghitei mountains.

As so many other words and expressions, the name was simply "borrowed" by Moscow to justify the carving out of another colonial possession. Speaking frankly, Soviet Moldavia is not a state and not a nation, but a communist-sponsored racket designed to facilitate the region's economical exploitation by the Kremlin. With a territory the size of Switzerland, Moldavia is inhabited by 3,000,000 people, of whom about two million are Rumanians (called "Moldavians" by the Soviets), 480,000 Ukrainians, 350,000 Russians, 100,000 Jews, 12,000 gypsies, and some 60,000 "Bessarabians" of mixed descent.

The number of Russians is growing steadily, both in absolute figures and in relative proportion to the republic's other nationalities, as Moscow uproots the Rumanian peasants and banishes them to the "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan, the Far East and Central Asia. At the same time, thousands of Russians are being transferred from the Tambov, Saratov, Voronezh and Smolensk districts, and resettled in the villages vacated by Rumanian farmers.

If this is not colonialism, perhaps all our existing dictionaries must be revised to find a better word. The relatively high proportion of Ukrainians is due to several factors. For political-psychological reasons, Moscow designed Moldavia as a "multinational republic." Otherwise, had it been populated only by Rumanians, not even Moscow's cynical dialectics could have justified its separation from the communist "sister state" and "brother nation" of Rumania, just across the border.

Therefore, the borders of Soviet Moldavia were artificially expanded east of the Dniester River, to include some pure Ukrainian districts as well. No one has asked the inhabitants of these districts whether they want to be "citizens" of Moldavia or Ukraine, just as no one has ever asked them whether they wish to live in the Soviet Union. No one has ever bothered to find out why should African cannibals who were photographed eating the hearts, kidneys and livers of their prisoners, be hailed as "gallant freedom fighters," "illustrious champions of human freedom," and why should sovereign states be created on the basis of primitive tribal societies, ruled by voodoo, juju, bribes and witch doctors—while the same rights are denied to the enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union?

The lot of the Ukrainians and other oppressed nations would have been much better had they been born on the banks of the Congo, Niger and Nile Rivers, rather than on the Dnieper, Dniester and Bug. As it is, the rural districts of Soroky, Kamenka, Rybnitsa, Hryhoriopil and Tyraspol were separated from Ukraine and transferred to the newly-created Moldavian "republic" which much ado.

While Moldavia's eastern districts were thus stolen from Ukraine, its central and western countries were torn away from Rumania. The Russians are foreigners who do not belong there at all, not any more than the British or French belong in Africa. The Jews are praying for the day when they can pack up and migrate to Israel, and the Rumanians hate the Russians with an intense hatred which can melt down the hard outer shell of communism.

I arrived in Kishinev in December 1964, aboard the Bucharest-Kiev express train. I shared a compartment with two Russian engineers who spent every penny they had saved from their *per diem* expenses to shop in the Iasi market, during the 45-minute wait at the station. They returned with wicker baskets of hardboiled eggs, garlic sausages, smoked hams, bottles of wine and brandy, cheap perfume, gaudy costume jewelry and Chinese silk lingerie which they displayed proudly for me to admire.

"Can't you buy such things in the Soviet Union?" I asked them. They looked at me as if I were crazy. "Sure we can," the older engi-

neer replied, showing two rows of stainless steel teeth, "but first of all we must return all Rumanian money at the border, so it's better we spend it here. And secondly, this stuff is *zagraničnoye* (foreign-made)."

They spread out a newspaper on a cardboard suitcase, uncorked a bottle of wine, tore apart a smoked herring with their fingers, sliced off chunks of sausage and broke a loaf of freshly-baked peasant bread by inserting a greasy thumb into the upper crust, and pushing hard with a swift practiced movement. They invited me to join them in their mid-morning snack, and we were still partaking of the Rumanian delicacies as the train halted for passport and currency control.

The Soviet customs officers were quite polite to me, but the two Russians underwent a thorough search. Boxes of face powder they bought for their wives were opened and sniffed suspiciously. It transpired the officers were searching for drugs. Despite the draconic sentences meted out to offenders—mostly death by firing squad—huge quantities of narcotics are being smuggled into the Soviet Union from the Middle East, via Bulgaria and Rumania.

We rolled into Kishinev's reconstructed central station at dusk. I found out I could not leave the train before showing our *provodnik* (passenger coach supervisor) my Intourist "marshroute"—as the officially approved itinerary of tourist travels is called in the USSR. Any deviation from the fixed travel schedule must be authorized by the local Intourist office. Otherwise, local authorities and militia patrols have the right to detain foreign tourists who are off their prearranged route.

Only after I showed the *provodnik* my official schedule, which foresaw a sojourn of 22 days in Kishinev, for business negotiations with officials of the Moldavian *Sovnarkhoz* (Central Economic Administration), did the surly watchdog release my luggage and call for a porter. A taxicab took me to the Intourist Hotel, where I had booked a room, full board and a chauffeur-driven limousine for \$45 a day. The car, a blue Volga sedan (instead of the black Chaika limousine which I was promised), arrived early the next morning.

The driver was glad to hear I knew Russian. He was supposed to double as a guide and interpreter too, in addition to filing daily reports with the local headquarters of Soviet secret police. When he saw I had taken no camera along on the first trip, he actually smiled.

We spent all day visiting the giant new cellulose combine at Kagul. The director, chief engineer and most of the senior technical

staff were Russians. The workers were either Ukrainians or Rumanians.

I checked the quality of newsprint the Soviets wanted to dump in Western Europe at cut-rate prices, and drove back to Kishinev. A thin crust of ice had covered the road, and our car skidded from time to time, despite its snow-chains and spiked tires. I wondered about the origin of ice coating. Sure it was cold, but no rain or snow had fallen for several days, and there was no reason for ice to form. Some stretches of the road were clear of ice, and the driver who swore and cursed all the time, had to stop and take the chains off. There was a law against damaging the asphalt surface by snow chains. A few miles later, we hit a big patch of ice, and skidded to a halt in front of two wrecked heavy-duty trucks which smashed into each other at high speed, turning over across the highway.

A labor gang, composed mostly of peasant women, was shovelling a detour across the field. While we waited for the by-pass to be completed, I understood from the conversation between my driver and the ORUD (traffic police) commander that the highway was deliberately sabotaged by *Rumynskiye svolochi* (Rumanian trash) who drilled holes in the *Vodoprovod* (water pipeline) and let the road be flooded, frozen and coated with ice. They did it to cause accidents, the police officer stressed, and were contemptible criminals and saboteurs.

This was my first direct encounter with anti-Soviet sabotage in Moldavia. Westerners who think of national resistance in terms of guerrilla warfare, bombings, ambushes, daring raids and derailed trains must get used to other forms of underground struggle by oppressed nations of the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet sabotage in Moldavia is a good example. It is not directed, inspired or connected to any national resistance movement. There are no underground organizations, no secret societies, clandestine meetings, whispered passwords and all the cloak-and-dagger paraphernalia of a "death-or-freedom" struggle. But there is a lot of vicious and cunning sabotage. A person or persons unknown cuts holes in the tarpaulin covers of trucks parked in front of a sugar refinery. The trucks are loaded with bags of sugar and drive off in drizzling rain. By the time they arrive at their destination, rain has penetrated the upper layer of bags, causing substantial damage. Nothing dramatic or heroic, but Moldavia is getting to be one of Moscow's biggest internal headaches, after the Ukrainians and the Jews, a real pain in the neck.

All dissatisfied non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union pose a serious problem for the Kremlin masters. But with the Armenians, Kazakhs and Uzbeks the Russians know at least where they stand,

one way or the other. But the Moldavians pretend to be happy, loyal and trustworthy. They attend political meetings, applaud communist agitators, vote for local Soviets and promise to contribute more and more to the victory of revolutionary socialism. But at night, the meek, docile, yessing Moldavians (I mean the Rumanian inhabitants of Soviet Moldavia—because actually there are no Moldavians, just as there is no Moldavia) pour kerosene into vats of wine, drill holes through water pipelines, toss flaming torches into haystacks and granaries, string thin piano wire from tree to tree across the roads, to decapitate motorcycle police patrols, and slice the throats of obnoxious communist party chiefs and secret police agents.

The Russians cannot do anything against this kind of resistance. Had there been any kind of anti-Soviet underground or organization, it would have been infiltrated by secret police operatives and smashed a long time ago. But the spontaneous resistance of Moldavia's Rumanian peasants is not planned, initiated by any body or organized. No one but the perpetrators themselves know who did what, why and how. The motivation of Moldavian resistance is not national either. The peasants would not have risked their lives to fight for a return to communist Rumania, which is in many respects just as bad as the Soviet Union. Nor is the motivation economical. The Rumanian peasants of Moldavia are actually better off, materially, than the peasants in most areas of the Soviet Union and Rumania proper.

What makes the Moldavian risk his life is personal resentment, vindictiveness and malice, coupled with fears of deportation and banishment. Had the Moldavian peasants been more articulate and sophisticated, they would have admitted that their reaction is that of a hooked marlin or swordfish. Where other fish let themselves be reeled in, once they are hooked, the marlin struggles on and attempts to snap the line, even if he dies afterwards.

And because the anti-Soviet sabotage in Moldavia is not prompted by national, political or economical aims, but only by personal feelings which are well hidden and disguised, the secret police are quite helpless against it. It goes without saying that dozens of people are arrested after each act of sabotage or *vreditelstvo* (malicious wrecking). After all, if the secret police do not produce culprits, and force them to sign confessions, they themselves will be charged with criminal negligence and tossed into slave-labor camps.

But whether or not the guilty persons are ever discovered is anybody's guess. The fact that some prisoners sign confessions, and admit to have been acting on behalf of the "American Intelli-

gence" or other secret Western agencies, does not mean a thing, of course.

Off hand, I would say that had the Soviets caught any saboteurs at all, the overall rate of resistance would have diminished rather than increased in recent years.

The Rumanian peasants of Moldavia are a very stubborn lot. I have heard Soviet officials describing the Ukrainians as glass and the Moldavians as glue. You can crush glass if you press it hard enough, though its splinters can still be very dangerous. But you can't break, strike or crush glue. If you hit it, it only sticks to you. The Moldavian resistance drives Soviet officials mad, and I don't blame them for giving vent to their feelings at every opportunity. For obvious reasons, the Soviets cannot handle the Moldavian situation with police terror methods alone. There are 18 million Rumanians across the border, 100 satellite populations on the fringe of Moscow's outer perimeter, 105 million non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union proper.

The Soviets hope to solve the Moldavian problem by what they politely call "integration." This entails a shift of Moldavia's Rumanian population east towards Central Asia and Siberia, and their replacement by Russian settlers from the interior.

Moldavia's colonization by Russian imperialists had undergone five different stages. In the years 1944-1947, over 200,000 Rumanians and Ukrainians living along the Dniester and Prut Rivers were executed, sentenced to prison camp terms or deported to "resettlement areas" on charges of collaboration with German Nazis, Rumanian Fascists and local *Boyars* (feudal landowners), anti-Soviet propaganda, counterrevolutionary activity, and the like.

From 1948 through 1953, Moldavia was settled by some 250,000 Russians, while great efforts were being made to increase the ridiculously small size of the Moldavian Communist Party. But at the time of Stalin's death, it numbered only 10,000 card-carrying members, most of them Russians and Ukrainian opportunists.

In the third stage, 1954 to 1959, thousands of demobilized Soviet soldiers—mostly Russians, but also Tartars, Bashkirs and Chuvash—were diverted to Moldavia, given houses, employment, loans and other incentives, and encouraged to marry local girls. Simultaneously, thousands of communist activists were transferred from Russia's interior region to bolster the Moldavian C.P. strength and provide cadres for law enforcement, administration, security and control.

In the fourth stage, 1960 through 1963, an estimated 300,000 Rumanians were uprooted by the "republic's" administrative-eco-

conomic reorganization, and resettled in the Barnaul, Altai, Irkutsk and Sayan regions of Siberia. There were no forcible deportations this time. But thousands of small *kolkhoz* collective farms were liquidated to make way for 650 big *kolkhoz* collectives and 72 huge *Sovkhoz* estates. This meant that hundreds of thousands of farmers had the choice of moving with their belongings and private livestock to prefabricated huts and clapboard shacks in the new villages, where they would become small cogs in a huge impersonal machine, or migrating to Southern Siberia where they were given houses, land and long-term interest-free loans.

Still, most peasants hesitated to part from their homeland. The official apparatus pressed hard, threatening them with prosecution for non-payment of taxes, demanding the return of unfulfilled agricultural quotas, and forcing them to work on highway construction and canal digging projects at ridiculously low wages.

In the end, the Rumanian peasants were induced to migrate east by this carrot-and-stick policy, at the rate of 100,000 a year. Early in 1964, this migration slowed down, and then petered out, for two reasons. The administrative-economic reorganization process was completed as planned, and letters written by the Rumanian expatriates in Southern Siberia indicated that it is better to be a "mamalizhnik" (impoverished maize eater) in Moldavia, than a prosperous collective farmer in Siberia.

The fifth stage of Moldavia's colonization by Moscow began in the summer of 1964, shortly after the final examinations and graduation ceremonies from local colleges and technical institutes. The Rumanian graduates found out to their chagrin that they could not get any kind of work at home. They were assigned to faraway places in the Far East, Central Asia and the Urals. They had the choice of either obeying the official assignment lists, or being deprived of their diplomas and reduced to the status of unskilled laborers. In most cases, they chose the first way. Their place was taken by Russian doctors, engineers, technicians, economists, lawyers, architects and pharmacists.

In this way, the Soviet regime hopes to reduce the proportion of Rumanian intellectuals and members of the free professions, replacing them by Russians. The expatriate Rumanians forget their language and ethnic origins, marry Russian girls and lose their identity as "Moldavians." And the increased percentage of Russian intelligentsia in Moldavia helps to speed up the process of the republic's Russification.

How do the Rumanian inhabitants of Moldavia react to being deprived of their land, property and national identity? No conference

of "Non-Aligned Nations," no "Anti-Colonialist Solidarity Committee" and no "Neutralist Summit" has taken up cudgels on their behalf. But what is happening in Moldavia and Ukraine is a thousand times worse than what has happened in the Congo or Angola.

When the director of the Red Banner *Sovkhoz* near Teleneshty accused his Rumanian employees of stealing corn from the fields, the obedient peasants bowed and assured Comrade Director that he must be mistaken. They would never dream of stealing socialist property. Still, the estate's corn plantations were being raided at night by persons carrying sacks and sharp knives. They cut off thousands of heads of corn, and disappeared at dawn without leaving any tracks.

Faced by a threat to his own safety if he neglected to act, the director filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor at Teleneshty, and summoned a platoon of *Druzhinniki* auxiliary militia. The *Druzhinniki* staged a will orgy in one of the barns, drinking vodka and making love to peasant girls, while the Russian director made the rounds of his corn plantations, to check the security precautions against renewed thefts. His body was found the next day, floating face down in the fish breeding pond. There were no signs of violence or foul play, and the official verdict was that he lost his way in the darkness, fell into the pond and drowned. The verdict overlooked such known facts as bright moonlight, which reflected on the pond's surface, making it shine like silver, a three-foot high embankment around the pond's outer rim, erected to protect livestock from falling in, and the director's ability to swim.

But the secret police investigators took the easiest way out, and hastened to close the file. Otherwise, had they admitted the possibility of murder, they would have been held responsible for failure to produce the culprits.

Master Sergeant Ivan Solovyev of the Railway Militia was pushed in front of a freight train at the Leovo marshalling yards. He was able to save himself by rolling beneath the locomotive, but he lost his right leg and the fingers of his right hand. He testified that someone crept up behind his back as he stood on guard on the platform, and pushed him hard just as the train clattered by.

Solovyev was instrumental in securing 10-year prison camp convictions for two young Rumanians who stole coal from the Leovo depot. He had apprehended them and was the only prosecution witness. The defendants claimed that they did not steal coal, but only scraped away the coal dust which accumulated on the ground, and which would be swept away by the autumn rains anyway. The court believed Solovyev's testimony, and the two youngsters were sent

away to Arctic camps. A few weeks later, the Master Sergeant was pushed under a train. The police arrested several friends and relatives of the convicted coal thieves, but secured no confessions as far as I know.

Not all resistance attempts end in murder or mayhem. Some are downright hilarious, others quite destructive in a practical-joke way. A favorite game of Rumanian urchins in Soviet Moldavia is to push a wad of rags or cotton waste down a motor vehicle's exhaust pipe. The engine turns over, coughs and dies. The driver swears and curses, but cannot find the cause of the trouble. The car or truck must be towed to a garage, the exhaust pipe unscrewed and taken apart, the rags removed and the gasoline tank checked for sugar which is sometimes added for good measure. A mixture of sugar and gasoline creates a chemical reaction which burns out the engine.

Another national pastime is pushing matchsticks up the main vents of truck and tractor tires. The caps are then screwed on again, but not all the way, and the air escapes slowly while the vehicle moves. In the end, the driver is immobilized with four or six flats, and only one replacement. He must alert passing trucks, and wait until spares are brought up from the regional garage. But there is a shortage of tires in the Soviet Union, and the most such an unlucky driver can hope for is a compressed air tank with which he must fill his tires.

Nail-studded boards, screws buried in the macadam with their sharp points up, jagged glass splinters and broken scythe blades are also distributed along the roads at night, by persons unknown.

Recent spotchecks of "Zagotzerno" grain elevators in Komrat and Kayshany revealed that sand and gravel were added to sacks of wheat delivered by local villages. Police investigators were called in, and the doctored deliveries traced to three villages along the Kogilnik river. But when the authorities demanded another delivery of wheat, as a punishment for sabotaging the initial order, unrest and seething discontent erupted among the farmers. The local granary was burned down in one of the villages, while a bag of crushed glass and rusty nails was placed on the porch of the local *Predsedatel's* (chairman of the village Soviet) house, with a crudely drawn slogan saying *Nash Podarok Borodatomu* (Our gift to the bearded one—a reference to Soviet wheat shipments to Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba).

While I was in Kishinev, two local farmers were brought to trial for damaging the fruit trees in their *kolkhoz*, by digging up the roots, cutting them away and covering the severed parts with earth. The trees withered and died.

One may well ask why are the peasants destroying their own means of livelihood? After all, their own *Trudoden* (daily pay in agricultural produce) quotas depend on the quality and quantity of wheat, fruits, vegetables and meat delivered to central supply stores. Less fruit trees in the *kolkhoz* means less fruit for the farmers themselves. But things are not as simple and clear-cut as that.

To begin with, the hard-working farmers, who are forced to toil *Od Zari Do Zari* (from sunrise to sunset) in the summer months, never get to taste their own produce. Special commissions inspect the trees, and determine the delivery quotas, which are unrealistically high. If the farmers fail to meet them, their own *Trudoden* pay is sharply reduced. If they deliver all fruit and vegetables at ridiculously low official prices, they are left only with the *Brak* (rotten fruit which falls down from the trees).

Under such circumstances, is it worth it for them to work like animals, and toil like beasts of burden? They prefer to destroy most fruit trees, so that there is less work for them to do until new ones are planted. They do not lose anything, because no delivery quotas are asked from withered orchards. And if they themselves desire an apple or a peach, they steal them from other orchards at night.

Moldavia's Russification is proceeding at a pace which is faster than elsewhere in the USSR. Nearly all streets in Kishinev and other towns have Russian names (Zhukovsky, Pushkinskaya, Komsomolskaya, Kotovsky, Sverdlov, Sovietskaya, etc.).

And as soon as townships or villages have more than 20 per cent Russians among their inhabitants, their Rumanian names are changed to Russian ones. Thus, Dubeshty became Dubrovka, Oreshty is now Oreshnikovo, and Petroseni is plain Petrovskoye.

Perhaps you can hear the Rumanian language spoken today in Siberia or the Arctic wastes. But the language one hears in the streets, buses and restaurants of Kishinev is Russian.

But it is extremely important to Moscow to keep up a semblance of Moldavian nationhood, while posing as the defender of Afro-Asian sovereignty and freedom. The Kishinev Radio Center broadcasts in Rumanian and Russian. The Moldavian State Publishing House has Rumanian and Russian language sections, and Rumanian is the principal language of instruction in about half of all grade-level (elementary) schools. But nine out of ten secondary-level (high) schools have replaced Rumanian by Russian, as did all Moldavian universities, colleges and academic institutes. The official pretext is that one cannot absorb the latest "achievements of Soviet science and technology" without a thorough knowledge of the Russian language.

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINA V DOBI DYREKTORIYI U.N.R. (Ukraine in the Era of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic). By Dr. Matthew Stachiw. Shevchenko Scientific Society—Ukrainian Scientific-Historic Library, Vols. IV, V and VI. Scranton, Pa. 1964.

The present three volumes, totalling 876 pages, cover one of the most important periods of modern Ukrainian history, namely, the period of the free Ukraine—November, 1918, to November, 1920. Each of the volumes deals with various aspects of the life and activities of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic and its government. The theme will be further expanded upon in forthcoming volumes.

The author merits praise for his ability and talent to utilize skillfully a great many primary sources. In addition to those in the Ukrainian language, found in the free world, Dr. Stachiw has made abundant use of Soviet sources, both in the Ukrainian and Russian languages, as well as the memoirs of various Ukrainian and foreign authors dealing with this period of Ukrainian history. The author has also gone to the archives for some rare materials, such as the minutes of the sessions of the Council of Ambassadors and the minutes of the Paris Peace Conference. Again, he has consulted reports of the American intelligence services on developments in Ukraine at that time. All the foreign sources are checked and evaluated against the Ukrainian ones. In a word, the work of Dr. Stachiw is a monument to scholarship in depth.

The first volume under review (Volume IV) covers the work of the Directorate, especially its preparation for the convocation of the Ukrainian National Labor Congress (*Trudovy Congress*), and what the congress was expected to do for the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation. The author dispassionately reports all happenings, whether they be constructive or negative from a national point of view, and objectively traces a number of political developments taking place in Ukraine at that time.

With the convocation of the *Trudovy Congress*, a milestone was reached in Kiev, capital of Ukraine: on January 22, 1919, an Act of Union was signed, binding together all Ukrainian territories into one, sovereign and independent state of the Ukrainian people.

Somewhat uncertain as to the kind of political face the Congress might assume, the Directorate invited Ukrainian delegations from Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia (Carpatho-Ukraine) to take part in the Congress, hoping that the well-established parliamentary and democratic traditions of these delegations would have a stabilizing influence if needed. For among members of the Ukrainian Socialist Workers' Party at that time in Ukraine there was a group which openly plumped for a Soviet system of government. A small faction in the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party also favored the same system.

When the Congress opened, difficulties arose in appointing the chairman of the congress, although the deputy chairmen presented no problem. Eventually the Congress was chaired by Semen Wityk, a Social-Democrat from Western Ukraine. The strong Ukrainian Social-Revolutionaries agreed to send their own candidate to the presidium of the Congress at a later date.

In the course of the conclave it became apparent that the Directorate had failed to prepare a comprehensive program and to provide a workable body of statutes, nor had it drafted a single bill or resolution. The speakers—including members of the Directorate headed by its preident, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Premier Volodymyr Chekhivsky—all delivered windy political speeches on events taking place in Ukraine, but failed to implement any important measures or program.

During the proceedings and deliberations, however, it became obvious that those favoring Ukrainian independence were in an overwhelming majority. Most articulate in this regard were the representatives of Western Ukraine. The Congress issued a *Universal* to the Ukrainian people underscoring that during the intervals of the Congress "all powers belong to the Directorate, supplemented by a representative of the Dniester Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia)." On January 28, 1919, the Congress adopted the text of the preliminary constitution.

At the same time the armed aggression of Communist Russia against Ukraine grew in intensity. The government, headed by V. Chekhivsky, sent a delegation to Moscow for the purpose of negotiating a stop to the aggression. The delegation, headed by Semen Mazurenko, failed to get anywhere with the Soviet government despite a protracted stay. Moreover, it had a hard time keeping in touch with Kiev because of the havoc wreaked by the Soviet invasion.

The Directorate also established contact with the French army command, which, however, descended upon Odessa without benefit of any understanding with the government of Ukraine. A strong group of Russian Czarist officers, under the wing of the French army, organized a powerful contingent which occupied the city and set up its own administration.

When the Ukrainian troops besieged Odessa and sealed off all avenues of escape, the attitude of the French command changed to respect. Thereafter a fruitful relationship prevailed with the French, despite the efforts of the Russian army group of Gen. Denikin to undermine it.

Volumes V and VI are devoted to the Ukrainian diplomatic activities in Paris, where a large Ukrainian delegation labored to win Allied recognition of Ukraine's independence. Headed by Hryhory Sydorenko, the delegation included Dr. Vasyl Paneyko, Dr. Stepan Tomashivsky and Prof. Alexander Shulhyn. Later, Dr. Arnold Margolin and Prof. K. Macievyeh joined the delegation, as well as English-interpreter Anthony Petrushevych and French-interpreters, Dr. M. Rudnytsky and A. Kulchytsky.

The delegation found a very unfavorable climate in Paris, especially with the presence of Russian Czarist embassies personnel from London, Paris, Rome, Athens, Madrid and Berne. The Russians made untiring use of their extensive connections with the English, French and American government agencies and personnel. All of them—as well as Boris Savinkov, representing the Russian democratic and socialist groups (the Mensheviks) were extremely active in sabotaging the Ukrainian efforts at recognition. In addition, a Polish mission, headed by Prof. R. Dmowski, a Russophile, also was hostile to the Ukrainian delegation.

While Ukrainian diplomacy was bringing to bear all its skills in Paris, the Ukrainian army valiantly resisted the Bolshevik invasion for several bloody months. Antonov-Ovsienko, commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops, called upon Moscow for fresh divisions in order to push the invasion deep into Ukraine. At the time of the *Trudovy* Congress the Soviet troops were already approaching Kiev, forcing the Ukrainian government to seek outside assistance.

Dr. Stachiw describes the major turns of Ukrainian foreign policy, which was conducted by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, head of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic. Losing all hope in withdrawal by the Russian Bolsheviks of their invading forces, Vynnychenko sent his emissaries to the Allied representatives in Odessa. The commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary force in Odessa was General D'Anselme, who was deeply influenced by his political adviser, Col. Henri Freidenberg. Chief of the Ukrainian delegation in Odessa was Gen. Alexander Hrekiv, commander of the Ukrainian army group which besieged Odessa.

Col. Freidenberg, a high-strung man, did not preclude the possibility of helping the Ukrainian government, but stipulated the ouster of Vynnychenko, who, in his opinion, was close to the Bolsheviks. He insisted that he would negotiate only with Gen. Hrekiv, refusing to receive Dr. A. Halip, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Subsequently, Vynnychenko decided to send another delegation, including Gen. Hrekiv, then Minister of Defense, and Dr. Halip. The delegation was led by Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, assisted by economist H. Ostapenko, and was authorized to conclude a treaty which would assist the harassed Ukrainian army. This delegation, too, failed to sway Col. Freidenberg, who insisted on the removal from the Ukrainian government not only of Vynnychenko, but also of Simon Petlura. He also demanded that the new composition of the Directorate meet the approval of the French command. Another stipulation was French control of Ukrainian railroads and finances. A third Odessa delegation, which was headed by Dr. Arnold Margolin, also failed to reach a satisfactory understanding with the French.

The author goes on to provide the background for these unsuccessful missions. One of the self-appointed *otamans* of Ukrainian insurgents who heretofore had been loyal to the Ukrainian government, went over to the Bolsheviks and launched an attack against the French forces in another Black Sea port. Ordered by Col. Freidenberg to repel the Bolshevik forces, the French troops refused to land on Ukrainian territory; the troops were already under the influence of Communist agitation. Alarmed, Col. Freidenberg himself invited the Ukrainians to negotiate, but nothing concrete was attained. Kiev had to be evacuated, and in the meantime the French government ordered the withdrawal of the French expeditionary forces from Ukraine. Thus the Ukrainian army near Odessa was forced to cross the Dniester River into Rumania, where it was disarmed. The northern Ukrainian army retreated to Podilia and Volhynia. During these crises on the military and diplomatic fronts, Vynnychenko was recalled from the Directorate upon a decision of his party.

Subsequently the author devotes a great deal of attention to the work of the Ukrainian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris. He is critical of the memorandum prepared by H. Sydorenko, head of the delegation, who was inadequately informed about the vast Russian net of intrigue which ensnared the Ukrainian delegation. Mr. Sydorenko, writes Dr. Stachiw, was also unaware of the intensified campaign against Ukraine which was waged by Dr. Roman Dmochowski, chief of the Polish delegation. In addition, the Ukrainian delegation neglected to present basic documents and materials on Ukraine in either the

French or English language. The author points out that the delegation did not have any of these in the Ukrainian language either.

Another serious flaw in the operations of the Ukrainian delegation was its inability to establish any contact with the French government headed by Georges Clemenceau, who was one of the most uncompromising opponents to Communism among the Western Allies at that time. He was an advocate of establishing a *cordon sanitaire* of a series of independent states to isolate communist Russia. But the French military commanders were, as a rule, pro-Russian and supported such reactionary Russian leaders as Admiral Kolchak or Gen. Denikin, and, in fact, worked against the political program of Premier Clemenceau.

It is to be recalled, writes Dr. Stachiw, that the Peace Conference preoccupied itself with the Bolshevik problem on many occasions, and heard many experts expound on it. There were many delegates who wished to negotiate with the Bolsheviks directly. A conference, in fact, was scheduled on an island in the Aegean Sea, in which the Bolshevik government as well as the governments engaged in the war against Communist Russia were invited to participate. Ukraine, oddly enough, was not invited. This omission, Dr. Stachiw adds, undoubtedly was due to the intrigues of the Russian diplomats and their friends at the conference. With the Bolsheviks accepting the invitation, the White Russian generals led by Denikin rejected the invitation, disdaining to sit at the same table with the Bolsheviks.

Dr. Stachiw states that Clemenceau was one of the most important pillars of the Peace Conference, with Lloyd George of Great Britain ranking below him. More often than not the latter was opposed to the French "Tiger," who was steadily supported by Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sonnino. He also contends that Winston Churchill, British Defense (War) Secretary, was openly in favor of a war against Communist Russia, expressing the stand of the United Kingdom.

The role of President Woodrow Wilson, according to the author, was extremely important in the conference, although he was not in Paris, being represented by Secretary of State Lansing, who in fact was against the principles of national self-determination enunciated by President Wilson.

The American intelligence services, the author points out, especially its members in Odessa, Rumania and Poland, were decidedly hostile to the Ukrainian state, inasmuch as all their sources of information were to be found in Russian (Red and White) or Polish and Rumanian circles.

In the light of these circumstances, the Ukrainian delegation at the Peace Conference was placed at a fatal disadvantage.

The work of Dr. Stachiw provides much light and information on an important period of Ukrainian history. The final phase of the policies of the Directorate will be discussed and analyzed in the forthcoming volumes of Dr. Stachiw's work, a most welcome addition to the studies of Eastern Europe as conducted by the scholars of the Free World.

VASYL MUDRY

POLITICAL ASSASSINATION: *The Legal Background of the Oberlaender and Stashynsky Cases*. By Hermann Raschhofer. Published by Fritz Schlichtentmayer. Tuebingen, Germany. 231 pp. 1964.

The present book by Herr Raschhofer is the English version of the original German book, *Mord auf Befehl* (Murder on Order) by Karl Anders which was

published in 1963 and which dealt with the "Stashynsky case," or the KGB killer who defected in August, 1961, from East Berlin and confessed the murders of two Ukrainian exile leaders, Dr. Lev R. Rebet and Stepan Bandera (cf. "Moscow on Trial in Karlsruhe," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 4, Winter, 1962, and "The Trial in Karlsruhe: Documents and Testimonies," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, No. 1, Spring, 1963). The work is now considerably enlarged by the addition of documents and testimonies regarding the so-called "Oberlaender Case," inasmuch as both cases have a definite connection by virtue of their common origin: both were manufactured in the criminal foundry of official Moscow.

It is to be recalled that a few years ago the Soviet press, seconded by the acclamation of the satellite organs, and indeed, by some great American newspapers, raised a storm against Dr. Theodore Oberlaender, then Minister for Refugee Affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany, accusing him of mass murder of the Ukrainian, Polish and Jewish population in Lviv, as a commanding officer of the German-sponsored Ukrainian Legion, the *Nachtigall* Battalion in June, 1941. When on October 15, 1959 Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) died in Munich under circumstances which immediately aroused suspicions of murder, Soviet propaganda went into action at once. Thus *Krasnaya Zvezda*, as reported by *Die Stuttgarter Zeitung* of October 23, 1959, accused Oberlaender of murdering Bandera because the latter knew too much about the "atrocities" committed by the *Nachtigall* Battalion under the command of Oberlaender. Subsequently, a "trial of Oberlaender was held *in absentia* in East Germany, at which Moscow mustered a number of "witnesses" who testified not only that Oberlaender was responsible for the massacre of prisoners in Lviv, but also for the murder of a group of Polish professors in Lviv, as well as slaughtering the civilian population in the Caucasus as a commander of the "Bergmann Unit," a military unit organized by the *Wehrmacht* out of anti-Communist Caucasian refugees. In reporting the murder of Bandera as perpetrated by the agents of Oberlaender, the Communist press in East Germany also stated that Dr. A. Herzner, former commanding officer of the *Nachtigall* Battalion, "died recently in mysterious circumstances" (*Berliner Zeitung*, October 23, 1959). Actually, Frau Herzner informed the Bonn Land Court that her husband had died on April 3, 1942, in the Hohenlychen military hospital from injuries received at the front!

Under pressure of the Soviet press and world opinion at large, the Bonn government instituted a complete investigation of the charges brought against Oberlaender. The findings were as follows:

1) During the final phase of the Soviet occupation of Lviv, on the eve of the German-Soviet war, the Soviet secret police arrested thousands of Ukrainians for their known or alleged opposition to the Soviet regime. When the transportation of prisoners to the hinterland became impossible, the Soviet government ordered the wholesale execution of prisoners before the retreat of the Soviet troops from Lviv. At least 3,000 persons were summarily executed in Kazimierzowska Street, and in the Zamarstiniv and the Lonski NKVD prisons.

2) These executions were committed before the entry of the German troops and the *Nachtigall* Battalion into Lviv; Dr. Oberlaender was not a commanding officer of the battalion, but acted as a liaison between the unit and Admiral Canaris' intelligence service (*Abwehr*); the actual commander of the *Nachtigall* was Dr. Albrecht Herzner. Dr. Oberlaender served as a liaison officer because of his knowledge of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. These findings also proved that no member of the Ukrainian Legion took any part in anti-Semitic

excesses in Lviv which unfortunately took place at a time when emotions were running high. The popular belief was that many Jews, in contrast to the Ukrainians and Poles, who were openly hostile to the Russians, had sided with the Communists and frequently served the NKVD as informers and collaborators. A group of Polish professors was murdered by the *Einsatzgruppen*, who were charged with mass murders of Jews in July, 1941 in Lviv, and subsequently in all other towns and cities in Eastern Europe. Significantly, neither the *Nachtigall* nor Prof. Oberlaender was mentioned during the Nuremberg trials, substantiating the author's contention that the Western allies had no proof to charge them with the Lviv massacres.

Herr Raschhofer quotes a lengthy memorandum of Dr. Oberlaender in which he sharply criticized the Nazi policies in Ukraine and the Caucasus and pleaded for the humane treatment of the Slavic peoples and also the Soviet POW's. Long before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the author asserts, Dr. Oberlaender wrote memoranda and articles for the *OKW-Abwehr* (German Army Intelligence Service), stressing the importance of the non-Russian nations within the Soviet empire. But with the exception of Admiral Canaris and a few others, the Nazi leadership ignored his advice.

Herr Raschhofer's deductions in the Stashynsky case are important and meaningful. Bogdan Stashynsky, a trained KGB agent, was sent by the Soviet government to kill two Ukrainian nationalist leaders in Munich, Dr. Lev R. Rebet, a writer, and Stepan Bandera, head of the Ukrainian revolutionary organization (OUN), which the killer accomplished to perfection by using a cyanide-loaded gun without being caught or spotted. For his deeds, especially for the killing of Bandera, Stashynsky was awarded the "Order of the Red Banner," a high Soviet decoration, which was signed by Marshal Klementi Voroshilov, then President of the Supreme Soviet, and one Goradse, secretary, upon the recommendation of General Alexander Shelepin, then the head of the KGB (Soviet secret police) and now one of the top leaders in the Presidium of the Communist Party of the USSR. This document was issued on November 6, 1959, three weeks after the murder of Bandera. Stashynsky also received a "Service Characteristic" (a citation) from the KGB on December 28, 1960, stating that he performed his duties conscientiously and "for successful work in dealing with an important problem." But on August 12, 1961, Stashynsky and his German-born wife, Inge Pohl, escaped to West Berlin and surrendered to the West German authorities. Subsequently, he was tried in Karlsruhe and convicted of the double murder and sentenced to eight years of hard labor.

The book, *Political Assassination*, brings out the important problem of mass or individual murders committed by governments or their agents both in their own states and abroad. The Nazi criminal policies and genocide were recognized, and the guilty ones were punished for ordering such policies, in the Nuremberg trials.

The Soviet state has been founded on terror and murder. The Soviet government by its instrumentalities of terror—the Cheka, NKVD, MVD and the KGB—has been committing genocide from its very inception, on the captive non-Russian peoples. During the German-Soviet war in 1941-1945 the Nazi police machine committed countless crimes against humanity, and for these crimes the top Nazi leadership was meted out just retribution and punishment.

But the Kremlin had equally been guilty of genocide during World War II: the killing of 10,000 Polish officers in Katyn, the mass murders of Ukrainians in Lviv and in other Ukrainian cities. For the massacre in Lviv the Kremlin tried to shift the blame on Dr. Oberlaender, in order to compromise him and

the Adenauer government of which he was a part. The Soviet government also tried to shift the responsibility for the murder of Bandera to the Bonn government, but the defection of Stashynsky revealed the true story.

Both cases analyzed in the book illustrate vividly how the Russians simply fabricate charges against any opponents brave enough to thwart their designs; how they ruthlessly "liquidate" their enemies in foreign lands.

This scholarly and well-documented book should be read by all who are eager to know what kind of government is now in Moscow, with which we are constantly urged to live in "peaceful coexistence." The book can be obtained from the BONIFACE PRESS, 5353 Magnolia Street, Philadelphia, Pa.—19144.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

THE POPULATION OF THE USSR. (U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee No. 1—Study of Population and Immigration Problems: Special Series No. 17 [A] — Testimony of Dr. Warren W. Eason, July 29, 1963). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964. 50 pp.

NATIONS, PEOPLES, AND COUNTRIES IN THE USSR. (U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee No. 1—Study of Population and Immigration Problems: Special Series No. 17 [B] — Testimony of Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, September 23, 1964). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964. 105 pp.

These two reports of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality are timely and significant, as well as complementary one to the other. Both have a function to perform in deepening our understanding of the populations and peoples of the Soviet Union. Taken by itself, neither gives an adequate picture of population trends and policies within the multinational complex that for more than forty years has been the USSR and before the abdication of Czar Nicholas II was the farflung Russian Empire.

The relative incompleteness of each report in analyzing the demographic characteristics of the populations within the Soviet complex, derives in part from the rather specific approach taken by the respective authors, and in part from the fact that detailed data on censuses and vital statistics of the Czarist and Soviet empires, is not always available to American scholars. This is especially true of data that reflects historical events unpleasant to recall.

From the viewpoint of historical reporting, however, and especially as regards documentation of sources, the lengthy testimony of Professor Dobriansky represents the more adequate job of research. He marshalls facts effectively and avoids abstractions that might obscure past or current realities. He also had the advantage, a not inconsiderable one, of having in hand the report of Professor Eason's testimony before the House subcommittee. The factual lacunae to be filled in thus were evident. Dr. Dobriansky, of the economics department of Georgetown University, is well known to regular readers of *The Quarterly*. Perhaps not so well known to them is Dr. Eason. The latter is associate professor of economics and chairman of the board of Russian studies at Syracuse University. In addition to teaching at Princeton and other universities, Dr. Eason has worked with the Rand Corporation.

Several years ago an extensive study of population and immigration problems was undertaken by Subcommittee No. 1, as it commonly is called, of the

House Committee on the Judiciary. Since the death of Congressman Francis Walter, who for many years held the post, whenever Democrats constituted a majority in the House, chairman of the subcommittee has been Congressman Michael A. Feighan of Ohio. The reports of the study, covering both oral testimony and prepared statements, if bound together would amount to two sizable volumes. Much of the material in the series is carefully researched and quite informative. Some, however, is less detailed and hence less significant on a permanent basis.

In general, the extensive and carefully planned study does credit to the judgment of the House subcommittee and its staff. Understanding within Congress and the Executive branch, of population trends and problems no doubt is greater as a result of the effort. But special credit goes to the subcommittee for providing opportunity for so many historically important facts about the USSR to go into the public record, despite anticipated concern among those inclined to avoid all irritation of the Kremlin.

Professors Eason, at the outset of his prepared statement, notes correctly that, "Not too many years ago, a paper on the population of the USSR was typically an exercise in statistical estimation, arising from the gross inadequacy of the scattered primary figures appearing in Soviet sources." He could have added that obfuscation of census and vital statistics data, as regards certain ethnic, nationality and/or religious groups, is an old practice that accompanied the central government in its move from St. Petersburg to Moscow. Eason is, of course, quite correct in suggesting that Kremlin policies under Stalin were an added reason for reporting demographic data in the aggregate only and for avoiding details that reveal *de facto* policies toward particular peoples.

The 1959 census, as Eason suggests, provides us with data more reliable than heretofore was the case. The 1959 census was well planned and, from internal evidence, reasonably complete and consistent in its data collection. From the viewpoint of formal demographic analysis, it now is feasible to reconstruct population trends within the Soviet Union. However, in fairness to early Soviet bureaucrats, it should be noted that the 1926 all-Union census was not so bad, even as to ethnic details. The 1939 census, on the other hand, was most unsatisfactory statistically and left the demographic analysts without a basis for comparison of data.

Professor Eason has done considerable work on Imperial Russian and Soviet census data and evidences detailed knowledge of abnormalities in growth patterns during certain decades. He also has done much work in adjusting annual estimates of population to census findings, and in noting deficiencies in the censuses themselves. (General censuses were taken in 1897, 1926, 1939 and 1959.) Eason also interprets well, though only in the aggregate, the trends in birth and death rates, and the relation of these to economic development. He is keenly aware of the demographic and social implication of the continuing movement, within the Moscow-controlled Eurasian landmass, toward urbanization and industrialization. And he recognizes that internal migration within the USSR has at times been promoted with a view to developing and/or consolidating less developed and sparsely-settled regions.

With considerable evidence, however, Professor Dobriansky points out that aggregate (All-Union) data in Russian and Soviet censuses tell only part of the story. He wants to know why the numerous ethnic and/or nationality groups within the old Russian empire are not cross-classified by ethnic origin or background, but simply are lumped together as "Russians" (RSFSR) or as residents

of one or other constituent republic. Thus, for example, the people of old Cossackia become Russians by centrally decreed boundary shifts, Dobriansky notes. Other peoples, he adds, such as those of Idel-Ural have disappeared from the statistical record, as policies of dispersion and "Russification" were intensively pursued.

Using numerous footnotes to government and non-government sources, Dobriansky tells of the demographic impact of famines (man-made and otherwise) in Ukraine, of deportations from the Baltic States and the Caucasus, of forced denomadization and collectivization in Central Asia, of vast slave-labor camps, of mass executions at Vynnytsia, Kharkiv, and elsewhere. He rightly notes that these and other historical events explain statistically certain differentials in mortality, natality and population growth that are diplomatically concealed in the aggregate (All-Union) data.

The Dobriansky testimony includes 21 pages of oral presentation (questions and answers before the House subcommittee); 62 pages of prepared statements, including tables and charts; and 15 pages of bibliography, including books, articles and government documents, all in the English language, which have to do with genocidal activity within the Russian sphere of influence.

It is Dobriansky's contention, and that of many authors cited, that the Russian-Soviet complex, several centuries old in its origins, represents the last major imperialist-colonialist effort of our times. At least he hopes it will be the last, and that its life expectancy from here in will be short. He insists that it is older than the October Revolution and manifests a remarkable continuity of policy as regards non-Russian peoples.

With no illusions about the human achievements of "Soviet man," Dobriansky more than suggests that the intellectual and cultural advances, such as they are, occur despite the system and that many within the Soviet Union continue to chafe under Kremlin policies of cultural control, linguistic Russification, Cyrillicization of alphabets, and so forth. He believes that given opportunity, most USSR residents would choose freedom with Kravchenko and the many others who have fled to the West.

Whereas the compulsory cultural conformism is depressing and dehumanizing, Dobriansky insists that the religious persecution over the years has been anti-human. Thus, the 25 million Moslems within the Russian Empire of 1912 were approximately 30 million by 1923, but in 1939 the estimated number was only 20 million. This was consequent to liquidation of various ethnic groups largely of Moslem faith, to closing of mosques, to deprivation of religious books, and to other practices whereby Moslems were secularized, driven underground, or forced into exile. As regards the fate of the Jewish people, once promised ethnic and cultural autonomy by the Bolsheviks, their members dropped from 5.2 million in 1914 to approximately 2.3 million in 1959. While many lost their lives at the hands of Nazi occupation forces, others were systematically liquidated religiously and culturally, or else driven into exile during the Stalin era. And, Dobriansky adds, the anti-Semitism traditional in the Russian empire still persists.

The fate of Catholic and Orthodox Christians, especially under Stalin, is touched upon by Dobriansky (p. 69-70) in his prepared statement. He goes outside the USSR, into the satellite countries, to arrive at his aggregate figures of deportations, killings, nationalization of monasteries, closing of churches. But taken in that context, and over the entire 1917-1959 period, the figures do not appear excessive. More detailed data and references on the persecution of Christians under the Soviet system, would have been helpful. The bibliography at the end of the testimony, however, provides additional references to sources.

What becomes clear is that religion under the Soviets—Moslem, Jewish, Christian, or other—has not prospered. Rather, it has suffered tremendous losses in terms of personnel, facilities, opportunities, despite the fact that the vast numbers within the Soviet Union refuse to give up their faith under what amounts to a government-sponsored program of forced conversion to atheism and/or extreme secularism.

In conclusion, this reviewer trusts that both the Eason and Dobriansky approaches to Soviet population data will have opportunity to express themselves. The Dobriansky approach tells us about policies and events that have influenced population size and composition, as well as social characteristics, among the constituent peoples of the USSR. Thus it becomes clear that implicit policies on population do exist, despite official affirmations to the contrary, and that these policies are not confined to urbanization, industrialization and/or control of fertility, as the unwary might infer from the Eason testimony.

On the other hand, a number of the demographic developments referred to by Dobriansky, including a certain amount of internal migration and differentials in fertility rates, take on a broader meaning when viewed in the light of the profound economic and social changes that have been taking place across the vast Eurasian territory once ruled by the Czars. Given the course of human history, of scientific discovery and of population trends, those socio-economic changes were bound to occur sooner or later. Some of them have brought improved levels of living, so far as these can be measured quantitatively, to most of the peoples concerned. That the changes *de facto* occurred under a totalitarian system, worse under the Soviets than under the Czars, is unfortunate and unnecessary. It is of interest that certain of the changes have occurred despite the cruelties and blunders of the system. That, in itself, may well be a source of hope. The human spirit is not readily suppressed, and the more it suffers the less it is inclined to accept tyranny on a permanent basis. A proper reading, in perspective, of these reports can contribute to the determination of free men that such a system not become permanent.

Fordham University

WILLIAM J. GIBBONS, S. J.

PRAYERS. Offered by the Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1964, pp. 313.

This work is no ordinary book of inspirational prayers whose messages may or may not have pointed relevance to the dominant issues and problems of our time. It would be a grave mistake, indeed, to view it as such and thus deprive oneself of the rich and unusual opportunity of being intellectually enthralled by a unique combination of talents. Each prayer carries its inspirational value, to be sure, but this is magnificently blended with an overpowering elegance of style, a clear lucidity of penetrating thought, and a profound expression of innermost convictions and principles. It is not without solid and good reason that Dr. Frederick Brown Harris is the chaplain of the United States Senate, in reality the custodian or brotherly keeper of the souls of men in whose hands the destiny of this Nation largely rests.

For a full and appreciative understanding of the tremendous role played by Dr. Harris in our national affairs one must know the man himself. Through his weekly newspaper column the affable clergyman interprets many current developments in the light of theological and philosophical truths. He is constantly and acutely attuned to the throbs and tenor of our outstanding problems. With genuine simplicity and humility his writings penetrate the essential core of

the problem and demonstrate the numerous applications of faith and spiritual strength in its eventual solution. As many know, his knowledge of the captive nations and Shevchenko well exceeds the scope displayed by those whose official obligations require a bit more. In his foreword to the book, President Johnson pays fitting tribute to the man and his works when he says "Dr. Harris is a man who has enriched my life as he has enriched the lives of all who have listened to him."

Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic Majority Leader, and Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, the Republican Minority Leader, also furnish their eloquent forewords to this valuable compilation of prayers. Senator Dirksen by no means overstates the case when he points out, "I know this volume will bring an equal hope and assurance to many people everywhere." If others in the Senate were offered this same opportunity to express themselves, the book would unquestionably contain ninety-eight additional forewords of glowing tribute. As it is, its size is impressive, including prayers delivered in the 87th and 88th Congresses or covering the period of 1961-64. Published by the United States Government Printing Office, the work was made possible by the passage of Senate Resolution No. 365.

Interweaving the complex questions of our day with the perennial teachings of the Christian tradition, the eloquent prayers offered here touch upon almost every conceivable subject of pressing importance. Freedom, interdependence, peace, bridges of understanding, materialism, patriotism, personal rights, captive nations and numerous other subjects of current discussion are objects of deep insight and reflection in these prayerful messages. On patriotism, a prayer given on January 30, 1961 declares "We are grateful for the patriotism and fidelity of those honored by the Nation, who have stood as watchmen on the ramparts of our Republic in the perilous years through which we have been called to pass; statesmen who have given of their best and now, in the procession of history, step aside as the tumult and the shouting dies, and the captains and the kings depart" (p. 8).

Concerning the communist conspiracy, Dr. Harris stresses in a prayer delivered on March 16, 1961, "In this dear land of our love and prayer, may we close our national ranks in a new unity, as sinister powers without Thee in awe plot to destroy the birthright of our liberty of worship, and of speech, and the sanctity of the individual" (p. 17). In a message the following month he extends this theme in these words: "We are conscious that it is a world where tyrants still deal in fetters and chains as they attempt to shackle the free spirits of men made in Thy image. We praise Thee for the multitude in every land with whom we are joined, who cherish freedom of body and mind more than life itself" (p. 22). At the end of this prayer, the chaplain emphasizes, "In all our striving to defend the truth, preserve in us the grace of self-criticism, so that the living faith of the dead may not become the dead faith of the living."

In every sense of the word the author of these moving phrases is a clerical freedom fighter, whose deep-seated convictions on national and personal freedom are brilliantly reflected throughout the whole compilation of prayers. Just read these lines from a prayer offered on May 15, 1961: "In this day of global conflict for the bodies and minds of man we pray that Thou wilt purge and cleanse our own hearts that we may be found worthy to march with the armies of emancipation which bring both liberty and release from the want and woe which beset so many millions of Thy children and grind them into the dust of poverty" (p. 28). In another message on June 7, 1961, the author continues,

"Unworthy though we are, Thou hast made us keepers for our day of the holy torch of freedom the Founding Fathers kindled with their lives" (p. 34).

Bridges of understanding and friendship also figure highly in the spiritual messages which are uttered almost every legislative day by the versatile Senate chaplain. A prayer given on July 12, 1961 urges that "As this day, in this shrine of freedom, Western and Eastern hands are clasped in enduring friendship, and in mutual allegiance to the liberty and dignity of the individual under all skies, may there be strengthened and expanded bridges of understanding and cooperation which shall tie together in a resistless crusade peoples and lands, one in heart, though they be half a world away" (p. 45).

The theme of hope resounds in all of these prayers. "Grant that our hearts may be shrines of prayer," he prays, "and our free Nation a bulwark for the oppressed, a flaming beacon of hope whose beams shall battle the darkness in all the world" (p. 66). Such God-filled hope is indispensable for ultimate victory in the type of war we are engaged. Dr. Harris knows this all too well when in his supplication he avers, "Thou hast called Thy servants here who represent the choices and will of a free people to be servants of the Nation in a tense and tortured time, when the earth is plowed with violence, when brave freedom fighters have been met and temporarily subdued by the bayonets and walls of tyrants, and when wars and rumors of war vex the world" (p. 68).

Captive Nations Week couldn't be more properly initiated annually than with these prayerful words: "At the beginning of this yearly week set aside by this free land and sponsored by our national leaders, we would this day join in our supplications with those who pray from sea to sea for those whose sovereignty and culture and treasured traditions, whose individual dignity and self-determination, which are Thy endowment, are being trampled into the dust of servitude by the cruel might of oppressors who hold not Thee in awe" (p. 108). This long prayer, given on July 16, 1962, ends with the Biblical quote, "I am come to bring deliverance to the captives." A similar prayer on July 15, 1963, at the beginning of "this week of national remembrance," speaks of "the moaning of the captives and their wail, 'How long, O Lord, how long?' and we here vow never for expediency's sake to stifle Thy stern demand: 'Let my people go'" (p. 178).

As a permanent part of our Nation's history, these prayers register not only the faith and convictions of a great spiritual leader but also the throbbing conscience of a free people. This book is a valuable collection that every American should study in the quiet of his individual conscience.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE RISE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE, A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy.
By Jan Librach. Published by Frederick A. Praeger, New York—Washington, 1964, 382 pp.

Another solid work has been added to the growing list of publications attempting to shed more light on the nature of Soviet foreign policy that has been the persistent subject of much vivid discussion among students of Soviet affairs since the end of World War II. Despite the welter of works appearing on the book market and dealing with this facet of Soviet government activity, few perhaps merit the distinction of being serious, dispassionate, and yet revealing studies. It is gratifying to the reader to detect in Jan Librach's book these qualifications bolstered by the author's experience in diplomacy and by his penetrating analytic capability. To present a well-rounded portrait of the

utterly complex nature of Soviet foreign policy—inherently unpredictable, ambivalent, and many-faceted—in a span of some 300-odd pages covering a period of almost a half century and to be able to penetrate the almost impervious masks of the devious tactics in order to gain an insight into the workings and motivations is no easy task.

As he remarks in the introduction, the book is primarily a study of Soviet foreign policy in action rather than a study of ideology. The latter is discussed only in so far as it affects Soviet attitudes and moves with regard to foreign countries. The author endeavors to expose the nature of Soviet foreign policy by drawing fine lines between the propaganda ingredients and the actual goals of such policy, between the short-term objectives and the long-term targets, between reality and appearance. This, it seems, the author has managed to achieve to a great extent.

The study is divided into five parts, starting out with an analysis of Communist doctrine as one of the basic underlying forces influencing and directing Soviet foreign policy. Soviet diplomacy and methods are scrutinized at length in the second part which discusses the foreign policy with regard to the Comintern, Cominform, the treaties with the West, peaceful coexistence, and other topics. Perhaps one of the strongest analyses of the book is evinced in the chapter on peaceful coexistence wherein the author subjects the highly controversial topic to a solid, meaningful scrutiny.

In part three, the author revives the all-too-frequently forgotten facts about Soviet Russia's occupation and takeover of the independent states that tore away from the Czarist Russian empire after the Bolshevik Revolution and were re-incorporated into the Communist empire by force of arms. Here, too, the fate of the Baltic states and of other independent countries of Eastern Europe is described in the light of the aims and goals of Soviet foreign policy.

It might be of interest to Ukrainians or students of the non-Russian nations to note that in the chapter on takeovers, the author dwells on Ukraine's proclamation of independence and the events that led to the suppression of the same and cites the recognition of independent Ukraine by the government of the RSFSR contained in a note to the latter. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet government presented an ultimatum to the Ukrainian government and within eight days invaded the new republic. Of interest is undoubtedly also the little known fact that the free Ukrainian government had sought aid and recognition from the *Entente* and only after fruitless contacts with their semi-official representatives turned to the Central Powers, notably Germany and Austria-Hungary, with whom it finally signed a treaty.

The second half of the book comprises parts four and five that concern themselves with Soviet foreign policy after World War II and the ensuing international problems, such as the Cold War, disarmament, summit meetings, and the growing divergencies within the Soviet Bloc.

In his analysis of the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, the author makes several interesting points of observation and deduction. For instance, he directs attention to the fact that with each success Soviet foreign policy became more and more bold and brazen (the conquest of the newly created independent states of former Czarist Russia, Rapallo, World War II successes, the possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs, space achievements, and the like). On the other hand, he points to Soviet recourse to threats or conciliatory moves or both when provoked by failures and setbacks (Brest Litovsk Treaty, the retreat from Poland in 1920, the initial military defeats in World War II, the Berlin Blockade, etc.). The reader will draw the inescapable conclusion that

regardless of the situation, Soviet policy is basically motivated and governed by a single thought—the ultimate achievement of world Communism.

It has frequently been asserted (especially by Soviet sources and Western pro-Soviet sympathizers) that in concluding a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, the Russians hoped to win time and gain territory to prepare for the expected German attack against the Soviet Union. This thesis is refuted by the author by strong documentation and logical deduction. He asserts that it was not the time and space elements that prompted the Soviet Union to conclude the infamous treaty, but rather the resolve to seize upon the opportunity to share the spoils with a partner. As evidence shows, Stalin never anticipated an attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler. On the contrary, he dismissed Western warnings as sheer fabrications or attempts at disrupting the solid friendship between the two countries.

Two other points of the author's observations are worth mentioning. It is his contention that the present Soviet foreign policy differs from that of former Czarist Russia only in scope (in the geographical sense) and in ideology.

The author further takes note of the never-failing Soviet endeavor to exact gains in negotiating with the West. While professing to subscribe to such lofty notions as peace, disarmament, and aiding the down-trodden nations, the Soviets have entered into negotiations with the West with the unswerving resolve to gain propaganda advantages as well as concrete concessions. Seldom, if ever, has the Soviet Union come out of negotiations as the injured party. On the other hand, however, the United States has rendered time and again aid to the Soviets in the course of the latter's forty-eight years of existence. Yet, it had not attached conditions to its aid, thus enabling the USSR to build its power and threaten the West repeatedly. Moreover, the United States seems to have contented itself with merely arresting the spread of Communism rather than facing up to it and placing conditions on its aid.

These are but a few remarks about the author's most interesting views and observations that throw light upon certain problems heretofore lacking meaningful interpretation. Although the author has not brought into his study any new facts, his illumination of a certain period in Soviet policy may well turn into a hard fact after more research and study. In discussing the Soviet-German *rapprochement* that led to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the Secret Protocol on "delimitation of mutual spheres of influence," appended to it, the author speaks of parallel negotiations conducted by the Soviet Union both with Nazi Germany and the Western powers during the months of March through August of that year. He holds that the Russians were the first to initiate secret diplomatic talks with the Germans and the first to suggest the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact. However, at the same time, they engaged in talks with France and England for a common front against Nazi Germany. There follows a step-by-step analysis of events pointing to the credibility of this contention. The author points out that there is no documentary proof when the Russians actually decided to choose Germany over the Western powers. The aim of the double negotiations was to find out who would pay them more. The interesting deduction is made that had the Russians succeeded completely in their double dealings, they would have entered Rumania and Poland (an act which the West had steadfastly opposed as did the countries concerned) legally by virtue of a treaty with the West, while at the same time they could have continued to collaborate with Nazi Germany by virtue of the Secret-Protocol and still share the spoils with the latter.

The book is written in a style that makes for easy reading. Yet, some noticeable shortcomings in both form and content require mention. For one thing, the reader would be aided considerably if the footnotes were placed at the bottom of the pages rather than congested at the end of the book forcing him to go through the repeated movements of turning the pages back and forth rather frequently. Another thing, the author may want to refresh the reader's memory of Russian history by affording a brief elaboration of a topic mentioned in passing. Perhaps, because he assumes the reader is well acquainted with Soviet history, the author has omitted giving some explanation as to the meaning of Trotsky's famous statement of "neither war nor peace" in regard to the negotiations at Brest Litovsk.

One would have liked to see an explanation in a footnote or in the text about the liberation of Prague by the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) led by General Vlassov. The ROA, in fact, saved the Czechoslovak capital from possible massacre by the Germans when its population rose on May 5, 1945. Although General Vlassov fought on Germany's side after having been released from a German prisoner-of-war camp, he went over to the Czech insurgents. This explanation would seem all the more in place since owing to too much condensation, the author gives the impression that the Soviet armed units liberated Prague although they entered a city which had already been freed from the Germans except for a few German pockets of resistance.

It seems that in connection with Hungary's last minute attempt to bring about a truce or conditional surrender at the hands of the Soviets, the author should have mentioned General Voeroes' name linked to that of General Miklos, whom he does mention. General Voeroes was instrumental in attaining some accord with the Soviets and in forming the interim government in Debrecen. He has later dienchanted by Soviet conduct and had to flee abroad.

Also, the reader would expect a separate treatise of the role of Soviet foreign policy in the United Nations. True, the author broaches the subject of USSR relations with the UN, but the importance of the world forum seems to justify this demand.

Stemming, perhaps, from the desire to be brief (at times too laconic), the book could not avoid such minor shortcomings. It undoubtedly constitutes a major contribution to the understanding of the nature of Soviet foreign policy. For serious students of Soviet affairs, it may well prove a must and a helpful guide for further analytical work. It is hoped that the book market will see a revised edition or editions in the coming years.

IMRE KARDASHINETZ

THE FATE OF THE HOLY UNION IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE. By Basil Boysak, Ph.D., Litt.D., S.T.D. Toronto-New York. 1963.

Carpatho-Ukraine lies in the very center of Europe. Being a small country and occupying a strategic position in Central-Eastern Europe, Carpatho-Ukraine has always been exposed to pressures exerted by its neighbors, thereby preventing it from receiving necessary help and assistance from its principal land base—Kiev. This circumstance determined the fate of the country for centuries.

In publishing this book, Dr. Boysak took upon himself an important task, especially so at a time when the ideal of Christian unity is increasingly assuming world significance. The work is divided into two parts: a) "Toward the Union with Rome" and b) "Toward the Outbreak of the Schism."

The first part of the book is devoted to the development of the union movement and its culmination, treating separately such topics as "Carpatho-Ukraine in the Middle of the XVIIth Century," "The Union of Uzhorod and Its Expansion" and "Conditions of the Reunion and Their Realization." The second part dwells on the "Difficult Situation in Carpatho-Ukraine (1848-1914)," "The Byzantine Catholic Church from 1848 to 1914," and "Formation of the Orthodox Church after 1918." A "Summary and Conclusion" completes the work.

For a better understanding of the religious development of the country, especially the realization of the Union, the author presents much historical data from the most ancient times to 1918, thus brightly illuminating the whole period of the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. The book clearly discriminates between the national and political interests of the autochthonous Ukrainians-Ruthenians and the ruling Hungarians, and the systematic resistance of the former against all forms of Magyarization.

The union movement in Carpatho-Ukraine was historically linked with the same movement in Galicia, as well as with that in Central Ukraine, in Kiev. This was not an accidental phase but was rather an expression of the will of one and the same people who at that time were divided by the barriers of political frontiers imposed on them by the alien masters on Ukrainian soil.

Special attention is given by the author to the development of unionism in Carpatho-Ukraine and the unspeakable obstacles placed in its path by the Hungarian Catholic church circles. This part of the book, mining a wealth of historical sources, is especially timely today with the far-reaching decisions of the Vatican Ecumenical Council. The present church *rapprochement* between West and East is due to a certain existing historical basis, and not to *ad hoc* created conceptions.

It is our impression that the author could have developed this thesis in a more concrete way and underscored the role of Carpatho-Ukraine towards union between Byzantium and Rome. This thesis can stand considerable expansion as an antithesis to the political use of religion today by the Soviet Union, which has mounted its own "ecumenical" movement for the purpose of political infiltration.

Nonetheless, the author is to be thanked for his excellent use of the source material, especially as regards the anti-Ukrainian action by Russian Czarist Orthodoxy and the representatives of Hungarian Catholicism.

It is imperative, both from the national and religious viewpoints, to clearly define the historical processes of development of the Ukrainian nation so as to prevent the falsification of Ukrainian history by biased and unobjective historians.

The author deserves much credit for doing just that. Our only qualification is insufficient explanation by the author of the role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in the destruction of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine rite in Carpatho-Ukraine after World War II. We hope that the author will dedicate his further efforts in this field. We also hope that Americans of Ruthenian (Carpatho-Ukrainian) background who are of the Byzantine rite, will welcome the book as a reliable source of information on the Catholic Church in Carpatho-Ukraine, and thus strengthen the national and religious sentiments of their community in this country.

VINCENT SHANDOR

THE MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. By Geoffrey Wheeler. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. xi, 272. \$7.00.

Soviet Russia and Red China, already at odds in the Communist world, are now standing toe to toe along much of the 4,000-mile border that keeps them apart in Asia.

That border has been the scene of trouble and conflict in the past—in the days of imperial China and Czarist Russia—and long before. More recently, border clashes have been reported between Russians and Chinese; old territorial claims are again being aired by Peiping. Rivalry is evident over Mongolia and Sinkiang, two vast border regions. Reports of increasing tensions are coming from the Asian mainland; evidence of Soviet troop movements from Central Russia to Red China's Sinkiang border has been recorded in world listening posts; Chinese forces, at the same time, are being shifted to Sinkiang from nearby Tibet. For people in Central Asia, the dispute between the USSR and Communist China is far from an abstract problem of Communist ideology; it involves the land they live on and people of their own blood.

These contemporary aspects are noted in this review, since they are not stressed, although noted in a sort of a "minor key" (see pages: 174-9) in this report by Colonel Wheeler (who had served 30 years in the Indian Army and Political Service; from 1940 to 1946 he was Director of the Government of India Publications Division and later served as Counsellor in the British Embassy in Teheran, and since 1953 has been Director of the Central Asian Research Center).

Here he covers systematically the area consisting now of the five Asian Republics of the USSR, situated to the east of the Caspian Sea and adjoining Iran, Afghanistan, and Western China. His main interest is a synthesis of the available facts on the land, the people, their history before and after the Russian conquests, and their fate under the Soviet masters; in the final chapter he describes the culture of these peoples from the earliest times to the present day.

There is no doubt that this is a ponderous, but also quite a valuable summary of the subject. But, at the same time, the work suffers from what is now one of the outstanding "insular" characteristics of the English scholarship: a tendency to "forget" or ignore the work published on this very topic by some outstanding American scholars. One may wonder what has happened to Lattimore, whose *STUDIES IN FRONTIER HISTORY* (1962) is noted in "Notes" (p. 258), but there is no reference to his important *NOMADS AND COMMISSARS: MONGOLIA REVISITED* (Oxford, New York, 1962). Or, how about S. A. Whitting and Shet-t-sal Sheng, *SINKIANG: PAWN OR PIVOT?* (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1958)? And other valuable works could be cited in this connection.

In fact, the "Bibliographical Note" (pp. 245-246) and "Notes" (pp. 257-259), are quite miserable, limited and incomplete; sometimes the works cited are without the year of publication or the publisher, and sometimes they are; but not a single article on this area, published in recent years in some outstanding specialized academic periodicals, is noted in the "Bibliographical Note." Only a very few articles are sprinkled in the "Notes." But the Index is excellent, and so are 21 photographs reproduced in the book.

All in all, then, within the limits noted here, the work will serve as a hand reference work—until a more substantial one will appear.

University of Bridgeport

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

70TH VOLUME OF "THE ANNALS OF ST. BASIL THE GREAT"

The Publishing House of the Basilian Fathers in Rome (Order of St. Basil the Great) has now released the 70th volume of its *Proceedings* (*Zapysky*), an outstanding publication feat and an important event for the Ukrainian cultural and literary heritage in the free world. In addition, the Basilian Fathers recently published the Bible in the Ukrainian language and a Church Slavonic-Ukrainian-English Dictionary, as well as a series of church songs and other publications.

The Basilian Publishing House began its activities before World War II in Western Ukraine, but with the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine and Ukraine's incorporation into the Soviet Union all Catholic organizations there were ruthlessly suppressed and destroyed.

Its tasks, however, were taken over by the Basilian order in Rome.

The first editor of *The Proceedings* was Rev. Dr. J. Skruten, who before the war published six volumes, containing 500-800 pages each. After the war the editorship was entrusted to Very Rev. Athanasius H. Welyky, the present Proto-Archimadrite of the Basilian Order and outstanding Ukrainian Catholic scholar, who has devoted his attention primarily to publishing a series of Vatican documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church and Ukrainian history in general. Father Welyky was also appointed secretary of the Commission for the Eastern Churches during the three sessions of the Ecumenical Council held in 1962, 1963, and 1964.

The Basilian *Proceedings* are divided into three sections: a) Works b) Proceedings Proper and c) Documents.

The first section contains works written in many languages by various authors who deal with Ukrainian history and law and the Ukrainian liturgy. Altogether 20 volumes have been issued in this section, whose editor is now Rev. Isidore Patrylo, secretary general of the Order of St. Basil the Great. It is impossible to enumerate all the articles or give a critical analysis thereof. But a glance at the authors and the topics should suffice to underscore the importance of *The Proceedings*:

- 1) M. Wojnar, "Administration of the Ukrainian Basilians," 1949, 218 pp. (Latin);
- 2) M. Soloviy, "The Liturgical Reform of I. Lisovsky (1784-1809)," 1950, 128 pp. (Latin);
- 3) M. Wojnar, "The Basilian Capitulae," 1954, 202 pp. (Latin);
- 4) I. Nazarko, "St. Volodymyr the Great, Ruler and Baptizer of Rus-Ukraine," 1954, 228 pp. (Ukrainian);
- 5) I. Nahayevsky, "Cyril-Methodian Christianity in Rus-Ukraine," 1954, 178 pp. (Ukrainian);
- 6) L. Sonevytsky, "The Ukrainian Episcopate of the Peremyshl and Kholm Eparchies in the XVth-XVIIth Centuries," 1955, 109 pp. (Ukrainian);
- 7) A. Pekar, "The Canonical Foundation of the Mukachiv Eparchy (1771)," 1956, 136 pp. (Latin);
- 8) R. Holovatsky, "The Vilnius Seminary of St. Trinity" (1609-1621), 1957, 159 pp. (Latin);
- 9) M. Wojnar, "The Proto-Archimadrite of the Basilians" (1617-1804), 1958, 298 pp. (Latin);
- 10) O. Baran, "The Kiev Metropolitan See and the Mukachiv Eparchy," 1960, 112 pp. (Latin);
- 11) I. Bilanych, "The Zamoysky Synod of 1720," 1960, 128 pp. (Latin);
- 12) M. Stasiv, "The Galician Metropolitan See—Its History and Juridical Form," 1960, 240 pp. (Latin);
- 13) A. Joubair, "Canonical Definition of the Rite," 1961, 104 pp. (French);
- 14) I. Nazarko, "Kievan and Galician Metropolitans—Biographical Sketches," 1962, 272 pp. (Ukrainian);
- 15) P. Lozovy, "Authority of the Kievan Metropolitans (988-1596)," 1962, 140 pp. (Latin);
- 16) I. Patrylo, "Kievan-Galician Archbishops-Metropolitans—A Juridical Study in the Light of a New Eastern Rite," 1962, 142 pp. (Latin);
- 17) O. Baran,

"The Maramorosh Eparchy and Its Establishment" 1962, 198 pp. (Latin); 18) S. Wiwcharuk, "The Provincial Synod in Brest in 1765 which Failed to Convene," 170 pp. (Latin); 19) N. Polonska-Vasylenko, "Historical Foundation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," 120 pp. (Ukrainian); 20) M. Soloviy, "The Divine Liturgy" (history, development and explanations), 1964, 440 pp. (Ukrainian).

The second section of *The Proceedings* is made up of the periodical journal dedicated to study of the various aspects of the church historiography and the monastic life of the Ukrainian church. Four books (c. 150 pp. each) constitute a volume. The first postwar editor of this section was Rev. A. Welyky, but since 1954 the editorship has been held by Rev. I. Nazarko. Up to now four volumes have appeared in print with a total of 2,468 pages. The latest (IVth) volume is dedicated to the 500th anniversary of the death of the first Ukrainian cardinal, Metropolitan Isidore of Kiev.

The third section of *The Proceedings* is the largest and perhaps the most interesting. It comprises a series of documents from the Vatican archives which pertain to Eastern Europe, specifically to Ukraine and Byelorussia. Wide in scope and rich in detail, these documents cast much light on many problems concerning Ukraine which otherwise would not have been known, much less discussed. Initiator of this section is Rev. A. Welyky, who has remained its editor even after becoming head of the Basilian Order. Up to now the following documents have appeared in print:

- 1) Documents of Roman Pontiffs, Vols. I, II (1075-1953), 1,398 pp.;
- 2) St. Josaphat. Roman Documents of Beatification and Canonization. Vols. I, II, 714 pp. (a third volume is ready for publication);
- 3) Acts of the Sacred Congregation for Propagation of the Faith, Vols. I, II, III, IV, V (1622-1862), 1,658 pp.;
- 4) Letters of the Sacred Congregation for Propagation of the Faith, Vols. I-VII (1622-1862), 2,542 pp.;
- 5) Particular Congregations, Vols. I, II (1622-1862), 696 pp.;
- 6) Letters of Metropolitans (1613-1762), Vols. I-IV, 1,590 pp. (Volumes V-VII are already in print, and additional three volumes are in preparation);
- 7) Supplications of the Ukrainian Church (1600-1740), I-II, 754 pp. (Two volumes are in preparation);
- 8) Papal Audiences in Matters of Ukraine and Byelorussia (1650-1779), 300 pp. (the second volume is being printed);
- 9) Letters of Nuncios (1550-1659), Vols. I-X, 3,504 pp. (four other volumes are being printed, and ten more are in preparation).

The latter collection, the Letters of Nuncios, is both priceless and extremely interesting. The period covered relates almost exclusively to the Ukrainian Kozaks and their struggle against the Turks and Tartars. These are reports written by Catholic Nuncios from Warsaw, Venice and Vienna. The Collection contains several geographical charts and maps of Eastern Europe and Ukraine, including a drawing of a Kozak boat (*chaika*) from the XVIIth century.

Altogether, the 35 volumes published to date contain over 13,000 documents on 12,968 pages. Most of these documents, except the Papal Documents, appear for the first time. Ukrainian and other historians thus have a wholly new and rich source for research and scholarship. Although most of these documents are in Latin or Italian, language barriers today are no longer formidable.

The value of this collection is thus very great. Every document is marked with a serial number and contains a short summary. They also contain explanatory notes, especially of the names and places, and of some events. An index of names and subjects appears at the end, the result of the long labors of Rev. H. Kinakh. There are also prefaces and introductions in all volumes.

This wealth of material is so extensive and abundant that a chronological index as well as a topical index is inevitably necessary, a need which undoubtedly is being considered by the editors and publishers.

For this section, it is known, many more volumes and important special collections are being prepared, including one on the Brest Union.

The cost of this important work of the Basilian Fathers is being borne by the Basilian Order almost exclusively. Among the patrons and donors who have helped in its realization are: the late Metropolitan Constantine Bohachevsky and the Most Rev. Neil Savaryn (5 volumes each); the Most Rev. Ivan Buchko—2 volumes; the Most Rev. Ambrose Senyshyn and the late Archbishop V. Ladyka—1 volume each, and Mrs. Tekla Kindziersky, who sponsored 3 volumes in honor of the Ukrainian women-pioneers in Canada.

The Basilian Order deserves much credit and recognition for undertaking such a monumental work dealing with so many problems connected with the Ukrainian church and Ukrainian history throughout many centuries. The editors and publishers are to be wished a speedy and successful completion of a work so necessary and beneficial for Ukraine and the world at large.

I. VYSHNIA

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"KHRUSHCHEV'S LAST REPORT," a commentary. *The East of Today*, International Committee for Information and Social Activity, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, October-November 1964.

An excellent appraisal of Khrushchev's last report on the USSR economy is presented here. The report was considered in late September, 1964, by high Party and State functionaries drawn from the State Planning Committee, the Supreme National Economic Council and other agencies. With the Seven Year Plan ending in 1965, Khrushchev is said to have urged a "Prospective Plan" for the next fifteen years. Others indicated a desire to revert back to the five year plans under Stalin.

Regarding the various peoples in the USSR, the former Russian leader advocated first priority for their well-being in the plan. However, as in the past, he quickly qualified this by calling for expanded heavy goods production, particularly in the chemical industry, chemical machine construction, electronics, and the oil and gas industry. Also, the production of armaments and the staging of space flights are to be "further stepped up." Considering the cost of this priority, not much margin remains for the necessary increase of mass consumption goods.

In all of this, it is pitiful to observe how the resources of the captive nations in the USSR are commandeered for objectives and designs of a power that is fundamentally foreign to them. This appraisal overlooks the essential fact that for the non-Russian nations it is not only a question of rising living standards but also, and equally, one of economic self-determination.

"THE SOVIET STANDARD OF LIVING," a research paper by Keith Bush. *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, Radio Liberty Committee, New York, N. Y., 1964.

For some concrete insights into the low standard of living in Moscow, this cautiously prepared paper should be read by all interested analysts of the Soviet Union. At the outset, the writer specifies the limitations of any comparative economic analysis between the USSR and other areas, such as the inaccessibility of many consumer items in the former, the problem of incomparability, and differences in the quality of goods. Notwithstanding this, his comparisons are formulated with a high degree of scientific application.

The gulf between Soviet and Western living standards is shown by the fact that for a rather meager diet an American would have to work only 8 hours and 55 minutes, a counterpart in the USSR would have to put in about 65 hours. As the author soundly points out, the best index is founded on the cost of each item measured by the time the worker must labor in order to earn it. Appendix III enumerates the time required for consumer items found in New

York, Moscow, London, Paris, and Munich. For the first two, in so many instances the ratio is well above 1 to 5.

Discrepancies between Moscow and Kiev, Minsk, Tiflis or Tashkent are known to be wide. One needn't wonder too long about the ratio between Chicago and Kiev, or San Francisco and Minsk.

"U. S. TRADE POLICY HELD AID TO SOVIET POWER AIMS," an article by Felix Belair, Jr. *The New York Times*, New York, February 26, 1965.

With the sub-caption "Senate Unit Is Told the West Gives Reds Concessions and Gets None in Return," this article presents an extensive report of the testimony given by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University on East-West trade. The testimony was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It opposes an unconditional liberalization of trade with Eastern Europe and proposes a "poltrade policy" based on graded political concessions.

According to the writer, "Dr. Dobriansky's testimony was the most vigorous attack yet heard by the committee on what he called an 'unconditioned' or non-reciprocal relaxation of restrictions." The various stages of the Soviet Russian economic offensive, which the testimony specified, are detailed in this report. The third stage, which we are in now, is described as follows: "In the sixties and seventies, the complete 'liberation' of the underdeveloped countries from politico-economic ties with 'the imperialists.'"

"FIVE PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST TRADE," an introduction by Senator Frank Lausche. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., March 16, 1965.

Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio introduced into the *Congressional Record* the full text of the paper reported on above. In his introductory remarks the Senator expressed the positive belief "that what Professor Dobriansky had to say is very pertinent in the consideration of the proposal that the West begin engaging in trade with Russia, the captive and the satellite nations..."

The five perspectives developed in the paper are: (1) U.S. economic contributions to Soviet Russia's inner empire; (2) captive nations versus totalitarian Red states; (3) development of the Red trade weapon; (4) the weapon of trade for freedom and (5) the need for Western trade policy unity. The first perspective deals with America's inadvertent aid toward the captivity of the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

"SOVIET TINDERBOX: UKRAINIANS STIRRED UP BY SLAYING," an article by Guy Richards. *The Journal American*, New York, January 6, 1965.

Covering a number of interrelated points, this comprehensive article concentrates on the murder of the Ukrainian nationalist leader, Stepan Bandera. All the essentials surrounding that heinous act are brought out with striking effect, including the role played by Aleksander N. Shelepin, now a deputy premier of the USSR. Concerning this, the recent book *Political Assassination* by a West German author, Hermann Raschhofer, is given special stress.

The writer sees the fiery force of nationalism among the Baltic nations, Ukraine, and the Tartars as the most important "impulse at the moment." He shows how the impact of all this is felt in the United States. Quoting Mr. Walter Dushnyck, the editor of this journal and *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, he writes, "The Bandera assassination demonstrates the eternal Russian fear of the Ukrainians' loyalty to the Ukraine. As long as Ukrainian freedom fighters

exist anywhere in the world, the Russian Communist bosses know they're insecure—and they are."

"SALES LOSS IN '63 WHEAT DEALS IS SEEN," a report. *The Sun*, Baltimore, Maryland, February 26, 1965.

Of the two dozen outstanding papers in the country which reported on the Dobriansky testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this highly regarded organ excerpted at length the contents of the presentation and viewed it as "strong opposition to uncontrolled trade." The points which seemed to attract this report are "the protracted ignorance" of the Western world regarding "the basic enemy of our nation" and the proposal for a NATO council on free world trade.

One paragraph from the testimony is highlighted in the report: "To argue as some do for more liberalized trade, or to adjust our license issuances to the fact that West European business profits from close to \$5,000,000,000 worth of transactions with Eastern Europe, is analogous to justifying the spread of opium-peddling because some indulge in it." The Georgetown professor views our wheat sales to the USSR in 1963 as the beginning of the present campaign for easy East-West trade.

"PUBLIC CEREMONY CLIMAXES CREATION OF CARDINALS," an article by James C. O'Neill. Vatican City (NC), February 25, 1965.

The historic elevation of Archbishop Joseph Slipy of Ukraine to the Cardinalate of the Holy Catholic Church is vividly described in this account. On February 25 a three and a half hour ceremony in St. Peter's basilica climaxed the creation by Pope Paul VI of 27 new cardinals. The writer makes a special point of the fact that few of the 20,000 observers were unaware of the well demonstrated promises kept by both Joseph Cardinal Slipy and Josef Cardinal Beran of Czecho-Slovakia, who had been imprisoned and exiled for their faith, when they again promised perpetual faithfulness and obedience to the successors of St. Peter.

What was especially significant on this historic occasion was the Pope's address during a special audience with the Ukrainian delegation. Explaining why Slipy was elevated to the dignity of cardinal, His Holiness declared, "We wanted to express Our deep respect for Monsignor Joseph Slipy and for the entire Ukrainian people." Recounting his early experiences with Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky, the Pope said, "It was at that time that We had ample opportunity to learn about the Ukrainian national and political problems, and the aspirations and sufferings of the Ukrainian people." Significant, indeed, was the Pope's admonition, "Be loyal, strong, brave and steadfast! Pray to God and have faith that the Ukrainian people will not perish, but will triumph in victory."

"EXPERTS URGE SOVIET TRADE," an article by J. A. Livingston. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., February 27, 1965.

This syndicated column lists the various experts who have expressed their views on East-West trade. George F. Kennan is listed as one favoring freer trade with the Red Empire. According to Livingston, most experts are in support of more liberal trade, including himself.

However, the selected witnesses before Fulbright's committee are no reliable measure of views held by competent people in the country. The writer distorts the position held by Professor Dobriansky who, he says, "was one of the few who advocated stern trade restrictions: The Communists are still intent on world domination." The testimony relied on considerably more than just this point, albeit a very essential factor.

"EDITOR CALLS ON CHURCH FOR ANTI-COMMIE STAND," a report. *The Scribe*, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut, March 11, 1965.

Views on the Ecumenical Council and the present relations of the Catholic Church with the Red Empire are related in this report of a lecture delivered by Mr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, at the University of Bridgeport. The lecture bore on the editor's experiences at the three sessions of the Council and struck a note for "a blunt denunciation of Communism" by the Church.

The lecturer himself evinced some skepticism as to the Church's move along this direction at the present time. As he put it, "the Church is careful not to give a denunciation because they do not want to upset the dialogue between Communist countries and the West in Church relations." The editor also expressed himself on the Council's schema bridging the schism between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, which he considered to be a most important product of the Council.

"NEW MYTHS, OLD REALITIES," an editorial. *The Richmond News Leader*, Richmond, Virginia, February 16, 1965.

A long editorial is devoted in this outstanding Virginian medium to the Consular Convention between the U.S. and the USSR. Much of it deals with the critical views expressed recently by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University. As the editors see it, he "has a theory on how to encourage the Soviet break-up: Junk the consular treaty."

The treaty has been signed, but it requires Senate ratification. Because of last year's Presidential campaign and the current Vietnam crisis, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has postponed hearings on the pact. Some of the criticisms it will have to consider are brought out in this well-written editorial. As it points out, "This is no time to invent new myths. We ought to face old realities." One of them is the USSR.

"I CENNI BIOGRAFICI LE ATTIVITA' I MERITI DEL NUOVI PORPORATI," biographical sketches of new cardinals. *L'Osservatore Romano*, Vatican City, February 22-23, 1965.

Biographical sketches of the twenty-seven newly elevated cardinals appear in this issue of the official Vatican organ. A photo of the cardinal accompanies each sketch. The highlights of Joseph Cardinal Slipy's career are described in detail.

Cardinal Slipy was born on February 17, 1892 in Zazdryst in the diocese of Lviv, Ukraine. His education in Austria and elsewhere and his work under Metropolitan Sheptytsky are cited at length. Also, the account relates his Siberian exile and final liberation in 1963 through the efforts of Pope John XXIII. The biography spells great faith, courage, and patience.

"WHY NOT DEAL WITH REDS?," an article by Robert S. Byrd. *Chicago Daily News*, Chicago, Illinois, March 8, 1965.

This long article treats the current debate on East-West trade. It sees four alternatives confronting the U.S. embargo, poltrade, normal trade, and special favors for some Red states. According to the writer, the third position seems to be the most popular one among the experts.

Whether the American public will buy the normal trade position is another question. The writer has Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky as a spokesman of the second position, at the same time mistaking him for a "Ukrainian-born professor of economics." His support of this position is not properly stated, though several paragraphs are devoted to it. The captive nations rationale is not even mentioned.

"THE NEXT PHASE IN SHEVCHENKO 'BRIDGE BUILDING'," an address by the Honorable Thaddeus J. Dulski, *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., March 15, 1965.

In this highly interesting address Congressman Dulski of New York endorses the President's call for building bridges with the peoples of Eastern Europe and points to two resolutions he's sponsoring as part of the way in achieving this objective. House Joint Resolution 225 seeks the establishment of a section in the Library of Congress to be known as the Shevchenko Freedom Library; H.J. Res. 226 provides for a Shevchenko freedom stamp.

The Congressman refers to the two resolutions as "two important steel suspensions in this Shevchenko bridge to the people of Ukraine." The passage of the two resolutions would demonstrate how sincere bridge spokesmen are in moulding ties of understanding between peoples. Ukraine is only the largest non-Russian nation in Eastern Europe.

"EXPERTS FAVOR EAST-BLOC TRADE," an article by Howard Margolis. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., February 27, 1965.

Another article on the East-West trade issue, this piece dwells on aspects of the opposition which many of the others have overlooked. Referring to the Dobriansky testimony before Fulbright's committee, the writer states "Dobriansky, too, agreed that without the support of West European countries, present United States restrictions are of little value." He also cites the professor's disagreement with those who claim freer trade would not help the Red totalitarian regimes.

It is a strange position, indeed, to hold that the Red Empire would not really profit from such trade. The obvious question revolves about its acute anxiety to engage in these relations. Moreover, it is not true, as some argue, that our allies would not cooperate on a unified and coordinated poltrade policy, one basing trade on political concessions of graded order.

"UKRAINE DAY PROCLAIMED," a report. *The Evening Sun*, Baltimore, Maryland, January 22, 1965.

As in numerous other cities across the country, Americans of Ukrainian descent in Baltimore, Md. observed the 47th anniversary of the independence of Ukraine. A detailed account of the observance and its significance is given in this report. Both Governor Tawes and Mayor McKeldin issued separate proclamations designating January 22 as "Ukrainian Independence Day" in the State and the city. This action, too, is a solid contribution to public education.

L. E. D.

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
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