The book I just wrote about my experience in Iraq has prompted a debate. I want to talk about the lessons I got from that American experience:
 To compensate Iraq for the damages suffered during decades of tyranny was not easy and I made mistakes. I entrusted the base-removal strategy to the Iraqis and they turned it into a political instrument. We focused on long-term reconstruction goals whereas we should have begun by improving the daily lives of the Iraqi population. I should have gotten rid of the bureaucracy to speed up the reconstruction.
 The United States must be better prepared for reconstruction missions. If in the future we face an identical situation, we shall organize public and private cooperation. – An appropriate number of men must be prepared to overcome the rebels. I asked for more troops but I was not listened to by the military in charge.
However, apart from those problems, great progress has been made in the country thanks to the action of the United States. The Iraqis voted in a democratic way, they adopted their constitution and elected their assembly. The economy grows at a rate of 17% annually.
Obviously, American and Iraqi soldiers continue to die, but Iraq is the central front of the war on terror and we should not withdraw.

Once again, we face controversies with regard to the way in which the Pentagon and its omnipresent private subcontractors obstruct open investigations in Iraq. “Muslim intellectuals have been paid to assist in American propaganda” says the New York Times. Journalists, intellectuals and religious persons take Uncle Sam’s money or, in this case, that of a Washington-based Public Relations company. From the moral point of view, this is disturbing and counterproductive. Obviously, prudent Muslims won’t be interested in listening to American advisors; the religious persons against the Sunni insurrection can now be described as the corrupted responsible ones.
There’s a serious problem with regard to these facts. From the historical point of view, it’s all senseless. The United States directed many secret and official operations known as “CA” during the Cold War. By means of the CIA mainly, Washington spent millions of dollars in the publication of books, magazines, journals; in the creation of radio stations, organizations, youth and women associations, scholarships, academic foundations, intellectuals groups and communities, apart from the direct payment to personalities who believed in the ideals the United States, considered to be praiseworthy.
It’s difficult to assess the influence of those secret programs. However, when an important Third World leader says that a very well known liberal western book had a tremendous impact on his intellectual development, it can be said that that program was effective, indeed. That should not be that hard for Americans, who are educated to support those activities, even when some can question their effectiveness.
Would it be that difficult, perhaps, to support more aggressive clandestine actions aimed at developing democracy in Iraq? Let me establish a parallel with the Cold War. It’s known that the CIA gave financial support to British journal Encounter. This journal had an influence on the debates about the Western secret services from the 50s to the 70s. When we analyzed it, we realized that it must have been the most effective non-military intellectual action organized by the United States. Can anybody seriously think that great intellectual Raymond Aron was assuming a personal commitment when he wrote regularly for those publications or for the also-founded-by-the-CIA French magazines? And moreover, although Aron or others in Encounter could have suspected that their checks were signed by the American taxpayers, their perspicacity and articles were less relevant and true?
Contrary to what’s usually admitted, the CIA funding of intellectuals for “propaganda” projects was mostly made in a very indirect way. In my experience and my knowledge of reports about the activities of the CIA in Europe and the Middle East, I never saw cases in which American agents manipulated the final product. What’s to be regretted is that CIA agents don’t have the language skills to deal with the regions they work on and, consequently, they lack the necessary elements to judge the benefits of the texts of the projects.
Probably, democracy in Iraq is as misguided as it could have been in western Europe after Hitler’s defeat. What we could truly reproach to the Bush Administration for is that it gave too much responsibilities to a public relations company (in the previously mentioned case, the Lincoln Group) and nothing could be done to protect the anonymity. Nonetheless, a recognition must be made to the Pentagon: that seems to be the only government agency that tries to, at least, educate Iraqi officials to conquer the population. The CIA seems to have abandoned its historical mission in that region.
The Bush Administration should not be afraid of making its clandestine “propaganda” in Iraq or any other country of the Middle East more intense. In these last great ideological battles, history has been on its side.

If we make a comparison of the White House statements since the summer of 2003, we can see that the Administration has continuously said that victory in Iraq is imminent and we don’t have any other choice but to keep our current policy. However, with luck, a transparent decision, a more courageous Democratic Party and the support of the Iraqis, the war in Iraq may end within the year.
Contrary to what George W. Bush affirms, our choice is not between “victory” or “defeat” but between staying without winning or leaving without losing. Victory, as defined by the Bush Administration (a stable, unified and democratic Iraq with a defeated insurrection), is unlikely. More troops would have been needed since the beginning as well as more support on the part of the Iraqis to achieve it. In addition, neither the Shiites nor the Kurds are willing to subordinate their interests to an Iraqi army that’s still an illusion. Therefore, trying to achieve a victory by meeting those conditions is useless and expensive in monetary and human life terms. On the other hand, the concept of “defeat”, as it’s being considered, is still marked by the Vietnam trauma, something that offers a deceptive point of view.
We must withdraw from the country. American citizens won’t back that war for a long time in the name of empty slogans. The Shiites and the Kurds can reorganize the country without the United States. The President must leave his political isolation and accept listening to people who are not part of his group of advisers.

Last December elections in Iraq could turn out to be essential. The Parliament elected last month will choose a president and a prime minister thus giving Iraq its first elected government according to the constitution adopted by referendum. That government could welcome a change in the foreign military presence and George W. Bush has said that the government would have more responsibilities with regard to the economic and political reconstruction of the country. The Iraqi armed forces should have a more active role in the struggle against the insurrection.
Elections in Iraq were preceded in the United States by a debate about the future of the American presence in Iraq. This represents a great opportunity to understand the role of the foreign presence in the country. Iraq is a country of considerable strategic challenges. A broken-down Iraq would be a calamity for the world. The American presence tends to contribute to that situation. There are two essential elements for “succeeding” in Iraq: a government willing to meet the necessities of the inhabitants as well as respecting the rights of the minorities, and an army answering the orders of the central government. What policy can favour such results?
For some, a quick withdrawal is crucial, but world consequences will be terrible. For others, the troops must stay, but the United States won’t bear the Iraqi burden for a long time. As a matter of fact, the Afghan example should be followed and the UN and NATO should participate more in the reconstruction for that would allow a reduction of the American troops.

It’s not a secret: democrats in Congress are very divided with regard to what should be done about the Iraqi war. Joseph I. Lieberman vigorously supports the stay of the troops in the country whereas John Murtha fights for their quick withdrawal. Many democrats find themselves in the middle of these points of view and try to find a happy medium: to keep the troops for a while and then leave.
This is the reason why centrist democrats must propose an agreement to the Bush Administration: democrats will support the Bush Administration in Congress for six months with regard to the way in which war should be handle and, in return, the Bush Administration promises to give more information about they way in which it’s handled. This does not mean democrats won’t be critic but we won’t legislate to put an end to the war during this period of time. In return, we want to have a real control of Congress about the security policy. A bipartisan commission about Iraq guaranteeing a balanced information must be created. What we understand by “victory” in Iraq must be defined too.
The acceptance of our proposal will be good for the country.

Australia’s decision to have 190 special Forces task group join another 110 groups and two Chinook helicopters in Afghanistan has met little criticism, mainly because most of us can see the sense of it. Our efforts are in direct defensive and domestic security interests. Assisting the new democratically elected government to fight the Taliban resonates with the moral convictions of most Australians.
The deployment has had bipartisan political support. Indeed, the Labour Party is still reaping some strategic credibility from its earlier criticism of the government for not offering consistent assistance to Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban. That we lacked sufficient forces to do so is quietly understood on both sides, including the lack of military commitment. There has to be a larger involvement of the special forces and the air service, although not much, since our capacities are limited and we cannot send all our troops.
The bipartisan support is much less important regarding our commitment with Iraq, even if the areas of agreement between the Government and the Opposition are far more than what they appear to be. While Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Opposition Leader Kim Beazley snipe at each other, the Coalition and the Labour Party essentially agree on Australia’s strategy to withdraw from Iraq.
Australia’s exit strategy (similar to that of its allies) depends on building up sufficient and effective Iraqi security forces before handing over to them the control of the country. Everyone agrees that the presence of foreign forces is due to the prevailing insurgency.
But this exit strategy bestrides the fine line of withdrawing too early or too late. If too early, Iraq could experience a civil war unconstrained by the international community. If too late, the presence of troops would paralyze political strategies and compromises required to establish a democracy in Iraq. Actually, the term “exit strategy” is used by people who are unable to recognize the solution, even if they fell over it. It is the similar degree of ignorance shown by those who cry for a strict exit deadline.

In three years of Iraq’s occupation, for most western observers, the lies, half-truths and suppressed facts have become part of everyday life. In Iraq, the main concern is whether the country, already divided in three parts, will survive or disappear.
Today, the poems of Mohammed Mahdi Al-Jawahiri, son of a Shia cleric, in which he praises the Iraqi nation, seem old. In fact, the US occupation is heavily dependant on the support of the Shia political parties, especially the Supreme Council for the Revolution in Iraq under Ali Sistani, Iran’s instrument in Iraq. Sistani prevented the Shia and Moqtada Sadr from waging their struggle against the occupation forces. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times demanded that Ali Sistani be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
If the Shia had resisted the occupation, it would have been over a long time ago. The Iranians did not oppose the overthrow of the Taliban or of Saddam Hussein, but they are playing a dangerous game. If the Ba’athists and nationalists had not resisted the invasion, the plan for a regime change in Tehran might have been much more advanced than as it is now. The Iraqi group that has benefited the most from the occupation is the Kurdish, an oppressed minority which has become the oppressor and would be very happy to be a western protectorate after it annexed the Kirkurk oil fields.
However, if the cleric Shia unity is divided, or Iran considered that an independent Iraq is in best interests, everything might change. At the moment, the Iraqi oil is being exploited by private interests. But such exploitation cannot continue without the presence of foreign troops.

George W. Bush called December elections in Iraq a “major milestone in the march to democracy”. They are indeed a milestone, but not just the kind that London and Washington would welcome.
When George W. Bush and Tony Blair invaded Iraq, the pretext was the weapons of mass destruction. Since the pretext no longer worked out, it became the support for democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. However, if the elections took place, it was not because of the support of the US, but that of Ali Sistani. If there were a real interest by the Iraqis, it would be observed from the polls conducted which showed that more than 80% of Iraqis opposed the presence of the occupation troops, but Bush and Blair still refuse to set a timetable for withdrawal.
The United States does not want a sovereign Iraq, but its control the country’s energy resources. If Iraq were a sovereign nation, it would approach Iran and enhance relations with the Saudi Shia who live in oil areas. We could then think of an alliance between Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabian Shia regions that would control vast oil areas and follow Iran’s policy to build closer ties with China. This is the US major concern. That is why Washington is struggling against this possibility and ensuring its control over Iraqi oil.