

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



LOWER INSERT: UKRAINIAN TERRITORY IN EUROPE UPPER INSERT: DISMEMBERMENT OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

VOL. II—NUMBER 1

AUTUMN, 1945

\$1.00 A COPY

UKRAINE AND UNO	<i>Editorial</i>
FREE PRESS	<i>Editorial</i>
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET REFUGEES	<i>Clarence A. Manning</i>
SCIENCE UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM	<i>Scientificus</i>
AUTUMN LEAVES ARE FALLING	<i>Anatole Kurdydyk</i>
THE UKRAINIAN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT	<i>Roman Olesnicki</i>
RUSSIAN CHURCH-POLICY IN UKRAINE	<i>Nicholas D. Czubytyj</i>
THE PROBLEM OF "SECOND GENERATION"	<i>Joseph S. Roucek</i>
AMERICAN INTEREST IN UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR I	<i>Stephen Shumeyko</i>
UKRAINE UNDER A DELIBERATE BLACKOUT	<i>Michael Nagurney</i>

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

Subscription: Yearly \$4.00; Single Copy \$1.00.

Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
11 E. 7th Street, New York 3, N. Y.

Checks Payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA.

Editorial Address: PROF. NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ
P. O. Box 656, Mahwah, New Jersey.
Tel.: CRagmere 8-3767-M

WITH COMPLIMENTS
UKRAINIAN CANADIAN COMMITTEE
701 McILROY
WINNIPEG, MAN.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. II—NUMBER 1

UKRAINE AND UNO	<i>Editorial</i>
FREE PRESS	<i>Editorial</i>
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET REFUGEES	<i>Clarence A. Manning</i>
SCIENCE UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM	<i>Scientificus</i>
AUTUMN LEAVES ARE FALLING	<i>Anatole Kurdydyk</i>
THE UKRAINIAN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT	<i>Roman Olesnicki</i>
RUSSIAN CHURCH-POLICY IN UKRAINE	<i>Nicholas D. Czubytyj</i>
THE PROBLEM OF "SECOND GENERATION"	<i>Joseph S. Roucek</i>
AMERICAN INTEREST IN UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR I	<i>Stephen Shumeyko</i>
UKRAINE UNDER A DELIBERATE BLACKOUT	<i>Michael Nagurney</i>
BOOK REVIEWS—UCRANICA IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS	

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA.

Edited by EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-chief, NICHOLAS D. GZUBATYJ
Associate editor, STEPHEN SHUMEYKO
Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA
with the support of contributions of Americans of Ukrainian descent.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Ukraine and UNO	5
<i>Editorial</i>	
Free Press	11
<i>Editorial</i>	
The Significance of the Soviet Refugees	14
<i>Prof. Clarence A. Manning</i>	
Science Under the Banner of Marxism	25
<i>Scientificus</i>	
Autumn Leaves Are Falling	33
<i>Anatole Kurdydyk</i>	
The Ukrainian Cooperative Movement	36
<i>Roman Olesnicki</i>	
Russian Church-Policy in Ukraine	43
<i>Nicholas D. Czubytyj</i>	
The Problem of "Second Generation"	57
<i>Dr. Joseph S. Roucek</i>	
American Interest in Ukraine During World War I	66
<i>Stephen Shumeyko</i>	
Ukraine Under a Deliberate Blackout	80
<i>Michael Nagurney</i>	
BOOK REVIEWS	
Taras Shevchenko: Selected Poems. Translated with an Introduction by Clarence A. Manning	87
<i>Percival Cundy, Th.D.</i>	
"We Can Do Business with Russia," by Hans Heyman	90
<i>Roman Olesnicki</i>	
Russia and the Western World, by Max Laserson	92
<i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS	96

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Ph.D., Professor at Columbia University and Acting Executive Officer, Department of East European Languages. Specialist in Russian and Ukrainian Literature, and translator, author of "Ukrainian Literature."

ANATOLE KURDYDYK, Ukrainian novelist, now displaced in Germany after serving in Nazi concentration camp during several months.

ROMAN OLESNICKI, Consular Attaché, economist, former member of Executive Committee of Western Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance.

NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ, Ph.D., Ukrainian Historian, former Professor of Greek-Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv, Western Ukraine until 1939, author of "Western Ukraine and Rome," "The Ukrainian Lands of Lithuanian Federation" and others, Vice-director of the Historical Department of Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv until 1939.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Ph.D., chairman, Department of Political Science and Sociology, Hofstra College, Hemstead, N. Y. Born in Czechoslovakia, educated at Charles University in Prague and American universities—University of California, New York University. Member of several learned societies. Author of "Contemporary Roumania and her problems," "Politics of the Balkans," "Contemporary World Politics" and others. Contributor to several American sociological journals.

STEPHEN SHUMEYKO, President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Editor of the Ukrainian Weekly, Born in USA.

MICHAEL NAGURNEY, professor at St. Basil College, Stamford, Conn. Member of several learned Societies.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

Volume I

1944-1945

AUTUMN—WINTER—SPRING—SUMMER

Subscription: Yearly \$4.00; Single Copy \$1.00

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA
with the Support of Contributions of Americans of Ukrainian Descent

Edited by Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief, NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

Associate Editor, STEPHEN SHUMEYKO

Editorial Address: PROF. NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

P. O. Box 656, Mahwah, New Jersey—Tel. CRagmere 8-3767-M

New York City

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

(BOOK REVIEWS IN ITALIC)

	PAGE
<i>Academy of Sciences of USSR, "Istoriya Ukrainy"</i> —N. Czubytyj	85
<i>Andersen P. B., People, Church and State in Russia</i> —Lev Dobriansky	174
<i>Bilmanis, Dr. A., Baltic Essays</i> —Dr. S. Demydchuk	293
Chamberlin William Henry, <i>Asylum for Europe's Uprooted</i>	322
Chamberlin William Henry, <i>The Issue of Ukrainian Nationhood</i>	228
Chamberlin William Henry, <i>The Ukraine and Soviet Nationality Policy</i>	11
<i>Chamberlin William Henry, Ukraine The Submerged Nation</i> — Dr. Longin Cehelsky	181
Czubytyj Nicholas D., <i>Dombarton Oaks and Ukraine</i>	140
Czubytyj Nicholas D., <i>The Meaning of "Russia and Ukraine"</i>	351
Czubytyj Nicholas D., <i>The National Revolution in Ukraine (1917-1919)</i>	17
Czubytyj Nicholas D., <i>Silver Jubilee of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 1918-1943</i>	236
Czubytyj Nicholas D., <i>The Ukrainians and the Polish Russian Border Dispute</i>	57
<i>Dallin David J., The Big Three, United States, Britain, Russia</i> — Lev E. Dobriansky	381
<i>Dallin J. David, The Real Soviet Russia</i> —Lev Dobriansky	283
Davies Rhys J., <i>Some Lessons of the European Conflict 1939-1945</i>	212
Demydchuk Simon, <i>In Support of the Cause of Freedom</i>	262
Dobriansky Lev E., <i>Ukraine in Mid-Twentieth Century</i>	330
Editorial, <i>Crimean Declaration—Words and Deeds</i>	101
Editorial, <i>Introducing The Ukrainian Quarterly</i>	5

	PAGE
Editorial, The San Francisco Conference and Ukraine	205
Editorial, We Must Not Revive Human Slavery	305
Editor of the Ukrainian Quarterly, Appeals for Displaced Ukrainians in Europe	376
Evach Honore, Mykola Khvylovy—Communist and Patriot	272
<i>Gibson Hugh, The Road to Foreign Policy</i> —R. Olesnicki	86
Granovsky Alexander A, Free Ukraine is Vital to Lasting Peace	117
<i>Koestler Arthur, The Yogi and the Commissar and Other Essays</i> — Roman Olesnicki	378
<i>Lippmann Walter, The U. S. A. War Aims</i> —Roman Olesnicki	184
<i>Mackenzie King L. W., Canada and the Fight for Freedom</i> —Honore Evach . .	391
Manning Clarence A., The Democratic Trend of Ukrainian Literature	40
Manning Clarence A., Pan Slavism, Its Use and Abuse	216
Manning Clarence A., The Russian Communist Unification	311
Manning Clarence A., Taras Shevchenko as World Poet	105
<i>Manning Clarence A., Ukrainian Literature</i> —N. Czubytyj	87
<i>Narys Istoryi Ukrainy</i> —Nicholas D. Czubytyj	291
<i>Normano J. E., The Spirit of Russian Economics</i> —Joseph Roucek	286
Obituaries: Metropolitan Sheptitsky	195
Obituaries: Alexander Koshetz	198
Olesnicki Roman J., The Problem of Ukraine in Recent American Peace- Planning Literature	72
<i>Pares Bernard Sir, Russia and Peace</i> —Nicholas D. Czubytyj	178
Roucek Joseph S., American Misconceptions about Central-Eastern Europe . . .	342
Roucek Joseph S., Ukrainian Sociology After the First World War	152
Shumeyko Stephen, In Retrospect	164
Shumeyko Stephen, Ivan Franko	251
Shumeyko Stephen, The Ukrainian Americans	49
Shumeyko Stephen, Ukrainian Literary Tradition	365
Simpson G. W., Hrushevsky, a Historian of Ukraine	132
<i>Snow Edgar, The Pattern of Soviet Power</i> .—Roman Olesnicki	390
<i>Steel Johannes, The Future of the Europe</i> —Dr. T. Lazare	385

	PAGE
Ukrainian American Heroes of World War II	79
Ucrainica in American Periodicals	89
Ucrainica in American Periodicals	295
Ucrainica in American and British Periodicals	186
Ucrainica in American and British Periodicals	393
Ukrainian-American St. Francisco Delegation, The Ukrainian Situation	217
Ukrainians of America and Canada in Cooperation	81
<i>Welles Sumner, The Time of Decision</i> —Roman Olesnicki	176
<i>White J. E., Repor on the Russians, The World is Half Slave</i> — Roman Olesnicki	287



UKRAINE AND UNO

Editorial

IN the New York Times for Sunday, January 20th, Mr. Edwin James noted that, "One of the very important factors in international relations now is the vigorous nationalism of Russia." Further on he added: "Indeed a very good case could be made out of the effect that much evil has resulted from the veiling of nationalistic adjustments. There was a legitimate reason for the veil during wartime, but with the war over there is small excuse for the veiling of such news. It is dangerous to do so."

Mr. James had the courage to write this in connection with the United Nations Organization session in London and the conference of deputies of the Big Three foreign ministers who are preparing blueprints for peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland.

There is no doubt but that Russian nationalism is a definite threat to international relations. It is even a greater threat than Nazism was, for it has under its control greater resources than Germany had. In addition it has hundreds of thousands of its quislings throughout the world, including America, and these men in the event of another world conflict will at the first word of command from the Kremlin start internal revolts in their countries. This fact alone may account for some of the highlanded methods employed by the Soviets in international relations.

What is more dangerous to world peace than these Red quislings, however, is the general policy of appeasement toward Moscow pursued by various governments. This is so obvious that one cannot help but remember the infamous days of Munich. The last Moscow conference, held during Christmas time, offered a fine example of this appeasement of the Soviets. One result of it is that today all of eastern and central Europe is writhing under the Soviet heel.

This policy of appeasement of the Soviets has its followers also among the peoples of the democracies, who have no clear idea what to do and in which direction to head. Soviet policy, on the other hand, is definite and clearcut and likewise ruthless in its execution, indifferent to human rights, and callous to human suffering.

How far this appeasement has gone can be judged by a recent press report that America and Great Britain are about to recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, thereby in effect giving their official approval to the enslavement of these states and their people. It is quite possible that an accord on this point was already reached at the Moscow conference last December, as each conference where Soviets interests were involved—Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam—strengthened the grip of the Soviets on the peoples under their domination.

Appeasing the Soviets has also tended to make their puppet rulers, Tito in Yugoslavia, Bierut in Poland, Groza in Rumania and Dimitrov in Bulgaria, more ruthless in their treatment of the people under their control even when the vast majority abominate Communism and all that it represents. Whether or not one or two “democratic Mikolajczyks” will be added to the Communist cabinets of Rumania or Bulgaria is beside the point, for such additions will in no way relieve the plight of the unfortunate peoples of those countries. They are merely window-dressing, intended to make appeasement look less ugly.

The unwillingness which statesmen of the democracies display when asked to do something to help the suffering peoples in countries bordering on the Soviet Union, becomes much more pronounced when any effort is made to have them intercede on behalf of peoples within the Soviet Union itself. “Why! that is untouchable, tabu!” they exclaim in effect. The trials and tribulations of these peoples are simply ignored or glossed over in the outside world. Examine, for instance, the coverage given by the press to the recent papal encyclical on Soviet religious persecution of Ukrainian Catholics in Western and Carpatho Ukraine. On the whole the press reported this historic document quite superficially, without even giving anywhere near its full text. It would appear that the world has resigned itself to allow the Kremlin to do whatever it will with the hapless people over whom it rules.

Quite a contrast is offered between the speeches at the UNO assembly on human rights in general and on the right of even colonial people to self-rule on the one hand, and on the other the sight of millions of human beings under Soviet misrule being denied these rights and made to suffer hellish torments. To these people Russian nationalism is an even greater menace than it is to the outside world. For them it spells denationalization and destruction of their national identity. Taking advantage of the victory over the Nazis and their prowess in international relations, the Soviet rulers have now inaugurated a policy of denationalization of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. They have

as their pattern the similar policy of Peter I to make "Russia" peopled by one homogeneous Russian Orthodox people.

The chief victim here is Ukraine, which Russia is determined at all costs to russify and gradually transform into a mere Russian province. It is a far from easy task, however, for Ukrainian national consciousness is very high and offers vigorous opposition to the resurgent Russian nationalism. Thus in Western Ukraine the opposition has developed into open warfare, conducted by Ukrainian underground forces. Thus now it is really a struggle of Moscow against Kiev.

The current Soviet persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church commenced soon after the suppression of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The spontaneous revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church during the war proceeded rapidly, and soon it had about five hundred parishes throughout the country. When the Soviets re-occupied Ukraine, however, they immediately proceeded, just as they had done in 1930, to ban the Church and liquidate its clergy and hierarchy. In its place they introduced the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by Patriarch Alexis of Moscow, a Kremlin appointee.

The Ukrainian Orthodox bishops who managed to flee from Ukraine are today hunted by Soviet agents, who demand their forced repatriation on the basis of an alleged Yalta agreement. The clergy and faithful who remained in Ukraine are subject to heavy-handed oppression or banishment to icy Siberian wastes, on manufactured charges of having collaborated with the Nazis. The bare fact that the revival of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church took place during the Russian retreat, is deemed by the Soviets as sufficient ground for the charges.

For that matter they are regularly made against any person prominent in Ukrainian national, cultural and economic life whom the Reds suspect of being anti Moscow. Thousands of such Ukrainians have been settled around the headwaters of the Siberian river Kilima, where amidst frigid wastes and great hardships they are forced to mine gold for the Kremlin potentates.

Having destroyed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church the Soviets next turned their attention to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Here it should be borne in mind that the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine, annexed by the Soviets against their wishes and contrary to Article II of the Atlantic Charter, are traditionally Catholics of the Eastern Rite. In the course of its existence their Church played a prominent role in their national development. Now the Soviets have set out to

liquidate it. Although they have set up an impenetrable veil of censorship around Western Ukraine, reports do manage to get through which indicate that a savage religious and national persecution of the Western Ukrainians by the Reds is now raging there.

The entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy, six bishops in all, headed by Metropolitan Slipiy, were arrested and imprisoned in Kiev and Kharkiv. Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislav died while en route to Kiev. Metropolitan Slipiy have to be transferred to one of Ural prisons. As could be expected, the pretext for this persecution is based on charges of a political nature, despite the fact that the leaders of the Ukrainian Catholic Church abstained from all political activity before, during and since the war. For that matter, the imprisoned Bishop Romza of Carpatho-Ukraine did not even consider himself a Ukrainian but a Russian. Moreover, when the Reds occupied Carpatho-Ukraine, he officially greeted them as liberators.

Along with the arrest of the bishops, the clergy found themselves under pressure to forsake their Ukrainian Catholic Church and join the Russian Orthodox Church and acknowledge the authority of Patriarch Alexis. The Soviet government is directly involved in this attempted proselytism, as the action is being conducted by the government authorities of the Ukrainian S.S.R. In an effort to quell the heroic resistance of the clergy, who refuse to desert their faith, hundreds of priests have been executed by the Soviets while many more have been banished as conscript labor to Siberia.

Just as in Eastern Ukraine, here too behind this religious persecution is hidden a plan to russify Western Ukraine and populate it with Russians of the Orthodox faith.

It is significant, also, that although Ukraine suffered the most during the war, reconstruction there is proceeding almost at a snail's pace. One reason for this is that Moscow is concentrating on building industrial centers in its Asiatic domains, where they would be comparatively safe from the air attacks it expects if and when war breaks out between it and the democracies. On account of its high national consciousness and proximity to the Black Sea, Ukraine is not regarded by the Soviets as good terrain for a military industrial development.

As for relief for the suffering and needy Ukrainians, the fact is that the bulk of the relief supplies sent from abroad to the U.S.S.R. eventually lands in the non-Ukrainian parts of the U.S.S.R. That is why the recent special UNRRA budget set up by the American Congress especially for Ukraine was no doubt greeted with much thankfulness in

Ukraine. It is to be hoped that this relief is passed from UNRRA officials directly to the populace, for if the Soviet authorities get their hands on it they are liable to use it as a club over the heads of the nationally conscious Ukrainians.

In an effort to help the people in Ukraine the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee has asked for permission to send a delegate to Ukraine to survey conditions there and supervise the distribution of food and clothing sent by Ukrainian Americans. Thus far the Soviet authorities have not granted such permission.

Meanwhile a sham of limitless proportions is occupying the stage of the UNO conference in London, one that can be likened to the famous Potemkin villages, which were built like modern movie sets to impress Empress Catherine during her tour through Ukraine. That sham is the Ukrainian representation at the conference under the leadership of Manuilsky.

When Ukraine was admitted in San Francisco conference into the family of the United Nations, Ukrainian people the world over rejoiced, for this international recognition of Ukraine was definitely a step forward in the centuries old struggle of the Ukrainians for national independence. Nonetheless no impartial observer deluded himself with the thought that this recognition meant that now the Ukrainians were masters of their homeland. Everyone knows that the Kremlin is now more of the master of Ukraine than ever before. In sponsoring this recognition at San Francisco, Moscow was not at all concerned about Ukrainian national identity. What Moscow wanted mainly, was to get three votes in the UNO. Moscow was also concerned to have its policies supported at all times by representatives of an ostensibly separate Ukrainian state. Finally Moscow desired by this move to mask its real intentions in regard to the Ukrainian nationality. As a spokesman for Ukraine, for the most enslaved land in the world today, it designated Dimitry Manuilsky, a Russian subject.

It is true that Dimitry Manuilsky was born in Ukraine and that his father was a petty Russian official, many of whom during Tsarist times had come to Ukraine from Russia. But when Manuilsky was barely 15 years old he moved to Petersburg and throughout his whole life there, until he went abroad, he was an active member of the Russian Socialist-Bolshevik party. He returned from the abroad when the Bolsheviks came into power and entered the service of the Kremlin. During the peace negotiations in 1918 between the independent Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic, Manuilsky served as head of the Russian dele-

gation. Then, as can be seen, he represented Russia; today, designated by Moscow he is representing Ukraine, with which he has no real ties at all. Moscow has likewise appointed him Commissar of Foreign Affairs for Ukraine. From all this it is quite obvious that Manuilsky is not a true representative of the Ukrainian people, but a mere puppet, and not even a Ukrainian one, of Moscow. Some day, and we hope it will be soon, a true representative of Ukraine will take his place in the UNO assembly. He certainly will not be Manuilsky or anyone like him.

“Ukraine has always aspired to freedom,” Voltaire once wrote. The same is true today, and even more so. When a puppet like Manuilsky supports at the UNO assembly in London the policies by which Moscow has enslaved Poles, Bulgars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, the Baltic peoples, Finns, and now tries to enslave Iranians, the Ukrainian people are compelled, wherever they may be, to rise and declare that these policies founded on force and terrorism are not the policies of the Ukrainian people but of Moscow alone, and that Moscow is capitalizing on the good name of the Ukrainian people and instructing Manuilsky to speak in the name of Ukraine in a manner which no responsible Ukrainian statesman would approve.

The true sentiments of the Ukrainian people can be expressed today by those Ukrainian bishops who are languishing in Soviet prisons and by those numberless patriots who have been banished to the icy wastes of Siberia or are living as displaced persons in Western Europe. They can also be expressed by the hundreds of thousand of persons of Ukrainian descent, who either by adoption or birth have become citizens of these United States of America, of Canada, England and France.

They can and should be allowed to express the sentiments of the Ukrainian people, for the millions of Ukrainians in their native land under Soviet rule, like their non-Russian neighbors, are unable to do so on account of Red terrorism.



FREE PRESS

Editorial

THE phrase "free press" is very much heard and seen today. It appears to be a veritable symbol of the free and democratic world toward which mankind aspires. Some have gone to the extent of recommending that a provision guaranteeing free press be inserted into the charter of the United Nations Organization. Still others, members of our Congress, have gone on record to say that they favor extension of UNRRA aid only to those nations which subscribe to the principle of free press. In a word, freedom of the press and freedom of the people appear to be inseparable.

This conception of a free press, of course, is not that entertained by fascists and communists. Both of these followers of totalitarian ideology consider the press as an instrument for the carrying out of their particular ideologies, to report only that which serves their ends and to slant editorial opinion accordingly.

Here in America the ideal of a free press has been uppermost since the days of Thomas Jefferson. Its basis has been the idea that by informing the people of the true facts involved, they will sooner and better draw the true and logical conclusions and their resultant acts will thereby be just and of benefit to the common welfare. This idealistic policy is daily implemented by our American press in its reportage of what goes on in our life. Of course, there are exceptions, but that is to be expected in a land of freedom and democracy. A good deal of those exceptions occur in relations to events happening in Eastern Europe, but here on the whole it is not so much a matter of willfulness but more of ignorance or scant knowledge among the run-of-the-mill journalists of the true East European situation.

This casual acquaintance of our journalists with the East European situation makes them very susceptible to the blandishments of official Soviet propaganda, which from years of practice is very ingratiating, likeable, simple, easy to believe, but, on the whole—based on falsehoods and distortions. What is the result? Simply that our press correspondents and radio commentators quite often and involuntarily serve as tools of Moscow propaganda. And who suffers as a result? The answer is—truth

and justice, and with it all the peoples whom the Soviets have absorbed within their empire and whose strivings to regain their national independence the Soviets suppress internally and distort and malign externally, that is to the outside world, including our country.

Of these peoples the Ukrainians are by far the largest and the most militant in their fight for freedom. Consequently the edge of Moscow propaganda is directed against them. Ordinarily, we feel, this edge would be blunted against the hard rock of American common sense and fair play. But Russia today is a powerful and an incalculable factor in world politics. So most everyone is careful not to step on her toes too hard. Consequently, the untruths she spreads about the Ukrainians and their centuries-old struggle for national freedom are usually accepted; no doubt, with misgivings and sharp pangs of conscience, but still they accepted and inevitably find themselves on the pages of our American press.

Thus not only is the Ukrainian independence movement misrepresented and maligned in this country, but the story of the heroic Ukrainian resistance against both the Nazis and the Communists during the war, and the saga of their national and religious persecution by the Soviets today, are well nigh completely ignored or distorted by the American press under the influence of Kremlin propagandists and their agents in this country.

The same applies to the Ukrainian displaced persons in Central and Western Europe. Although they are the most numerous of all the DPs, and although in most respects their plight is the worst of them all, still because the Soviets regard them as enemies of their totalitarian regime and anti-Ukrainian policies the untruths the Reds spread about them gain credence among American and other journalists. As a result, very little is done to alleviate their plight. What is worse, not much is known about the attempts of the Soviets to forcibly repatriate these Ukrainian DPs, so as to settle accounts with them in their usual summary and brutal fashion because of their pro-free-Ukraine sentiments.

A striking example of the general susceptibility here to Red propaganda was the recent publication on the pages of the New York Herald Tribune of a dispatch from Washington by J. C. Metcalfe entitled: "Pro-Nazi Ukrainian Seek Funds to Bring Storm Troopers to U. S."

In it Mr. Metcalfe departs completely from the truth. Taking as his subject the current efforts of Americans of Ukrainian descent to provide relief in form of food and clothing for Ukrainian displaced persons in

Europe and to further help prevent them from being forcibly repatriated by the Soviets, Mr. Metcalfe in this dispatch distorts the whole picture completely and makes it appear that what he says in the headline is true, when actually it is a lie. In fact his whole dispatch abounds with untruths and distortions, from beginning to end.

Aside from the extremely pro-Communist line of the dispatch by Mr. Metcalfe, what is truly disturbing here is not so much what he wrote as the fact that the Herald Tribune published this dispatch and after refused to publish either of the two replies to it, one dispatched by the President of The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and the other by the Editor of this journal, the latter who lived in Ukraine until August 1939 and is obviously familiar with political situation of the country.

Is this in accordance with the principles of free press? Certainly not, especially since serious accusations are involved here, and, what is more, when these accusations are patently false and misleading, so very similar to unprincipled Red propaganda. The mentioned article in N. Y. Herald Tribune has as its object to discredit even purely humanitarian efforts of Americans of Ukrainian descent to help one's kinsmen in Europe, who are far from their native land, forced to dwell amidst squalor and suffering, lacking food and clothing, and, above all, constantly faced with the threat that they may be forced to return to their native land under Soviet rule and there because of the anti-totalitarian feelings be persecuted, or banished to barren Siberian wastes, or executed outright.

Surely the spirit of the American free press will allow the cries of these unfortunates to be heard. Surely, when they and those who try to help them are attacked and vilified, the least a daily like the Herald Tribune can do is to give them a little space to defend themselves. That is real meaning of the free press.



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET REFUGEES

By PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

MORE and more the newspapers published in the United States in the languages of those lands that have been occupied or absorbed by the Soviet Union are being filled with articles on the sad position of their kinsmen who are threatened with compulsory return to the Soviets. To a less degree the great organs of the English language press are beginning to notice this problem but it has not yet received the prominence that it deserves for it is a concrete indication of the nature of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the democracies of Western Europe and America. On the solution of this depends the entire course of world events during the next quarter of a century and the nature of the coming civilization. It is too serious to pass over in silence or to treat as a temporary but unpleasant phenomenon.

All thinking people recognize to-day that the relation between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world is one of the most crucial questions that confront humanity. Yet in all too many cases the problem is viewed superficially without any attempt to trace it to its roots and to realize all that is involved in it, for it is no mere divergence in externals but a result of contrasting philosophies of life.

The jubilation over the ending of the Second World War and the prospect that mankind can return to the paths of peace leads men everywhere to turn away from problems that threaten to cast dark shadows over the future. The hope for a world organization that can prevent such holocausts as that of the last years is so strong and desirable, so necessary of fulfilment that it does not seem right to be critical of details or to pay attention to obstacles in its path.

So it was in 1918. With the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, men everywhere echoed their thanks that the war was over and a new period of history had commenced. They did not realize or care to know that in Eastern Europe, fighting was not over. The struggle of Ukraine and the other nationalities in the Russian Empire for political independence and self-determination seemed very remote and unimportant and meanwhile the cities and

villages of Eastern Europe were being devastated. Fighting was going on, human lives were being sacrificed and a large part of a continent was in confusion. Over the fields of Ukraine armies were marching and fighting as Ukrainian patriots, Poles seeking for the restoration of a great Poland. White Russians seeking to maintain the boundaries of the Russian empire, and Communist Russia aiming to create a Communist world locked in conflict. The price to the area in blood and devastation was enormous but there were few to foresee that the cost to the world of this failure to establish democratic governments in eastern Europe would be even greater.

For twenty years statesmen played with the League of Nations and tried in one way or another to make it universal and to bring Germany and the Soviet Union into its membership. They finally succeeded but only by turning the institution into something weak and helpless. When we think of the many conferences designed to keep Germany and the Soviet Union from uniting, we can see how the failure to establish a proper democratic order in the East sowed the seeds for the revival of German military power and prepared the way for the Second World War and the rise of Soviet imperialism. It may be doctrinaire and academic now to discuss whether American isolationism or general idealism were the more responsible for the terrible debacle caused by the rise of Fascism and Nazism but it is obvious that the existence of an independent Ukraine as one of a chain of democratic nations brought together to cooperate for world peace would have saved the world millions of lives and infinite treasure.

This is the more certain when we reflect that not a single country on the borders of the Soviet paradise during twenty years voted to join the new system of organization. Even the small Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were able to maintain their independence and to check the many Communist intrigues and putsches until the time when the big powers had allowed the reorganization of Nazi Germany and its rapprochement with the Soviets. Everywhere from the Arctic Ocean to the Chinese border, experience had been the same. There had been developed national democratic governments which were functioning with increasing success against odds. Then came foreign interference, the calling of Soviet troops by a determined minority and the recognition of this invasion as the free exercise of democracy in order to avoid an international crisis. By the time the League of Nations, weakened by its efforts to tolerate

Italian conquest in Ethiopia, Japanese aggression in China, and Nazi advances in Europe, dared to take steps against the Soviet for its attack on Finland and its seizure of the Baltic states, it was too late. Germany and the Soviet had come to a temporary agreement, that called for division of Poland and the other lands between the two great powers.

There is no need to recount in detail what Ukraine suffered during these years. There was the period of so-called Ukrainization when the Communist authorities seemed to be winning the favor of the population by encouraging or at least not suppressing local sentiment. Then as the regime felt itself stronger, there began the process whereby the leading Ukrainians were denounced as nationalists. There came the collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture, the deliberate starvation of millions of the population and the deportation of millions more to Siberia. The Kremlin was well on its way to creating a purely communists Russian culture which would be Ukrainian only in language. In all the languages of the Soviet family there would be sung only the praises of Stalin and the slogans authorized by Moscow. Purges and political trials were the order of the day. A veil of secrecy was thrown over the country and the amount of available information was steadily reduced for the outside world.

Yet the few rumors that leaked across the firmly closed borders were not of a kind that satisfied the neighboring lands. Even in their struggle to oppose the demands of Nazi Germany, no one thought of turning for assistance to the Soviets. The people of Western Ukraine in their opposition to Poland did not dream of turning to the east, where so many of their leaders had vanished during the preceding years. The Baltic states and Finland were as suspicious of the one side as of the other. Everyone felt that there was a storm lurking just beyond the horizon and all were darkly apprehensive.

Communism won its greatest successes not among its neighbors but among populations far removed from its practices. There it could play with the word democracy and persuade various leftist and other groups that it would join with them in a united front against Fascism. It hoped to destroy the democratic traditions by infiltration, by giving new names to old things and by appearing under new guises. It succeeded in deceiving many well-disposed people by talking of economic democracy as opposed to and supplementing political democracy and all the time its leaders were flirting with the

Nazi leaders and preparing for the next step. In Soviet literature whether in Russian or Ukrainian there emerges the constant identification of Pilsudski and the Poles who fought for Polish independence, of Petlura and all who fought for Ukrainian independence, and of Denikin and the White Russians as the avowed enemy of the Soviet fatherland, and the vocabulary was forged for the appeal to the West.

The alliance between Hitler and Stalin in 1939 was the prelude to the Nazi attack upon Poland and the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic states and its attack on Finland. The western communists denounced the interference of England and France as an imperialistic war. They bemoaned the judgement of the Soviet Union by the dying League of Nations. They opposed aid to victims of Soviet aggression.

Yet in the territory liberated by the Soviets, there began without delay the same process that had gone on in Soviet Ukraine. There came the deportation of the leaders, the confiscation of property, the crushing of the capitalistic and small landowning class. The same reign of terror that had existed for more than a decade on Soviet territory was introduced into the newly acquired lands who in the same conventional way voted almost unanimously to be included in the Soviet family of nations. The ultimatums of 1939 had merely called for Soviet bases in the Baltic. The occupation by these forces in 1940 turned loose the fury of Communist rule. Thousands and hundreds of thousands of Western Ukrainians, Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians disappeared into the "democratic" realm of the Soviet Union while even the few vestiges of civilized society as maintained by the Red Cross and its services were cut off.

In 1941 with startling suddenness, the Nazis turned on their erstwhile collaborators and invaded the Soviet Union. Especially in Lithuania there came a revolt of the democratic and anti-Soviet elements. Had Hitler wished to liberate the oppressed populations, he could have found help and support on a wide scale. He did not want allies but slaves and once again the flames of war spread over the unfortunate lands. Once more there was the rounding up of the populations of Europe and their removal to the West.

This gave an unparalleled opportunity to the rulers of the Kremlin. The Western world welcomed the aid of the Soviet forces exactly as they had the help of the Russian Imperial Army in 1914. Under the stress of the German occupation and the assaults of the Japanese, the United States and the British were grateful for Soviet assistance

and they willingly supplied the Soviet forces with arms and equipment under lend-lease agreements. Under the pressure of war, the Soviets might sign the Atlantic Charter and the declarations as to the Four Freedoms and under the pressure of war the Western nations could overlook Soviet denials of these to their population. There was always the excuse of military necessity and the possibility that criticism of the policies of Moscow would be abetted by Fascist spies and agents. Moscow had a free hand for stressing its own theories of democracy, for slurring over the differences between the ideals of liberty as worked out for centuries and millenia and the rigid control of all details of life by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party and it seemed tactless and unpatriotic to ask too many questions.

Yet as the German tide began to ebb, it became evident that the old questions would sooner or later be reopened. It soon became clear that Moscow was not to be satisfied with the Governments-in-exile, although they had been maintained in the hope of having some form of administration for the territories occupied by Germany and for some system of training armies to aid the Allies. As always Moscow went on its own way, maintained its own policies and sought its own Communist-Russian advantage, even to the point of entering the war against Japan in the last days of the struggle.

It was against this background that there broke out in eastern Europe the desperate struggle of many Ukrainian bands against both the Soviets and the Nazis, which has been so carefully veiled by censorship. There came the uprising in Warsaw which found no support from the Soviet troops across the Vistula because it had not been led by people under Soviet leadership. There came the entire series of actions by no means honorable which have created the present situation in the Balkans. There came the flight before the Red Armies of thousands of persons to the West, for they preferred to take their chances in Germany, at least part of which would be occupied by Western troops, to meeting a certain fate if they were returned to Soviet controlled areas.

For five years the Nazis had been systematically moving the population of Europe around to secure man-power and to remove the possibility of revolts by the oppressed and conquered people. It was only natural that the various meetings of the leaders of the Great Powers should consider ways and means of returning these people to their homes. The French wanted to return to France, the Norwegians to Norway, the Dutch to Holland, the Italians to Italy. As to

that there was no dispute and the agreements were signed providing for the return of populations. Naturally citizens of the Soviet Union should be returned, for there was maintained the theory that there was no essential difference between the ideas of democracy of the nations that had combined against Fascism.

Then there came the revelation of the fact that thousands and hundreds of thousands of persons who had fled before the Red Army or had been removed from the Soviet Union by the Germans had no desire to return to their former homes. It came as a surprise to many people who either did not know or want to remember the conditions that had prevailed in 1939. The Poles who had been deported by the Soviets and had then been allowed to form a Polish army in 1941 and fight through the War in the West refused to return to a Soviet dominated government while at the same time their comrades and representatives from the underground were being tried for opposition to the Red Army. Men and women from the Baltic states who had seen their homes confiscated by the Soviet authorities in 1940 had no desire to go home to Soviet Republics, even at the time when the United States had still not recognized the Soviet aggression of 1940.

The Ukrainians were in an even worse situation. They had lacked before the War an independent government but they had been well trained in the meaning of Soviet rule for two decades in eastern Ukraine and they had seen what to expect after 1939, when Western Ukraine was seized and communized. The Greek Catholics knew what to expect. The Ukrainian Orthodox knew the attitude of the Patriarch of Moscow toward them and their attempts at organization. They realized the shift between a series of Communist republics and the new all-embracing Soviet family of peoples with its glorification of all the Great Russian conquerors.

It is small wonder that many committed suicide. Others tried to hide or to escape from the refugee camps where they ran the risk of being compelled to return under Soviet domination. There were many disgraceful stories of attempts made by American officers to carry through by force the orders to hand over some of these people to the Soviet collectors and finally General Eisenhower issued an order that no one was to be returned against his will.

So far, so good, for any other order or solution would have been contrary to all the traditions of the United States during its long history. Any other order would have brought disgrace upon the

United States as a champion of freedom and the oppressed. It is still not enough, for there is evidence that the same process is continuing not only in the American zone of occupation but it is also a widespread practice in those liberated countries where the new governments are trying to secure the favor of Moscow, even while they are looking to the United States for help in reestablishing themselves.

This rule for deportation to the Soviet Union is being applied not only to persons who made their escape before the Red Armies or were taken prisoner by the Germans but to many who escaped even as far back as 1918 and have lived for twenty years under the rule of other countries, have become citizens of them and have fulfilled their obligations to them both in peace and war. They too are passing behind that impenetrable veil that already hides a large part of Europe and Asia.

It fits in well with the general Soviet policy of refusing permission to its citizens to travel abroad and of restricting severely the right of peaceful citizens of other countries to travel freely where they wish in the Soviet Union. It fits in with the rigid censorship of all dispatches from the Soviet Union and explains the general lack of accurate information about what is going on. It fits in with the general obstacles put in the way of official relations on other than the most formal levels.

There has been a widespread hope among the American people that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies would somehow prove a turning point in Soviet development. Every sign of response, no matter how slight, has been emphasized again and again as a token that this agreement was on its way. The newspapers as a whole have avoided any criticism of the Soviets that might arouse suspicion on their part. It was therefore the more surprising to the great masses of the American people when the Conference in London broke up without solving many of the important questions that were to be discussed.

There was however no element of surprise in it for any one who had carefully read even those extracts from the Soviet government press that had been published in the United States. There has never been the slightest hint that the Soviet Union was even considering any recognition of a relaxation of its iron rule or giving any weight to the Western doctrines of political democracy that includes and justifies the liberties which we enjoy as a matter of course.

Quite on the contrary, the latest speech of Molotov on the Soviet

Union and its policies since the ending of the War bears out as forcibly as possible the differences between democracy as the Soviet Union understands it and as the rest of the world regards it. In one case it means the absolute domination of the Communist Party, the voting for a single candidate nominated by higher authority and the confidence that the group at the top are alone able to put into words and practice the inchoate wishes of the masses and the firm rule that all who disagree can only be capitalists or Fascist or whatever is the favorite word of denunciation at the moment. On the other it means liberty as it has been worked out during the long development of Western civilization.

From this point of view the position of the refugees is again important. The vast majority of these people had first-hand knowledge of Soviet methods. They had also gone through the cruel treatment of the German slave drivers and torturers and the German prison camps. If even then the impression made upon them by their former experiences was such that they in many cases chose suicide to return, it is a strong evidence of the conditions which they had left.

It is ridiculous to assume that they had all been so indoctrinated with the Nazi ideology that they had forgotten their own happy lot in the past and preferred to serve as anti-Soviet propagandists. It is equally preposterous to assume that they formed a select group taken out of their own environment. It is far safer to believe that they represent the sentiments of their own groups and are perhaps less extreme than were the millions who have disappeared behind the veil.

If this is so, even in the slightest degree, it casts a dark shadow upon the future of humanity. American policy has been trying by all means in its power to advance human freedom throughout the world and to put an end to the forced domination of man by man. It has tried consistently to stand for the end of spheres of influence, for the right of each nation to govern itself. In the celebrated documents which heralded American entrance into the Second World War, the United States opposed direct and indirect conquest. Again and again it has interfered for humanitarian reasons to alleviate the fate of unfortunate classes of people. It has worked steadily for a free world to be inhabited by free peoples.

To-day the world is again at a cross road. Despite the serious efforts of the diplomats and representatives of the free nations to make concessions to the Soviet Union in the hope that there may be given some alternative to the old order, there is growing a definite

impasse that becomes more striking with each new development. It is becoming more and more obvious that there are two definite philosophies in the world, two opposing views of human rights and obligations and that these two must be taken into account in any attempt to reorganize the world into one consistent whole.

There is one thing certain. Ignorance is the one hope of carrying out this plan and all steps to enlighten the American people will lead them more and more resolutely to question the good new world which is in the making. In the long run public opinion in the United States will not stand for the playing on words which will be necessary to organize the United Nations in line with Soviet policy. Sooner or later the American people will react against the new democracy which refuses to grant personal liberty or the right of independent judgement. Sooner or later, without regard to views on liberalism, or conservatism, or radicalism, the American people will come to understand that the world is divided into two philosophies of life, two political blocks, and that the ideals which have been taught in this country and espoused by the millions of immigrants and their descendants do not form the main part of the world organization which alone can guarantee security against war and destruction. When that time of realization comes, it will be the signal for the holocaust of World War Three.

At the time when American sentiment was all too slowly being aroused over the aggressions of Hitler and his Nazis and it was becoming realized that the continued satisfying of the ever increasing demands of the Führer was but a form of continual appeasement, no one would have dreamed that the ending of the war would have produced anything of the kind that is happening. No one of the American representatives at Teheran, Yalta, or Potsdam, had they realized for a single instant the import of their words, would have consented to the agreements in the sense that they are now interpreted. No one would have failed to be appalled at the abyss which is opening before humanity.

That abyss can be most clearly seen in the light of the displaced persons and the refugees and the dilemma that it presents to the world seems almost insolvable. On the one hand there is the question of the future care of these people. There is the problem of resettlement for them in lands and under conditions where they can become again valuable members of society. That is itself a task of gigantic magnitude.

It is the smallest part of the problem. In many cases, perhaps a majority, when these people were forced from their homes into German slavery, they left behind them their families, their children, their wives and their parents. These now are in the Soviet Union. In some cases they have been punished for the refusal of the refugees to return. It is highly unlikely that the Soviet government will give them permission to leave, even emptyhanded, to rejoin their families, abroad at a time when the Soviet authorities are trying to induce in every way all who have left their lands to return.

Despite the efforts of Soviet sympathizers to prove that all these people are Fascist and that all anti-Communists are Fascist, the refugees are an uncomfortable demonstration to the world that all is not well within the Soviet Union. They are a living demonstration abroad of all the arguments that have been advanced by the Ukrainians who have been striving to bring their cause to the attention of the civilized peoples of the world. They are a proof of the statements of the diplomatic representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and of the few people from those countries that succeeded in making their escape to Sweden and elsewhere. They support all the statements made by representatives of all those countries which have had Communists and near-Communist governments inflicted upon them by the Red Army. They justify the criticisms of the new form of Pan-Slavism dominated by Moscow. They make plausible the seemingly fantastic stories of labor camps and of deportations that have come out of Moscow.

Finally they show humanity that the task of building a world organization, necessary as it is, is not one to be accomplished merely by the signing of a few general platitudes as to the need of liberty and democracy without definitely specifying what those words are to imply. They dispel the often held notion that all the nations of the world are agreed as to the meaning of a good life and that all the governments are striving toward the same general goal. They show the gulf that exists and that is steadily growing deeper between conflicting ideologies.

All men everywhere are agreed that the horrors of the past years must not happen again and that all men must be brought together or perish. Yet the world could not exist half-Nazi and half democratic. Sooner or later a clash was bound to come, and it came in 1939, despite the efforts of appeasers and of Quislings. The scientists who plead that the secrets of the atomic bomb be handed over to

a world organization to save humanity from destruction, the idealists who talk about the humane significance of a world organization, the diplomats and statesmen who fashion boundaries and sign treaties are all dealing with something important but superficial. The real problem lies in the situation that has driven millions of poor and starving people to refuse to go back to their homes lest something worse than death await them. They plead the need of a world organization in commanding tones but they emphasize also the difficulties in its way. They reveal to an unwilling world that would gladly be busied with something else the difficulties that must be faced before the new order can be applied. They show what the new order must contain and they make clear the nature of the fundamental dispute between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies. They emphasize that the endeavor to create just living conditions for the world is not merely a form of perfectionism intended to delay action for the sake of obstructionists and that the real obstructionists are those who use slogans and who pervert the meaning of words so as to deny to men all those rights which have been fought for and cherished for thousands of years. All Americans should think carefully about the problem that they offer and they should realize that just as it was the failure to secure peace and liberty for the peoples of eastern Europe in 1918 that sowed the seed for the disaster of 1939, so failure now to stand for the principles in which they have always believed will set in motion the forces that will create a third holocaust in less than twenty-five years. If the Soviet Union really desires peace, its inclusion of Ukraine and of White Russia in the United Nations can easily be the stepping stone to a new system in Europe that will afford it but if it is to insist on its present policy of a purely Russian Communist culture as the only form that is not Fascist in essence, then the democratic nations must draw their own conclusions in time and not jeopardize all that has been gained throughout the centuries. That is the significance of the displaced persons who refuse to return home and why they pose a larger problem than that of giving food and shelter and clothing to more than a million unfortunate victims of a world catastrophe.

SCIENCE UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM

By SCIENTIFICUS

SCIENCE is the mainspring of modern civilization. It has achieved this dominant position because it is concerned with the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Moreover, scientific truths do not remain merely as pronouncements made by great scientists but they are checked and rechecked in the laboratories of the world with the utmost precision which human skill can devise. To test the soundness of the scientific method one need but recall the advent of machines that calculate with human-like intelligence but with greater accuracy and rapidity; penicillin, the wonder drug of medical science; radio; machines that fly; anesthetics and a host of other modern wonders which have become commonplace in our day.

In order that science may flourish, however, the scientist must be conceded leadership in the field in which he is a specialist. For example, although it would be highly convenient to unscrupulous book-keepers if 2 and 2 were 5 the fact remains that it is 4. Similarly, it would simplify the teaching of arithmetic in schools if π , the ratio of the circumference of the circle to its diameter, were an even 3 nevertheless we must take it on the authority of mathematicians that it is 3.1416 . . . Regardless of the fact that it would be of infinite value to invent a perpetual motion machine, science does not seriously entertain such a possibility. Again, whether one likes Archimedes or not it is still true that a floating body displaces its own weight of water. And finally, all these things are true regardless of the teachings of the Short Course of the History of the Communist Party in Russia.

What has just been said must appear obvious and seemingly pointless to any thinking reader. That is certainly so in those countries where the democratic concept of life is the basis of thought and action. But it is not entirely so in countries where statism is supreme and science is made subservient to the dictates of a political creed.

A striking example of what can happen when science becomes subservient to the whims of political authority is well illustrated in the writings of Dr. Michael Polanyi. Dr. Polanyi is professor of physical chemistry at Victoria University, Manchester, England. He is the author

of several books and is a leader of a school of thought advocating the freedom of science in contrast to another school which advocates government planning.

An article by Dr. Palonyi entitled *The Autonomy of Science* originally appeared in volume 85 of *Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society*, session 1941-43. It was reprinted in the February 1945 issue of the *Scientific Monthly*. With the permission of the author we reprint portions of this article dealing with science in the U.S.S.R. Since the text is of a scientific nature it was thought desirable to annotate where necessary in order to make article more intelligible to the general public.

The attempts of the Soviet Government to start a new kind of science are on an altogether different level.¹ They represent a genuine effort to run science for the public good² and they provide therefore a proper test of the principles involved in such an attempt.

We will illustrate the process and its results by the example of genetics³ and plant breeding, to which governmental direction has been applied with particular energy. The intervention of the state in these fields began about the year 1930 and was definitely established by the All Union Conference on Planning of Genetics and Selection held in Leningrad in 1932. Up to that time genetics had developed and flourished in Russia as a free science, guided by the standards that were recognized in other countries, throughout the scientific world. The Conference of 1932 decided that genetics and plant breeding should henceforth be conducted with a view to obtaining immediate practical results and on lines conforming to the official doctrine of dialectical materialism, research being directed by the State.

No sooner had these blows been delivered against the authority of science than the inevitable consequences set in. Any person claiming a discovery in genetics and plant-breeding could henceforth appeal directly over the heads of scientists to gullible practitioners or to politically minded officials. Spurious observations and fallacious theories advanced by dilettantes, cranks and impostors could now gain currency, unchecked by scientific criticism.

¹ The author is making a comparison with science in National Socialist Germany.

² Note that Dr. Polanyi is sympathetic and not biased against the Soviet Government.

³ The science of genetics is that branch of biology which is concerned with the study of heredity and variation.

An important case of this kind was that of I. V. Michourin, (1855-1935) a plant breeding farmer, who some years earlier had announced the discovery of new strains of plants produced by grafting.⁴ He claimed to have made revolutionary improvements in agriculture, and to have obtained a striking confirmation of dialectical materialism. The opinion of science on the contrary was—and still remains—that Michourin's observations were mere illusions, that they referred to a spurious phenomenon known by the name of "vegetative hybridization" which had been frequently described before. The illusion can arise from an incomplete statistical analysis of the results obtained and may be occasionally supported also by the fact that viruses⁵ are transmitted to the graft and its offsprings. The occurrence of true hybridization by grafting would be incompatible with the very foundations of modern biological science and its existence has been discredited by the formulation of Mendel's laws⁶ and the discoveries of cytogeneticists.

The denial of Michourin's claims by scientific opinion now lost its force. His work appealed to the practitioner and it conformed to the philosophy imposed by the State. It thus fulfilled both the criteria which had replaced the standards of science. Hence—inevitably—Michourin's work was now given official recognition. The Government, in its enthusiasm over this first fruit of its new policy in science, went even further and erected a monument of unparalleled splendour to Michourin. It renamed the town of Koslov and called it "Michourinsk" (1932).

The breach thus made in the autonomy of science laid the field of genetics and plant-breeding wide open to further invasion by spurious claims. The leader of this invasion became T. D. Lysenko—a successful worker in agricultural technique—who expanded Michourin's claims into a new theory of heredity which he opposed to Mendelism and cytogenetics. His popular influence caused hundreds of people without proper scientific training, such as farmers and young students of agriculture, to attempt grafting experiments with the aim of producing "vegetative hybrids." Lysenko has himself described proudly how by the labours of this mass movement vegetative hybrids "poured out like the fruits from the horn of abundance." Aided by a claim of this kind, Lysenko gained high recognition for himself by the Government. He

⁴ Grafting is a well known practice in horticulture in which a piece of one plant is inserted into a stem, root or branch of another plant so that a permanent union is effected.

⁵ Viruses are substances which give rise to certain diseases in plants and animals.

⁶ Mendel's laws are laws observed in the inheritance of many characters in plants and animals. They were discovered by Gregor J. Mendel (1822-1884), an Austrian Augustinian abbot in breeding experiments with peas. These laws form the basis of the science of genetics.

was appointed a member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and made President of the Academy of Agricultural Science of the U. S. S. R. By 1939 his influence had reached the point where he could induce the Commissariat of Agriculture to prohibit the methods hitherto used in plant breeding stations and to compel the introduction of new ones that were based on his own doctrine of heredity and that were contrary to accepted scientific opinion. In a publication of the same year he even went so far as to demand the final elimination of his scientific opponents, by the total abolition of genetics in Russia: "In my opinion"—he wrote—"it is quite time to remove Mendelism entirely from university courses and from the theoretical and practical guidance of seed-raising."

However the Government hesitated to take the decisive step and a conference was called to clarify the situation. The Editors of the Journal "Under the Banner of Marxism" acted as conveners, and the proceedings, together with an extensive editorial commentary, were subsequently published in that Journal. The reports of this Conference form impressive evidence of the rapid and radical destruction of a branch of science, caused clearly by the fact that the conduct of research had been placed under the direction of the State. We may note that the government in this case was a particularly progressive one and that it was aiming at solid reasonable benefits for its own people. It is all the more significant that in spite of this, the result of its action was only to plunge the science of genetics into a morass of corruption and confusion.

The Conference, which revealed these conditions to the outside observer was presided over by M. B. Mitin (a person unknown to international science and probably a representative of the Journal), who in his opening speech outlined once again what were the practical and theoretical principles to which science must conform under the direction of the Soviet State. "We have no gulf between theory and practice, we have no Chinese wall between scientific achievements and practical activity. Every genuine discovery, every genuine scientific achievement is with us translated into practice, enters into the life of hundreds of institutions, attracts the attention of the mass of people by its fruitful results. Soviet biologists, geneticists and selectionists must understand dialectic and historic materialism, and learn to apply the dialectic method to their scientific work. Verbal, formal acceptance of dialectic materialism is not wanted."

Academician N. I. Vavilov, internationally recognized as the most eminent geneticist in Russia (as shown by his recent election as a

Foreign Member of the Royal Society)⁷ put the case for the science of genetics. He surveyed the development of this science from its inception and pointed out that not a single author of repute anywhere outside Russia would either doubt the soundness of cytogenetics, or would be prepared to accept the existence of so-called "vegetative hybrids."

Such appeals had now become groundless; with the establishment of State supremacy over science, the authority of international scientific opinion had been rendered void. Vavilov was rightly answered by being confronted with his own declaration made at the Planning Conference of 1932 in which he deprecated the cultivation of science for its own purposes. Yielding at the time perhaps to pressure, or believing it wise to meet popular tendencies half way, little expecting in any case the far reaching consequences to follow from his relinquishment of principles he said: "The divorce of genetics from practical selection, which characterises the research work of the U.S.A., England and other countries must be resolutely removed from genetics-selection research in the U.S.S.R."

Such principles having now been generally accepted, Vavilov could raise no legitimate objection if the classical experiments to which he referred, and on which his branch of science was based, were laughed to scorn by men like the practical plant breeder V. K. Morozov—who addressed the meeting as follows: "The representatives of formal genetics say that they get good 3:1 ratio results with *Drosophila*.⁸ Their work with this object is very profitable to them, because the affair, as one might say, is irresponsible—if the flies die, they are not penalized." In Morozov's opinion a science which in 20 years had produced no important practical results at his plant breeding station, could not possibly be sound.

This view can in fact be considered as a correct conclusion from the criteria of science now officially accepted (though fortunately by no means universally enforced) in the Soviet Union. If all the evidence drawn from practically unimportant cases is to be disregarded or at least treated lightly, then little proof can remain in support of the theories of genetics. In such circumstances any simple, plausible ideas such as the fallacies advocated by Lysenko must inevitably acquire the greater convincing power and gain the wider support among all non-

⁷ Of Great Britain.

⁸ *Drosophila* is a zoological name of a genus of flies to which the common fruit fly belongs. The fruit fly or *Drosophila melanogaster* has been extensively used in breeding experiments to study the inheritance of characters and the mechanism of heredity.

specialists, whether practitioners or ordinary laymen. This is in fact what the Conference on Genetics demonstrated. Morozov could assure Lysenko that nearly all practical field workers, agronomists and collective farmers had become followers of his doctrine of heredity.

The authority of science having been replaced by that of the State, it was also logical that political arguments should be used against Vavilov's traditional scientific reasoning. Lysenko for example introduced such arguments as follows: "N. I. Vavilov knows that one cannot defend Mendelism before Soviet readers by writing down its foundation, by recounting what it consists of. It has become particularly impossible nowadays when millions of people possess such a mighty theoretical weapon as 'The short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevists)'. When he grasps Bolshevism the reader will not be able to give sympathy to metaphysics, and Mendelism definitely is pure, undisguised metaphysics."

It was logical again that Lysenko and his adherents should invoke Michourin as an authority whose claims had been established by the State; that Lysenko should speak of "that genius of biology I. V. Michourin, recognized by the Party and the Government and by the country . . ." and declare that it is "false and conceited" on the part of a biologist to think that he could add anything to Michourin's teaching.

In such circumstances there seems indeed nothing left to the hard pressed scientists but to attempt a defence in the same terms as used by their opponents. This is what the eminent geneticist Professor N. P. Doubin apparently decided to do at the Conference on Genetics. His speech in defense of cynogenetics refers freely to Marx, Engels and the "Short Course of the History of the Communist Party." He reverently mentions Michourin, naming him as a classic next to Darwin. But in his view—as he explains—all these high authorities are directly or indirectly supporting Mendelism. "It is quite wrong," he says, "to describe Mendelism by saying that its appearance represents a product of the imperialist development of capitalist society. Of course after its appearance Mendelism was perverted by bourgeois scientists. We know well that all science is class science."

Such is the last stage in the collapse of science. Attackers and defenders are using the same spurious and often fanciful arguments, to enlist for their own side the support of untutored practitioners and of equally untutored politicians.

But the position of the defenders is hopeless. Science cannot be saved on grounds which contradict its own basic principles. The ambitious and unscrupulous figures who rise to power on the tide of a movement against science, do not withdraw when scientists make their last abject surrender. On the contrary they stay to complete their triumph by directing against their yielding opponents the charge of insincerity. Thus Lysenko says, "The Mendelian geneticists keep silent about their own radical disagreement with the theory of development, with the teaching of Michourin," and even more jeeringly is the same taunt made by Lysenko's assistant Professor I. I. Present: "It is new to find that all of them, some more sincerely than others, all of them try to give the impression that with Michourin at least they have no quarrel."

Such taunts are unanswerable and their implications are shattering. They make it clear that scientists must never hope to save their scientific pursuits by creeping under the cloak of essentially anti-scientific principles. "Verbal, formal acceptance of these principles"—the Chairman had sternly warned—"is not wanted."

The demonstration given here of the corruption of a branch of science caused by placing its pursuit under the direction of the State, is, I think, complete. The more so—I wish to repeat—as there is no doubt at all about the unwavering desire of the Soviet Government to advance the progress of science. It has spent large sums on laboratories, on equipment, and on personnel. Yet these subsidies, as we have seen, benefited science only so long as they flowed into channels controlled by independent scientific opinion whereas as soon as their allocation was accompanied by attempts at establishing governmental direction they exercised a violently destructive influence.

We may hope and expect that some day the Soviet Government will recognize the error in such attempts, that they will realize for example that their plantbreeding stations are operating on lines which were abandoned as fallacious in the rest of the world about forty years ago.

What can a government do when it realizes such a state of affairs? What course can it take to restore the functions of science?

According to our analysis the answer cannot be in doubt. One thing only is necessary—but that is truly indispensable. It is only necessary to restore the independence of scientific standards in respect to all

their proper functions, in the selection of papers for publication, in the selection of candidates for scientific posts, in the granting of scientific distinctions and in the award of special research subsidies. To restore to scientific opinion the power to control by its influence the publication of text books and popularizations of science granting of scientific distinctions and in the award of special research subsidies. To restore to scientific opinion the power to control by its influence the publication of text books and popularizations of science as well as the teaching of science in universities and schools. To restore to it above all the power to protect that most precious foothold of originality, that landing ground of all new ideas, the position of the independent scientist—who must again become the sole master of his own research work.

Ottawa, Canada.



AUTUMN LEAVES ARE FALLING

By ANATOLE KURDYDYK

Translated by STEPHEN SHUMEYKO

THEY took him away, her Stephen, two such dirty Reds, with sharp steel on their carbines—and she pitter-pattered after them without even a tear.

Pittered-pattered, with doddering ancient feet through the village and the fields (the frost was already settling down on the road), her shawl askew and her hair damp with perspiration sticking to her head. Under her arm a little bundle: a shirt and a piece of bread—for him. Her heart heavy with fear.

On and on, after them, without e'en a tear.

In the early morn they had quit the village, and now at noon they were already in the city.

They led him inside a large gate. It clanged shut after him. A heavy blow on the chest with the butt end of a carbine sent her reeling to the ground.

—Beat it! . . .

She glanced up—a heavy bearded face, with not a trace of mercy in it. She cringed, just like a dog driven away from home, her eyes fastened to this gate that had swallowed her son.

While from the chestnut tree nearby leaves fluttered down and down . . .

She limped over to the steps opposite the gate and sat down, her head in a whirl. The city was deathly still (for *they* had come yesterday) —and yet how familiar it was.

How many times had she hurried here from the village when her son worked as an apprentice here. She flew to him then, young, happy, for she could not be without him for long. In her bosom—money, and in a little package she bore—apples, red, like blood . . .

But now, opposite her, a grey wall, tall, forbidding, with black windows. A dreadful wall . . .

Such were her thoughts, creeping like a climbing ivy along a wall, touching every window, reaching to the very roof.

Wait! They will surely free him! Why should they hold him! . . .

Dry leaves rustle on the paved walk. Some fall into her lap. She knows that they signify:

—Autumn . . .

With ancient hands, shriveled, like these leaves, she aimlessly smooths them out before her.

And opposite her the wall and the pacing guard: tramp! tramp! tramp!

Wait! They must free him! . . .

Above the wall, black, ragged clouds scud by. The wind rushes down the street, whirling the leaves before it, whipping her skirt . . .

No! She won't go away! She is waiting for Stephen!

Someone passes by, glances at her. She raises her eyes to his face—and lowers them. He, too, seems to be suffering . . .

Again the street is still. Only she is alive and that one over there, pacing back and forth with the shining bit of steel on his shoulder.

This autumn afternoon is so chilly . . . She draws her shawl closer—while the cold pierces to her very breast . . .

Footsteps again. Someone is being led, just as was her son. The ravenous gate opens, and closes! But no Stephen . . .

The leaves whirl about, rustling, tumbling . . .

Several hours pass by. The gate opens. Voices. The guard is being changed. She looks up. Yes, that's him, the one who brought her son here . . .

And slowly she stretches her foot, rises . . .

Oh! what is it that grips her heart so!

Crack!—from inside the wall. The echo of the shot pierces her heart.

She walks over to him—to this murdering Red . . .

Yes, she will kiss his hand, anything; only she must know, where is her Stephen . . .

She approaches, but he already knows what she wants.

—He is no more, mother. Didn't you hear? . . .

He points towards the wall. She gasps!

The little bundle drops to the ground. She runs to the gate. But he seizes her by the shoulders:

—Beat it!

She tears his hands away, falls to her knees, crying wildly:

—Stephen! . . . Stephen! . . .

But those cursed arms are so powerful, and her age so weakening. They lift her bodily and carry her back to the middle of the street, and drop her there. Her aged body thuds against the pavement.

—Stephen! . . . My son! . . . My baby! . . .

But the cobblestones are deaf, as deaf as those who took him away,

She does not know that her voice is becoming weaker and weaker, that it is all in vain: the stones will not heed her cry.

She raises herself—and feels within her chest a terrifying emptiness. Such an awful void, through which wild winds shriek and groan . . .

She starts unsteadily towards the gate again. But the guard calls out to her.

—Go to the cemetery. He will be there . . .

Without a word, without e'en a tear, she bends and picks up her bundle, that had rolled into the gutter, and goes. Her chest is burning, her walk unsteady, and on her forehead—sweat, cold, like drops of dew . . .

She knows, where the cemetery is. In that direction her tottering footsteps bend . . . Her feet are so heavy, but she goes on. One street is passed, a second, and a third. She sees nothing; nothing matters to her. Only the rustling leaves touch her consciousness. She feels them caressing and kissing her feet.

At last, there it is. Many, many trees . . . Leaves are falling everywhere and the wind is sighing . . .

Entering the gate she looks. A wagon is standing there. Piled high on it are human bodies.

Her feet become leaden. With difficulty she drags herself over to the wall, against which she leans, while in her heart a great burning stone has been suddenly rent asunder!

This stone is so heavy, like the very earth itself. It drags her down. She does not sit—but slumps to the ground . . .

They are taking those bodies off the wagon. Bloody corpses. She looks on with stony eyes:

—No, that one is not mine—not he—not my Stephen . . .

Thud! into the grave! Thud! Thud!

While dusk steals over the cemetery.

And finally she sees him. Just as the others, so they drag him off too. His shirt is white, his head black with congealed blood. And then—thud!

She wants to rise, to flee, to leap in after him—but that stone in her chest is so heavy, she cannot . . .

She wants to cry out—and the stone gets into her throat . . .

So she just whispers, like a child:

—Stephen, Stephen, my ba-by . . .

Autumn leaves are falling on her, rustling. Falling on her dishevelled head, her shoulders, and feet . . .

(Lviw)

THE UKRAINIAN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT

By ROMAN OLESNICKI

THE democratic spirit inherent in the Ukrainian people caused them when confronted with economic exploitation by their political oppressors, to seek ways of relief best suited to their temperament. This relief they soon found in cooperative organization. And the success of the Ukrainians in their cooperative economic enterprises may be attributed to the existence of the following factors: 1) the democratic spirit of the Ukrainians, 2) the absence of a capitalist class among Ukrainians, 3) partial fulfillment of their political aspirations in cooperative organizations.

Since the Ukrainian nation was partitioned among many nations during the time of the development of its cooperative institutions, it is necessary to treat separately the history of each Ukrainian cooperative movement in the various countries, of each of which the Ukrainians were a political part. Thus for the period from the beginnings of the cooperative movement (the 1860's to 1880's) up to the end of World War I, in discussing the Ukrainian cooperative movement in Russia we have in mind Ukrainian ethnographic territories included in the then political boundaries of Russia. The other country ruling Ukrainians up to 1918 was Austria. After 1918 the picture changes, and as Ukraine was partitioned among four States, the Ukrainian cooperative movement has to be treated separately for each of the four countries, i.e. the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. A short historical outline of the Ukrainian cooperative movement will therefore require six separate subdivisions.

1. Tsarist Russia. At the time of the establishment of the first consumers' cooperative by M. Ballin in Kharkiv in 1866 the political oppression of the Ukrainians by the Russians was so intense, that this and other Ukrainian cooperatives did not even dare to call themselves Ukrainian. In spite of their completely nonpolitical character Ukrainian cooperatives or rather cooperatives in Ukraine were not only not encouraged by the Russian administration (as they were on Russian territories) but all possible obstacles were put in the path of their growth and development, so that only about 50 cooperatives were established in Ukraine over a period of almost 40 years. Only after the

1905 revolution, when political oppression slackened and laws giving more autonomy to cooperative enterprises were passed, begins a period of rapid growth of Ukrainian cooperatives, best illustrated by the following figures:

- 1905: number of consumers' cooperatives in all Russia 1080
number of consumers' cooperatives in Ukraine 52
- 1912: number of consumers' cooperatives in all Russia 6700
number of consumers' cooperatives in Ukraine 2437

In drawing conclusions from these figures one must bear in mind the proportion of the population of Ukraine to that of the whole of Russia which may be taken at 30 to 180 million people, or at the ration of 1 to 6. The proportion of the number of cooperatives to the population shows that the Ukrainians developed more than double the number of cooperatives than did the Russians. A similar trend of development is shown regarding the growth of credit or savings cooperatives (Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch systems) in Ukraine and Russia during the same period.

The war years 1914-1917 and the years of Ukrainian independence, 1918-1920 show a remarkable growth of cooperatives in Ukraine. Their total number (consumers' credit, producers', farmers' etc.) reached 7922 in 1917, and over 22,000 with a membership of 6,000,000 at the time when Ukraine was invaded and taken over by the Bolsheviks in 1920. Cooperative associations do exist in the Soviet Union, at least as far as publication of statistics on their growth is concerned. Cooperatives did have a certain measure of autonomy during Lenin's NEP period. After the institution of successive five year plans, however, they were restricted in growth and membership, until finally by a decree of September 29, 1935 all consumers' cooperatives were liquidated and their assets taken over by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Whether these enterprises which the Soviet State calls cooperatives but which are attachments to State factories or State collective farms can be considered as cooperative associations in the true sense of the word can be judged by two yardsticks. The first is the fact of their ultimate ownership by the State, and the second, that to each and every cooperative association there are assigned a few members of the Communist Party whose duty it is to act as "guardians of cooperative democracy in the consumers movement."¹

¹ Quotation from U. S. Department of Labor Bulletin No. 770 of 1944 entitled "Cooperative Associations in Europe."

2. Austria. The Empire of the Hapsburgs held from 1772 until 1918 the Ukrainian territories of Eastern Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine (an administrative part of Hungary) and Bukovina. The total number of Ukrainians in these territories in 1914 approximated 4,500,000; as is well known the Ukrainians suffered not so much at the hands of the Hapsburgs or the Austrians as at the hands of the Poles, who took over the bureaucratic administration of Galicia after a grant of autonomy by Austria and misused that power on the Ukrainians. The Governors and lesser administrative officials in Austrian Galicia were mostly Poles, who used all their power to favor the Polish population over the Ukrainian. Thus the development of cooperatives met with many obstacles, and it was only due to their democratic banding together and tenacity that the Ukrainians achieved what they did between the establishment of their first cooperative society in Tysmenyca in 1873 and the fall of the Austrian Empire in 1918. In figures the growth of the Ukrainian cooperatives in Austrian Galicia, compared to Polish and Jewish cooperatives, is as follows:

Year	Ukrainian	Polish	Jewish	Total
1903*	184	451	404	1039
1912**	1063	1612	854	3529

For comparison the average population of Galicia for the period 1903-1912 was:

Ukrainians	Poles	Jews	Others	Total
3,800,000	3,700,000	875,000	125,000	8,500,000

The above table shows that during the period 1903-1912, which incidentally was the period of the greatest Ukrainian fight for equality in the administration of Galicia with the Poles (under Austria) the Ukrainian cooperative movement grew almost sixfold, while the Polish grew not quite fourfold and the Jewish only doubled.

3. Poland. Because of the unsettled political and economic conditions: there was warfare and uprisings until late 1921, the Allied Powers did not grant Poland sovereignty over Galicia until March 23, 1923 and the Polish currency was not stabilized until 1924; the growth and development of Ukrainian cooperatives under Polish rule can only be discussed for the period 1924-1939. With the advent of Polish rule the entire picture as regards territory, population and political status

* The year of the enactment of a law requiring compulsory auditing of cooperatives.

** Last normal pre-world war I year.

changes. They have to be analyzed separately: whereas Austria held Ukrainian Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine, Poland did not acquire the two last territories, but did acquire besides Galicia, the so-called Ukrainian Northwestern lands, i.e. Volhynia, Kholm, Pidliassia and Polissia. The number of Ukrainians under Polish rule according to the Polish census of 1931 was 6,103,000 but they were not only not permitted to unite politically but even Unions of cooperatives and Auditing Associations had to operate separately for Galicia and for the Northwestern lands.

Political persecution of everything Ukrainian in Poland was rife. This included the placing of administrative obstacles in the way of establishing and auditing cooperatives, the withholding by way of political pressure of credits made available to certain types of cooperatives by act of Parliament and diverting such funds to Polish cooperatives exclusively and finally political persecution of persons affiliated with the Ukrainian cooperative movement which included the placing of such persons in concentration camps after they were established in Poland in 1934.² Yet in spite of all this, or perhaps because of it, there occurred a unique phenomenon: in the development of a cooperative movement the Ukrainians under Poland surpassed all previous achievements of their own under other rules and most interesting of all they surpassed by far, absolutely and relatively all Polish cooperative movements. Unfortunately, due to the events of the war, no figures after 1938 are available, but a sufficiently clear picture can be established from the study of the fifteen year period 1924-1938. Thus the number of cooperatives belonging to the Ukrainian Auditing Association was only 1029 at the start of 1925 and grew to 3337 by 1934. The difference of growth of Ukrainian and other cooperatives in Poland are most marked when seen in proportion to population:

	Ukrainian	Polish	German	Jewish
Percentage of cooperatives				
(1934)	28.4	55.6	7.6	8.4
Percentage of population				
(Census 1931)	13.8	68.9	2.4	8.5

Still more significant are data for the 5 Voievodships (administrative

² This fact is confirmed in the aforementioned publication of the U. S. Department of Labor, which states on p. 217: "The (cooperative) movement (in Poland) was neutral and nonpolitical, except in the Ukraine."

divisions) with a majority of Ukrainian population. On the territories of Lviv, Stanislaviv, Ternopil, Volhynia and Polissia the cooperatives were such percentages: Ukrainian 58.5%, Polish 35.3%, Jewish 5.2%, German 1%. It must be borne in mind continuously that all this happened in spite of the Polish Government's encouragement of Polish cooperatives and discouragement of Ukrainian (with a neutral attitude towards Jewish and German cooperatives). It might be well to illustrate the situation by an example: the Ukrainian dairy cooperative "Maslosoyuz" (Butterunion) established in Galicia in 1905 and re-established after the war, through the cooperation of its farmer-members and the hard work of its personnel made such strides in its development that it spread its chain of own stores from Ukrainian to purely Polish territories (western Poland, Upper Silesia, etc.). Furthermore the quality of the products of this cooperative reached such a high level, that its "MC" brand products were at a premium on the markets of Great Britain, France, Spain, etc. A competitive outfit was therefore established by the Poles "Malopolski Zwiasek Mleczarski" (Polish Dairy Union) with the object of depriving the Ukrainian cooperative of its sources of supply and subsequently capturing its markets. This Polish cooperative was strongly supported by the Government, so much so that a fresh Government loan saved it quite a number of times from the brink of bankruptcy. The fight was lost, however, before it even started: the Ukrainian peasants, some of them poor to the point of destitution, refused the Polish dairy their milk even at higher prices, stuck to their contracts with "Maslosoyuz" and the Ukrainian dairy chain finally won. Alas, a Pyrrhic victory, for with the advent of the Soviet liberators of Ukraine in the Stalin-Hitler partition of Poland in 1939 most Ukrainians active in and responsible for the development of cooperatives were "socially engineered" to slave labor in Siberia. Needless to say, the Ukrainians' Polish competitors were similarly dispatched by their common liberators.³

4. The Soviet Union. Any discussion of cooperatives in Soviet Ukraine

³ How much the Ukrainian peasants and laborers benefited materially from their cooperative movement is now impossible to determine due to the complete destruction of the Western Ukrainian territories by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. The moral benefits derived can, however, be quite accurately estimated when facts as the following are considered: in 1938 Ukrainian Cooperative Associations in Poland had a membership of 676,000 persons doing an annual business of 175 million zlotys; three periodicals were published by the Ukrainian Auditing Association, all devoted exclusively to the cooperative movement, and close to half million zlotys was spent annually by the Auditing Association for publications, periodicals, courses and meetings. Whether the present Soviet State controlled system is satisfactory to a people who learned to do things of their own free will is a question open for debate.

after 1920 is entirely fruitless, as cooperatives are incompatible with the communist system. So that even if the Soviets continued to maintain and publish data on cooperatives, these pertain to state owned and state controlled institutions and are cooperatives in name only, and not in spirit. For that part of Ukraine, therefore, which came under Soviet rule in 1920 the chapter on the cooperative movement closes that year.

5. Romania. In Bukovina, then under Austrian rule, the first Ukrainian cooperative bank was established in 1889. The Ukrainians were free from Polish interference during Austrian rule until they came under Romania in 1919 and thus up to the year 1914 when they developed a considerable network of cooperatives. The Ukrainian population of this territory was only about 300,000; yet by 1912 there were 174 Ukrainian cooperatives with a membership of 18,786 persons. The Government of Romania after taking over Bukovina soon saw to it that no Ukrainian cooperatives were permitted to exist. By 1932 the number of Ukrainian cooperatives which had managed to withstand Romanian liquidation had dwindled to 28.

6. Czechoslovakia. This refers, of course, to Carpatho-Ukraine, which as previously mentioned was under the Hapsburgs' crown of Hungary until 1918, and then went to Czechoslovakia. One of the more interesting facts about the Ukrainian cooperative movement in Carpatho-Ukraine (especially to Anglo-Saxon readers) is the one that it was started by an Irishman, Edward Egan,⁴ in 1898. With the start given it by Egan, the movement spread fairly well, considering the comparatively low standard of the people, and the number of Ukrainian cooperatives in Carpatho Ukraine reached 346 in 1916. The Czechoslovak rule of Carpatho-Ukraine, at least during the Presidency and lifetime of Thomas Masaryk was fair. They permitted many Ukrainian political refugees from Poland to settle there and carry on work among the peasants. Finally there was a Ukrainian Agricultural College in Podebrady with special courses in economics and cooperation. This

⁴ Egan's father was an Irish rebel, condemned by the English. The family sold their estate in Ireland and with the proceeds bought land in Carpatho-Ukraine in the 1860's. Edward Egan was only a boy then and he grew up amongst the Ukrainian peasants, speaking their tongue and learning their plight, which was very similar to that of his own Irish kinfolk. He acquired a higher education in Budapest and Vienna and became subsequently Hungarian Minister of Agriculture. He considered himself a Ukrainian and used all his power to help the people and alleviate their political and economic exploitation by Hungary. He died in an accident in the 1900's.

College produced many future workers in the cooperative field of Carpatho-Ukraine. In spite of the poverty of the land and its people the number, but especially the quality of cooperatives grew. When Carpatho-Ukraine bid for its independence after Munich (1938-1939) it was the cadres of organizers of cooperatives who seized and organized power in the land.

The popularity and continued success of cooperative movements among Ukrainians proves that they have no need or use for a communist economic order: evils inherent in capitalism tend to spontaneous correction by the people of Ukraine in a manner similar to that effected of the Scandinavians.



RUSSIAN CHURCH POLICY IN UKRAINE

By NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

THE Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union compelled Stalin to exert every possible effort to save the Soviet empire from destruction. The hitherto popular shibboleth of Red propaganda that Russia is the fatherland of international proletariat proved no longer sufficient to keep the martial ardor of both the Russian and non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. at white heat. Other means had to be found, that would touch the hearts of the people and especially their national and religious sentiments. As one result of this Stalin began to take a more benign view of the traditionally national Russian Orthodox Church, and a closer collaboration developed between the Kremlin and the Moscow patriarchate.

The non-Russian peoples, however, especially the Ukrainians, failed to be impressed by this revival of Russian nationalism and of the Russian Church. In the past both had been used to denationalize them. To offset this distrust, the Bolsheviks made to the Ukrainians certain cultural and literary concessions, such as the publication of war literature to arouse their native patriotism and pride. Even this failed to drive the Ukrainians into the Russian war camp. Where Stalin failed, however, Hitler succeeded. The attempts of the Nazis to transform Ukraine and the Caucasian nations, occupied by the most nationally conscious and anti-Russian peoples, into mere colonies of the German Lebensraum, at once aroused among the Ukrainians and others deep hatred and undying opposition against the Germans. This opposition became all the more bitter as the Nazis executed or imprisoned scores of thousands of Ukrainian nationalists and drove millions of people into Germany to do forced labor there. Thus in no time at all the Ukrainians realized that they would gain nothing by exchanging their enslavement by the Russian Bolsheviks for the Nazi colonial system of national extermination. It was case of out of the frying pan into the fire.

When finally victory was won and Soviet world imperialism came into play, the policies of the latter required the revival of the Orthodox Church as an instrument of the state, to be used to russify the non-Russian elements of the U.S.S.R. and, on the other hand, to cause the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans and adjoining countries to look up to

Russia as the staunch defender of their faith and the champion of their national interests. Therefore the Russian Orthodox Church was revived, to become an instrument of policy of the atheistic Soviet rulers. Soon it surrendered itself to them so slavishly as to negate its very Christian mission.

Casual observers of this elevation to official grace of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, rushed forward with premature conclusions. According to them, this was the beginning of religious tolerance in the U.S.S.R. and marked a new era in Soviet internal affairs. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Soviets have not changed their views on religion. They have come to recognize it as a convenient tool of their state policies and a means of serving Soviet policies and supporting the atheistic Kremlin rulers. In fact the Russian Orthodox Church has received certain concessions, but they are far short of any religious freedom.

Insofar as the non-Orthodox people of the U.S.S.R. are concerned, the new Soviet religious policy has ameliorated nothing. In fact, Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern rite, centered in Western Ukraine, have found in many cases their position worse than before. Where previously the Reds persecuted religion as a whole, in an attempt to supplant this "opium of the people" with their materialistic philosophy, today the Bolsheviks continue their persecution of all churches excepting the Russian Orthodox. Their purpose is to erect upon the ruins of all these Soviet Russian Orthodoxy as an instrument of national extermination of the non-Russian peoples within their borders. The legend of religious freedom in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the myths about Soviet ethnic democracy, that is the alleged equality of all peoples under Soviet rule.

Russian Orthodox Church as Instrument of State Policy

A characteristic of East European history has been the close relationship between the church and national life, vastly different from that in Western Europe or America. That is why in Eastern Europe each nation of the Orthodox faith has created its own national autocephalic church with its own independent head.

Nowhere has this relationship between State and the Church been closer than in Russia itself. It is quite old, since it dates back to the Tartar period of Russian history, that is to the first half of the 15th century. At that time the religious ideas of Muscovy were beginning to assume form, together with its imperialistic ideas of territorial expan-

sion in Eastern Europe. At about that time Constantinople, known then as the Second Rome, had fallen into the hands of the Turks. Moscow seized this opportunity to proclaim itself the Third Rome, and then proceeded to flout the authority of Constantinople. Meanwhile it steadily exerted pressure to make its Orthodox Church serve its various political interests and imperialistic aims.

Accordingly, the ambition to reach and dominate the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles became camouflaged as "the duty of Orthodox" Muscovy to restore the cross to the dome of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Constantinople. Similarly, the plan to conquer Ukraine together with its Kiev, mother of all Ukraine-Rus cities, became known as "the lending of a helping hand to our Orthodox brethren in Polish-Catholic slavery." These grandiose plans, however, could not be realized then, as Moscow was still too weak politically and culturally. It was impossible for Moscow at the time, to force Ukraine and White Ruthenia—countries of Western mentality and with a higher cultural level—to accept its religious "protection." Consequently as the self-styled Third Rome, Moscow was on constant guard lest the peoples of the former Kievan Rus state confess a faith other than the Orthodox of the Muscovites. In line with this policy it blocked all attempts to establish a religious union between Ukraine and White Ruthenia and Rome, and to develop close West European cultural influences among them.

There was indeed then considerable likelihood that these two nations would unite themselves with Rome. At the Ecumenical Council in Florence in 1439 the ecclesiastical union of the Constantinople Patriarch with Rome was finally accomplished. The leading spirit behind the union was the Kievan Metropolitan Isidore. Moscow refused to ratify this agreement and thereby isolated itself religiously as well as politically. Seeing its hopes dashed of ever reaching shores of the Black Sea and of affixing the cross to the dome of St. Sophia, Moscow began an intensive campaign to nullify the results of the accord reached at Florence. From that time Moscow has ever been an implacable enemy of any attempted religious union of Ukraine and White Ruthenia with Rome, as such a connection with the West would destroy any possibility that Moscow might have of uniting these nations into one religious unit and assimilating their peoples into the Russian nation. One of its methods here has been the cultivation of blind hatred against anyone or anything connected with Catholicism. "If an angel appeared from heaven before you," wrote the Muscovite Metropolitan Jonas, "and told you to recognize the authority of the Pope, then curse him."

Closer relations between the Church and State in Muscovy were inaugurated during the first half of the 16th century. It began with a dispute between Abbot Joseph of the wealthy Volokalamsk Monastery at Volotsk and Abbot Nil of the modest Sorsk Monastery. The first was of the opinion that monasteries should try to become rich in order to better train monastic candidates to become bishop counsellors of the Tsar. The other abbot felt differently. He believed that it was not the main purpose of monasteries to train counsellors for the Tsar, or to mix into politics at all, but only to save the souls of the brotherhood and other faithful. The Church, he said, had no need to mix into State affairs or act as an instrument of the State. Moreover, the Orthodox Church should be independent of the State while its Metropolitan should have a free hand over it.

In the dispute, the views of Abbot Joseph prevailed. Subsequently his views were approved in theory by Metropolitan Makary, in the middle of the 16th century. According to him the Russian Orthodox Church should have two heads, a temporal one, in the person of the Tsar (from 1547 on), and an ecclesiastical one—the Metropolitan, who should be elevated to the dignity of Patriarch—which is exactly what happened in 1589. The value of this elevation was first strikingly proved during the Period of the Great Troubles when the Moscow Patriarch played a vital role in the salvation of the Muscovite State after the extinction of the Rurik dynastic line in Muscovia.

Nonetheless Makary's view on the necessity of having two heads of the Church did not prevail long. Tsarist autocracy could not tolerate the presence of another autocracy beside itself. Conflict between the Tsar and the Patriarch became inevitable, and resulted in the abolition of the Patriarchate by the builder of the modern Russian empire, Peter I.

Peter's reformation of the Church replaced its single patriarchal head with a Holy Synod composed of a number of ecclesiastics plus a civilian Procurator, the official representative of the Tsar, in whom was vested the real authority in the Synod. From that time the Russian Orthodox Church became a mere tool of the internal and foreign policies of Russia.

In actual practice the Russian Orthodox Church became somewhat of a branch of the Ministry of Police, as in its own way it too was duty bound to uphold the Tsarist system. On that account alone it became an object of hatred among the Russian progressive circles, as well as among the non-Russian peoples, especially the Ukrainians and

White Ruthenians. The latter immediately recognized it as an important agent in the officially sponsored attempts to Russify them and to deny to them freedom of conscience and faith. The Russian Orthodox Church ever remained alien to the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, who developed their religious faith and life along the traditional lines of the ancient Kievan Rus-Ukraine state of wide tolerance and close relations with the Western European nations.

Church and People in Ukraine

Following the final break of the Russian Church with the Kievan metropolite (1461), as the spiritual leaders of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples, the Kievan metropolitans began steadily to draw their Orthodox Church closer to the West. Living beneath the foreign rule of the Polish-Lithuanian Roman Catholic state, the Kievan metropolitans were compelled to depend for support upon their faithful rather than upon the State. Thus at the time when the Russian Church was already well on its way of becoming a State church, the Ukrainian Church remained dependent upon the people, first upon the nobility and magnates who represented the Ukrainian people and then, later, upon the masses themselves, organized in their church brotherhoods. There was in this some resemblance to the Protestant Church organization.

Such dependence upon the masses eventually proved to be inconvenient to the Ukrainian-White Ruthenian Orthodox Hierarchy and reforms were sought to make it more on the order of the Catholic models, that is to transfer the authority of the church from the masses to the hierarchy itself. Much along this line was done by the famed Kievan metropolitan Peter Mohyla, who went to the extent of educating the seminarists at the newly founded Kievan Mohyla Academy (1632) on the basis of the teachings of Catholic theologians and Catholic canon law, which was adapted by the Metropolitan himself to meet the needs of the Ukrainian people. In this manner the cleavage between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church widened to such an extent that when about the middle of the 17th century a good portion of Ukraine found itself under Muscovite protectorate (1654) and the Ukrainian and Russian clergymen came into contact with one another, the latter looked upon the former as some manner of Catholic heretics while the Ukrainians looked upon the Russians as some sort of barbarized Christians.

As could be expected, amidst these occidental tendencies of the Ukrainian Church there was the natural inclination to go a step further and revive the accord of the Council of Florence (1439) and re-unite the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the authority of the Pope, albeit with the preservation of the centuries-old religious traditions and rites of the Ukrainian people. This was done at the council held in Brest in 1596. This radical step evoked strong protests among the more conservative elements who preferred that the church remain dependent on the masses. Among them there were some who as a result began to look to Moscow for support. The Ukrainian people were thus split into two religious camps—the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern Rite, often called Uniates.

Forcible Russification of Both Churches in Ukraine

Political circumstances themselves finally decided the fate of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. From a protectorate Ukraine soon was transformed by Moscow into a mere province and concurrently the Ukrainian Orthodox Church found itself forced to give up its allegiance to the Patriarch of Constantinople and submit to the authority of the Russian Church (1685). From then on that submission constantly grew more subservient until finally the Ukrainian Church itself became an instrument of russification of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people. Any attempts to preserve Ukrainian religious traditions were brutally suppressed by Moscow.

It is no wonder then that during the 18th century a strong sentiment appeared among the Ukrainians for a religious adherence to Rome, which by that time had managed to bring within its fold about two-thirds of the Ukrainian people and well nigh all of the White Ruthenians. To reverse the natural historical cultural development of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians was possible only by means of force, as the hard political conditions of the Ukrainian people under Russia certainly did not encourage them to desire religious dependence upon Moscow.

An opportunity for the Russian authorities to settle accounts with the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite finally arrived with the partitions of Poland in 1772 and 1795, in the course of which the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians found themselves under Russian domination. Russian persecution of Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Catholics of the Eastern Rite followed and this sometimes

rivalled that of the early Christian martyrs. The stark fact is that Russia was able to force eleven million Ukrainians and White Ruthenians to become "converts" to the Russian Orthodox Church.

Among the other measures taken then was the ukaz by Catherine II directing the evacuation from Ukraine into St. Petersburg of the majority of the Ukrainian bishops, headed by the Metropolitan himself, there to be interned for the remainder of their lives. Meanwhile the Ukrainian clergy became the object of widespread Tsarist investigations directed to the uncovering of "dissidents." Against this there rose among the masses a wave of popular resistance. Millions of the people, called "resistants," although officially registered as Orthodox, refused nevertheless to regard themselves and their children as such. Their clergy who openly took an intransigent attitude against this forced conversion to the Russian Orthodox Church, and likewise scores of thousands of their faithful, were summarily arrested and exiled into distant and barren Russian provinces.

Following a period of relaxation of this persecution during the reign of the more liberal Alexander I, there came during the reign of his successor, Nicholas I, a fresh wave of persecution. It ran its course for ten years (1829-1839) and culminated in the complete extirpation under Russian rule of the Ukrainian and the White Ruthenian Catholic Church of the Eastern rite. The sinister figure behind this extirpation was the Auxiliary Bishop Siemashko, who was definitely a *personata grata* with the government at St. Petersburg. The success of this action became complete, when in 1874 the last vestiges of Ukrainian Catholics in the area of Kholm, formerly under Poland, were disposed of by the Russian government.

As a consequence of all this, Catholicism of the Eastern rite, so dangerous in Tsarist eyes, passed out of existence in Russian occupied lands and remained banned, even during the revolutionary year of 1905, when the decree of religious freedom ignored it completely. To be sure, the decree allowed the Orthodox subject of the state to change **his religion to any other, even to the Roman Catholic**, but definitely not to the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern rite. This ban upon the latter, incidentally, lasted until the Russian Revolution in 1917.

Russian action in this connection was not limited to politicians and ecclesiastics alone. Abetted by the Russian authorities there appeared an officially supported "West Russian historical school," which with might and main proceeded to picture the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian religious union as a "Polish intrigue, an act of the Jesuits,

for the destruction of the Ukrainian nation." Strange it was indeed that such solicitude for the Ukrainian nation was expressed by those who elsewhere refused to acknowledge the very existence of the Ukrainian nation, and went even to the extent of banning the use of the Ukrainian language 1863.

There is no doubt but that the church union of Ukraine and White Ruthenia with Rome was an indication of the natural cultural development of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples, aimed at preserving close relations with Western Europe and incorporating themselves in it, just as the ancient Kievan Rus-Ukraine considered itself a part of the European "Communitas Christiana." This attitude of Ukrainian culture became one of the most striking characteristics of the national individuality of the Ukrainian nation.

The Western Ukrainian Cultural Piedmont

In the pursuit of its imperialistic aims Russia has for centuries been trying to assimilate the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian people. In the process it has constantly attempted to destroy those traits which differentiate them from the Russians. Here lies the reason for the relentless and brutal campaign to eradicate the cultural attributes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the doubly brutal campaign to do the same in the case of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite which in Western Ukraine has become like a national faith.

The fact that Galicia, the principal part of Western Ukraine, was able to preserve its eastern Catholic faith was largely because for one hundred and fifty years it was under the rule of Austria, which had no interest in destroying this religion. Through Austria, Galicia was in close contact with Western Europe and as a result became the most dynamic portion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Piedmont as it has been aptly called. On this account Russia has always plotted to annex it and destroy its national and religious life.

During the years before the first World War the Russians spent large sums of money on Orthodox propaganda among the Galician Ukrainians. This propaganda was used in the adjoining but Russian occupied Ukrainian province of Volhyn, and was conducted by a large group of Russian clergy headed by Archbishop Evlogiy. They vainly attempted to persuade the Galician Ukrainians to adopt Russian Orthodoxy as their own faith. When the Russian troops occupied Galicia during the war, these attempts were redoubled on the spot. Metro-

politan Andrew Sheptitsky and other Ukrainian Catholic clergy were banished into the depths of Russia, there to remain until the Russian Revolution (1917).

The Red Fight Against a Revived Ukrainian Orthodox Church

At first the revolution brought national and religious freedom for the former enslaved peoples of Tsarist Russia. A movement quickly appeared among the Orthodox Ukrainians of Eastern Ukraine (until this time under Russia) to Ukrainianize their church. Likewise a friendly feeling toward the Catholicism of the Eastern rite of Western Ukraine appeared among them. This movement, however, never really got under way simply because of lack of leadership. In all of Ukraine there could not be found even one Orthodox bishop who considered himself a Ukrainian, so thoroughly had the Orthodox Church in Ukraine been russified. A group of clergy and laymen then undertook to lead the reform of their church. Their principal demand was to make the Church autonomous and Ukrainian, something which, of course, the bishops in both Ukraine and Russia refused to permit. The Orthodox Ukrainians then convened (late in 1918) a Ukrainian Church Council, in which Rev. Vasile Lypkivsky played a prominent role. The council urged that the hierarchy appoint Father Lypkivsky as the Kievan metropolitan. The hierarchy again refused. The Council then proceeded to make the appointment itself and proclaimed the establishment of the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The Bolsheviks, who had by then occupied Ukraine and Kiev, at first did not mix into church affairs. They were busy with a general atheistic campaign, which affected Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine far more than it did the independent Ukrainian Church. Soon the former became extinct in Ukraine and into the resultant vacuum the Ukrainian Church entered and steadily spread throughout the land. Although it was not canonically well founded, still it represented a national revolution in the field of religion.

During the period of so-called Ukrainization between 1923 and 1929 under Red rule, the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church gained correspondingly. With the end of that period, the church, like other Ukrainian institutions, became the object of savage persecution at the hands of the Reds. The new metropolitan of Kiev, Mikola Boretzky, was imprisoned, the church itself was ordered to dissolve, and

some of the hierarchy were compelled to make debasing recantations of their faith, while the faithful were hounded for years (1930). In a short time the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church disappeared from view, and what remained of it went underground.

Just as some ten years earlier Moscow had destroyed the Tsarist Orthodox Church in Ukraine and thereby enabled the Autocephalous Ukrainian Church to grow in its place, so now it had destroyed the latter in order to revive in Ukraine the Russian Orthodox Patriarchal Church which was coming back into the good graces of the atheistic Kremlin rulers.

Religious Persecution of Western Ukrainian Catholics

The occupation of Western Ukraine in 1939 by the Soviets with Nazi approval had the same aim which had prompted Tsarist Russia to occupy Galicia in 1914. It was simply to seize and throttle the national spirit of the most dynamic part of Ukraine. Although atheistic, the Reds were not at all averse to using religion for this purpose.

Following its usual pattern in such cases, Moscow first disposed of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Western Ukraine by placing it under the control of the Moscow Patriarch, and by forcing the Volhynian Archbishop Oleksiy and his assistant Bishop Polikarp to recognize his authority. For a while they allowed the Ukrainian Catholic Church to remain in peace, probably because of the worldwide influence and personal popularity of its venerable head, Metropolitan Count Andrew Sheptitsky. Still, though the Church then was not persecuted, its development was not allowed to proceed by the Soviets unhindered.

The retreat of the Reds from Western Ukraine and subsequently from Eastern Ukraine as well offered an opportunity for the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Oleksiy, however, refused to lead the revival, saying he would remain loyal to the Moscow Patriarch. Soon he was murdered by the underground of the Ukrainian independentist groups. Bishop Polikarp assumed the leadership. Thus the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church came again into being and soon spread not only throughout Volhynia but throughout East Ukraine as well. In retaliation, the Patriarch tried Polikarp in absentia and excommunicated him. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church continued to grow in strength nonetheless, and under the direction of Bishop Mstislav, assistant to the Kievan Metropolitan, it revived five hundred parishes, mostly in Ukraine west of the Dnieper river.

The Soviet reconquest of Ukraine brought all these gains to a quick end and compelled the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy, clergy and outstanding churchmen to quit Ukraine and flee westward.

The Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy and clergy, however, did not flee before the Soviet advance. Upon express orders of Metropolitan Sheptitsky they remained with their parishes. As long as their venerable prelate remained alive, they and their flocks were not particularly molested by Reds. But when he died and was succeeded by Metropolitan Joseph Slipiy, a savage persecution of the church, its clergy and the faithful swept over the land.

The first blow fell upon the hierarchy. Metropolitan Slipiy and all his bishops were arrested and thrust into prison. There the first to perish was the aged Bishop of Stanislaviw, Gregory Khomyshyn, together with his assistant, Ivan Liatyshevsky. Late in 1945 Metropolitan Slipiy himself was reliably reported to have died in a Kiev prison. A more recent dispatch has it that at present he is in prison in the Ural mountains. By that time the Reds had turned their attention to the priests, and had executed scores and imprisoned hundreds of them. The comparatively few who have been left at liberty, are today subjected to various restrictions and indignities.

With the purge well under way, the Moscow Patriarchal Synod issued an appeal to all Ukrainian Catholics to forsake their church and enter the Russian Orthodox Church, and at the same time to recognize as their religious head a certain Bishop Makariy, whom the Moscow Patriarch had appointed Bishop of Lviw and Ternopil. When this appeal went unheeded, the Kremlin then set up an "Initiatory Group for the Reunion of Ukrainian Catholics with Russian Orthodoxy." It was composed of three priests, one from each of the three Galician dioceses. It is worth noting that their leader, Rev. Havriyil Kostelnik, had already served a couple of months in Soviet prison when he accepted membership in the group. Another member, Rev. Michael Melnyk, was recently reported as being on the verge of insanity. Whether they are serving willingly or not, the fact remains that with all the official authority and power at their disposal, these "missionaries" have been able to "persuade" a bare forty of the Ukrainian Catholic priests to be "converted" to Russian Orthodoxy out of about 2,700.

One of the measures taken by this Initiatory Group was to ask the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine to come to its aid. Although the Soviets profess that the church is separate from the state, still this did not prevent the Council of Commissars in response to the appeal

from the Group, from dismissing from their ecclesiastical offices the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and appointing in their place not their canonical successors but handpicked interlopers. The document issued by the Council in this connection is worth quoting here:

(To) Members of the Initiatory Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church: Dr. Kostelnik, Dr. Melnyk, and A. Pelvetsky.

As per instructions of the Council of People Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and in reply to your declaration of May 28, 1945, I wish to inform you that:

1. *The Initiatory Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church is hereby recognized in its present form as the sole provisional ecclesiastical administrative organ, to which is granted the authority to administer fully the existing Greek Catholic parishes in the western regions of Ukraine and to direct the reunion of the said parishes with the Russian Orthodox Church.*

2. *The Initiatory Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church has the authority for the future to settle all legal questions pertaining to the administration of the Greek Catholic parishes and their reunion with the Orthodox Church, with the authorized Commissioner of the Council of People Commissars in matters relating to the Russian Orthodox Church designated by the Council of the Peoples' Commissars of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and in accordance with regional official delegates.*

3. *After the registration of deaneries, parishes and monasteries of the Greek Catholic Church, the Initiatory Group is required to send to the proper Commissioner in matters of the Russian Orthodox Church authorized by the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian S. S. R. lists of all those deacons, rectors and monastery abbots, who refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction over them of the Initiatory Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church.*

Commissioner of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs on the Council of People Commissars of the Ukrainian S. S. R.—P. Khodchenko.

Kiev, June 18, 1945.

It is clear that tovarish P. Khodchenko is vested by the Council of Ukrainian People Commissars with the authority of the Pope over the West Ukrainian Catholic Church.

In reply to the above order, the clergy of St. George's Cathedral in L'viv sent a protest directly to Molotov, vice-chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow.

The protest declared that:

As a result of the arrest of the episcopate of the Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, together with a long series of priests, and because of the order forbidding any of the Greek Catholic clergy to administer the Church, our Church has now found itself in a very abnormal condition.

The situation has become all the more complicated by the appearance of an Initiatory Group (etc.), which has issued an announcement to the Greek Catholic clergy . . . Because this announcement contains much falsehood, we Greek Catholic clergy reject all responsibility for it . . . (here follows an expression of loyalty of the clergy to the Soviet Union, and then) :

Our attitude toward the action of Rev. Kostelnik is completely negative, and we consider his action as pernicious, basically un-church-like and contrary to the truth as proclaimed by Christ: "There shall be but one flock and but one pastor." With the present situation being what it is, religious strife may rapidly ensue. Therefore we appeal to the government to release from prison the entire Episcopate with our Metropolitan at its head, and in the interim between now and the time of such release, to make it possible for us to administer the affairs of our church. Until our Metropolitan and bishops are released, the legal church administration would govern in accordance with the canons of our Church.

We believe that the Government will grant our petition, for Stalin's Constitution guarantees to all citizens, and therefore to us too, freedom of conscience and religion. We know in the name of what high ideals the Revolution of 1917 was fought, and we believe that these high ideals of liberty are alive even today, and that, moreover, they are growing and encompassing the whole world.

Therefore in the name of justice and in the light of the brilliant victory of the Soviet Union, we plead that we and our people be permitted to retain that freedom in Church affairs which we have enjoyed for hundreds of years and to which on the basis of Soviet law we have full right now.

L'viv, July 1, 1945. St. George's Cathedral Square. No. 5. (signatures).

It is not known whether there has been any answer from Comrade

Molotov to this appeal of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy of the city of Lviw, in which they emphasized the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Stalin Constitution. Reports from Lviw, however, mention further arrests of the cathedral clergy, and members of the faculty of the Theological Academy, and the closing of the Cathedral of St. George, the national shrine of the Western Ukrainians. Moreover, in connection with the protest of the Ukrainian Catholic clergy to Mr. Molotov were over 300 priests arrested and sent into exile. Many were executed.

The persecution of the Ukrainian Catholics on account of their religious conviction prompted the Holy See to issue an Encyclical letter to the world "Orientales omnes Ecclesias" of Pope Pius XII. It pictures the miserable religious status of the Western Ukrainian Catholics under Soviet occupation, sends encouragement to the jailed bishops and praises the martyrs of the Faith.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church of Western Ukraine is today undergoing a period of severe persecution. One sees there taking place a desperate struggle for the preservation of their ancestral Faith at the very moment when in the London Assembly of the U.N.O. there are being professed for the record beautiful ideals of human rights and the Four Freedoms of a better and freer world.



THE PROBLEM OF "SECOND GENERATION"

By DR. JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Hofstra College, Hempstead

AN unrepairable damage has been done to the mentality of many—although not all—American-born children of the Slavic (as well as all) immigrants by the more or less dominant "Nordic" theories dominating America in recent years.¹ Basically these theories argue that the children of the Central-Eastern European immigrants are rooted in backgrounds which are "inferior" to the Anglo-Saxon backgrounds of the "old" immigrants. Social workers, criminologists, educators, and sociologists all agree that the resulting attitudes of the "second generation" are the most burning problems of America which have cost us much in social maladjustment, in poverty, delinquency, and in family disorganization.

In many respects the experiences of the second-generation—the children of immigrants—have been considerably more difficult than those of their parents. These "marginal Americans" lack a spiritual solidarity with old world culture; but, in many cases, they find little opportunity for participation in American culture. Part of the damage produced by the old-fashioned sort of Americanization is that they have destroyed the loyalties and values that might have facilitated the cultural development of young people who now find themselves between two worlds, without being quite a part of either. Thus Louis Adamic writes: "The chief and most important fact . . . about the New Americans, is that the majority of them are oppressed by feelings of inferiority in relation to their fellow citizens of older stock . . ."

Whenever two cultures come into contact, a certain amount of miscegenation takes place, the offspring of which constitute most interesting objects of sociological investigation. In this respect, the American-born generation of our immigrants, who constitute a population of 23,157,581 (15,183,740 of foreign parentage, 5,267,140, father foreign, and 2,706,700, mother foreign—1940 census), stands on the border, as it were, of two cultural—or—more—cultural worlds, that of their foreign-born parents and that of America, to neither of which do they

¹ Cf. Joseph S. Rousek, "American Misconceptions About Central-Eastern Europe," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (September, 1945), pp. 342-351.

wholly belong. In their efforts to adjust to both these worlds of social and cultural experience, they encounter numerous problems of culture conflicts and maladaptation—on the one hand, within their home, and, on the other, in American society.² These problems are especially in evidence in the family situation and lie at the root of causes of delinquency and personality maladjustments. Contributory to the second generation problem are the special handicaps inherent in the low socio-economic status of their parents, the circumscribed character of the immigrant community in which many of them live, and the prejudicial attitude of American society toward minority groups.

Democratic Characteristics of the Second Generation

It is interesting to note that second-generation Americans have been constantly gaining in numerical importance. In 1930, the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage alone numbered 25,361,186. To be sure, this number dropped to 23,157,581 in 1940, which is undoubtedly due to gaining of the immigrant population, but the third generation certainly must have increased considerably during that period.³ The native whites of German parentage are the most numerous of all, numbering nearly 4 million, followed by the Italians (nearly three million strong), the Irish, and the Polish, English, Russian,⁴ and Canadian second-generation groups.

What is important—from the standpoint of Central-Eastern Europe—as time goes on, the “new” (that is also, the Ukrainian) immigrants’ descendants will tend progressively to replace the “old” immigrants’ descendants, whose numbers will decrease due to the higher death rate accompanying their advancing years. Furthermore, because of the difference in age distribution of the two groups, there will tend to be a higher proportion of offsprings of “new immigrants in years to come, so

² Dorothy Krall, *The Second Generation Immigrant in America*, a doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1937, is one of the best surveys of this whole problem, and deserves to be published. As Dr. Krall points out: “to study these problems of the second-generation immigrant is to break new ground for the larger study of causes and effects of the contact and conflict of cultures, and, incidentally, to reveal some interesting aspects of the processes of culture change and assimilation as they are taking place in America.” See also: Samuel Koenig, “Second—and Third—Generation Americans,” Chapter XXI, pp. 471-485, in Francis J. Brown & Joseph Slabey Roucek, *One America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945); Joseph S. Roucek, “Immigrant and Second Generation,” Chapter 20, pp. 438-458, in Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Sociological Foundations of Education* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942).

³ There are no figures available on the third generation.

⁴ The official census of the United States includes Ukrainians in the group classified as “Russia (U.S.S.R.)”. But it is interesting to note that the Ukrainian immigrants in the United States are more numerous than Great Russians (Moscovites).

that the children of the "new" immigrants will eventually outnumber those of the "old."

These "marginal" youths, like their parents, are highly concentrated in the New England, Middle Atlantic and East North Central states, although many inhabit these regions to a lesser degree than do the foreign-born. A majority of the second-generation are concentrated in ten states (New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, California, Wisconsin, and Minnesota); there is an even higher concentration of the foreign-born in the above states, especially New York. Although the second-generation are a comparatively small part of the population in a number of states, they are an influential group from the standpoint of relative numerical strength.

On the whole, the children of immigrants, like their parents, tend not only to live in cities but are highly concentrated in the large cities; the foreign-born are even more highly concentrated in the large cities than the second-generation. This high concentration is especially marked in the case of the recent immigrant stock, that of Southern and Eastern Europe. While the second-generation are more urban than the native-Americans, they are in every case less urban than the foreign-born, since the "old" immigrants, among whom are most of the rural foreign-born, are a fast declining population. But the urban distribution of the immigrant population is of great importance. The urban settlements are made up of descendants of the original settlers and those who flooded in from the rural areas and by immigrants from overseas. The last two groups frequently live in cultural islands in our cities, a condition which retards assimilation and makes serious problems for governmental administrators, educators and social workers. What is even more important is the fact established by criminological research—that our urban centers have the highest rate of crime. The larger the city, the higher the rate. We also know that the highest rates are found in the economically least-favored sections of the cities. It does not make much difference who lives in these sections. In the high delinquency areas of Chicago, Germans, Irish, Slavs, Italians, etc. have lived at various times but apparently there has been little variation in the rates of these areas. It has been the lot of the immigrant to start at the bottom of our economic ladder, and so long as he or his children stay there, and particularly when they stay there in our largest cities, they will continue

to contribute heavily to our crime problem. When they have risen above the poverty level, their crime rates have declined.⁵

On the Margin of Two Cultural Worlds

Children of foreign-born parents are bound to retain some of the "foreign" characteristics of their parents, due to the authoritative influence of their elders. As these youngsters come under the influence of the school, neighborhood, movies and friends, they rebel against the "inferior" old traditions and customs within the family group, considering them not only "old-fashioned" but even inimical to their attempts to fit in with American conditions. Parents, on the other hand, cannot understand that the children's objections to their ways are not directed against their personal authority but rather against their ideas of what is proper. Parents, for instance, might object to children spending their time on baseball, movies, and play, believing that every child should contribute by hard work to the maintenance of the family. The resulting conflicts have their source also in the problem of religious habits.

Such children, resentful of the "old-country" ways of their parents, are likely to develop a sense of inferiority because their acceptance in outside groups often depends on their shedding their parent's culture. They become ashamed of their parents, of their accent, of their low economic status, and refuse in many instances to bring their friends home or to return home where they come into constant conflicts with their parents. Often they develop a sense of guilt, are on the defensive toward slights at their parents and their background, become argumentative, quarrelsome and, in general, "carry chips on both of their shoulders." Often they deny their cultural backgrounds, and do everything possible to be as "Americans" are. Meeting with prejudices on account of their cultural backgrounds, they often even hate everything connected with the culture of their parents. Some become aggressive in their efforts to gain acceptance by American society, others withdraw within the intimacy of their own group. But it must be also noted that many second-generation individuals are well-adjusted, and have never experienced problems which made them cognizant of their differences

⁵ This suggests another obvious interpretation. We have, in the past, been forced to compare the delinquency rates of immigrants and their children, who live largely on a low economic level, with those of the native-born, who have a much higher proportion of their number living on higher economic levels. If more refined and scientific comparisons could be made, it would probably be found that there is relatively little or no difference between the second-generation and the native parentage group; that, in other words, a high delinquency rate is largely a function of environment and not of nativity. We do not disregard here, however, the element of culture conflicts.

from native Americans, or have solved them adequately and successfully.⁶ Particularly where the immigrants can maintain their cultural backgrounds without much competition from the surrounding culture (such as the Czech farmers in Texas, where even the third American-born generation speaks the Czech language), the second-generation individuals tend to solve their conflict by extolling the virtue of the culture of their fathers. The difficulty usually begins when the child begins to associate in a wide variety of ways with his American schoolmates and friends, which produces an ever widening distance between parent and child. During the years when these "marginals" are in school mingling with other Americans, they become interested fundamentally in being typically American. But they also find that social barriers are raised against them. Sometimes they grow closer to their parents, but more often they are disillusioned, developing "inferiority complexes," and overacting in their anxiety to become "Americanized." In their efforts to be accepted in the established group without hesitancy, they go to extremes in gambling, drinking, and attaining the status of being "good fellows" in their gangs.

Cultural problems are, furthermore, immensely complicated by the existence of race differences because physical differences serve as a persistent uniform of group identity and difference. But in order to avoid prolonging the treatment, we cannot deal with the Chinese and Japanese and other minor groups in America. Sufficient to say that their racial characteristics single them out, and the second-generation suffers particularly as their appearance identifies them, in spite of their American birth, as aliens.⁷

Personality Problems of the Second Generation

Much has been said about the personality problems among the second-generation born Americans. It is true, of course, that many, if not a majority of them, have no problems and have become outstanding individuals in America.⁸

⁶ In the study of the adjustment of any group to a social and cultural milieu, a number of positive as well as negative aspects of the situation are important to understand—such as the degree of total adjustment that has been affected by the group, the speed of adjustment with reference to certain elements, e.g., language, family, mores, courtship customs, etc., and the ways in which adjustment is achieved. The generalizations offered here are based on research studies which, of necessity, must be specialized and narrow in scope, dealing with the second-generation of specific nationalities, treating particular aspects of second generation problems, or attacking these problems from a specialized point of view.

⁷ See: L. G. Brown, *Immigration*, Part IV, "The Orientals" (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1933).

⁸ For a suggestive list of them, see Francis J. Brown & Joseph S. Roucek, *op. cit.*

In the background of these difficulties are basically the conflicts engendered by the differing cultures of native-born children and their foreign-born parents, and between them and the American environment.

There are, of course, additional factors complicating the situation. The immigrant suffers from differential treatment in the process of law administration,⁹ although it must be pointed out again that, contrary to the popular conception, the foreign-born in the United States come into contact with the law less frequently than does the native group as a whole.¹⁰

The difference in the crime rates of various nationality and nativity groups has given rise to a variety of explanations.¹¹ Probably the most prominent but also the most silly is the theory of racial differences, which suggests that the low rates of the "old" immigration are due to their Nordic ancestry, while the high rates of the South Europeans are due to their Mediterranean race origin.¹² This theory is, of course, sociologically untenable. But it has been and it is even now popular among a number of pseudo-scientists who, like many a sociologist and a historian used to agree with Paleontologist Henry Fairchild Osborn that Anglo-Saxons were God's special gift to earth. It might be even pointed out that such ideas of "the superior race" flourished under a different garb, in Nazi Germany and Italy, and is known as the "Nordic" or "Anglo-Saxon" theory in the United States. Fortunately, long before Henry Osborn died in 1935, a new generation was hard at work knocking his theories down.

The leaders of the new, environmental eugenics have proven that there is no evidence that any racial group or social class has more native intelligence than any other.¹³ There are more variations in heredity

⁹ Thorsten Sellin, "Race Prejudice in Administration of Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 41, pp. 212-217; Kate Holiday Claghorn, *The Immigrant's Day in Court* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1923).

¹⁰ This conclusion was arrived at as early as 1910 by the Immigration Commission, and was repeated by the so-called Wickersham Commission. See: National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on Crime and the Foreign Born*, Washington, D.C.; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931.

¹¹ For the best survey of this whole problem, see Thornstein Sellin, *Culture Conflict and Crime* (New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 41, 1938), and particularly "The Second Generation," pp. 78 ff.

¹² Harry H. Laughlin, "Analysis of America's Melting Pot," *Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House of Representatives. Sixty-Seventh Congress, Third Session, November 21, 1922* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1923, Serial 7-C, pp. 725-829).

¹³ Among the leaders of this school is Frederick Osborn, who demolishes such fancy in his *Preface to Eugenics* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940); Ruth Benedict, *Race, Science and Politics* (New York: Modern Age Books, 1940), is one of the latest anthropologist's examinations of race theories.

among individuals or a group than among any social or racial groups. Osborn shows that children tend to be like their parents in hereditary capacity; if their endowments are weak, not even a college education can make them bright. "In the limited environments of isolated and marginal people," says Osborn, "good hereditary capacities do not have a chance to develop as they would in a better environment. An environment equalized at a higher level would show up a superior heredity in great numbers of persons now at a low level of development."

The fact remains that any explanation of the social pathology related to immigrants cannot be traced to any racial differences—in line with the trends in sociology recognizing environmental and social factors as of greater importance than the factors of heredity and of inherent psychic defect—but to the rapid transition from one type of culture to another, resulting in a gradual loss of primary group control, hastened by the physical distance from the family group. A serious situation arises when children reared in immigrant homes break from the old-world traditions because they have acquired American standards and behavior patterns. Family solidarity is weakened and thus also family control. Confusion in the standards and codes of behavior is inevitable. Contacts of the second-generation with American life exert a disorganizing influence. Hence the children tend to break away from parental control and become delinquents more readily. This trend is again supported by the fact that many immigrants live in the sections of our cities characterized by poverty, poor housing, and bad neighborhood influences. The second generation then produces its own kind of culture. In fact, "the second generation is not a group culturally adrift with neither the culture of their parents nor of their new environment to guide them, but is a group with a very definite culture, a culture of a socio-economic level that is determined by irregular, poorly paid employment and results in broken homes, inadequate education and recreational opportunity, and a general stunted environment. And this culture determines for its inhabitants, whatever their activity, a high crime rate.¹⁴ The consequence is, what Sellin calls, "a conflict of conduct norms," a result of a process of group differentiation within a cultural system or area, or a result of contact between norms drawn from different cultural systems or areas.¹⁵

¹⁴ Harold Ross, "Crime and the Native-Born Sons of European Immigrants," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXVIII (July-August, 1937), pp. 202-209.

¹⁵ Sellin, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

The Problem of Americanization

The existence of our minorities has led to the development of special educational programs for the cultural and political absorption of immigrants, known as "Americanization," under both public and private auspices. During World War I the term stood for a nationalistic and political effort to make assimilation compulsory according to preconceived notions of American ways of life, in spite of sporadic protestations, both theoretical and practical.¹⁶ The employment of coercion to teach the immigrant English and civics, the tendency to ignore almost all the immigrant's own cultural background, and the assumption that American culture was the latest streamlined accomplishment of man's existence were its characteristic features. In general, this brand of Americanization tended toward the suppression of initiative, the destruction of traditional moral and artistic values, the fostering of feelings of inferiority and confusion, and toward personal and social conflict. Blame of the immigrant for his lack of assimilation, probably the greatest hindrance to the old Americanization movement, completely prevented the cultivation by native Americans of the sympathy toward immigrant life and culture.

By 1924, however, the interest in such an Americanization program had almost subsided. A new point of view began to assert itself, propounding that assimilation was not the abandoning by the immigrant of all he brought with him and the imitation of what he found, but a process of creation for immigrant and American alike. The name "Americanization" has fallen into disrepute since 1930, and the work itself has since been stimulated under the title of "adult education," developed particularly as a consequence of the program of government measures, as a consequence of the Depression.

Cultural Democracy

Today it is generally conceded that classroom adult immigration education can be but a fraction of the total process of Americanization, another expression of the new concept of education propounding that formal instruction in language, history, traditions, custom, behavior patterns, economic techniques, social attitudes and values, and loyalties, is inevitably dwarfed under the existing social order by the experiences of everyday life.¹⁷ Hence any educational program for the immigrant

¹⁶ Maurice R. Davie, *World Immigration*, Chapter XIII, "The Americanization Movement," pp. 495-520 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936).

¹⁷ Since the popular concept of Americanization has come to have a definitely nationalistic connotation, it might be better to use the more neutral and inclusive term "acculturation."

must be related directly to his social experiences, which, in turn, are related to general community activities. It must be acknowledged that we suffer from social disorganization, conflicts, and confusion from the shock of contradictory cultures of America and rapid social changes, but a solution must acknowledge the existence of the present diversity and by accepting it can then work for the eventual absorption in order to achieve cultural assimilation as the final goal of all such efforts.

In this respect two particular points come up: (1) the knowledge that the "conditioned" personality of the immigrant cannot be changed overnight into the American Anglo-Saxon mould, and (2) that assimilation is a social and cultural process which involves, on the one hand, the fusion of cultural heritages and, on the other, the modification of sentiments and attitudes and the gradual incorporation of the strangers into our culture pattern. Such a process involves borrowing or copying the practices on both sides, though the general pattern which would prevail is that of the dominant body (that is, the American). The rate of assimilation varies directly with the number of intimate contacts and is retarded by isolation. The theory of "cultural pluralism" points out that it is obviously impossible for the immigrant to abandon his old heritage and to accept fully and immediately the American social pattern, that all our immigrant groups have significant contributions to make to the American culture of the future, and that the process of assimilation and the problem of the second-generation can be approached only by a better understanding and appreciation of our minorities.¹⁸

¹⁸ This thesis is developed in Francis J. Brown & Joseph S. Roucek, *One America*.



AMERICAN INTEREST IN UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR I

As Revealed in American Periodical Comments

By STEPHEN SHUMEYKO

ALTHOUGH Ukraine and Ukrainians were comparatively little known in this country during the First World War, yet paradoxically enough American interest in them, particularly in their struggle for national freedom, was of a more understanding and sympathetic nature than it has been during recent times. Such, at least is the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the various editorials and articles in leading American periodicals of that day, written by prominent American journalists and scholars. To be sure, their writings on Ukraine were not numerous, yet they were unusually well informed, and in some respects more objective, less swayed by propaganda of the enemies of the Ukrainian independence movement, than has been the case during the second World War.

* * *

One of the earliest articles on Ukraine to appear in the American press was in the *Literary Digest*, (vol. 51, p. 344) of August 21, 1915, at a time when the Ukrainian people were being subjected by Tsarist Russia to a most rigorous policy of Russification. Entitled "The Future of the Ruthenians," it reviewed the comments of the other current periodicals concerning the determined efforts of the Ukrainians to cast off their bondage. To quote the opening sentence: "Oppressed nations have a habit of becoming inconveniently obtrusive, says a writer in the London *British Review*, and a time comes when their claims can no longer be ignored. Such a moment, he thinks, has dawned for the Ruthenians, or Ukrainians as they should be termed." The article then outlines the recommendation of the Review writer to form an independent Ukraine, but under Russia's protectorate, and also outlines the demands of the Ukrainian national leaders.

Speaking of the Russian occupation then of East Galicia and the attempts to Russify the Ukrainians living there, the Digest article quotes the *British Review* as alleging that the "Ukrainian attitude today is one of undivided loyalty to Russia."

To refute this argument, the Digest publishes a pastoral letter of the then Ukrainian Catholic bishop of the United States—Msgr. Stephen Ortynsky, in which he wrote that:—

“These letters are solely an expression of grief and repugnance to the Russian Church and Government, who are heralding to the world that they are saviors of the Slavonic nations and that they alone cherish a sincere love for every Slav. We say openly before the whole world: Lord! Spare us from such a love as like the Russians showed to the Slavonic Ruthenians (Ukrainians) people in the Ukraine, and lately in Bukowina and Hungary.”

* * *

Meanwhile, the impetus of the events in Europe served to stimulate the freshly-arrived Ukrainian immigrants in America to fresh endeavors to help Ukraine. Some of this work found its echo on the pages of American periodicals. Thus the November 6, 1915 number of *Survey* (vol. 35, p. 121) contained a report of the “First Congress of a Submerged People,” held at the historic Cooper Union in New York City, and attended by 507 delegates representing 410 societies, in order “to demand the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state which should comprise the Ukrainians now inhabiting the countries of eastern Europe.”

* * *

The tremendous defeats suffered by the Russians during the second half of 1915 at the hands of Hindenburg and Mackensen revealed to the astonished world all of the age-old defects which Russia had been covering up. It revealed, too, that instead of the seemingly one mighty Russian nation composed of one homogeneous Russian people, Russia was actually composed of many subjugated races, striving for freedom or autonomy at least.

The December 11, 1915 issue of the *New Republic* (vol. 5, p. 146), featured an editorial by its editor and distinguished economist, Alvin S. Johnson, entitled “Russia’s Ireland,” where he pertinently pointed out that—“To the medieval Turk, in his bigotry and benightedness, all Western Europeans were Franks. English, French, Spanish and Italian seemed to him one language and a barbarous one. . . Let us not scoff at an antique Turkish misconception, for we cherish similar misconceptions ourselves. To us all Slavs are one, Great Russians, Poles, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs. . . But the current of Slavic immigration to the

United States promises to dispel our ignorance of the inner problems of Slavdom."

Mr. Johnson goes on to mention a book which appeared then, "Ukraine's Claim to Freedom," published in English by the Ukrainian National Association and the Ruthenian National Union. After distinguishing the Ukrainians from the Poles and Russians and citing the Ukrainian demands, he attacks the exploitation, the Russification and the Polonization of the Ukrainians as being against the cardinal principles of nationalism. He says—

"This is the essential meaning of nationalism: the conquest of all the stratas of life, from the soil up, by a homogeneous population. Russianizing, Polonizing. . . are tendencies that masquerade under the lofty ideal of creating homogeneity in vast empires. In their antagonism to separatist nationalism the centralizers are animated by much less respectable motives, the wish to reserve for the ruling race the high places, the posts of ease. They are anti-democratic much more than anti-nationalistic. And with the progress of democracy, which neither war nor reaction can check, the oppressed nations must eventually win the essentials of freedom."

* * *

The above article provoked an irritated reply by one Alexander S. Kaun, which appeared in the January 8, 1916 number of the *New Republic*. This correspondent was manifestly a rabid follower of the pan-Russian doctrine and in his letter to the periodical condemns it for giving such an "absurd interpretation" as he calls it of the Ukrainian problem. He then goes into an exposition of the familiar, moth-eaten Russian propaganda denying Ukrainian national identity.

To this Mr. Johnson replied as follows:—

"What Mr. Kaun offers is the characteristic doctrine of the Great Russian and the Russified ruling and middle classes of the Ukraine. . . Mr. Kaun informs us that the words for 'land' and 'song' are the same or nearly the same for the Great Russian and 'Little Russian' (Ukrainians). The words 'land' and 'song' are also nearly the same for German and English. . . Mr. Kaun quibbles, too, when he produces isolated words, elementary proof of kinship of languages, as proof of identity of language. He is gambling on the chance that the reader will be inexpert in philologic method. . .

"The real question at issue, however, is not linguistical but political and sociological. Is it desirable that the minority languages be ob-

literated, leaving a few great languages to divide the world among them? Bureaucratic imperialists are always inclined toward homogeneity of language. So also are the commercialized liberals, who see in diversity of speech only obstacles to trade. Men who believe in democracy, on the other hand, recognize in distinct languages thoroughly dominant upon their natural soil, a defense against encroachment on the part of greater alien peoples. Men who regard the world's cultural stock as more important than its stock of exchangeable wealth are also inclined toward the preservation of minority languages."

* * *

The March, 1916 issue of the "*Contemporary*" contained a lengthy article "The Ukrainians (Ruthenians) and the War," in which the writer, Bedwin Sands, says: "One of the national problems, which may be, and ought to be at least considered in the rearrangement of Europe after the war, is that of Ukraine."

After bringing out the differences between Ukrainians and Russians and giving a sketch of Ukrainian history, he brings out a curious fact—

"An interesting historical fact may be recalled in connection with the policy of Russia towards Ukraine. It has culminated in ruthless russification in later years, but Peter the Great offered in 1706 to John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough, the Principality of Kiev (with the crown of the Ukraine). This is recorded in Cambridge Modern History, vol. 5, chap. 9, p. 595. What a curious field for imagination is provided by the thought that descendants of the great Churchill, instead of leading the House of Commons and presiding at the British Admiralty, might have been the reigning family of a European state six times as large as Bulgaria."

Concluding the writer recommends the settling of the Ukrainian problem "on lines recognizing the principle of nationality, which as Mazzini declared over fifty years ago, was the sole foundation of peaceful brotherhood in the family of Europe."

* * *

In April, 1916, the *Review of Reviews* (vol. 53, p. 485) carried an article posing the question: "Who are the Ruthenians?" It consists mostly of quotations from an article in the "*Nuova Antologia*" (Rome) by Signor D'Acandia, who sets out the national differences between the Ukrainians and the Poles, and tells how greatly the Poles

were favored by Austria over the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. He concludes with an eloquent statement of the part that heretofore oppressed peoples may be called on to play in the future. To quote:

“And it is perhaps in the hands of these peoples, which have had to wait the downfall of modern feudalism to uplift their faces to the sun . . . that are held the keys of the world to come.”

* * *

In June, 1916 there appeared a long article in the *Catholic World* (vol. 103, p. 349), entitled “The United Ruthenian Church of Galicia under Russian Rule,” written by F. A. Palmieri, O.S.A. It is excellent in its depiction of the invasion and occupation of Galicia by the Russians and of the Russification carried on during the occupation under Count Bobrinsky.

Speaking of the political blunders of the Russians which alienated the Ukrainians from them, the writer notes that—

“One day unbiased history will point out the sad results of the violent measures adopted against the national reawakening of the Ruthenians.” The writer finds it impossible to understand why in a war which is said to be fought for the freedom and defense of oppressed nationalities, the leaders of the Ruthenian patriotism, professors, teachers, physicians, lawyers have been arrested and exiled to Siberia.”

Here the writer mentions the arrest of the late Metropolitan Andrew Sheptitsky, who refused to seek refuge in Vienna before the occupation of Lwiw by the Russians. The writer lauds this great prelate for his untiring and prodigious labors devoted to the Church and to Ukraine.

* * *

Following the previous one, we find no important articles on Ukraine appearing in American periodicals until about a year later. Undoubtedly the events on the Western Front, America's entrance into the war and other factors overshadowed completely what was happening in or to Ukraine. With the breaking out of the Russian Revolution, however, and its attendant setting up in Kiev of a Ukrainian Government, America's attention was once more focused on Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

Among those whose attention was directed there was the author of historical works, T. Lothrop Stoddard. In a postscript to his article

on "Little Russia" in the August, 1917 number of the *Century Magazine* (vol. 94, p. 569), he noted prophetically enough: "The preceding pages were written before the Russian Revolution, but I have determined to make no changes in the text because I do not believe that the Revolution will of itself solve the Ukrainian question."

At the very outset Stoddard notes that—

"Seen from without, Russia gives an impression of overpowering synthesis . . . But . . . distance lends enchantment . . . Russian unity under close scrutiny resolves itself into surprising diversity."

Continuing in this vein he notes that: "It is certain that Ukraina would have bulked large in world history had it not been for the terrible series of Asiatic invasions that overwhelmed Eastern Europe."

Then follows a long comprehensive dissertation on the Ukrainian national movement, extending from the formation of the Kievan Kingdom to modern times. The writer calls the reader's attention to the fact that the Ukrainian writers were forced to write in Russian on account of the restrictions upon the use of Ukrainian, and thus Russian literature was greatly benefitted. Throughout the entire article the writer's warm sympathy for the Ukrainian people and their struggle for freedom is more than manifest.

In conclusion, the author says:

"Nearly seven hundred years ago the old Ukrainian state perished beneath the Tatar hoofs, and since those far-off days the Ukrainian people have suffered every conceivable political, religious and economic persecution which Polish and Muscovite ingenuity could invent in the effort to stamp out the Ukrainian race identity. Besides this age-long martyrdom what is Poland's century of subjection or Finland's struggle for twenty years? Yet the Ukrainian phoenix today rises from the ashes of the dreadful past virile with life and hope. How can such burning fate, such race tenacity, be overcome?"

* * *

"Ukraine throws off the Shackles of Serfdom After 263 Years," was the title of an article appearing in the January 12, 1918 issue of the *Literary Digest* (vol. 56, p. 47).

It concerns itself with some enlightening facts on Ukraine, as given in article appearing in the *New York Sun* daily by Bedwin Sands.

Following the Ukrainian Declaration of Independence (Jan. 22, 1918) various comments on it appeared in both periodicals and news-

papers in this country. They are too numerous to dwell upon them here except to cite them. Among them worth reading are: "Ukraine Throws Off the Shackles of Serfdom After 263 Years," in the January 12, 1918 issue of the *Literary Digest* (vol. 56, p. 47); "Birth of the Ukrainian Republic," *Literary Digest*, February 23, 1918, vol. 56, p. 7); "The Ukraine People's Republic," *Independent*, March 2, 1918, vol. 93, p. 335); other informative articles and reports appeared in *Review of Reviews*, March, 1918, vol. 57, p. 307; *New York Times Current History Magazine*, March, 1918 (especially good); *ibid.* June, 1918; and *Times History of the War*, vol. 16, pt. 196, p. 16, May 21, 1918 (including pictures, such as "Ukrainians leave Kiev to Fight the Bolsheviks").

* * *

Leaving the struggle for Ukrainian freedom for the moment we find an excellent article on "Ukraine in Literature," in the *Literary Digest* of August 30, 1918 (vol. 58, p. 29). After showing that Gogol, the famous novelist was Ukrainian and not Russian by nationality, the article goes on to quote the *Athenaeum* (London) as to the beauty of the Ukrainian language:

"An Englishman who wanted to give his countrymen an idea of the beauties of the Ukrainian tongue, once advised his readers to combine mentally classical Greek with modern Italian."

The writer then elaborates:

"Probably neither Greek nor modern Italian, with their softer tones, possesses the force of Ukrainian, a force derived. . . from its strange consonantal combinations and an abundance of the deep sounds of 'ui' and 'u.' It is this peculiarity which has made a modern English authoress speak of its 'haunting musicality.' One of its distinguishing features is its unparalleled aptitude for forming diminutives. They are made not only from adjectives, adverbs and even verbs. This gives that singular charm referred to by P. Chevalier in 1871: 'The language of Ukraine is very beautiful, abundance of diminutives and pretty fashions of elegant speech making it very delicate.'

"Among its other peculiarities, the fleeting accents of its words, as well as an aptitude for its deliberate extension or cutting down of the number of syllables in the majority of its grammatical forms, together with the retention of some very archaic features, as the dual number, must be mentioned. These qualities make the language wonderfully adapted to verse, and the possibilities of its expressiveness

and harmony when handled by a native are almost unbounded.”

Concluding, the writer mentions Chekhov, Korolenko and Dostoievsky as being of Ukrainian origin, and then writes about Taras Shevchenko as well as other Ukrainian writers.

* * *

Coming now to religion we find in the September 18, 1919 number of the *Catholic World* (vol. 107, p. 820), an article by Mary Catherine Phelps Lynch entitled “Ukrainian Pictures.”

It tells of the writer’s impressions of a visit paid by her to St. George’s Ukrainian Catholic church in New York City on East 7th street. The article is very delicately and tenderly written, and its authoress appears to have more than a passing knowledge of Ukraine. It opens with a translation of the Ukrainian national anthem.

She writes of the “glorious liturgy of the Mass” while the “music, without instrument according to the Greek Church custom, had for me far more of pure devotion than that so perfect music of the Russian Cathedral Choir.”

After sketching Ukraine’s history and sufferings, she says:

“At Mass that Sunday morning a year ago, I thought of all this suffering under every conceivable persecution, political, economic and religious which these people about me had borne. I did not wonder over their lack of self-consciousness; there is no room for self in a people who have suffered as have the Ukrainians for the sake of the great things of love. Nor did the whole-heartedness of their devotion; the ardor, the humility with which each soul seemed lost in God, cause one to marvel. I have seen many people at their worship, but none as these Ukrainians. I have known no other people who have been martyrs for seven centuries.”

* * *

“Confusion in Ukraine” was the title of an article which appeared in the January 4, 1919 issue of the *Independent* (vol. 97, p. 9). Its purpose was to dispel the many unreliable reports emanating from Russia to the effect that Denikin’s forces were victorious everywhere. The author could see “no reason why Americans should rejoice in an advance of the Cossack (Denikin’s) armies, since their object seems to be to conquer the Ukrainians and restore the Russian monarchy.”

* * *

The following article, "The Case of the Ukraine," which was published in the *Nation* (April 19, 1919, vol. 108, p. 635), will interest the student of history rather than the general reader. It is a translation of a note sent by the General Secretariat of State of the Republic of Ukraine (Western Territory) to France, England, Italy and America, protesting against the Allied Mission sent at that time to adjust the fighting between the Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia, which mission, says the note, was not impartial but entirely under Polish influence and anti-Ukrainian in all respects.

* * *

"What Happened in the Ukraine" is the subject of an article in the May 3, 1919 number of the *Independent* (vol. 98, p. 169), written by the magazine's editor, author and scholar, Edwin E. Slosson, and containing maps and illustrations.

This is a long and able account of the Ukrainian struggle under Petlura against the Bolsheviks, as well as of the French and English intervention on the side of Deniken. In this connection Slosson points out that—

"It does not appear that the United States had any voice in the determination of the policy adopted toward the Ukraine, which is a pity, for they are our blood brethren. A half a million of our people have come from Ukraine. We have worked by their side and fought by their side. We can understand them and sympathize with them, as the French cannot, for the French are not a cosmopolitan and colonizing people. They stay at home and inbreed and so cannot be expected to have that personal familiarity with racial characteristics which comes natural to an American. Considering the close relationship between the United States and Ukraina and our intimate concern in their affairs, it does not seem unreasonable to expect that our government should be consulted by the Allies before they embark upon operations such as those (i.e. attempts to establish spheres of influence) that have just come to such a disastrous conclusion."

* * *

To refute the many rumors circulating at that time that the Ukrainians were Bolshevik sympathizers, the *Literary Digest* (September 6, 1919, vol. 62, p. 26) published "Ukraine Political Bill of Health," being a review of an article of the Bucharest correspondent of the "Paris Temps." To quote an excerpt:

“The wide-spread belief in Ukrainian Bolshevism . . . is due to the opponents of the Ukrainian Republic, who persisted in reporting that the Ukrainian Government was hand in glove with Lenin and Trotzky, and multiplied allusions to an alliance between Ukraine and the followers of Bela Kun (Red leader in Hungary then) . . . The truth is that the Ukrainian army is ‘giving a magnificent example of devotion to the cause of order and of right which triumphed for the Entente.’ The real ‘co-workers with the Bolsheviki are the enemies of the soldiers of Petlura and not the soldiers themselves who are ‘fighting with all their strength against Soviet tyranny and for the deliverance of their country’.”

* * *

The October, 1919 issue of the *New York Times Current History* magazine contains a good article by K. Vishevich titled “Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom.” The preface to it states that it is “vouched for by the Ukrainian National Committee of the United States,” and that it “makes clear the Ukrainian nationalists’ attitude toward Russia, Bolshevism, Germany, the Poles of Galicia and the Entente. Ukraine, with General Petlura as its military leader, is fighting Soviet Russia for independence. Regarded as a separate nation it is the largest new State created by the war, and the second largest country in Europe, in population, the fifth, and in natural resources, the richest.”

* * *

In the November 1, 1919 number of the *Nation* (vol. 109, p. 569), we find an excellent and moving report by Henry G. Alsburg of the tragic “Situation in the Ukraine” during 1919, and of his interview with Petlura. At the same time it is an indictment of Allied policy responsible for much of the situation. Alsburg notes that—

“. . . worst of all is the state of sickness and disease. It is not too much to say that about every third person in Kamanietz has had typhus. In the other cities the situation is the same. In the army it is worse. At Vapniak I was with Petlura at a review of a frontier garrison where out of a thousand troops at least two hundred had had typhus. Against this epidemic Petlura’s government is quite powerless it make headway. The Ukrainians are condemned to death by the fact that the Entente is backing Denikin.

“In an interview I had with Petlura, he begged that if only for humanity’s sake, the Red Cross would send over a mission to fight typhus. Let me add that right across the river in Rumania are all the medical

supplies necessary, as well as plenty of food with which to feed the dying Ukrainian children. The head of the American Red Cross in Czernowitz, and also the head in Bucharest, had a first impulse to send supplies here. But two American Red Cross delegates have since come from Paris, who say that they will have to go first to the Ukraine to investigate the conditions. One of them told me that the Entente had decided to back Denikin, and would do nothing for the Ukrainians in Petlura's territory. In short, far from being any mission to relieve the terrible suffering, they had been sent merely to report on how near Petlura was to breaking down."

This *Nation* correspondent then indicts the devious policy followed by the Entente which caused the failure to establish a stable government in Ukraine, led to anarchy, and caused "hundreds of thousands to have perished because of our stupidity."

"All that one can say is that the western Ukraine is perhaps one of the nearest places imaginable, to the city folk at any rate, to Hell," wrote Alsberg.

"We not only asphyxiated Petlura by a terrible blockade, but we actually destroyed him by allowing Denikin to attack his forces. We would let neither Petlura nor the Soviets rule Ukraine. We promoted anarchy through Denikin."

* * *

Transferring our attention from Ukraine we find "Ukrainians in America," in the November 15, 1919 issue of the *Literary Digest* (vol. 63, p. 40). This was one of the "Lessons in Patriotism" prepared by the periodical for school use. In it we are told that the Ukrainians are "a large element of the population," more than one million of them.

From it we further learn that—

"about twenty years ago (1899) the Ukrainians began to come to this country in great numbers, which increased until they were landing at the estimated rate of 100,000 per year. The outbreak of the war in 1914 resulted in the stopping of their immigration . . .

"In the American forces during the war there were 30,000 men of Ukrainian descent. As an extremely thrifty and prosperous race, in whatever calling, the Ukrainians were among the heaviest buyers of Liberty Bonds in the class of foreign nationals."

The survey then describes their organizations, churches, and activities. There is also data on the Ukrainian Canadians.

* * *

The February 7, 1920 issue of the *Nation* (vol. 110, p. 184) published an "Appeal of the Ukrainian Cooperatives." After outlining the status of the Ukrainian cooperative system in Ukraine, the petition appealed to the U. S. Government to send them machinery in return for Ukrainian raw materials and partly manufactured goods. The purpose behind this was to "establish stable and permanent trade and commercial relations between Ukraine and the United States."

* * *

"Poland 'Freeing' the Ukraine," in the May 15, 1920 number of the *Literary Digest* (vol. 65, p. 29), is an article expressing American skepticism concerning the motives of the Polish advance on Kiev following the alliance made then by the Poles with Petlura. Most of the quoted newspaper editorials in this survey saw in this offensive the fact that "Poland is animated by imperialism and that the campaign will be provocative of other and more terrible wars. 'It is a war of aggression,' flatly says the 'Brooklyn Eagle'."

* * *

The *New York Times Current History* magazine published in its July, 1921 number (vol. 14, p. 657) "The Letters of an Ukrainian Soldier" in their English translation, written by Omilan Tarnavsky of the Ukrainian Army to his father, Very Rev. Philemon Tarnavsky, here in this country.

These letters throw vivid light upon the life of a Ukrainian soldier forced to fight on many fronts in the defense of Ukrainian freedom, against the Poles, the Bolsheviks and the Denikinities.

* * *

This survey of American periodical comment on Ukraine during the first World War would not be complete without, mention here at its close, of a most enlightening article which appeared in the July, 1921 issue of the *Century* magazine, entitled "The Ukraine and the Balance of Power," by Herbert Adams Gibbons, distinguished American author, scholar and foreign correspondent.

After outlining the attempts of the victors to create a balance of power in Europe, Dr. Gibbons brings forward the Ukrainian problem:

"An independent Ukraine, however, does not seem to fit in with the interests of the victors in the World War, as these interests are conceived by their statesmen. Hence, every possible effort is being made to

deny the existenc of a Ukrainian race. During the last few years the most absurd and unfounded statements about the Ukrainians have been circulated and have gained credence. To get at the truth we must consult authorities who wrote before 1914. In those days, uninfluenced by political considerations and the prejudices born of the war, historians, geographers, ethnologists, and philologists of France, Germany, and Great Britain did not question the fact of the Ukrainian race. They wrote voluminously of its origin from a distinct Slavic immigration, of its racial characteristics, of its language, more nearly allied to Servian than to Russian, and of its independent history before it was swallowed up by the Polish and Muscovite empires. Students of the history and peoples and languages of Eastern Europe have never dreamed of confusing Great Russians (Muscovites) and Ukrainians. Simply because the Ukrainians are Slavs and have been subject to Poland and Russia for nearly three centuries, must they be considered as a branch of the Russian race and their language a Russian dialect, or must the right of Poland to seize the territory they inhabit, be admitted? If such theses were consistently supported by the Entente (Allied) governments, what would become of Poland's claims against Russia and Germany?

“ . . . We are creatures of habit, blissful in our ignorance, and so we have readily believed the propagandists when they told us that the Ukrainian Nationalist movement is an artificial creation of German propaganda during the War, launched to destroy Russian unity and continued after the Revolution to thwart reconstruction of Poland. Because one never happened to hear of the Ukraine, the Ukraine does not exist. Or because one does not want the Ukraine to exist, the Ukraine does not exist. The French peasant dismisses the unfamiliar with a positive ‘Je ne le connais pas.’ That settles it. I fear we have his mentality without his frankness. The possession of the one, or the absence of the other, is disastrous. The peasant does not have to bother with the unknown, for the unknown does not affect his life. Intelligent public opinion, however, which is the salvation of democracies has to know about Ukraine, nilly-willy, in order to deal with Ukraine. Annoying factors in world politics do not disappear by ignoring them.”

He then asks the question, “Why were the Ukrainians treated as they were and not permitted to enjoy the fruits of liberty and independance?”

“Because” says he, “an independent Ukraine stood in the way of every combination to create a new balance of power favorable to France

. . . and Great Britain. This statement will be strenuously denied by propagandists, but I believe that the facts in the case support the statement."

"The misfortunes of the Ukrainians have come from the fact that the independent existence of their nation was an obstacle to the political aims of all the rival forces contending for supremacy, and at the same time proved an irresistible magnet to the occult powers behind armies, which lust for oil and coal and iron and monopolies of food stuffs and raw materials."

He then shifts to the East Galician phase of the Ukrainian struggle for independence and shows how imperialistic Poland, aided by her equally imperialistic ally, got control of Ukraine. The article also contains a historical survey of Ukraine.



UKRAINE UNDER A DELIBERATE BLACKOUT

By MICHAEL NAGURNEY

St. Basil College, Stamford, Conn.

IT WOULD be difficult to black out a nation of forty five million people and pass over in silence their political aspirations, were it not because of the unusual conditions produced by the Soviet-American political relations. It would be especially difficult to do this in Europe, were it not for the fact that the soil of Ukraine is the most coveted area of the continent.

In spite of all the sacrifices made by Ukraine in the crushing of Nazism, reasons of expediency have brought it about that it is under the most complete blackout in the world not only because of Soviet official propaganda but also because of the actions of most of the correspondents of the democratic countries. This covers the religious persecution of the Western Ukrainians, the imprisonment of all the bishops, the arrest of over one thousand priests, and the execution of dozens of them, a persecution which reminds us of the days of ancient Nero. No mention is made either of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian political refugees in Western Europe, who have often been delivered by force into Soviet hands for annihilation. Even the American correspondents who are eager to discover the minor details of American and British Military Government in Germany are unable to inform the world about these unfortunate victims of that new world which was organized by the Big Three at the conferences in Yalta and in Moscow. Expediency demands that there must be a blackout of the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people against the bloody rule of the Kremlin.

To say that the Ukrainian people were subjects of another nation would be tantamount to asserting that during enemy occupation the Phillipines were the property of Japan, that at a somewhat earlier period Ethiopia belonged to Italy, or that most of Europe recently was the lawful property of that power which recently withdrew its gory tentacles before the demand of unconditional surrender. If we refuse to accept aggrandizement by conquest, it becomes illogical to infer that any nation belongs to any other nation. An exception is made for Ukra-

ine only in order to secure the good will of Joseph Stalin, now the virtual dictator of the world.

At least four Ukrainian armies composed the bulk of the Soviet forces which fought on the Eastern European front. Their cause was just because the German hordes had wrought destruction not so much upon Russian property as upon the Ukrainian lands and people. The Ukrainians, who in Finland in 1939 were reported reluctant to bear Russian arms, surged forward through 1943-1944-1945 as the prongs of victory in Europe. The war in East Europe had become a war of retribution for never was a land so ravaged not only by fire and sword of the invader but also by the scorched earth method of the withdrawing forces. The road back renewed that destruction.

It is to be noted that in the eastward withdrawal the bulk of the defending forces was Russian. Beginning with the defense of Stalingrad a force consisting of the four Ukrainian armies with other troops sent the Germans reeling back in disaster. It is to be further noted that the forces composed of Russians were assigned to the northern flank while the Ukrainian armies operated in the south. Russian psychology indicated that retribution could best be inflicted upon the enemy by the people who had suffered most—hence the assignment of Ukrainian armies to the task of driving the Germans from the Ukrainian lands.

Perhaps the most disturbing factor about the Russians in American minds is the perpetual news blackout in the Soviet. To an American it would seem that "Pravda" is the only newspaper in Russia. Perhaps it is. At any rate it is the only Soviet newspaper of which the average American is aware. The news blackout is an interesting demonstration of the Soviet psychology which has been employed since the present administration came into power following the revolution.

Should we be tempted to ask why the Ukrainians are not speaking for themselves we might look for reply to the Balkan and Baltic countries. Why have we heard nothing from them since "liberation"? The majority of the Ukrainians have been living under similar circumstances since 1920.

Our correspondents are not permitted to circulate freely through those reconquered lands which are under Russian control. These are the only allied controlled territories where correspondents are denied the privileges of their profession. On the other hand, the censorship imposed upon correspondents in Moscow is a basis for everlasting complaint from those who are assigned to that city, while they do not take

into consideration the censorship imposed by correspondents upon themselves concerning the Ukrainian problem.

Should the Soviet alter its policy and our correspondents would have the courage despite official Soviet-American policy to tell the full truth they would discover upon visiting Ukraine that here is a land ravaged in the extreme and inhabited by a people determined to eke out an independent existence. They would find also several millions of Ukrainians living in the Western section of Ukraine beyond the Soviet boundaries of 1939 and to unite with their eastern brothers in an expression of that freedom for which their ancestors had longed for generations but which they had not obtained under Soviet Russian rule. Such an expression was made manifest in 1918-1919, but their covetous neighbors could not withstand the temptation of seizing from a weakened people lands so rich in natural resources.

The economical self-sufficiency of Ukraine is a real fact. Among the natural products of the Ukrainian soil are huge quantities of coal, petroleum, salt, iron, steel and other metals. Wheat, rye, barley, oats, corn, potatoes, and sugar beats are produced in such great quantities that more are exported than can be used at home.

Democracy is inborn in the Ukrainians. It had flourished among their ancestors in the latter part of the Middle Ages. Though tsarist historians in their subtle way speak of the people as "rebels and the separatists," the tsars had good reason to fear those principles which became the clarion call of liberty throughout the world. We are now victorious after a second war for democracy, yet the people who first revived it as a national practise since ancient times are the least remembered of all.

The Ukrainians flourished as a nation as early as the ninth century. Lying on the crossroads of Europe and Asia the nation acquired not only the culture of the eastern peoples but also that of the western whose merchants passed by the crossroads with caravans laden with goods. Kiev, the first capital of Ukraine, was not only the home of princes whose exploits capture the imagination, but also was the host of most commercial and economic expeditions which carried on trade between the European countries and the Middle East. As early as 988 the Ukrainians, after a carefully planned study of their own pagan and other religions, accepted Christianity from Byzantium. There need be no surprise, then, that there was intermarriage between the members of the Ukrainian court and those of the courts of Europe including France,

Norway, England, and the middle countries for the court of Kiev was most progressive.

During the eleventh century and the early part of the twelfth, the Susdalian principality, the predecessor of Muscovy, was established on the northern colonial territories of the Ukrainian kingdom. The reasons for the separation were perhaps many but most important of all was the different racial descent of the local population. At any rate, a century later the northern state was sufficiently developed to attack and pillage Kiev and to initiate the decline of the first Ukrainian government. In reality it was the beginning of several hundred years of bitter struggle between Kiev and its northern neighbor, Moscow.

Three quarters of a century later the Suzdalians were conquered by the Mongol hordes. It was the liberty loving Ukrainian Prince Daniel who first organized a plan to evict the Asiatics. Before his plan could be executed it was discovered and the Mongols forced Daniel to abandon it and destroy all the fortifications he had secretly constructed. The struggle of Ukraine against the barbarians was propitious for the development of civilization in Western Europe. Ukraine was fighting in its defence.

The Suzdalians established in Moscow their capital city. The country was called Muscovy until four centuries later when tsar Peter conceived the plan which he hoped would be fatal to the Ukrainian aspirations. Historically the title "Rus" belonged to the people who are now known as Ukrainians.

After subjugating the Ukrainian Kozak Republic Peter appropriated their ancient title "Rus" and became the first ruler to call his country Russia, "the land of Rus." He was also the first Muscovite ruler who tried to introduce western civilization into Russia. In the meantime the Ukrainians slipped again into a period of national insignificance after the decline of the Kozak Republic.

The Ukrainian Kozakdom was a true democracy. Founded in approximately 1540 it continued to influence international policy in Eastern Europe until the partition of Ukraine in 1772 by Austria and Russia simultaneously with the partition of Poland. Under the democratic structure of Ukrainian Kozak Republic the people elected the president whose title was "Hetman." Laws were proposed and accepted in the assembly, and then submitted to the Hetman for concurrence. The Hetman was elected for an indefinite term but he could be deposed by the assembly, in a way similar to impeachment or recall.

The assembly concluded treaties with other nations and the Ukra-

inian Kozak Republic went often to the aid of both Poland and Russia in fulfillment of its obligations, particularly in the wars against the Turks.

The defense of Stalingrad during the World War II was more than the defense of a city, for it was the last remaining citadel on the west side of the Volga. It was the last remaining city within the sphere of Ukrainian operations where the forces could be regrouped for the stand which broke the dangerous German offensive. After Stalingrad the German drive went into reverse, and was powered by American arms in the hands of the Ukrainian forces. Is it any wonder then that the Germans never recovered from the blows struck within its ravaged walls?

The modern history of Ukraine in the nineteenth century is similar to that of Poland in the same period. The national development was handicapped by the despotism of the tsars on the one hand and by the rise to power of Austria-Hungary on the other. Subjugated politically, the Ukrainians turned to literature and the arts for national sustenance. The works of such prominent men as Skovoroda, the philosopher; Bezborodko, the librarian; Shashkevich, the educator; and Shevchenko, poet and author, laid the groundwork for the emancipation of the peasants under Austria, while the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius championed the reorganization of Russia as a federation of free national republics. Franko, the writer, Hrushevsky, the historian, and Archbishop Sheptitsky, philanthropist and Churchman, were true representatives of the Ukrainian efforts for independence.

In spite of the difficult conditions under the tsars, Ukrainian independence won a resounding victory in 1905. Previous to the Russo-Japanese War the tsars spared no effort to destroy any evidence that the Ukrainians were a distinct people from the Russians. A revival of the Ukrainian language and press occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century but it met violent oppositions. Following the revolution of 1905 even the Russian Imperial Academy of Science declared themselves to have found that the Ukrainian language was a separate language as different from Russian as it was different from Polish or any other Slavonic language.

The determination of the Ukrainians to enjoy the life of an independent nation became obvious during the first world war. It is interesting, that it came into the open after the ukase of the tsar restraining the rights of language and organization. The challenge was taken up by the formation of *The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine*, the avowed

purpose of which was to struggle for an independent Ukrainian nation. The great Russian Revolution of 1917 offered the opportunity of proclaiming Ukraine as an independent Democratic Republic.

Consequently when Western Ukraine won its independence from the disintegrating Austria-Hungary (1918) and Eastern Ukraine declared its independence from Russia (1917) both areas merged to form the United Ukrainian Republic on January 22, 1919.

Events which followed in swift succession consisted mostly of "sink or swim" diplomacy. As the poorly armed Ukrainian armies were unable to wage a war against well armed and supported powers, the diplomats turned for justice and the free exercise of human rights to the statesmen of constituted nations. There followed a period of alliance, indecision, the rebuke of alliance, internal upheaval, external intrigue, and disintegration. It was the combined forces of Russia, Poland and Roumania which destroyed this Ukrainian bid for freedom.

The cause of Ukraine was prominent at Versailles. It was championed by President Woodrow Wilson among others, but the tigerish Clemenceau prevailed and another partition of Ukraine followed.

The inborn Ukrainian idea of democracy again asserted itself in the resistance to Soviet efforts to collectivize the farms and villages. The dignity of the individual and the rights of private property were defended with such tenacity that in the periods of 1923-1924 and again in 1932-1933 an estimated nine millions of people sacrificed their lives in passive resistance as a protest against collectivization.

Even after the ill-fated Munich agreement the nation temporarily cherished a ray of hope. This came in response to the granting of that autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine which had been promised in the 1919 Czechoslovak constitution. A national election was decided upon and a legislative assembly of elected members was convoked. The assembly elected as its president a priest, Rev. A. Voloshyn. Unfortunately, the armies of Hitler's ally Hungary crushed the sprouting democracy before it was possible to accomplish anything real while unhappy Poland cheered on the sidelines.

In spite of the blackout by official information we cannot say that Ukraine is a forgotten nation absolutely, for when the issue is pressed, statesmen display an amazing knowledge of the facts. Discussions on the subject have been more common in the British Parliament than in any other legislative body. There were many such debates before the outbreak of the recent conflagration. Outside of these outspoken discus-

sions of the nation's future are rare, but occasional hints are obvious here and there in print and in the spoken word.

The most recent and frank discussion occurred recently in the British Parliament when Prime Minister Churchill went before that body to explain the Yalta agreement. At least two points were brought to the fore in the speeches.

First, Western Ukraine had never previously been a part or possession of Russia and never wished to be a part of Soviet Russia. This is very important in view of the fact that such nations as the Baltic group; Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, had previously been incorporated into that East European power. The second point was that the British House knew the strength of the Ukrainian national movement which had existed for many years in that territory. Mr. Eden pointed out factually that the dispute over the Curzon line was not purely a Polish-Russian question. He stated that it was also very much a Ukrainian question because there were a vast majority of Ukrainians in the area. Mr. Eden answered questions, in that historic debate, by stating that the British government was not in possession of factual up to date information. The same is probably true of all other governments except the Soviets. The present occupants of Ukraine are very well informed about Ukrainian underground fighting for the liberation of Ukraine from Nazi Germany as well as Russian-Soviet domination. The Moscow rulers are well informed about the hundreds of thousands of victims who are suffering national as well as religious persecution in the recently occupied territory of Western Ukraine. The world will be kept in ignorance concerning events under Soviet control until our correspondents will be permitted the same freedom of travel and expression as foreign correspondents are permitted in our United States.

The debates in the British Parliament merely serve to indicate that the nation has been blacked out because it is convenient to do so at present. It is probably that the injection of the Ukrainian question at San Francisco was made by a majority of small freedom-loving nations in the interest of the freedom of Ukraine and not merely to give the Soviets an extra vote in world affairs.

We must not hinder the conscience of a free world in its task of removing that artificial blackout over Ukraine.

BOOK REVIEWS

TARAS SHEVCHENKO: SELECTED POEMS, Translated with an Introduction by Clarence A. Manning, Ukrainian National Association, Jersey City, 1945, pp. 217, \$2.50.

First impressions have a deep and lasting value in determining one's attitude to any writer whose works fall into one's hands. The Ukrainian National Association is to be congratulated in the first place on the appearance and format of this volume on Shevchenko by Dr. Manning. Old Doctor Samuel Johnson once said that "what we need are books we can hold easily and take to the fireside with us." The volume is clearly printed on a good page, opens easily and is light to hold.

All this may seem at first sight to be a very minor consideration in comparison to the poetical selections from one of the finest flowerings of the human spirit the world has hitherto known. Yet it does have something to do with helping to secure a first welcome from those for whom it is intended, namely: English-speaking readers, whether of Ukrainian origin or not. Indeed it should appeal to the latter most of all, by revealing to them the soul of a great poet-prophet who is worthy to stand beside the finest interpreters of the themes which are priceless to humanity.

"It is a strange fate," says Dr. Manning in his Foreword, "that has confined knowledge of his works to some scanty references in books on literature, while lesser men in other languages have received fantastic praises." The significance of any poet who can transcend the limits of his nation and language lies in his universalism, and this Shevchenko displays in an eminent degree, but because he wrote in the vernacular of a people oppressed for centuries, harried by a fearful and jealous political police, he is only just beginning to emerge and to take his rightful place among the singers of world importance. This volume is a worthy passing on of the torch of Shevchenko's spirit expressed in his verse to Americans in their own speech, to a people who have so far been able to realize some of the ideals for which Shevchenko pleaded as a voice crying in the wilderness.

The four chapters of biographical and critical introduction constitute the best that has so far been written in English to the best of my

knowledge. After giving a picture of the literary background of the poet's times, there is a very full biographical study of the man himself, who lived a life full of romantic but tragic episodes. Here is a poet, born a serf, who experienced an exaltation to intercourse with the finest artistic and intellectual circles of contemporary Russian life only to be plunged into the depths of lonely exile with a penal battalion in the far away Caucasus among the half-naked Kirghiz tribes, and then to die at a comparatively early age with the best promise of his genius still unfulfilled.

What seems to me the best of these scholarly and illuminating chapters is the third, which deals with the poetry of Shevchenko. The reading of this emphatically dissipates the superficial view of Shevchenko as a mere serf who suddenly appeared as an untutored genius. Dr. Manning says: "There is need of far more study than has hitherto been undertaken as to the way in which he (Shevchenko) acquired knowledge and trained himself for his great work." However Dr. Manning does more than, as he says, "trace in broad outlines" the poet's intellectual resources and their development. It is conclusively shown that Shevchenko was by no means the guileless and unthinking poet writing in a peasant dialect as he appeared to the superior and self-satisfied Russian literary critics. Posterity often wreaks a terrible vengeance on the self-constituted arbiters of literary taste and judgment. A study of his work shows that Shevchenko was a person well acquainted with the literatures of Europe as filtered through Russian and Polish translations and critical studies. For example, Dr. Manning points out he was very well acquainted with Zhukovsky, the outstanding Russian authority on European literatures and the foremost translator. Zhukovsky's translation of Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard* has become a classic in its own right in the Russian language. Dr. Manning also points out that Shevchenko's ballads, while thoroughly Ukrainian, show the employment of the same artistic principles that Scott and Schiller consciously used in their works of the same order.

There is a "deceptive simplicity" about his work, remarks Dr. Manning, which conceals the master artist. Unlike Edgar Allan Poe, however, who has given us a thorough analysis of the workings of the artistic spirit in evolving his poem *The Raven*, Shevchenko has never laid bare the creative process in himself or given us a single hint as to how he attained his artistic mastery, for his earliest poems are as perfect in their own way as his greatest masterpieces. In regard to this "deceptive simplicity," let me adduce here what Dr. Simovych wrote in the

preface to his edition of the *Kobzar*, 1921: "The view still stubbornly persists among us that Shevchenko was a people's poet and that anyone who takes his works in hand will understand them at once. This is a misconception, entirely untrue. However, it is not strange. One picks up the *Kobzar* and reads a portion—the words are simple, the meaning seems clear, but when one thinks it over, here there is something inexplicable, there again, is something one does not rightly grasp. For in order to understand it all thoroughly, one must not merely be transplanted in thought to the times when Shevchenko lived, must not only endeavor to understand the conditions in which the people then lived and breathed, however difficult it may be to know their thoughts and desires, but beyond all this there is Shevchenko's own particular individual point of view . . . All this requires a great deal of study, for all that happened then is reflected in the *Kobzar*. And one must also know Shevchenko's life well, for that was not like that of other peoples' and it weighs heavily in the poet's works—this also demands much study, for up to now all is not yet clear . . . therefore the majority of the readers of the *Kobzar* merely *feel* that it does contain something that pulses with strength, ardor and truth, something that grips the soul, but that is all. And all this is still far, far away from a true understanding of the *Kobzar*."

This is setting up a high standard indeed, but one of the great merits, to my mind at least, is that Dr. Manning's introductory studies and the illuminating and interpretative notes prefixed to the individual poetical selections chosen for translation go as far as the ordinary reader needs for an appreciation of and an understanding of Shevchenko in English garb.

Not one of the least of Shevchenko's glories is that he gave the Ukrainian language a standing in world literature by writing in it, so that one, in approaching his work, will have to learn at least that a language so often decried as a mere "peasant dialect" must needs have an independent existence to have produced a genius who used it as his idiom in speaking his message not only to his own people but to mankind. I am reminded of Franko's early tribute to Kotlyarevsky in which he compares him to a mighty eagle sitting on a snowy height which suddenly starts up and takes to flight in the heavens:

His sweeping wing brushed off a clod of snow,
It fell and started other clods downhill;

They gathered strength and force and size until
An avalanche went thund'ring down below.

Shevchenko was the avalanche and his course is not yet stayed.

PERCIVAL CUNDY, TH.D.
West Collingswood, N. J.

"WE CAN DO BUSINESS WITH RUSSIA," by Hans Heymann, with foreword by Eric Johnston, Ziff Davis Publishing Co., Chicago-New York. 268 pp. \$2.50.

The dissolution of the Comintern by Stalin and his regime was obviously justified. Why maintain a great and expensive apparatus all over the world whose propaganda value was oftentimes overshadowed by the displeasure of countries and governments in which the Comintern operated, if the same and even better propaganda minus displeasure can be had free of charge. The deluge of indiscriminately pro-Soviet books together with their "selling of Russia" to America and conversely "selling America down the river" proves that with or without a Comintern the Soviet Union is out to capture American public opinion.

The volume here discussed is addressed to American businessmen whom the author is trying to convince that business with Russia offers the best opportunities to America in the postwar world, and to some extent to the American public at large whose possible opposition to a long-term interest-free fifteen billion dollar loan to Russia the author is trying to melt.

What price does the author ask America to pay for the opportunity of doing business with Russia? Not much in cash, only the ten to fifteen billion dollars, on long term without interest. That would certainly not be too excessive a price to pay for a volume of business which would provide the United States with full employment for a number of years. But the author does not make any such promise, stating merely (along with the author of the foreword) that "we can do business with Russia, and Russia can do business with us." The price, however, which Mr. Heymann asks Americans to pay for business with Russia in social and economical changes is according to this reviewer too brazenly exorbitant to be acceptable to any American with the least sense of business. He wants no less than that America substitute "production for use" in place of "production for profit" and abandon capitalism for social capitalism, which of course does not differ in any

respect from what the Soviet authorities have introduced in place of communism.

Mr. Heymann appears to be an expert in social capitalism and kindred sciences purporting to create real wealth out of paper credit operations, but in matters political concerning Russia he is either closing his eyes purposely to certain basic facts, or else his Russo-philism does not permit him to see them. The most Mr. Heymann can say in condemnation of Russia's cruelty, slavery, ruthlessness and extermination of political opponents is "If Russia has been a little ruthless in a land of inherited ruthlessness, let us look at it in the light of her problems . . ." (p. 211). The question of subjugated nations such as Ukraine is completely ignored. Instead Mr. Heymann mentions the existence of "Little Russia" which furnishes wheat to the whole Soviet Union. In case anyone would have doubts about the status of nations within the Soviet Union, Mr. Heymann blandly informs the reader on p. 213 "Each of the sixteen Soviet Republics has the right of withdrawal similar to that of members of the British Commonwealth."

Fortunately there are books which endeavor to present Russia to the American reader in an objective light, like William L. White's "Report on the Russians" with which, however, Mr. Heymann deals in a summary manner describing it as "gloomy." We may well ask Mr. Heymann whether the picture of millions in slave labor gangs, other millions starved by artificial famine, still other millions deported from their homelands is not gloomy indeed?

In final appraisal of "Can we do business with Russia" this reviewer wishes to pose a question to the author: in extolling Russia and the splendid business opportunities it offers America is it really necessary to fight World War I verbally all over again on behalf of Germany?

It seems that one of the secondary purposes of the above book is to disprove Germany's guilt in World War I and prove the cruelty and folly of the Treaty of Versailles, commonly known in Germany as "Versailler Diktat." For otherwise why should the author of a book about Russia insert such paragraphs as (p. 66) "reparations and other excesses of the Versailles Treaty" . . . "imposed by the Versailles Treaty;" (p. 105) "By accepting Lend-Lease as a matter of principle, Congress righted the wrong of Versailles," and finally, (p. 148) "In-

sistence upon the pound of flesh in reparations and war debts as a principle of international relations has been ameliorated by well-meant financial makeshifts such as the economic elements of the Versailles Treaty."

ROMAN OLESNICKI

RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD, by Max Laserson, 1945, The Macmillan Company, New York. 275 pp.

This work, written by a Latvian-born and Russian-educated professor, presently teaching at Columbia University, is another addition in the currently fashionable endeavor on the part of such individuals to "explain" to the American public the history, politics, and economics of Russia toward the desirable end of a more liberal human understanding among peoples. Yet, despite the obvious competency of the author in most respects, the sincerity of purpose and simplicity of technique permeating his entire treatment, and the impressive publicity given his work, highlighting especially its foundation on original sources unavailable to American writers unacquainted with the Russian tongue, his achievement, it must be honestly stated in all fairness to Professor Laserson, is only a partial success. Except for one or two chapters, the results of his avowedly "scientific examination" represent in large measure a rehash of comparatively recent events in the Soviet Union and its relations with the world, especially chapter six on Soviet foreign policy; moreover, his opinions, in the academic form of reflective generalizations based on assembled facts, are not new, nor are the numerous errors that typically recur in treatments by Russian-educated authors, notably in the fields of Ukrainian and Russian history.

Mr. Laserson's thesis is in essentially twofold. Confessing at the very outset, in a favorably liberal scientific spirit, the somewhat hypothetical character of several of his results conceived in factual contexts still in a state of flux, he maintains foremost (1) that in the past decade Soviet thought and action, shaped more experientially than ideologically, have taken a direction far astray from the dogmatical lines of Marxist doctrine and (2) that during approximately the same period Soviet foreign policy, affected equally dominantly by internal and external changes and developments, itself is a further manifestation substantially at difference with Marxist aspirations, following instead revived nationalist lines presently being affixed in the interests

of security and peace to the national criteria of other powers. Thus, of the two main positions governing analyses of trends in the Soviet Union today, namely that the U.S.S.R. hasn't substantially repudiated its Marxist ideology, rather it is opportunistically pursuing a course purposed to realize eventually Marxist ends, as represented in the contemporary works of Dr. Dallin, and that the Kremlin, whether it likes it or not, by sheer force of circumstance beyond its control has been compelled to follow both internal and political behavior, the author upholds the latter. Much can be and is said for both, but obviously only future developments will conclusively resolve this interesting issue.

After defining this position, the author proceeds to argue for it on the basis of the facts he so carefully assembles. His main point that the Soviet Union has radically changed from the position of a world revolutionary unit to a traditionally national state is given support by the indicative fact that the present Red Army, with its revived embellished ranks and an admission oath stressing the Soviet homeland as against socialism, which was not formerly done, is not the same as the proletarian protector of yesteryear (p. 47); by the fact that the Russian Patriarchate has been fanfaringly restored (p. 58); by the fact that Russian jurisprudence has been rehabilitated after the phase of Marxist negativism (p. 136); by the fact that Russian national history has been patriotically restored (p. 158); and by the fact that especially after the Soviet Union's entrance into the League of Nations, it has had to repudiate its original Marxist antagonism toward states representing "bourgeois capitalism" in favor of a stabilization theory, allowing for the co-existence of socialist and capitalist states and significantly having led to the elimination of the Comintern (chapt. 6).

All of these facts, except that of rehabilitated Russian jurisprudence, curiously enough receive a counterposing interpretation in Dr. Dallin's works, notably his "The Real Soviet Russia" and "The Big Three—The United States, Britain, Russia," and with greater effectiveness in demonstrating that these events are not inconsistent with the retention and advocacy of basic Marxist ideology. Moreover, in elaborating on each of these paramount points, the author exposes himself to many an indictment of error in his selection of presumed facts and the interpretations made. For one, his view of the radical collectivization of the peasantry as a justified necessity for modern warfare smacks of specious reasoning (p. 42). To write off the countless lives lost in this brutal program and the unimaginable havoc created as a

result on this slim note of justification is hardly commendable in the least. The facts that collectivization is an intrinsic tenet of the Soviet experiment, war or no war, that its initiation at the end of the 20's was at a time when threat of war was non-existent, and that even in terms of maximum productivity such a measure is questionable do not seem to interest the author.

Furthermore, he overdoes the significance of the restoration of the patriarchate in 1943 without even raising the question of its political utilization by the Soviet government in the Balkans and as is now witnessed in the persecution of the Uniates in Western Ukraine. When one considers the historical importance of the Russian church in implementing the ends of traditional Russian aggrandizement, as was and is now seen in Ukraine, it is hard to believe that any writer bent upon scholarly thoroughness would ignore this consideration.

His contrast between the Soviet attitude toward constitutional law and what he terms German cynicism is likewise specious inasmuch, as the author himself shows, both states advanced the sanctimonious spirit of liberal law, but violated it consistently by deeds through the numerous escape clauses imbedded in their respective laws, constitutional or otherwise. In any dictatorship final and ultimate power rests with personal leadership, not a popularly applicable set of laws.

In addition to attaching undue importance to the forms and letters of Soviet law, the author commits an equally grave error in his adulations over the federal form of the Soviet Union which he considers "of primary importance, the matter of democratic rights and their assertion secondary" (p. 95). Such misplacement of value requires little comment, but to state that what is only nominally federal but actually dictatorially centralized resulted from voluntary agreement on the part of the Soviet Republics (p. 97), that the problems of federation there are comparable to those of the United States in the past (p. 103), and that Polish Ukrainians were attracted by the Ukrainians in the "autonomous" Soviet Ukrainian Republic (p. 111) is to commit the gravest of errors—namely untruth!

For want of space only a few more timely criticisms may be made here. The author praises the Soviets for elevating the inferior peoples of Asia—semi-barbaric tribes—through its nominally federal government (p. 95), but refuses to entertain the relevant idea that this was motivated by a Russian desire to offset overwhelmingly any opposition from the more advanced peoples of the west, such as the Ukrainians. Yet, in another place (p. 110) he argues against the thesis that the Soviet

proclamation of 16 constituent republics was directed toward future territorial aggrandizement because "Russian influence will decline progressively." Such casuistry is hardly instructive.

In his chapter on "The Rehabilitation of National History," the author ably describes the resuscitation of national historical consciousness among the Soviets, but here, too, fails to judge it as the old chauvinistic presentation which arrogates to itself portions of Ukrainian history, namely that of Kiev. The most glaringly nonsensical aspect of it is the intention of Soviet historians to depict Russia as having passed through the same stages as the West—slave-owning, feudalism, bourgeois capitalism—and yet to incorporate Kievan history as part of it (p. 158). This too, Mr. Laserson passes uncritically.

In conclusion, the book sheds considerable light on the many tendencies engulfing the U.S.S.R. in recent times. Especially is the chapter on law commendable, but it fails miserably in its historical portions; and as for the bulkiest chapter, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West," it rates far below the clear analysis provided in Dallin's "The Big Three . . ."

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
New York University



UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS

“Soviet Race and Nationality Policies,” by William H. Chamberlin.
The Russian Review, Autumn, 1945.

Herein the author dwells on a problem which poses many misunderstandings in the world today. Soviet diplomats boast of the Kremlin as having solved the problem of nationalities in an ideal manner, to be emulated by other nations. American Sovietophiles talk a good deal about an “ethnic democracy” in the Soviet Union, although facts do not bear out the existence of such democracy in practice, best proof of which is the tremendous difference in rights enjoyed by Ukrainians as compared with the Russians. W. H. Chamberlin stresses the fact that the Soviets grant equal rights to all nationalities in theory and (also in theory) consider any form of racial discrimination a crime. What about practice? In practice the deciding factor is the current policy of the centralistic communist party, whose policy is the law of the land in the Soviet Union, regardless of contrary provisions of laws and the constitution.

Mr. Chamberlin has not quite rounded out his thesis, omitting e. g. to tell that the communist party adhered until about 1934 to internationalist principles which were supplanted with principles of Russian nationalism at that time, obliterating as a matter of course all theoretical equalities of races and nationalities. One more problem requires our attention, and that is the fact that the Kremlin applies to the most primitive races of Asia (e.g. the Yakuts) the same policy that it does to nations with a highly developed centuries old separate culture. There can be no argument about the fact, that the establishment of elementary education is for the Yakuts an attainment of a great degree of freedom. It must be borne in mind, that because of the low cultural development of most of Russian's Asiatic races, they naturally adopt the language of their masters as a sign of higher civilization. Therefore these primitive people are satisfied, although unbeknownst to them, they are being russified. The same standards of policy towards nationalities when applied to Ukraine turn into a paradox of racial equality. For the truth of the matter is, that Ukraine is being forcibly russified by the dominant Russian factor in the Soviet

Union and Ukrainians compelled to assume the role of secondary citizens, after their masters, the Russians, the "elder brethren."

"Stalin the Infallible," by David J. Dallin. *Partisan Review*, Winter, 1946.

Mr. Dallin, who is one of the best experts on Soviet Russia in the Anglosaxon world, presents an excellent sketch of the spiritual crisis through which Russia is passing today. Up to outbreak of the war Stalin was considered infallible. His prophecy, that if the Soviets do get involved in the conflict, the outcome of the war will be determined by the solidarity of the world's proletariat which will bring about revolutions in enemy countries and thus the victory of the Soviet Union, was not fulfilled. It was not the solidarity of the proletariat, but the solidarity of capitalist nations and their aid which decided of the Soviet's victory.

Stalin does not prophecy any more, but lets himself be carried with the current which throws Russia about from left to right. The most significant is the current of Russian nationalism, which has superseded the old communist doctrine of equality of all nations of the Soviet Union. "Today," says Dallin, "the Soviet Union is Russia, the land of heroes and giants. Her rights abroad are proportional to her sacrifices. The progress of mankind is measured by the successes of Russia. Among the peoples of the Union not all are of equal value; for instance, the Ukrainians and White Russians proved unequal to the ordeal. But the Russians, that is to say the Great Russian, is the demiurge of history, because he has saved Russia and civilisation. Such are the chief ideological elements of the new Communist nationalism." This spiritual crisis engulfs the military and party workers. Some party members try to defend their old stands, but some voices are heard condemning class warfare and leaders of class movements. Voices are heard against servilism and in defense of human dignity. Will this spiritual crisis find a repercussion in new political trends of the Soviet Union?

"Tragedy in the Ukraine," by Charles Keenan. *America*, Jan. 5, 1946.

This Catholic weekly belongs to that minority of the American press which has the courage to discuss controversial subjects on which the average American newspaper is silent either for reasons of expediency or higher politics. Among such subjects is the subjugation of Ukraine by the Soviet Union. Mr. Keenan of "America's" editorial

staff devotes space to the latest history of Ukraine, i.e. its former partition among Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia and the most recent absorption of the whole Western Ukraine by the Soviet Union. The author dwells broadly on the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics by the Soviets, mentioning the arrest of all bishops, a majority of the clergy and mass executions of priests. There is also mention of Soviet anti-religious activities through the medium of the so-called Preliminary Committee and a petition by the Western Ukrainian Catholic clergy to Mr. Molotov to desist from compelling them to commit apostasy from their faith. Mr. Keenan also quotes parts of a letter sent by the Ukrainian Catholic Bishop Bohachevsky of Philadelphia to the American Catholic Episcopate wherein all the Ukrainians' aim toward independence is explained. Mr. Keenan thus concludes his article: "This is necessarily only a glimpse of the tragedy of a nation of 45 million people, whose fate it has been to pass from one domination to another... Five million Catholic Ukrainians stand in imminent peril of losing their religious and human rights. Many thousands swept outside of the Ukraine by the tides of war are faced with the prospect of being sent back to slavery or death . . . The United States, as one of the Big Three, must shoulder the responsibility for what happens to these hapless people of Ukraine. American Catholics dare not remain indifferent."

"The Postwar Inflation of Russian Power," by Francis S. Campbell.
Thought, December, 1945.

The author contemplates the results of the growth of the power of the Soviet Union in the Old World, blames America for this occurrence, and gives advice for the future. Mr. Campbell finds the following facts on the growth of Soviet power: the Soviets have created a bloc of nations clearly aimed at and opposed to nations belonging to Western Christian civilization. Moscow's chief target is Rome and nations under the influence of Rome. The Soviets' tactic is to divide the two worldwide civilizations: Catholic and Protestant and then to conquer each separately. Today's neutrality of the Anglosaxon Protestant World is of great help to the Russian atheistic world in its battle to conquer Catholic civilization, part of which came within the Soviet Union as a result of the war. The Soviets have seized control of 120 million people, among them 67 million Catholics of Central Europe. They have absorbed the whole Eastern Catholic Church represented by the most important Ukrainian group, and are destroying it mercilessly before our very eyes.

Christianity is threatened by a tidal wave of Russo-asiatic atheism, similar to the Islamic wave which flooded the Christian world in the 7th and 8th century.

From the economic angle the Soviet bloc is in control of all countries which were responsible for feeding Europe also of all nations which have the highest birthrate. The fate of Western Christian civilization and with it of the world will be decided by such a remote factor as to whether China will go communist or not. The Anglosaxon world has lost much of its prestige by compromising with the Soviet world of force and wickedness, and by displaying a phenomenal ignorance of Europe. To quote: "Ignorance about European affairs—religious, historical, geographical, sociological—in this country is startling." What should be done? The world of Anglosaxon and Protestant civilization must abandon isolation and join forces with the Catholic world in saving Christian civilization. Mr. Campbell's work is full of historical vision, and one of the most profound articles on this theme by an American author.

* * *

"Democratic World—Morituri te Salutanti." *The Baltic Review*, 1945, Stockholm.

A noteworthy periodical in the English language has made its appearance in Sweden. The first issue of "The Baltic Review" published in Stockholm in 1945 creates the impression of a serious approach to historical and political subjects. As is well known almost the entire intellectual class of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania escaped the joy of "liberation" by Russia by getting speedily away into friendly, democratic Sweden. This group is united behind the aforementioned periodical, one of whose objects is to tell the world the truth about Russia's "liberation" of the Baltic States. In an article entitled "The National Character of Lithuanian People" Mr. Jouzas Lingis disproves any historical destiny of the Lithuanians in common with the Russians. In another article, which deserves the attention of Ukrainians striving to obtain political sanctuary for their brethren at present "displaced" all over Europe, Dr. N. Kaasik surveys "The Legal Status of Baltic Refugees." The title of this article speaks for itself. "The Baltic Review" is a publication requiring the attention of all serious students of Russia and nations subjugated by Russia.