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EASTERN EUROPE AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE *Editorial*
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POEMS.—METROPOLITAN SLIPY IN A LABOR BATTALION.—BOOK REVIEWS.
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EASTERN EUROPE AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Editorial

IN February 1947 a minor diplomatic conflict occurred between the United States and Soviet Russia. Mr. Dean Acheson, American Undersecretary of State, made a statement under oath to the Senate Atomic Energy Committee, in which he described the Russian foreign policy as "expansive and aggressive."

Thereupon the Soviet government lodged a protest against the statement of this high official in the Department of State, as an insult to the Soviet Russia whose policy, according to the tenor of the protest, is "peaceable and freedom loving." The Soviet protest was rejected by the American Government; and the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, supported the words of his Undersecretary as the truthful declaration of an official who in his report to the Senate Committee was bound under an oath to reveal the truth.

A few days later Mr. James Reston, of the New York Times, carefully revealed in figures and dates that during the Second World War Soviet Russia had increased her territory by 260,225 square miles and a total of 21,937,684 population. In all these cases these regions were annexed to Soviet Russia against the will of the native populations, and hence in defiance of the Atlantic Charter which the Soviets had pledged themselves to respect. Not included here are the territories of the countries which became satellites of Soviet Russia and the populations of which are four times greater than that of the annexed territories. Although these satellites do not belong to Soviet Russia formally, they nevertheless support her political plans one hundred percent. Therefore, the Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, had full right to call the policy of Soviet Russia "expansive and aggressive."

Russia has always applied an "expansive and aggressive" policy toward her neighbors. Whenever she had the power to do so, she was always unscrupulous in that respect. The expansion of tsarist or Soviet Russia by means of aggressive action against her neighbors never was in proportion to the internal welfare of her population. For that reason the tsarist Russia of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Catherine II,

as well as the Commissar Russia of Lenin-Stalin, has always been an empire of beggars.

But besides her territorial expansion Russia continually attempted to enforce an ideological expansion beyond her own political borders in order to bring into her fold thousands of quislings in the neighboring states. When the right time came, they were to assist in the territorial expansion of Russia. Such an ideological bluff marked the propaganda based on the solidarity of the Slav or of the Orthodox peoples, *i.e.*, the solidarity of the Russians, and the peoples subjugated by them, with the peoples of Austria, of the Balkans and of the near East. Tsarist Russia distributed million of rubles for that purpose.

As a substitute, the post-Revolutionary Russia of Lenin and Stalin found a successful slogan in the universal solidarity of the proletariat united by the Communist faith into a better world of common humanity. The Communist propaganda of Moscow had every opportunity to spread throughout the world, and not only in the Slav or Orthodox countries. At home Soviet Russia did not succeed in establishing that happy state, although the government was in the hands of the so-called representatives of the proletariat but the Soviet system reduced that country to the level of a poorhouse which has since been held in discipline by terror. Yet, even to-day, in their propaganda the Soviets continue to promise that fictional paradise to the socially wronged, a paradise which does not exist even in their own midst. It is only too evident that the entire world has become a terrain for the deceptive propaganda of Soviet Russian imperialism, and that the Communist parties of the entire globe have become the fifth column the task of which is to make it easier for Russia to gain domination over the entire world.

To some these Soviet plans of world domination may appear improbable; but if one is aware of the really mystical convictions of the Russian Panславists of the 19th century as to the mission of Moscow to become not only a religious Rome (Third Rome), but also the teacher of the entire world,—one will also understand that among the plans of the Russian imperialists of the 19th century and the plans of the present Red Kremlin there is a close affinity. The Russian Panславists of the 19th century considered western civilization as "decayed." Likewise the present Russian Communists scornfully look down upon the western world, which, in their opinion, is a "world of decayed democracy." In their estimation, Moscow is appointed to give to the world a "new democracy" of the Russian type. The conception *ex*

oriente lux prevailed among the Russian imperialists in the times of the White tsars, and it prevails now, in the times of Red commissars. The tsarist Orthodox propagandists liked to repeat the phrase: "*Moskva usemu svetu golova*" ("Moscow is the head of the entire world"), and the Russian Communists began to realize it by establishing the Comintern in Moscow in order to control the world from that headquarters when it embraces the Communist faith.

It is necessary to bear in mind all this, because in the Anglo-Saxon world one often comes across a view, even among the most determined opponents of Communism, that the undermining of the world's stability, which makes impossible the establishment of a lasting peace, lies exclusively in Communism, and that the Russian people, on the contrary, are peace-loving and without imperialistic ambitions. It might be possible to agree as to the individual goodness of the Russians, but the Russian people as a whole, from their appearance in eastern Europe, in the middle of the 12th century, to this very day, *i.e.*, throughout the eight hundred years of their existence, have always been ruled by absolute power and had no opportunity to reveal their political aspect. It is, however, a fact that the imperialism of the tsarist Russia always found a sympathetic response among the Russians throughout the world, just as the present imperialism of the Soviets has drawn to the Kremlin's side an overwhelming majority of the Russians beyond the borders of Soviet Russia, even those who are opposed to the doctrine of Communism, including the Orthodox Church.

Few care to remember that the Monroe Doctrine was evolved when America was a weak state and when imperial Russia in her pride was looking to become the master of the Pacific Ocean. Friction with Great Britain over the Oregon boundary was an issue in American politics for years, but those Americans who knew the West knew like President Monroe, the President of Good Feeling, as he was often called, that the great problem of American politics was the rescue of the Pacific coast from the grasp of an expanding and an imperialistic Russia. It was a commonplace for Russian warships to be on the California coast. There was a Russian settlement near San Francisco and with the uprising of the Spanish colonies, the stage was set for Russia to extend her domination over the whole of the Pacific Ocean and thus stop the development of the United States forever.

The difference between the new and the old imperialisms lies in the fact that the tsarist imperialism was less dynamic, less universal, and therefore less dangerous than the Soviet brand of Russian imperial-

ism, which like any other movement that emerged from the flames of a revolution, is more dynamic, in its amorality more unscrupulous, in its communism more universal, and in its results more dangerous to the world.

Having become aware of the Russian political expansion and of the Communist propaganda, the peoples of the western democracies revealed the maximum of their good will in their willingness to meet the demands of the Soviets, who justified their excessive claims on the basis of the immense sacrifices undergone by the Soviet Union in the war. The fact, however, remains that those sacrifices were endured not by Soviet Russia, but by Ukraine and White Russia (both subjugated by the Soviets), the main areas invaded by Teutonic Nazism.

All attempts at appeasement of the Kremlin have showed that they not only do not satisfy Soviet Russia, but even increase its political appetite.

The Communist propaganda has revealed itself not as a socially progressive movement, but, on the contrary, as a reactionary movement of political quislings, which undermines the safety of every country in which it is spreading. It takes advantage of the naivety of those theoreticians and snobs who, dazzled by the mirage of a better social order, fail to see how reactionary Communism is in social practice in Russia herself, and how dangerous it is to their own countries.

The governments of the western democracies which had access to the real facts on Soviet imperialism and Communist destructiveness, have become convinced that their countries now face the question—"to be or not to be." In their relations with the USSR there remains only two possibilities:—full capitulation or a determined policy of arresting in their course both Russian imperialism and Communist propaganda even if that leads to the third World War. That is the background of the Declaration of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman to the American Congress.

The formation of this historic declaration was occasioned by the relatively minor matter: of financial assistance to Greece and Turkey for the protection of their independence. But the declaration of the American President has a universal import, and the grave meaning of it was expressed by its author.

The declaration of President Truman is in keeping with the finest ideals of the American spirit, from the Declaration of Independence (1776) to the statement of Woodrow Wilson as to the self-determination of peoples.

"One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States," said President Truman, "is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion." According to the President, that was the chief moral reason for waging war against Germany and Japan. "We shall not realize our objectives, however," he went on, "unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their free national integrity against aggressive movements which seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes" . . . "The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will." Having mentioned Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, President Truman added: "I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments" . . . "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" . . . "Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events."

As a logical complement to the declaration of President Truman came the statement of the Secretary of State regarding the fundamental liberties and rights of individuals. This statement he made several days later in Moscow during the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four. Both these declarations constitute a whole, and fully define the present foreign policy of the United States of America.

Such a clear specification of the political purposes of our country's foreign policy could not but arouse a keen reverberation in the land and beyond its borders, for it places upon the United States a responsibility of global proportions.

The American people have already decided to rebuff Communism in the United States. But the task of checking its advance throughout the whole world seemed to have struck many an American with amazement. Extensive discussion of the matter in the Congress and in the press is a proof that the Administration of the United States has, in its political thinking, anticipated American public opinion, which will have to be brought up to understand the real situation and what is really at stake.

The Communists and their fellow travelers have already begun a counteraction in the country with a view to making this policy unpopular among the American people by pointing out the "detrimental" effect it will have on the United States. It is true that the former amplitude and self-assurance of the American Communists have been

generally weakened, but their determination to mobilize all their supporters for the purpose of annihilating the Truman doctrine is proof that they well understand what the doctrine means.

Abroad, the declaration of President Truman began to clear the air. A new spirit of self-assurance has filled the threatened peoples; the anti-Communist parties in all the European countries became at once more confident; the potential allies of the United States, which have thus far been disintegrated and terrorized by the Soviets, are consolidating their ranks.

The declaration of President Truman became a new gospel first of all to the nations of eastern Europe which have been subjugated by Soviet Russia; and that in spite of the fact that Soviet censorship either suppressed the news about it or reported it only partially. Wherever the declaration has been announced, it became a source of hope for brighter things to come. The peoples of the satellite countries, which President Truman mentioned by name, and which are now terrorized by the Red policy, gained at least a ray of hope that the Communizing efforts in their countries will soon end.

But the most salutary hope in their desperate plight was instilled by the Truman declaration into the nations of eastern Europe for which Soviet Union is an immense prison-fortress: to some for more than twenty-five years, to others for only five years. The Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, Azerbaydjani, Armenians, Turkestani, and other peoples of the Soviet "democracy" await the new Truman order of things in which they "will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.

At international gatherings the Kremlin often likes to champion the freedom of colonial peoples, some of whom have long ago reached the maturity of self-governing bodies, while others must still pass through the necessary stages of civilization before they will be able to govern themselves. But as yet no champion has appeared to raise a demand of restoring liberty to the peoples of the immense colonial empire of Soviet Russia, who long ago reached maturity and are capable of leading an independent sovereign existence; while many are, in culture, much older than Muscovy itself. These form, according to President Truman, that "number of other countries" where there have been "similar developments," as in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, where negligible, but well armed minorities seized power by outside help.

President Truman's statement: "I believe that it must be the

policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure,"—becomes to those peoples what Christ's teaching regarding freedom and equality had been to millions of slaves in the ancient Roman world. They thank Providence for having placed the physical power of the world in the hands of that country beyond the sea, which is in a position morally and physically to take over the leadership in liberating these colonial peoples which have been subjugated by Red totalitarianism.

Well may a few American "liberals" take a stand in the defence of the Soviet prison-fortress of peoples, well may they defend the totalitarian Kremlin; they are quite powerless to prevent millions of common men and women of Ukraine and other nations of Soviet Union from struggling to gain their liberation. This struggle has, in fact, been going on for the past twenty-five years. It has been a well-known Promethean movement which has united the Ukrainians, White Russians, the peoples of the Caucasus and of Turkestan in their struggle against the Soviet-Muscovite domination.

The second World War gave these people weapons, and for two years following the end of hostilities the struggle for their freedom has been seething in eastern Europe. Under the leadership of Ukraine an Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations has been formed, which comprises not only the Promethean peoples, but also the newly subjugated prisoner nations—the Poles, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Slovaks and Czechs. The partisans of Ukraine and White Russia who, during the war, fought the Nazis, now ceaselessly carry on the fight against the Red totalitarianism which has enslaved their countries.

News about the action of the Ukrainian Rebel Army (UPA) finds an occasional echo even on the pages of the world press, although the exact magnitude of its scope is hidden by the iron curtain which separates Ukraine from the democratic world. The recent assassination in the Carpathian region of the organizer of the Polish Communist Army, Gen. Karol Swierczewski, known as "General Walter" of the International Spanish Brigade, reminded the world of the fact that in eastern Europe there exists a powerful bloc of people who are potential allies of the United States in this country's mission to purify the world of the remainder of totalitarianism which still lingers after the defeat of the Nazi and Japanese militarisms.

Upon the United States has fallen the great responsibility of becoming the leader of the world of freedom against the world of

tyranny. The magnitude of this burden terrifies the American nation which fears that the weight is beyond its strength to bear. The Doctrine of President Truman, however, has the power to make the Americans rise to the emergency of that task. Although the practical side of its program speaks only of checking the further expansion of Communism and Russo-Soviet imperialism in the middle East, life itself raises the need of opposing that imperialism in Korea, China and western Europe.

Is the mere stemming of the Russo-Communist imperialism enough to lead to the establishment of a total peace and safety in the world? Of course, not.

The experience of thirty years of the tactics of Russian Communism teaches us that one may force it to give ground and even to capitulate, but never to give up its doctrinal purposes which it seeks to realize by means of its agencies scattered throughout the world. And its chief purpose is to effect a world-wide Communist revolution. Defeated in 1918 and in 1920, Red Muscovy withdrew for some time to the east, but simultaneously, in the following year, it began to organize the Comintern in order to gain its ends by a Communistic undermining of the entire world. The difference between the situation in 1920 and that of 1947 is this:—twenty-seven years ago Russia was a weak nation, while to-day it is a well organized power which it is not so easy to force to capitulate or to retreat.

The two worlds which now face each other cannot but clash. Only a miracle can save the world from the third World War, says Msgr. Fulton Sheen. A realistic view of the world really leaves no third outcome. The clash of these two worlds is inevitable, but its result is certain. In the decisive battle Soviet Russia will be paralyzed by the movements of liberation of the peoples both recently and formerly enslaved by her. The destruction of the Soviet dungeon-fortress is inevitable. Thirty years of modern European history teaches us that the wealth of Ukraine, endlessly pilfered by Moscow, has become the decisive factor in the growth of the Soviet power. This thirty-year-old struggle of the Ukrainians for freedom, and their leadership in the present movement for the emancipation of the peoples of eastern Europe is a proof that only the liberation of the ever restive Ukraine, which Moscow has continually "pacified" by terror, can deal the death-blow to the Soviet Colossus and become the key to the establishment of a lasting and just peace among the nations.

STIRRINGS OF UKRAINIAN UNREST

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE recent appointment of Lazar M. Kaganovich as chief Soviet Communist representative in the Ukraine is an indication that the Soviet regime is obliged to cope with stirrings of political unrest. Kaganovich for many years has been one of Stalin's chief trouble-shooters, a term which under Soviet political conditions can usually be taken very literally. He is a member of the all-powerful Politburo and has acquired a reputation as an industrial administration.

The assignment of Kaganovich to the Ukrainian field is an alarm signal, following, as it does, a number of developments pointing to unrest in that country. Resolutions of the Communist Party of the Ukraine have noted failures of Party propaganda and an obstinate persistence of nationalist sentiment. Such sops to Ukrainian patriotism as the paying of official honor to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, leader of the Ukrainian struggle for freedom in the seventeenth century have not been sufficient to reconcile the Ukrainian people to domination from Moscow.

The very method of the appointment of Kaganovich shows how hollow is the selfgovernment which is theoretically assured to the constituent Soviet Republics under the Soviet Constitution and which was ostensibly broadened in 1944, when military affairs and foreign affairs were transferred from the central government to the individual republics. There was no pretense of an election by the Ukrainian people. Although Kaganovich was born in the Ukraine he had not been active there for many years. Yet everyone familiar with Soviet political realities knows that so long as he remains in the Ukraine as the trusted agent of Stalin and the Soviet Government he can overrule any law or decision of the local authorities.

The persistence of nationalist sentiment is not the only concern of the Soviet rulers. Another recent resolution of the Ukrainian Communist Party is full of lamentation about "serious defects in the restoration and development of agriculture." One of the essential tasks of the Communist Party in the Western Ukraine, according to this resolution, is to strengthen the agricultural administration of the

area and to explain "the advantages of a collective economy over an individual economy."

Inasmuch as the first fruits of the introduction of forced collective farming in the Ukraine were two of the greatest human catastrophes in Ukrainian history, the brutal "liquidation" of large numbers of moderately well-to-do farmers who were labelled kulaks and the great famine of 1932-33, which took a toll of millions of victims, the task of convincing Ukrainian peasants of the superiority of the collective economy may not be very easy.

The Soviet regime in the Ukraine faces great difficulties, political and economic. It is of no small significance that some eight or ten million people of Ukrainian stock (the exact figure is hard to determine because of uncertainty about war casualties and refugees) who formerly lived in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia have now been incorporated in the Soviet Union. The Soviet frontier has been pushed westward to the line of the Bug River, the Carpathians and the Pruth River as a result of the annexation of Eastern Galicia, with its large Ukrainian population, the Carpatho-Ukraine area of Czechoslovakia, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

The Ukrainians who lived in these regions had nationalist grievances against the Polish, Rumanian and Czechoslovak administrations. But they were not subjected to Soviet rule and compulsory communism until 1939 and 1940. They preserved their national culture, even under oppression, their religion and their traditional way of life. The assimilation of these new subjects to such features of Soviet life as one-party dictatorship, universal espionage, all-out economic collectivism, would have been a matter of some difficulty even under normal conditions.

And conditions in the Ukraine since the end of the war have been far from normal. It is no accident that the Soviet "iron curtain" shuts out the light of foreign observation most rigorously in these newly annexed regions of the western Ukraine. Only in the annexed Baltic States, in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, has there been such a rigorous exclusion of foreign journalists and travelers. One may be sure that, if there were any cause for pride and satisfaction in the achievements of the Soviet regime, conducted tours of newspapermen to Lviv, Czernovitz and other towns in the Western Ukraine would have been arranged.

One of the most obvious difficulties has been the existence of famine or near famine conditions. Not long ago the Soviet State Planning Commission, described in carefully guarded language a drought

which must have brought tragedy to the war ravaged Ukraine. Its statement read in part as follows:

"The drought commenced in early spring (the end of March, 1946) in Moldavia, rapidly spread to the southwestern districts of the Ukraine and then swept all the regions of the central Black Soil zone, including the northern regions of the Ukraine. By the middle of May the drought spread to areas on the right bank of the lower reaches of the Volga. Such drought had not occurred in the territory of the USSR in the past fifty years. The territory affected is larger than that stricken by the drought of 1921, and nearly as great as the area affected by the drought of 1891."

It may be taken for granted that such a natural disaster, coming in the wake of the war and aggravated by disruption of transportation, caused very great suffering and did not make people who had been forcibly incorporated in the Soviet Union more enthusiastic for communism. While UNRRA included the Ukraine and White Russia in its relief program of 1946, the amount of aid, mostly of American origin, which it extended could not have compensated for a drought of such severity.

Some light on desperate food and housing conditions in the Ukraine may be found in the articles which John Fisher contributed to Harper's Magazine last summer after going to the Ukraine with the UNRRA relief mission. It is symptomatic of Soviet nervousness on the subject that some American UNRRA officials, who seem to have been unduly concerned for Soviet susceptibilities, made a rather extraordinary attempt to discredit Mr. Fisher's qualifications and the statements in his articles. Actually he leaned over backward in his attempt to be fair to the Soviet regime and paid it some tributes which are scarcely borne out by other evidence on the subject. But the authorities in Moscow were evidently anxious to keep the Ukraine behind an iron curtain.

The full accurate story of the Ukrainian struggle for freedom during the late war has never been told and may never be told, unless some of its guerrilla leaders escape to some free country and write their reminiscences. There was throughout the Ukraine a remarkable two-front struggle, against the Nazi invasion and also against the restoration of the hated Russian Communist rule.

A nationalist partisan leader named Stepan Bandera, who had been sentenced to a long term in prison for activity against the Polish administration, was a prominent figure in this struggle and built up an almost legendary reputation. There have been repeated official state-

ments from the present pro-Communist Polish government about widespread guerrilla activity in the countryside. This has been largely under the direction of three organizations, the Polish "Freedom and Independence" and "National Armed Forces" and the Ukrainian movement in which Bandera was a prominent leader.

An American who was in Poland last year reported that he was offered an opportunity to go with "forest bands" as far as Kiev, showing that the insurgent movement extends far within the former frontiers of the Soviet Union. It has been a consequence of the war that the Soviet and Western Ukrainians have come together after two decades of severe isolation; and this has certainly stimulated national consciousness among the Soviet Ukrainians who had been cut off from the main centers of the nationalist movement.

Another cause of unrest in the Western Ukraine has been the Soviet policy of trying to force the Uniat Church, of which many Western Ukrainians are communicants, to accept the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. This is a rather peculiarly cynical form of religious persecution, because it lacks even the excuse, if it is an excuse of honest bigotry.

The Soviet leaders are all convinced atheists and would not feel any preference for the theology of the Russian Orthodox Church over that of the Roman Catholic Church, with which the Uniats are affiliated. But for purely political reasons the Soviet Government wished to bring under the control of the Orthodox Church (itself an obedient instrument of Soviet secular policy) the Ukrainians of the Uniat communion.

The usual somewhat crude methods of destroying an undesired organization were employed. A few priests were found who were willing to take the lead in a movement for union with the Orthodox Church and the Western Ukrainian Bishops were arrested and deported. Some are reported to have died in prison. However, this attempt to enforce religious uniformity aroused much opposition and must be considered another cause of Ukrainian unrest.

There are several hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees in Germany, Austria, Italy, France and other countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence. The exact figure is impossible to determine, because Ukrainians who were Soviet citizens on September 1, 1939, are liable to forced repatriation under a clause of the Yalta Agreement.

It is estimated by Ukrainians who have studied the situation that

about half of the refugees are from the former Soviet Ukraine, the other half from the Western Ukraine. When I was in Munich I noticed that the blonde drivers of the jeeps assigned to American correspondents were not familiar with the city. They were young Ukrainians, who had taken courses in driving and had found this work. Several with whom I talked told the same story. They came from villages in the neighborhood of Lviv; their families had been deported to Siberia after the Soviet occupation; and they had drifted into Germany.

Remembering the scenes of looting, violence and mass deportation that accompanied the occupation of their homeland by the Red Army, they had no desire to return to a Soviet Ukraine. I encountered another Ukrainian refugee in Vienna. She had been taken from her home in Ekaterinoslav by the Germans for forced labor. When the Red Army approached Vienna she had a chance to leave for Western Austria, but preferred to remain, thinking that she might want to return.

But she was horrified by the fearful spectacle of drunkenness and rape after the Soviet troops entered Vienna. This was worse, she told me, than anything she had seen the Germans do in the Ukraine. So, like many other Ukrainians, she had found some rather precarious job, found a room somewhere with her daughter and was waiting,—she hardly knew for what.

Munich is sometimes called the DP capital of the world, because many transient uprooted people pass through the city and UNRRA and other organizations provide emergency accommodations. One hears a Babel of almost every European language on the streets of the bombwrecked city. I found many Ukrainians there, especially in a DP "university," where courses were being given to refugees of many nationalities.

This whole problem of the displaced refugees calls more and more insistently for settlement. There are well over a million refugees, if one estimates those who are hiding out under assumed names, with false passports and nationalities, as well as those who are registered in the UNRRA camps. They are of many nationalities, Ukrainians, Poles, Letts, Estonians, Lithuanians, Jews, Yugoslavs, Russians. It is significant that practically all are fugitives from totalitarian regimes. The life of a refugee without a country or recognized citizenship is extremely hard and bleak. One can measure the ruthlessness of the political regimes in Russia, the Ukraine and the Soviet satellite states by the

remarkably high number of people who have resisted what was often very strong UNRRA pressure for repatriation.

It is now evident that these Ukrainian and other refugees represent a longterm, not a shortterm problem. Camps were a good emergency expedient; but life in camps over a long period of time is demoralizing and discouraging. What is needed, what the new refugee organization set up under the United Nations should work out as soon as possible is a vigorous replacement and resettlement policy.

There are countries in Europe itself (France is a good example) where there is a shortage of labor. There are also prospects of migration to undeveloped South American countries like Brasil and Argentina. The United States and Canada might well receive selected immigrants. What the International Refugee Organization should supply is an element of co-ordination of resettlement possibilities, shipping and finance, so that men and women whose endurance has been sorely tested by the experiences of these last years may see some hope of resuming productive work again.

The fate of the Ukrainian people is closely bound up with the gigantic duel between freedom and totalitarianism which is shaping up all over the world. The Ukrainian people under Soviet domination and during the war have given indisputable evidence of a desire to be free. There have been repeated mass arrests and executions of suspected nationalists in the Soviet Ukraine. Members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Eastern Galicia were hunted down ruthlessly by the Soviet political police and many are known to have perished or disappeared.

What is perhaps even more striking, a remarkable number of Ukrainian Communists were "liquidated" for real or alleged political unreliability after they had reached high office. The veteran Ukrainian Communist, Mykola Skrypnyk, a friend of Lenin, committed suicide in 1933, probably in fear of arrest and perhaps from remorse for the fearful famine which had laid waste the country. A long list of men who held such prominent posts as Prime Minister, President of the Republic, Secretary of the Communist Party, Chubar, Petrovsky, Lubchenko, Bondarenko, were put to death or committed suicide during the purge of the thirties.

It seems quite probable that Ukrainian disaffection with Soviet rule will be enhanced after the war, and for two reasons. The Ukrain-

ians in the newly annexed territories will not be easily assimilated. There is a familiar saying in Europe now: "Two things are bad for communism. The Red Army has seen Europe. And Europe has seen the Red Army." Ukrainians are perhaps more susceptible than other citizens of the Soviet Union to the influence of European contacts.

So, although Kaganovich has taken up his old work in the Ukraine (he was Stalin's chief lieutenant there in the years up to 1933) there is no assurance that the Ukraine will be quickly or easily pacified. In fact it is highly probable that, if Soviet domination of Eastern Europe should suffer a decisive check, the Ukrainians would be just as eager as other subjugated peoples in that part of the world to assert their right to independence.



THREE SCHOLAR GENERATIONS OF THE KISTIAKOWSKY FAMILY

THE WILLIAM H. NICHOLS medal for 1946, offered annually to stimulate original research in chemistry, was conferred on Dr. George Kistiakowsky, Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University, on March 7, 1947 at a dinner-meeting in New York City.

The speakers included President James Bryant Conant of Harvard and Prof. W. Albert Noyes, Jr., President of the American Chemical Society of Rochester University. The medal was presented by Dr. Charles N. Frey. Dr. Kistiakowsky, it was pointed out, "made fundamental contribution in the field of explosives and as head of the explosives division at the Los Alamos Atomic Laboratories he contributed vitally to the success of the atomic bomb."

Dr. George Kistiakowsky is the third prominent scholar in the old Ukrainian scholarly family of Kistiakowsky. His grandfather, Prof. Alexander Kistiakowsky of Kiev University was a famous historian of Ukrainian Laws of the 17th and 18th century. He contributed vitally to the Ukrainian journals *Osnova* and *Kievskaya Staryna*, which marked the cultural rebirth of the Ukrainian nation.

The father of Dr. G. Kistiakowsky, Prof. Bohdan Kistiakowsky of Kiev University, was a world famous sociologist and one of the first member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, founded in Kiev 1918. He died in 1920 after the Red occupation of Ukraine, but his son, Dr. George Kistiakowsky, emigrated to the USA to continue the brilliant scholarly tradition of his ancestors in this country.

MARKO VOVCHOK

By PERCIVAL CUNDY

WHAT Shevchenko is for Ukrainian poetry, that is, a model of form and content for others to follow, Marko Vovchok is for Ukrainian narrative prose, although of course the talents of the two writers cannot be put in ambivalent comparison.* The appearance of the first volume of *Tales of the Common People* (Narodni Opovidannya) in 1857 by a hitherto unknown writer created a furore in literary circles in Russia. When the book came out under the editorship of Kulish, he prefaced it with a foreword in which he placed the author in the same category with Shevchenko and Kvitka. "The great merit of these *Tales*," he wrote, "consists in the fact that they describe our people as they actually are, not as we see them from the outside, but as they mutually look upon themselves . . . Such stories as these by Marko Vovchok (God grant there may be more of them!) will in time become fundamental in our national literature."

There is an element of the mysterious running all through the life and literary work of Marko Vovchok, pseudonym of Mariya Markovych, wife of Opanas Markovych, a member of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, to which Shevchenko and Kulish had also belonged when it was condemned in 1847.

In the preface quoted above, Kulish tells how the first of the *Tales* came to him. In the magazine he was then publishing, he had printed a request for ethnographic material for further volumes of his *Notes on Southern Russia*. "Some one," he wrote, "signing himself Marko Vovchok, sent me a MS comprising two short narratives. I glanced at them and thinking them to be a stenographic report of oral tales in the vernacular, laid them aside. A couple of weeks passed before I took them up again and began to read carefully. I could hardly believe my eyes; I had in my hands a faultless artistic production, lucid, full of freshness. I wrote the author asking how they came to be written. The reply came that the writer had lived a great deal among the peasantry, although not of the same social class, was greatly interested in studying them, and loved their society very much. The stories were fruit of what the

* Serhiy Yefremov, *Survey of the Ukrainian Literature*.

writer had seen and heard among them . . ." Continued Kulish, "The author was evidently engaged in ethnographic study, but by his deep penetration into the souls of the personages he described, his perception of beauty in nature, and the harmony of the language in which he clothed his work, was manifestly a poet in ethnography."

When the *Tales* came to Shevchenko's attention, he was enthralled by them. He soon had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the author when Mariya Markovych and her husband came to St. Petersburg on a visit. It was to her, as a memorial of the day he met her first, that he dedicated the lines which begin:

"Not long ago, beyond the Urals far,
I wandered lonely, and to God I prayed
That our beloved cause might not be lost,
That our dear speech should not die out for aye—
God heard that prayer, and unto us has sent
A tender prophetess to speak for us—
One who unveils the cruel, heartless deeds
Of men insatiable . . ."

The great Kobzar adopted her as his "literary daughter and hereditary successor" in the field of Ukrainian literature. It was at this time, in the course of a conversation Shevchenko had with Turgenev that the novelist enquired what authors he should read in order to gain familiarity with the Little-Russian dialect. (The word "Ukrainian" was taboo in Russia then). Shevchenko burst out enthusiastically: "There is only one who has a mastery of our language: Marko Vovchok!" This led to a personal acquaintance by Turgenev with Shevchenko's "literary daughter," and as a result, in 1859, the first volume of the *Tales* appeared in Russian, translated by Turgenev himself. A year later what is considered to be the most characteristic of Marko Vovchok's stories, *The Aristocrat* (Instytutka), also appeared in Turgenev's Russian translation two years before it was published in the original Ukrainian. Her popularity was great but also lasting. Before me as I write lies a copy of *Marusya* (also called "The Kozak's Daughter"). It was printed in Zhovkva, 1938, and bears on the title page "Tenth Edition." What is more the editor, T. Kostruba, says in a foreword: "This story is a most popular book in Europe. Translated into French, it has run through several dozen editions, and from French it has also been translated into German and Italian." A bibliography of her works shows that in addition to the languages already mentioned, her stories have appeared in Serbian, Croat, Polish and Czech. In English, a few of them, translated by the present writer and

others, have appeared in recent years in the pages of the "Ukrainian Weekly."

The publication of the *Tales* created an impression comparable to that made by Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, although from a literary and artistic point of view there is no comparison between the two women writers. Marko Vovchok's work has remained, as Kulish prophesied it would, "fundamental in our national (Ukrainian) literature." Seventy years later, Yefremov said what amounts to the same thing in other terms. Critics made a search for parallels in the work of both, talked learnedly about "influences" of the American on the Ukrainian authoress. However, it does not seem that Marko Vovchok was acquainted with *Uncle Tom's Cabin* when she was writing the first series of her stories. What the two women had in common was a burning indignation against human bondage of any sort and a profound sympathy with the enslaved and downtrodden, one with the Negro in America, the other with the serf in Russia. "Even the ox under the yoke will bellow; why then should a Christian soul suffer all kinds of abuse and indignity and not cry out," says one of Marko Vovchok's characters. Harriet Beecher Stowe's work was a powerful piece of literary propaganda for the times in which it was written, while Marko Vovchok's *Tales* remain a living classic. Her work bears the stamp of native originality in form and content, coupled with the power to touch the most sensitive strings in the reader's heart, and through it all there runs a democratic, freedom-loving, humanitarian philosophy of life.

As has been said there is much of the mysterious, unexplained, and conjectural in the life and personality of Mariya Markovych. As far as Ukrainian literature is concerned she was like a meteor, bursting out suddenly with great brilliancy and as swiftly fading away. As there was at first little knowledge of the facts behind the pseudonym and confusion later on, the authorship of the *Tales* was a matter of critical debate for years. The question was: Who in reality is Marko Vovchok? Mariya, or Opanas, or both together,

The fact that Mariya had apparently been brought up solely at Orel in Great Russia, and that she seemed to have resided only five to six years in Ukraine after her marriage to Opanas Markovych, coupled with the fact that her husband was a zealous Ukrainian patriot with a passion for the study of the peasantry and their folklore, gave rise to the assumption that the pseudonym covered the cooperative authorship of husband and wife. This was reinforced by a false statement

made by Kulish, according to which Mariya provided the plot and artistic form and Opanas the verbiage of the *Tales*. The inference was drawn that it would have been impossible for "a typical and full-blooded Great Russian" to have acquired the mastery of the language and insight into the life and psychology of the peasantry displayed in the *Tales* in so short a period of residence in Ukraine. Moreover, while there, the Markovych's had lived mostly in cities and very little in the country. On the other hand, it was a fact that Mariya possessed remarkable linguistic gifts. She spoke French like a native without a trace of foreign accent, Polish likewise; Czech admirably, and she could read with ease and discrimination German and English classics in the original languages. With such gifts she could easily in five or six years' residence in Ukraine have attained the mastery of the vernacular she displayed in the *Tales*.

However, the "fatal fact" remained for some that after the death of her husband in 1867, Mariya "died" as far as Ukrainian literature was concerned. The battle over the "enigmatic pseudonym" raged for years. For some, Mariya was indisputably "Shevchenko's literary successor," for others, she was "the impudent Muscovite who tried to steal the crown from Ukraine's finest writer, her own husband, Opanas Markovych." Only since 1908, thanks to the research of V. Domanytsky, who chivalrously defended Mariya and demonstrated her sole authorship of the *Tales*, has all doubt and suspicion been dissipated. However, much in her personality still remains "mysteriously Sphinxlike," to use Turgenev's phrase concerning her. Judging from the published correspondence of men such as Shevchenko, Kulish, Turgenev, Herzen, Bakunin and others, men who knew her well and were in close relations with her, she somewhat mystified them, while at the same time they bear witness to her great charm, intelligence, and sympathy. She was frank and open-hearted, but her dignified reserve left many of her motives unfathomable. Hence, in some part, arises the aura of mystery which surrounded more or less all her life.

Mariya Oleksandrivna Vylynska (there are three variants in the spelling of her surname) was born in 1834. Where, it is not exactly clear, but in all probability on her grandfather's estate in Orel. Her ancestry, according to some notes she scribbled on the pages of a magazine, correcting misstatements of an article therein purporting to give her biography, was mixed Great Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian. She was educated in a private boarding school at Kharkiv, Ukraine. This, together with some statements in her letters, testifies to the fact

that the Ukrainian language was familiar to her from her early years. Although it was not the language of ordinary intercourse at home, we do know that Ukrainian proverbs, sayings, and songs were often heard there.

In 1848 a young student, Opanas Vasylovych Markovych, came to reside at Orel under government supervision for complicity in the affair of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. He was an attractive and interesting personality. Here he met Mariya, who, besides the promise of great intellectual and spiritual gifts, also possessed a handsome face and figure. She is described as a splendid blonde, tall, and with beautiful grey eyes, a quiet and assured composure, and with an easy flowing grace in all her movements. She must have exercised a great fascination by her intellectual qualities also, for Turgenev, who came to know her intimately and greatly befriended her, speaks in one of his letters to her of his desire to continue "those long, long conversations while travelling together." (He meant the journey to Paris in 1859.) "Particularly do I recall one conversation we had between Cologne and the border in the warm and tranquil evening. I do not remember what exactly we talked about, but the poetical sentiments aroused by it remain in my soul since that night." In 1850 or 1851, the year uncertain, but at Orel certainly, Opanas and Mariya were married. Under his influence Mariya came fully to share the views of the Brotherhood in regard to the emancipation and uplift of the common people, and with him as mentor, took up ethnographic study as a means of coming to know them better. As a result we have her literary productions in Ukrainian. Yefremov remarks with justice that "the works of Marko Vovchok with their protest against serfdom are the only immediate result in Ukrainian literature of the broad and far-reaching plans which were discussed in the meetings of the Brotherhood in Kiev during 1846-7."

Shortly after their marriage the young couple moved to Ukraine where they resided in various places, including Chernihiv and Kiev. In 1855 Opanas got a position as teacher of geography in the local gymnasium at Nemyriv, Podolia. It was from here that the first of the *Tales* were dispatched to Kulish with the resulting enthusiasm which followed.

In 1859 came a visit to St. Petersburg where Mariya and her husband made personal acquaintance with many leading personalities, such as Shevchenko, Turgenev, and others. Kulish she had already met. While there a mysterious something took place, which caused a

crisis of a sort in the marital relations of Mariya and Opanas. Taking her young son, Bogdan, Mariya went abroad, first to Berlin, then to Dresden. Opanas followed her to Germany but soon returned, "finding his position somewhat embarrassing." From then on husband and wife lived apart, and the latter returned to Russia only after Opanas' death in 1867. To add to the mystery, the two kept up a correspondence in cordial terms all the time, and Opanas, although frequently in straitened circumstances, sent his wife money from time to time. There was plenty of "talk" among their friends, though no one really knew what was at the bottom of the whole affair. "Why they lived apart," wrote Opanas' nephew later, "I do not know; but this I do know for certain that my uncle grieved terribly, and his favorite topic of conversation with me, a second-year student in gymnasium in 1860, was his son Bogdan, his studies and his letters." It appears now that Kulish was the one responsible for the original separation. What the reason was on his part is open to speculation, but later on he took an ignoble revenge. In 1886, in answer to a question by Prof. Ohonowsky, then engaged in writing a history of Ukrainian literature, as to who should be regarded as the real author of the *Tales*, Kulish replied: "These stories were written by Opanas and Mariya Markovych in cooperation, so that in the history of Ukrainian literature the two must be regarded as constituting one author." This was utterly untrue, but the testimony of Kulish was looked upon then as conclusive evidence until the matter was finally cleared up by the researches of Domanytsky, and Mariya received her just due.

In company with Turgenev, Mariya travelled to Paris, and after visiting Rome and several other places, settled there until her return to Russia after her husband's death. Here the stories included in the second and third volumes of the *Tales* were written and sent to Russia for publication. During these years she seems to have been constantly making preparations to return home, but something always arose to prevent it, either a lack of funds or some other causes unknown. In any case, as we learn from Turgenev's letters, she spent money like water and was often entirely without ready cash. He says in one place, "Mariya Alexandrovna is again in her normal condition—without a cent." Again, "She is a very fine woman, but she eats up money." Turgenev greatly assisted her as a sort of literary agent for her with Russian publishers, arranging for the publication of her work and terms of payment. During her residence abroad, besides the *Tales* in Ukrainian, she began to do a good deal of translation work into Russian. One of

her productions in this field was a translation of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. After a time she ceased writing in Ukrainian altogether.

The stories in Marko Vovchok's *Tales of the Common People* may be grouped under three heads. First there are those dealing with peasant life under conditions of serfdom. Second, those treating of social and family relations among free peasants. Of the remainder, some may be classed as social-psychological studies, while others are based on popular historical traditions, fairy tales, and legends. All we shall speak of here are those in the first and second classes, because they are intimately related and constitute the substance of Marko Vovchok's "messages."

The strongest and most characteristic of the *Tales* are two, written shortly after her settlement in Paris.

The Good-for-Nothing (*Ledashchytsya*) is the story of the daughter of a free Kozak woman. The mother has been made a household serf by fraudulent means and can find no way of escape. The mother's longing for freedom has been transmitted to her daughter, Nastya, who asks her mother's help in winning freedom. The mother tells her that it is no use trying. In desperation Nastya takes to drink and has a child by a man who, she hopes, will make her a free woman. The man fails her, the child dies, and Nastya becomes a hopeless drunkard. When freedom is finally proclaimed, all Nastya can say is: "Good people, am I free, or am I drunk?" At the cost of her virgin honor and broken health Nastya had vainly sought to purchase freedom, and when it does come it releases her only to die a drunkard's death. The point of the story is that here is a woman of free birth, unjustly made a serf, who longs and struggles for freedom.

In *The Aristocrat* (*Instytutka*) we have a masterly summarization of all that Marko Vovchok wrote on the subject of serfdom. Ustyia is a household serf in the home of an old aristocrat who treats her maids fairly well. However, when the old lady's granddaughter comes home after having finished her education at an "Institute," (a private school under Imperial patronage for daughters of the nobility and gentry) Ustyia finds that she now has a hard, unfeeling mistress who makes her life a misery. But by taking advantage of a certain situation she manages to get permission to marry Prokip, also a serf, with whom she has fallen in love. The couple plan to win their freedom somehow. This they achieve after great tribulations. Although the story ends with Prokip being sent away to serve a term as a soldier, while Ustyia must remain behind in Kiev to gain her living as a household drudge, yet

it ends on a note of indomitable hopefulness. At the end, Ustya says, "Somehow the thought that I am free, that my hands are not bound, will help me. This is an evil that will pass—the other was lifelong." In this story, serfs by birth are actively struggling to attain freedom.

At the time Mariya wrote, however, serfdom was definitely on its way out as an institution, but the lot of the peasant under free conditions was not much improved. In the most representative of the stories dealing with this phase of peasant life, *Sister* (*Sestra*), the narrator is a hard-working woman who has been compelled by pity and love to mortgage her labor and give the proceeds to save her unfortunate brother and his family from economic ruin. She, too, finds an ungrateful mistress hard to work for. She says in closing, "O Lord, Lord, it's hard to humor a good-for-nothing person. But I've hired and sold myself, so I must needs work it out. But when the year is done, please God, I'll hunt for a decent place. Where there's a will, there's a way."

Mariya possessed a magnetic capacity for attracting the common people to herself, and this was one of her great assets as a writer. She could easily induce them to talk about themselves, their troubles and trials, joys and feelings. It was this that enabled her to penetrate their psychology and to describe them and their life so accurately and movingly. Her attitude toward them was that of a near and dear friend to whom the wretched can freely pour out the burdened heart and relate without reserve the story of the evils inflicted by the upper classes.

In addition, she had the gift of writing a simple, natural prose which revealed the rich treasures inherent in the Ukrainian vernacular. But her great talent lies in the ability to describe the people in the mass, made up as it is of a multitude of indistinct grey existences which form the solid background of human life. Hence her characters appear rather as collective types than fully drawn, outstanding personalities. Yet for all that, they are none the less real and living—perhaps even more so, for common life is like that. One may easily forget details, even the names of her characters, but their personalities leave an unforgettable impression on the reader. One reason for this is, as a note appended to some of the stories says, that often they were transcriptions of events that came under the writer's personal observation. In her hands, such fragments of experience became pictures of real life in a frame of artistry.

The womanly point of view, and by this I do not mean the "feminine," prevails all through the *Tales*. Almost all of them are put into the mouths of women narrators, either that of the principal actor, or

rather, sufferer, or that of a friend who witnessed the whole course of the action. They all speak in simple, unvarnished language, such as a woman from the ranks of the common people would naturally use. With them there is no more dissection of character or analysis of motives than is usual in ordinary life. The descriptions of natural surroundings they give in passing are only such as would come as a matter of course to one thinking of certain scenes connected with certain experiences. The chief interest is centered on woman and her hard and difficult lot in life, whether bond or free. Men, generally speaking, play a subordinate role. This emphasis on women's life and experience in the *Tales* leaves upon them as a whole the stamp of the womanly in its finest sense. They give us throughout an impression of womanly tenderness, mildness, gentleness, and simplicity, except, of course, where the feminine characteristic of shrewishness is introduced. Even here, as it is generally one of the same sex who suffers from it, the womanly characteristic of patience and long-suffering comes out all the stronger by contrast. Marko Vovchok's favorite type is that of a woman, quiet, submissive, kind, and good, who loves generously and self-sacrificingly, and bears without complaint her heavy cross. For this reason the *Tales* are enveloped in an atmosphere of quiet sadness, they breathe an elegaic note of grief over broken lives, finer feelings abused, and hopes unfulfilled, borne with infinite patience and meekness.

The exact date of Mariya's return to Russia after her husband's death is not known, except that it was sometime in 1867. Toward the end of the 70's she married again, her second husband being a certain Lobach-Zhychenko. She settled in St. Petersburg where she was soon invited to become a regular contributor to a leading Russian journal published there. She wrote a number of stories and novels in Russian during the years that followed. The work of translations into Russian, begun while abroad, was continued on a larger scale. For example, she translated a large number of Jules Verne's novels from the French, as well as many pedagogical works from various languages.

What induced her to forsake writing in the Ukrainian language in which she had achieved her first and greatest success? What was it that drew her entirely into the field of purely Russian literary activity?

There are a number of valid reasons. Yefremov suggests that as long as she was in contact with Ukrainian circles she kept up her enthusiasm for work in that language. However, living abroad gradually weakened the ties which bound her to the Ukrainian cause until they finally broke entirely. What contributed to this were: the death

of Shevchenko; the failure of the short-lived Ukrainian journal, *Osnova*; the dispersal of the Ukrainian group in St. Petersburg; Valuyev's circular ("There never was, is not now, and never will be a Ukrainian language"); and lastly, the death of her husband and first mentor. To these Domanysky adds others which, in his opinion, were more cogent. They are: the influence of leading Russian writers; the assurance that she could win no less glory by writing in Russian; and the lure of "insidious metal" as a means of comfortable support for herself and son abroad, which "insidious metal" Russian publishers were able to dispense much more liberally than the single Ukrainian journal *Osnova*, which, anyway, was slowly failing. We know, too, that while abroad, Mariya had maintained close relations with Russians such as Turgenev, Herzen, Bakunin, and Pisarev. For Herzen's "Bell" she wrote articles, and for Bakunin she translated revolutionary proclamations into Ukrainian.

It is quite understandable then that as a result of such strong influences and unfavorable circumstances, Mariya passed over into the field of purely Russian activity as a writer. However, she never forgot her first love for Ukrainian ethnographic study and writing. Between 1880-9 she spent eight years near Bohuslav, during which time she amassed a large number of notes on Ukrainian folklore. Besides this, a number of begun but unfinished works belong to a still later date. A visit to Kiev in 1902 revived her early enthusiasm for creative writing, and on her return home, she completed a couple of legends which were printed in Kiev. She also began a long novel, *Haydamaky*, on which she worked to the very last, spending the last few days of her life in correcting it. The language of these last works, it may be noted, is as limpid, fresh, and colorful as that of the *Tales* of 1857. The pity of it is, what might she not have accomplished for Ukrainian literature in the years between, had it not been for the all-embracing, assimilative spirit of Russian Imperialism in the intellectual realm as well as in the political.

She died forty years ago this year, July 28, 1907.



DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY AND UKRAINE

By PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

IN the autumn of 1914 Professor Munroe Smith of Columbia University made a statement on the tangle in international relations on the eve of the First World War and emphasized the difference between the diplomat and the historian in the interpretation of events. According to him, the historian is a person whose primary mission is to deal with facts. The diplomat must deal with what people assume to be facts. He might have added also that especially in democratic countries, the diplomat has to adjust his policy to the public opinion of the moment, even if he is well aware of its incompleteness or even inaccuracy.

It is only this last circumstance that has rendered unsuccessful so much of democratic diplomacy during the last years, and has allowed the totalitarian dictators of both right and left to pursue their policies with seeming freedom and impunity, for the same motives for appeasement that produced the Second World War are still being followed far too close, for the well-being of mankind. Despite the efforts of sincere and well-meaning people, men of intelligence and knowledge, the world certainly seems to be moving along a course that bodes little good and toward a destiny that the people do not wish.

The manners of diplomacy have changed greatly in the last century. The essence is still the same. There was a time in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when courtesy and good form were the hallmarks of the statesman. He was not required to be honest or sincere but he could not express himself freely or there would be unfortunate consequences and perhaps even war. To-day the reverse is true. The mouthpieces of dictators resort commonly to language that in other days would have produced a definite crisis in events. The rest of the world prefers to discount the tone of these remarks, because it does not care to face the situation that would arise if they were taken at face value. Yet despite the apparent frankness of the dictators, their blasts of abuse need as much interpretation as the polished compliments of an earlier age.

It is at this point that the democratic diplomats are at a disad-

vantage. The totalitarian diplomats, like the monarchical ambassadors of the past, can direct their policy and actions toward their destined goal, secure in the knowledge that they are responsible only to their chief. The representatives of the democratic powers must not proceed further or faster than public opinion will support them and it is hard for that public opinion to take a clear stand amid the torrents of propaganda.

During the period before Pearl Harbor, the United States was swamped with Japanese propaganda. Besides that, there were many honest individuals who from close study of the situation had become convinced that war between the two countries would be disadvantageous for both nations and, that there were many reasons for friendship and they added their voices to the general stream that was emanating from Tokyo.

To-day the same thing is true in the ideological struggle that is being waged by the Soviet Union against the rest of the world. There is the mass of interpretations and arguments advanced by the Communists and their secret supporters. There are thousands of sincere persons who believe that there should be friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries. They try to prove it by studies of history, of economic conditions and advantages, by the difficulties of waging war, by the needs of the devastated areas in the Soviet Union, and by every argument that the brain of man can devise.

The most potent of these arguments is probably the realization of the destructive nature of modern war, especially in the atomic era. The dread of the atomic bomb has added new force to the desperate efforts of the democratic powers to give strength and stability to the United Nations. Every thinking man and woman realizes all too clearly that only by the elimination of war can there be any safety and security in the world and so the democratic diplomats are being forced by the pressure of public opinion to make concessions, exactly as the constant threat of war by Hitler and Mussolini forced one compromise (a polite word for surrender) after another, until further yielding would have been the definite end of democracy and liberty in Europe.

The public in far too many cases has a short memory. How often during the past years we have heard that the Soviet Union has a right to be distrustful of the West because of Allied intervention after the Russian Revolution. How few people still remember or wish to be reminded of the fact that the Soviet leaders themselves were not desirous of friendship with the captalistic world, that they were hoping

for a worldwide Communist revolt, and that they were doing their best to bring one about. How few really know and understand the significance of the fact that no responsible Soviet statesman has ever disavowed this purpose even indirectly. How few even want to believe that the wishes of the nations that had been enslaved by tsarist rule were reflected in the national governments that arose spontaneously in 1918 in Ukraine, in Georgia, in Finland, and the Baltic states. How few even grasp the idea that the Soviet attacks on Ukrainian nationalism following World War Two are the best proof that the old spirit of these people is not dead and that they would welcome the opportunity to live their lives in their own way and under their own governments, free from the secret police of the Kremlin.

The world forgets to-day that the League of Nations in its last hours found the moral courage to expel the Soviet Union for its unprovoked attack on Finland. It had stood idly by while Mussolini bombarded Corfu. It had done nothing about the Soviet attack on China. It overlooked the Japanese seizure of Manchuria. It applied platonic sanctions to the Italian attack and absorption of Ethiopia. In every case there was the excuse that any determined action against the dictators would mean war and the democratic countries did not want that. Yet there was always the danger that public opinion might wake up and demand action and so the three aggressive nations, Germany, Italy, and Japan, left the League of their own volition. Yet with World War II going on and with Germany and the Soviet Union dividing Poland, with the Soviets attacking Finland and swallowing the Baltic states, the League finally acted. It was too late to save the League but it was the brightest act in its history.

Public opinion supported the democratic diplomats in issuing the Atlantic Charter and in refusing to recognize the fake vote by which the Baltic states were forced to register the loss of their independence. It supported the diplomats in maintaining the governments in exile after the Nazis had overrun the smaller countries of Europe. It recognized that these were the only possible representatives of the oppressed people and that while they might not be perfect, while new trends might arise in the war, their return to their native lands could guarantee honest elections without the danger of anarchy. It was sure that the handful of so-called leaders who had taken refuge in Moscow were merely a group of Communists who had no more real influence than they had in the days before the war.

Then came the Nazi attack on the Soviets and soon after Pearl

Harbor. A world that was stubbornly defending its liberty against tremendous odds was overjoyed to have a new ally, which could put millions of men into the field in a common cause. It seemed the very moment when the rapprochement between the capitalistic and the communist worlds could come about naturally and cemented on the battlefields of two continents. Public opinion was thrilled and the statesmen and diplomats, sure of popular support at home, did their best to bring it about. Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were the result.

Amid the strenuous efforts that all the nations were making to overcome the common enemies, there was no time and little inclination to study the situation and analyze exactly what was being gained. The prime task was to drive the Germans and Italians back within their own borders and to hurl back the southern expansion of Japan. No one cared to give due weight to the unexpected refusal of the Soviet leaders to extend to their allies those courtesies and the reciprocity that was being given to them so richly. The diplomats and public opinion with them chose to believe that further concessions to the Soviets would create that real friendship which was the only guarantee of future peace. Step by step the governments in exile were abandoned. Step by step the world was brought to believe that the Communist agents in Moscow really spoke for their nationals instead of for the Kremlin, and soon it was all too ready to accept the Moscow theories that the displaced persons would be willing to return to the Soviet paradise, if they were not war criminals or fascists.

It was in this mood and in the desire to create a World organization that the constitution of the United Nations was drawn up, and that the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet Republics were admitted, even though everyone recognized that their spokesmen would be only the mouthpieces of the Kremlin and not representatives of the Ukrainian or White Russian people. Success promised so much to the world that it was easy to represent the doubters and the critics as the foes of the human race or as secret Fascists and anti-social elements.

Yet in the democratic countries it is as true to-day as it was in the days of Abraham Lincoln that it is impossible to fool all of the people all the time. Slowly, all too slowly, the truth of the situation began to penetrate public opinion, despite the efforts of the Communist propagandists and the honest idealists to prevent it and to gloss over the horrors of Soviet prison camps and the Soviet abuse of human rights. The open flouting by the Soviets of their promises to allow free elections in the countries within the iron curtain has given them the controlling

position in many lands to continue their work of violence but to-day there are few statesmen who have the effrontery to proclaim to the world that the elections were free and democratic.

Where once the problems created by the displaced persons were mentioned only on the inside pages of some foreign language newspapers in the United States and were ignored by the great American dailies, now they are mentioned openly. The Soviet use of the veto, the continuing unbridled attacks on the democratic powers, the machinations of the Communists and their systems of espionage in supposedly friendly countries are all having their effect and the growing menace of the Soviet Union is being recognized in steadily widening circles.

It is becoming a commonplace to-day that the United States as the champion of democracy is being brought face to face with Soviet tyranny at every part of the earth's surface. In Europe and Asia and in the meetings of the United Nations as well as at the peace conferences, the issue is joined and in less open forms there is the same conflict going on in South America, where the Communists are seeking to destroy the Pan-American solidarity which has been built up with so much effort.

The weakening of Great Britain and her action in transferring to the United States the supporting of Greece, the only Balkan state to remain outside the iron curtain, brings home to the American people the situation still more emphatically. The attempts of the Communist governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to dominate the life of their southern neighbor is being carried on by the same methods which were invoked by the Soviets in their overrunning of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and many other states in 1919 and 1920. It is tragic to think that at the end of a Second World War a country like Greece which suffered so severely at the hands of the Nazis should be exposed to the constant guerilla attacks of men trained in the methods of the Kremlin. Yet there is the one advantage that Greece can be reached by sea and that it is a country which is known abroad. It will be to the lasting shame of the United States, if it fails to take up the challenge which has been thrown to it.

The new situation which has been brought into the open with startling suddenness confronts the public opinion and the diplomats of the democratic countries with the same situation as did the continuous aggressions of Hitler and Mussolini. It places before the United Nations the same alternatives that were shirked by the League some twenty years ago. It raises again the grim spectre that hung over all the

meetings at Geneva and which would not vanish, no matter what kind words were used in an attempt to exorcise it.

With every meeting and every new clash, it is becoming more evident that the Soviet Union must be stopped in its quest for world domination. Some way must be found to do it and public opinion must be prepared for the necessary efforts.

It is not an easy task and it is made incomparably more difficult by the fact that the leading statesmen are unable to tell the people the truth in simple and clear language. It is only the leaders of the totalitarian states who can speak out bluntly and denounce all other countries as preparing for a new war. If it were done by the leaders of the democratic countries, an outraged public opinion would turn against them and the totalitarians would be openly free to act as they wished. There will therefore be the same expressions of trust and confidence that marked the years before 1939 and the same willingness of far too many people to see in these statements the complete and final truth. Already nearly two precious years have passed since the conclusions of hostilities. Peace has not come, human misery has increased, and the plundering of Europe and Asia by the Soviet occupying forces is reaching a new high. Even to-day before the treaties with the Axis satellites have even been presented for ratification by the democratic powers, no one dares to defend their provisions except with the weak statement that they are indefensible but that they are the best that can be secured by negotiations with the Soviets. It is an alarming statement of the bankruptcy of modern thought and ideals and of the danger into which the modern world is running.

How does this situation affect Ukraine? Her position may seem hopeless. Her territory which was ravaged by the Nazis in the War cannot be restored under the present situation. Her leaders are being decimated, her population deported. The Soviets are continuing their purge of Ukrainian nationalism. The nation is represented in the United Nations by Communists appointed by Moscow. The voice of her people is stifled at every turn, and no one can speak for her except the Ukrainians abroad.

At the same time there has been one great change in the situation. Now for the first time in centuries, the world is becoming conscious of the existence of Ukraine. At the time of the First War, when the Ukrainian Republic began its struggle for independence, there were few people of importance in world affairs who were aware of the hopes and aspirations of Ukraine. From the time when Khmel'nitsky acknowledged

the supremacy of the Tsar of Moscow and certainly from the time of Peter the Great, Ukraine disappeared from history. It was only a few provinces of southern Russia and Russian propaganda abroad denied the unrest and the discontent that it was ready to admit in its instructions to Russian rulers of the unhappy people. Even during the First War, it was possible for the Russians to spread the reports abroad that the Ukrainian movement was only a result of German activity. The fate of Ukraine in the second War and her sufferings at the hands of both the Nazis and the Soviets have proved the falsity of all these stories. Her admission to the United Nations even under Kremlin domination have made the world familiar with the name of Ukraine. The Soviet stories of the evils of Ukrainian nationalism and on the ideological errors of Professor Hrushevsky have been so numerous that thinking people are beginning to sympathize with her fate.

There is little that can be done at present. The democracies have not found yet the means of breaking the iron curtain that has descended over all the lands that they so cheerfully abandoned at the time when they were hoping to establish good relations with the Soviet Union by placating Stalin and his associates. They have not come to the point of taking the offensive and of endeavoring to give reality to their recognition of the independence of the Baltic states. They are still allowing the Soviet police to deport and ravage at will in these countries that were once duly admitted as democratic countries to the family of nations.

Yet when it is once generally recognized that the onward march of Soviet aggression must be stopped, public opinion will force action. When that time comes, the position of Ukraine will be important. As the New York Times stated in an editorial on March 6, 1947, "Ukrainian separatism remains a weakness in the seemingly monolithic Russian structure which could become a serious factor if Russia should over-extend herself abroad." Such words would have been unthinkable twenty five years ago and would not have been printed even at the beginning of World War Two. Their appearance now reflects the gain that the Ukrainians have made in spreading a knowledge of their past, their unhappy present, and their future hopes. They speak of the future of the world as well, for the continuous Soviet aggression against humanity and democracy must either secure world domination and final victory or create a sufficient counter-movement which will destroy the Soviet Union and give liberty to the oppressed people under its yoke. If the latter happens and civilization is not to be wiped out,

Ukraine will be in an important position, and will be able with its long record of its struggle for independence to attain its goal.

In another way, too, Ukraine and the Ukrainians are playing a great, if costly part in the diplomatic struggle. Moscow is spreading far and wide its Pan-Slavic program. It is trying to prove to the world that the Slavs are all united behind Mother Sovietia. Their agents in control of the other Slav governments are singing the same song. They are silencing the free voice of all the other Slav peoples by the same methods that they have been employing for twenty five years against Ukraine. The fact that even now in 1947 Ukraine still needs pacification and purging is the best proof that the ideals of liberty and democracy for which the Slavs fought in two World Wars have not been suppressed by the NKVD, even though subservient Communist governments loudly proclaim the fact.

The situation of the world is more critical in 1947 than ever before. The conflict between democracy and tyranny is more open and more bitter. Yet it is now clear that democracy will not voluntarily abdicate. The dream of the Soviet that they would win the victory over the human spirit by default is being proved false. Public opinion is being aroused from its refusal to face the facts of the present world and this in turn will sooner or later allow the statesmen and the diplomats of the democratic countries to take such action as may be necessary to make sure that the ideals which have helped mankind from barbarism to civilization will live to see human beings everywhere create a better and a warless future.



THE DUMY: LYRICAL CHRONICLE OF UKRAINE

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IN their collective whole the Ukrainian historical songs and *dumy* (the plural of *duma*) comprise an epic and lyrical chronicle that vividly depicts (rather than describes) the period roughly between 1500-1800. They constitute a historical document of the age, with the historical spirit rather than factual data predominating. The chief source of interest in them is not their fictional or realistic matter, but the general types and heroes that the genius of the race created, because it is precisely in these types that the soul of the nation is revealed.

The *dumy* were usually sung by blind musicians called *banduristy* or *kobzari*, so called from the names of the instruments—bandura, kobza, with which they accompanied their recitative chantings. The recital of the *duma*, which was their specialty, as love themes were that of the troubadours of the Middle Ages, was rendered in a rapid rhythmic manner, one syllable to each note, except for occasional grace notes and special flourishes.

The term "duma" is of Bulgarian origin and means "word" or "account" of some historical event or incident. It is to be distinguished from the historical song not so much by its contents as by its form. The latter is strict in its strophic measure, rhythm and rhyme, and its contents are fixed by popular usage; the former, on the other hand, is quite free in all those artistic devices. Both are noted for their method of positive and negative parallelism, by which a poetic comparison is effected between event on the one hand and natural phenomena on the other. It is rarely that a "fixed" *duma* can be found. There are many variants of each known *duma*, chiefly because they were for the most part the property of the *kobzari* who, in reciting them, often improvised, adding to them smaller or greater amounts of lyricism, which enhanced or reduced the value of the account according to the inspiration and the power of feeling of the chanting poet.

The *duma* is generally solemn in tone and its theme somewhat complicated. For that reason it required an expert to perform it properly. The historical song, on the other hand, although occasionally

dealing with like themes, is frequently of a festive and even humorous vein, with the melody and not the recitative predominating, and is quite within the range of any person possessing a tolerable voice. The *duma* is a poetically exalted chronicle; the historical song is a ballad relating a simple sentimental or heroic story. The former derives in part from the old popular lamentations and wails so common among the peasant folk. Just as professional mourners once raised a stormy dirge over dead bodies, so did the *kobzari*, in their *dumy*, lament over the cruel lot of the people.

For some time it was thought that these blind *kobzari* were the creators of the *dumy*. Recent research however has established that their authors were those poetically gifted persons who took part in, or witnessed, the events recorded in those accounts. Their product, passing through the mill of popular enthusiasm, at times lost some of its pristine freshness, but it invariably gained in lyrical scope. Thus processed by the popular muse, these songs assumed the aspect of a collective authorship. Later, there rose among the Kozaks professional singers whose duty and cult it was to extol the exploits of those Slavic knights for the moral and practical edification of all the Zaporozhians as well as the people in whose defence they had risen. Still later, until recent times, their place was taken by the wandering blind *kobzari* and *banduristy* who, vaunting their artistic talents, made the *duma* sound dramatic, thus making it appear more important than the historical popular song, which, none the less, takes precedence over the *duma* by its more artistic form.

The *dumy* are so full of religious and moral elements that one cannot help but think of them as historical "psalms," as it were. Their prayerful mood often rises to a degree of fervor noted only in books of devotion, and that in spite of the imprecations that frequently rise out of their very excess of religiosity. They are drenched with tears, clamorous with lamentations which vie with the wails of Jeremiah, inspired by strict moral ardor, and glorified by the heroic deeds they recount.

The popular historical song of that period, says Serhiy Yefremiv, was the only "defender of the spiritual interests of the people." Not only that; it was likewise their defender in matters material. These songs, as well as the *dumy*, were the only medium, outside his religion, by which the common man could vent his joys and sorrows, smiles and tears, despair, hopes and aspirations. The written literature of the day was too bookish and scholastic, and so quite alien to the needs of

the peasantry, and of little avail in the struggle of the masses against their harsh destiny.

In kozak times the people as a whole were united into a solid human monolith against the common oppressor. Nowhere is the idea of this unity seen more clearly than in the *dumy* relating to that heroic period in which there was but "a single freedom and a single song of liberty." As long as there is unity, there is strength. Once it begins to relax and a differentiation in the social status to set in, then the songs and *dumy* immediately begin to reflect that new disintegrating trend and to point out in realistic terms the cleavage that exists. All in all, they mirror faithfully the signs of the times.

The more keenly a people feel the pangs of life, the more profound are the songs in which their experience is mirrored. Thus it was in the sixteenth century when the Tatar hordes were rampant in southern Ukraine, making the life of the peasant altogether insecure. One was never certain when an attack would occur, and who would be next to fall a prey to the barbarians bent on booty and captives, riding rough-shod over the entire region. The workers in the fields were continually on the alert for the "black cloud" from the south, because the onslaughts multiplied and no one knew the day or the hour when the stealthy Tatars would strike and submerge entire communities in blood and grief.

Out of this misfortune rise songs whose predecessors are ancient funereal lamentations. In them is vented the ineffable grief of the captives, mainly young women, for whom the Turks and Tatars had a special eye because of their beauty and mercantile value. The sorrow expressed in the nostalgic wails of these female captives is heart-rending indeed.

No less keenly is felt the lamentation of the males who (in the cycle of the Kozak epos) weep and groan in chains as they lie rotting in underground prisons or perish gradually as rowers of Turkish galleys. Tearfully they raise their eyes and enchained arms heavenward, imploring God to grant them respite from their cruel sufferings, and crying out in anguish::

"Free us, O Lord, from this grievous bondage,
And let us sail onto the peaceful waters,
Under the bright stars,
To reach our happy land,
And join the baptized folk
In Christian habitations."

And as their prayers remain unanswered, the wretched captives lapse into vocal despair and curse the "busurman" (a corruption of "Mussulman") to the clanging accompaniment of their chains which are rusted by their never-ceasing tears. That lachrymose feeling is no doubt exaggerated; but only by this means can the intensity of their sorrow be made the more telling. Destitute and defenseless, the captives implore the doves, hawks, clouds, wind to bear their sorrow to their dear ones in the "land of Christendom" in order to rouse them to action on behalf of the unfortunate ones in the land of Islam.

These lamentations are by no means of a maudlin nature. They are like a thick ponderous cloud surcharged with thunderous elements amid which righteous curses and defiance rage like lightnings—a defiance of a Christian against the Mussulman world. For the Christians, as they appear in the *dumy*, remain captives of their own choosing. It lies within their power to become free. All they need in order to emerge from their subterranean caves into the light of liberty, and even emoluments and luxury, is to renounce Christianity and follow the prophet; but Orthodoxy is so firmly rooted in them that they become voluntary martyrs for the true faith.

There were, however, exceptions. One such was Marusia of Bohuslav. Having espoused Islam and a wealthy Turkish lord, she is surrounded by luxury; and yet the consciousness of her guilt is like a thorn in her heart. So painful is it that it finally goads her to visit her countrymen in prison in order to cheer them with the news that it will be Easter on the morrow. This news unleashes a volley of curses upon her for reminding them of that festive season. What qualms of conscience failed to do was accomplished by these vituperations; Marusia, who had become an infidel "for the sake of Turkish luxury and miserable greed," returns and, while her husband is in the mosque, opens the door for them into freedom.

A character similar to Marusia appears in the *duma* about "Samiylo Kishka" who not only turned Turk but became a fierce janissary, cruelly persecuting the Christians entrusted to his care. He goes so far as to seek to convert "hetman" Kishka (an historical Kozak leader) to the faith of his master, promising him wealth and freedom if the Zaporozhian will "trample upon his Christian creed." The latter's reply is as decisive as it is scathing: he will suffer life-long servitude but will not prove false to the faith of the Kozaks; whereat Buturlak, in his inordinate zeal, strikes him on the mouth. But even this hardened apostate feels the thorn of his conscience, especially in his drunken moments which bring back to his memory the happy times

when he was a Christian. Such a reflection drives him, during his master's wedding, to seek the company of Kishka in order to carouse with him and at the same time "discourse upon the Christian faith." While Buturlak is sleeping off his drunkenness, Kishka, who all that time was only pretending to be drinking, takes the key from his boon companion and by a stratagem takes possession of a Turkish galley in which he and his fellow-captives sail homeward. In these and other *dumy* the driving, sustaining and converting force of Christianity is revealed in all its redeeming power.

The didactic elements in the *dumy* and historical songs are everywhere in evidence. This trend is especially keen in the account of the "Death of Three Brothers on the Banks of the Samara," where they lie cut "to pieces" by the Turks. Worried about being deprived of a Christian burial (this theme is very common in the *dumy*), the brothers ask the youngest to sound the *surma* in order that wandering Kozaks might be drawn to the spot and inter them as befits the Christian dead. Instead of fulfilling their request, he exposes to them the reason for their mortal plight:

" 'Tis not the Turkish sword that cut us up,
Nor the janissary's bullets that pierced us;
It is our mother's tears that punished us,"

because before leaving home to join the Kozaks, they did not seek their parents' consent and blessing; whenever they passed the church they neglected to bare their heads; and never thought of asking God to come to their assistance. It is precisely these transgressions that brought this misfortune upon them.

The fate of the "Homeless Fedir" is much more envious, for he, although slashed by the infidels, is at least heartened by the appearance of the Kozaks who, he is certain, will with their swords dig him an honorable grave, bury him in it with all the knightly honors and, after raising a mound over it, will sit around it and hold a festive memorial celebration. Such an end was indeed devoutly to be wished by a Kozak whose fate it was to die far from his native home and loved ones.

However imperative the importance of these crusading expeditions, they are only second in comparison to the duty one must feel towards one's progenitors. The love of God and of one's parents, and an honest, sedate life take precedence over the zeal one might feel towards the crusade. This precept is made only too plain in the *duma* which relates the "Storm and the Black Sea." While the raging

elements appear to doom the entire expeditionary force of the Kozaks, their leader steps forward and asks the one who feels guilty of some inhuman sin to confess it publicly before God and men in order to placate the Divinity, for it is surely on account of that sin that they have come to such a terrible pass. The culprit Oleksey, the priest's son, then comes forth and reveals his transgressions, the greatest of which is his disrespect towards his parents. As soon as he confesses this, the storm subsides and the Kozak continue merrily on to a "banquet" with the Turks.

In all similar *dumy* it is the mother's tears (sometimes curses) and not the Turkish bullets that bring a Kozak low. And it is likewise her tears that save him from the depths of misfortune. The sacredness of filial love is all powerful: preserved, it heals and delivers; neglected, it dooms and destroys. With such strict morality and such rigid conception of duty towards one's parents, is it any wonder that the Ukrainian family has remained throughout the centuries a solid mainstay of national life?!

The Tatar inroads and the resulting suffering of the people produced a reaction the watchword of which was: "Let us all rise as one man in defence of our Christian faith!" The movement assumed the proportions and significance of a crusade; and all who could bear arms considered it their sacred duty and most exalted honor to take part in the expeditions. The movement may also be compared to the chivalrous period of Western Europe, where knightly honor required the paladins to redress wrongs, succor the weak, and free the persecuted and the captives. That was indeed the chivalrous period of Ukrainian history, devoid, however, of the anemic platonic feeling. Here, too, there were "fair damsels" to be freed, but in the main the movement developed not out of a vague ideal, but of sheer necessity. It was gory; the *dumy* and historical songs simply reek with blood and tears, and the exploits related in them are somewhat as improbable as those in the don-quistish romances of the western nations; but the daring deeds of the Kozaks, although extremely fantastic, are still not beyond the point of credibility, as are on the other hand many episodes of the Spanish *El Cid* or the French *Roland*, in which the very sport of carnage predominates the purpose that brings it about. The purpose behind the Ukrainian epics is not to cultivate the "pale" love or to enhance the worship of *domnei*, but to fight for the preservation of Christianity and its faithful.

The passion that spurred both the young and the old to take up arms against the Turk is plastically reproduced in many a *duma*; and

in them one often notes that extreme zeal turns into a rashness that eventually destroys the very end it intends to serve. In several *dumy* there are strong intimations that moderation is to be preferred to heedlessness, that self-protection is the best policy, and that cool reasoning is more important than juvenile cocksureness.

Incomparable heroism and stern sacrifice are concentrated in these historical songs. The greatest of these is that in which are related the exploits and death of Bayda, whom some identify with Dmitro Vishnevetsky, the founder of the Zaporozhian Sich. As the song begins Bayda is rashly making merry in Byzantium itself: the sultan offers him his daughter in marriage if he will accept Mohammedanism and consent to rule over the entire Ukraine under the sultan; but the Kozak-knight scorns the prospective bride and curses Islam; whereat the enraged sultan causes him to be hooked by the ribs and suspended from a gibbet. Hanging thus three days and three nights, Bayda finally, with the strength that yet remains in him, snatches a bow and three arrows from a Turk and with a supreme effort kills the sultan's family, thus demonstrating that one must, as long as life remains, war against the enemies of one's faith and people.

This fantastic account conforms with the oral legend evolved around the turbulent figure of Vishnevetsky, whose heart, it is related, the Turks ate in order to gain some of the qualities of courage that enlivened that mighty warrior. It is impossible to say where in this instance the fact begins and the fiction ends; but the deeds of Vishnevetsky against the Turks are historical enough. It was he who organized the Kozaks against the enemy of Christianity and blazed the trail to the land of the Turk for hetman Sahaydachny and others to follow.

The *duma* cycle may be divided into two categories:—Firstly, the songs of the captives with their tearful passivity; and those in which one sees a reaction develop into a general crusade of delivery. The second group is that which revolves about hetman Khmel'nitsky and, later, relates the inner divisions of the Kozak military organization with the resultant decay and disintegration.

These categories took rise out of the fertile soil of Kozakdom and flourished luxuriously, nourished by the sun of glory that attended these bloody exploits. In all these the Kozaks were the inheritors of the knightly, romantic tradition which reached its acme of lyricism and warlike spirit in the *Slovo o Polku Ihoreve* ("The Tale of Ihor's Campaign") which, although the product of the twelfth century, is nevertheless the greatest *duma* in existence

In the flame of grief and pain is forged the character of an individual as well as that of a nation. In the Turkish raids and in the sufferings of the captives one must seek the rise of lusty and hardy men who are fired into an organized effort to withstand and eventually destroy the enemy. Hence the rise of the Zaporozhian Sitch, and out of it—such glowing types as Prince Dmytro Vishnevetsky, the every embodiment of disinterested love for his native land and its people.

Thus it appears that there is an intertwining between the two categories of the *dumy*. The second (the Khmelnitsky epos) rises out of the first (the captive epos) and both merge into a solid whole, depicting in song the vicissitudes of fortune of a heroic *gens*, whose common ideal solidifies scattered individual sportive efforts into a general military endeavor and by a strict discipline makes them conscious of their common purpose. And that purpose is:—"Let us all rise as one man to defend our Christian faith . . . thereby to gain knightly glory. . ." This refrain recurs time and time again in the *dumy*, for it is the main motive of the general uprising of the masses. And in that defence of the faith the glory that is gained as a result shines resplendently and reveals the entire people whom one defends; and out of that discovery one gains the idea of that people's distinct ethnical existence.

The Kozak expeditions against the Turks consolidated that military organization into a mighty instrument against any power seeking to encroach upon the rights of the people. The threat from the south having been stemmed, the Poles, who at that time had overrun eastern Ukraine, sought to assert their mastery over the people by driving them out of their lands and possessions. The peasants who had always looked upon the Kozaks as their protectors, sought their aid against this new danger which threatened them with the loss of their liberties and with the resultant serfdom.

By that time the Kozak organization had become "a state within the state." It sided with the peasantry in the struggle with the Polish nobility and land-owning class. The reaction became greater when the Poles attempted to convert the Orthodox faith to Catholicism. It was then that the protest exploded into an armed warfare. Under hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky the Zaporozhians became the defenders of the political, economic and religious freedom of the Ukrainians. The entire population whose liberties were threatened "turned Kozak," including the Ukrainian nobility. And the cry:—"Let us all rise as one man to defend our Christian faith," used formerly against the Turks, was now turned against the Poles in the defence of national and social freedom of the Ukrainian people.

It was only natural that in the Ukrainian-Polish war that followed a new cycle of songs should take rise, and that the popular Muse should exert itself in idealizing both the leader and his followers in their struggle with the common enemy.

In the *duma* about Khmel'nitsky and Barabash, the former is represented as a crafty hero who by fair means or foul outwits his opponents in order to gain his end. This *duma* reminds one of the "Kishka" episode in the "Captive" cycle, with Barabash assuming a role similar to that of Buturlak in that he advises the hetman to gain peace by coming to terms with the enemy. The hetman, however, tricks him and gets possession of secret letters of the Polish king, and according to these he is able to plan his strategy and so gain an upper hand over the Poles.

Khmel'nitsky is represented in the *duma* of this period as a mighty stalwart who heeds no obstacle. He is somewhat like Charlemagne, as presented in the Frankish epos, brooking no opposition and allowing his foolhardy foes to beard him in his den only at the risk of their lives. And so Khmel'nitsky is not only idolized but assumes the proportions of a universal savior of the Christian people as a whole, as is evidenced in the *duma* which relates his expedition against Moldavia.

The apotheosis of the hero was however short-lived. It waned soon after the Peace of Bila Tserkov which Khmel'nitsky was forced to conclude with the Poles. On the basis of that treaty the number of free Kozaks was limited to twenty thousand; the rest were required to return to their native regions and to the serfdom from which they had fled, hoping that the great hetman would abolish it. Khmel'nitsky, however, was constrained to comply with that stipulation at the insistence of the Tatar khan who had an understanding with the Poles; and in order to keep his promise, he mercilessly crushed several armed protests of the Kozaks against the Polish landlords. As a result of this great betrayal of the cause by Khmel'nitsky, the popular ire rose to the degree of utter hatred towards him, and the people soon began to vent their ire against the hetman in words like these :

"May the first bullet not miss
That Khmel'nitsky,
And may the second find its way
Into his very heart."

From that time on Khmel'nitsky saw that he needed allies against the Poles, and sought them. He tried to force the ruler of Moldavia, Vassil Lupul, into an alliance, but the latter foresaw Polish revenge

and refused. As a result the hetman attacked Moldavia and forced Lupul to accept his conditions. This incident is idealized in the *duma* "The March on Moldavia" where Khmel'nitsky appears in all his amazing doughtiness. His deeds are extolled, and his motives are as yet not questioned. They are, however, questioned in the *duma* in which is related the "Rebellion after the Peace of Bilaserkov," which begins with a query. "Was it right, our hetman Khmel'nitsky, to make peace with the Poles, with the noble lords at Bilaserkov?" Later, this question expands into a more insistent protest:

"Our lord, hetman Khmel'nitsky,
Zinovius, our Sire from Chibirin,
Why have you caused our anger to rise against you?
Why have you given us over to such servitude?
In nothing have we now liberty:
The Poles, the noble lords, have deprived us of our keys
And have become masters in our households."

And yet, regardless of the great "betrayal," the people, even as they upbraid Khmel'nitsky, still do not lose hope in him, so great has his moral stature become in their fancy. Popular opinion of him is so intensely favorable that it even seeks to excuse him for his faults, and makes it appear that the treaty which he concluded with Tsar Alexis of Russia at Pereyaslav in 1654, which effected a political union of Ukraine and Russia, was prompted by the desire of the people themselves.

The period following that treaty is one of the division and disintegration of the Kozak organization. By that time there appeared in the Kozak ranks a wealthy class of landowners, especially among the officers; while the private Kozaks either had to return to the serfdom, from which they had fled, or remain landless and destitute. Hence the enmity between the two classes: the Kozak *holota* (the "wretched") and the wealthy *duky*. The latter not only fail to help their less fortunate fellow-Kozaks but deliberately seek to deprive them of the precious little they do have.

This economic situation is clearly reflected in the *duma* about "Handzha Andiber," a representative of the landless class; he was, perhaps, as Hrushevsky suggests, hetman Bryukhovetsky himself, who, also, led a rebellion of the *holota* against the landowners. The subject matter of this *duma* is naive: a ragged Kozak, Handza, enters a tavern in which three *duky* are making merry. They ask the tavernkeeper to drive him out, but in spite of her efforts he refuses to move. Then one of them takes pity on him and asks her to bring the poor wretch

some beer. She sends her servant-girl to the cellar, telling her to draw the worst quality there is; but the maid does the opposite. Having had his fill of the potent beverage, Handzha Andiber produces money, and having spent some of it in feasting with the *duky*, reveals himself as hetman. At a given sign his Kozak retinue appears; and then he orders them to flog the *duky*, except the one who bought him beer. At least in song, if not in reality, the common man has the upper hand over his well-to-do oppressor.

The Kozak *Holota*, disillusioned in his dreams of liberty, yet seeks to preserve, even in misery, his tattered dignity by taking the law into his own hands and by meting out deserved punishment in the name of his truth and justice. There were many such *holota* and *netyaha* (ragged) Kozaks roaming about Ukraine, and in them one sees to what a sorry degree the Kozak organization was reduced following the treaty of Pereyaslav:—to a mere shadow of those warriors who in the previous century rode on the crests of the waves to shake Byzantium itself. Now the offspring of those knights were being disbanded, and their remnants reduced to the low category of a *holota* wandering from place to place, seeking land and glory, both in vain. For some time yet even those who belonged to the *holota* continued to be idealized in popular songs, but the *dumy* in which they figure, as that in which is related the "Duel of a Kozak *Holota* with a Tatar," do not ring sincere. These shine only with the reflected glory of the former productions of the kind, in which the atmosphere and the account of the exploits are genuine and worthy of the song. The Kozak who began his existence as a warrior knight on the battlefield, now ends it in the tavern where he seeks to drown his grief in liquor. He becomes a thoroughly disillusioned man. And his decadence causes the deterioration of the *duma*.

These historical ballads and *dumy* continued to be sung by old blind beggars for yet a century after the disappearance of the Kozak organization, and are still occasionally sung by professional "beggars;" but they no longer have their freshness, because the times which produced them have radically changed. If these songs still retain some of their original flavor, it is because the exploits and the heroes they extol have in the course of time been gilded by an aura of legend. They are still romantically appealing, but they are beautiful only as are the ruins of a temple or a castle of ancient fame; and attractive, as are the remnants of those places in which once were performed deeds of daring and honor that serve to remind future generations of the vitality of their forebears.

UKRAINE AND THE WESTERN WORLD

By NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

AT the last annual meeting of the American Historical Association in New York, the Section on Modern European History raised the question as to what was, in the cultural sense, the eastern boundary of Europe. There is no doubt that Russia, *i.e.*, Muscovy, does not, strictly speaking, belong to the cultural sphere of Europe. Its political, cultural and economic interests being what they are, Muscovy belongs to Asia. This fact is accepted not only by the Russian Communists of to-day but also by those Russians who are opposed to Communism. The present policy of the all-powerful Politbureau clearly sets the population of the Soviet Union apart from European culture, and is moving the economic and political centre of gravity of the Soviets beyond the Urals, to Asia. The same program is accepted by the potential successors to the Communist rule in Russia, the present Russian nationalists, who have even called their political and cultural conception of post-Communist Russia as Eurasianism.

It therefore is pertinent to ask: where is the western cultural boundary of Russia, or of that political, economic and cultural unit called Eurasia? An amateurish approach to the problem of eastern Europe will incline one to include in that unit, as a simple matter of course, that territory which before World War II belonged to the Soviet Union, *i.e.* Ukraine and White Ruthenia. A careful study of the political and national problems of eastern Europe will however give a different result. Just as the present satellite nations lying on the western boundaries of the Soviet Union are kept dependent on Moscow by the sheer force of police, so in the course of some two hundred years Ukraine and White Ruthenia were kept within the bounds of Russia—and at present within the Soviet Union—only by the terror of the Russian occupation, against the wishes of the local and native population, and by the deliberate decimation of the native population. Only the utterly mad racial policy of the Nazis who, after having occupied those territories during the last war, began to exterminate millions of the local Slavic population, in addition to the Jews, helped the Soviets to regain those territories. A wise German national policy in eastern

Europe, which might have taken into consideration the national aspiration and the cultural past of these peoples, would have led the Soviets to their downfall. This should be taken into account by all those statemen who in time to come may have to deal with the problems of eastern Europe. If one overlooks the problem of the national independence of Ukraine, White Ruthenia and the other peoples on the western and southern boundaries of Muscovy, they can only serve to strengthen Moscow and will certainly not rid the world of the threat to its peace. Nationally, the pre-war territory of the Soviet Union was not a homogeneous entity, as many "specialists" on East European Affairs would lead us to believe. Ukraine and White Ruthenia are nationally and culturally distinct and separate nations, the most easterly regions of the western world and this is the subject of our article.

Kiev and Moscow—Two Distinct Worlds

In the middle of the last century the Russian writer Aleksey K. Tolstoy, one of the Russian westerners, found in eastern Europe two separate national types represented by Moscow and Kiev. According to him, as far back as the 13th century, *i.e.*, following the Tatar invasion of eastern Europe, these two types rose out of the ruins of the old Ukrainian state known as *Rus'*. Writes Tolstoy: "One *Rus'* has its roots in the universal, or at least in European culture. In this *Rus'* the ideas of goodness, honor and freedom are understood as in the West. But there is another *Rus'*; the *Rus'* of the dark forests, the *Rus'* of the Taiga, the animal Russia, the fanatic Russia, the Mongol, Tatar Russia. This last Russia made despotism and fanaticism its ideal . . . Kiev *Rus'* was a part of Europe, Moscow long remained the negation of Europe."¹

Modern research in the anthropology and pre-history of eastern Europe make it plain that these two distinct national types, Muscovy and Ukraine, existed long before the Tatar invasion of eastern Europe in the 13th century. Anthropologically the Muscovite-Russians are a type completely different from the Ukrainians. It was only the ancient Ukrainian civilization, which prevailed on all the territories of the Kiev *Rus'*, that lent a superficial similarity to both the inhabitants of the Dnieper basin and to those who dwelled along the upper course of the Volga.² The Tatar invasion and the different attitudes of Ukraine

¹ *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. XIX, 1939-40, pp. 71-72; "The Meaning of Russia and Ukraine" in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. I, 4 (1945).

² Scherbakivsky, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*, Prague, 1941—in Ukrainian.

and Muscovy towards the invader served only to deepen the existing basic differences between the two nations.

Under the Tatar domination Moscow managed to preserve its strength, grew more powerful, and set out to gain supremacy over Ukraine, its former teacher and civilizer. From that time on Moscow continued its onslaughts on the mentality of Kiev and its European character. When in the middle of the 17th century it conquered that part of Ukraine which had seceded from Poland as a result of the rebellion led by Khmel'nitsky, it increased its attacks against the West-European character of the Ukrainian culture and educational system, as well as against the western influences in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which it wished to pattern on the Muscovite Orthodox faith and, to use likewise as the tool of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

When towards the end of the 18th century, after the downfall of Poland, the remaining Ukrainian territories west of the Dnieper fell under the Russian rule, the Russian government began a systematic destruction of the West-European culture also in that part of Ukraine which, even more than eastern Ukraine, was under the influence of the West. The Ukrainian Catholic Church which prevailed there was made the object of a severe persecution on the part of Russia. This religious oppression lasted about a century and forced some eight million Ukrainians and three million White Ruthenians to abandon their faith.

The schools and other institutions of learning which Russia established there made it their purpose to destroy the western influence in Ukraine and to persuade the population that the salvation of the Ukrainians who had been oppressed by the Poles was to be found solely in Russia.

These tsarist measures with regard to Ukraine were in due time adopted by the Bolsheviks who still continue to attack everything that links Ukraine to western Europe. The chief purpose of the pogrom, in 1930, of Ukrainian culture and its representatives, men of science, writers and artists, was to put an end to the orientation of Ukrainian science, literature and art toward western Europe. In other words, its purpose was to destroy the old traditional trend of the Ukrainian culture.

This traditional orientation of the Ukrainians was best summed up by the Ukrainian proletarian writer, Mikola Khvilovy, a Communist, who in his literary manifesto to his colleagues said: "Let us turn our backs to Russia, and our faces to Europe." For seeking, under

the Soviets, thus to orientate Ukrainian culture, Khvilovy was forced to commit suicide, and thereby increase the number of those victims who had been genuine creators of Ukrainian culture and who died by the hundreds in the defence of the European soul of the Ukrainian people. Time and again Ukrainian leaders in the realms of literature and politics have returned to that course, especially when they are able to express their minds more freely, as was the case in the last world war. During that time the Kremlin, sorely pressed by the Nazis, permitted some cultural freedom to the Ukrainians. However, as soon as the danger passed, the Moscow government again assailed the traditional trend of Ukrainian culture, and on the orders of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party there began a purge of those Ukrainian men of science and letters who had emphasized the relation of Ukrainian culture with the West. This fact has been recently reported in the American press.

Western Qualities in the Character of the Ukrainians

The Ukrainian language, which is quite different from the Russian, the Ukrainian manners and customs, national art, and historical traditions, all these are external characteristics which distinctly place the Ukrainian people apart from the Russian. But the deepest cleavage between the two peoples are found in the Ukrainian mentality and idealism, which are completely at variance with the mentality of the Russians. The first basic quality of the Ukrainian character is the individuality, as contrasted with the mass temperament of the Russian. A Ukrainian likes to live on his own property, however small it may be: his home he considers his particular microcosm; his possessions he delimits from the possessions of his neighbor and lords over it according to his own fashion, improving it as well as his highly developed national art will permit. The house of a Ukrainian peasant is always newly whitewashed, surrounded by a garden and orchard, with flower beds in front. In the interior the wooden parts are often meticulously carved; the earthenware is made vivid with bright ornaments; the walls and beds are covered with artistically woven carpets; towels, table cloths and shirts are finely embroidered. In a word, the house of a Ukrainian is, as it were, a family temple.

A Russian is exactly the opposite. He has a tendency towards collectivism. Long before the Revolution there existed in Russia the so-called *mir*, or the system of collective ownership of land by the entire community. The land was distributed by the government of the com-

munity for temporary use. These collective farms existed on vast scales.—Furthermore, a Russian is a realist and feels no desire to devote much time to beautifying his home. For that reason the house of a Russian peasant is usually untidy, without the amenities of an orchard or flower garden. This characteristic is so deeply rooted in the soul of a Ukrainian that even in Siberia, or wherever the Ukrainians and Russians exiled from Europe are to be found in one community, the house of a Ukrainian can be easily distinguished from that of a Russian.

By their nature Ukrainians are democrats and opponents of all dictatorial government imposed from above. In the entire course of Ukrainian history one therefore meets only elected organs of government wherever the Ukrainian masses could have enough influence to establish them. In the old Kiev state the moot (*vitche*), or the general assembly of the citizens of the capital city, was one of the organs of government which controlled the power of the prince and not infrequently even deposed him and elected another in his place. During the Ukrainian Kozak Period all the governmental posts, from the lowest to the highest, were elective and under the control of the general public. Even under an alien government, Polish or Russian, the peasants were always eager to elect their own representatives, and had their own so called "multiple" courts for settlements of district matters of an economic nature, as well as for all questions of local justice.

The contrary is true with regard to the Russians who, it seems, have a natural inclination to accept a government imposed by force and to remain subservient to it. From the first years of the history of Muscovy, *i.e.*, from the middle of the 12th century, we meet in Suzdal, and later in Moscow, an absolute government, in the establishment of which the people as a whole had no part and they had no influence upon or control over it. It appears therefore that for the Russians the absolute form of government is quite natural. So they felt while under the tsars, and so they feel now, after the Revolution of 1917.

A vivid illustration of the respective attitudes of a Ukrainian and of a Russian is a story as to how a Russian and a Ukrainian peasant reacted to the news of the Revolution and the consequent dethronement of the tsar in 1917. The Russian *mouzhik*, upon learning the news, was very surprised that such a thing could at all happen, and said: "Well, what of it? Tsar Mikola is gone—there will be another." The Ukrainian peasant, on the other hand, reacted thus: "Well, if there is no tsar, we shall now begin to form the people's government."

Ukrainians love liberty and continually aspire to it. Their history, however, has taken such a curious course, and still does, that for centuries on end they have been deprived of freedom; but likewise for centuries on end they have never ceased struggling in order to attain it. No wonder, then, that the French writer Voltaire, who was acquainted with some Ukrainian emigrants who supported that great liberator, hetman Mazepa, wrote that the Ukrainians continually strove to attain liberty. The Russians, on the other hand, do not feel the need of liberty and therefore do not struggle for it. The fact is that in the course of the 800-year-old history of the Russian people there is not a single period of genuine liberty or of popular rule. The only democratic regime in Russia occurred after the Revolution of 1917; but it lasted only half a year and ended with the return to dictatorship, this time to that of Lenin and his successor Stalin.

In connection with their individualism and love of liberty, the Ukrainians also possess the sense of self-respect, as well as respect for others. It is the custom of any Ukrainian to show his esteem towards other persons, even children, regardless of his social status: he will not allow himself to be insulted, and likewise will not allow others to be offended. Therefore the entire life of a Ukrainian, more or less like that of the Chinese, is filled with ceremonialism toward both intimate friends and strangers. A guest is welcomed quite effusively and the host endeavors to make his sojourn with him as pleasant as possible. The guest is seated in the most comfortable place, off which the master of the house must by all means personally wipe the dust. A Ukrainian, even of lowly origin, never uses trivial or ribald words; and if he is forced to utter some word which is not too elegant, in order to emphasize some unavoidable thought, he begs to be excused several times for having to resort to such an expression.

Sexual life is the deep concern of the two persons who are to live together in wedlock; and it appears that this aspect of life does not at all exist in the view of the Ukrainian people. The love relations of young people are characterized by an idealistic approach to their spiritual connection, which only after the wedding assumes the character of mutuality such as should normally exist between husband and wife.

All these attributes regarding the dignity of a human being and his self-respect, as well as his sparingness in the use of ribald terms, are alien to the Russian temperament. It is a fact that even in the aristo-

cratic circles of tsarist Russia highly indecent and blasphemous expressions were not avoided even in the presence of women.

When Did Ukraine Begin to Fraternize with the Western World?

Ever since its first appearance on the arena of history, the ancient Ukrainian Kiev state, known by the name *Rus'*, had always been in close relations with the Greek world. The influence of the Greeks on the Ukrainians, especially that of the Greek colonies scattered along the Ukrainian coast of the Black Sea, is an historical fact. That influence revealed itself in the everyday life of the Ukrainian people—in their attire, manners and customs, and in their clear outlook on life. Having accepted Christianity from Byzantium, Ukraine became a part of the universal Christian world which was deeply rooted in the classical Graeco-Roman culture. The extensive Ukrainian translations in the 11th century, from the classic literatures, prove how quickly Ukraine appropriated the spiritual attainments of that culture.

Between the two rival centers of the Christian world, Rome and Byzantium, there appears a third center, Kiev, the capital of that eastern European state which was a part of the medieval *Communitas Christiana*, i.e., of the union of the Christian peoples of Europe under the spiritual leadership of the Pope. The independent attitude of Kiev in the ecclesiastical quarrel between Rome and Byzantium is a well established fact. It is likewise certain that both of these Christian centers sought at any price to bring Ukraine within the orbit of their influence. The intermarriages of the members of the Ukrainian dynasty with almost all the ruling families of western Europe is ample proof that Ukraine had no thought of abandoning that union of the Christian peoples; on the contrary—it endeavored to link itself more strongly to it.

The great factor which led Ukraine to a closer connection with western Europe was its geographic position as the guardian of the gates through which the Asiatics entered Europe. Waging incessant warfare with the barbarians who were continually pressing westward, Ukraine was forced to maintain good relations with the West and even to move its main center of resistance to its western boundaries, because the Dnieper basin was extremely vulnerable. The Tatar invasion linked Ukraine even more closely with western Europe for the purpose of withstanding the more successfully the Mongolian element which had flooded the entire eastern Europe. Hence the plans of a religious union

of Ukraine with Rome, as well as the projects of alliances of the western Ukrainian state with the crusading nations, Hungary, Austria and Poland.

Ukraine and Muscovy assumed two different attitudes toward the Tatars: Ukraine sought alliances with the West and, while establishing its solidarity with Europe, continued its struggle with the invaders. Muscovy, on the other hand, surrendered to the Mongolians, entered the sphere of Asiatic culture and became a Eurasian state. It found this course the easier to follow: firstly, because of the racial origin of the overwhelming number of its Magyar-Finnic population; and secondly, because of the fact that as a political and national individuality, Muscovy never had been a part of the universal Graeco-Roman world. As a separate political entity, it became crystallized only in the middle of the 12th century, precisely at the time when the connection of Kiev with Byzantium became very weak on account of the nomadic tribes from Asia, which had by that time overrun the Ukrainian steppes north of the Black Sea. With the western world, however, Muscovy had no connections, and did not even seek to have them established. Having become politically stronger under the Tatar rule, Muscovy became a world unto itself, quite separate from the Christian world of Byzantium and Rome. It took advantage of the fall of Constantinople to proclaim itself a formal successor to Byzantium, a Third Rome, although culturally it inherited nothing from that Empire and was moved only by its political ambitions.

The interest of Ukraine in the life of Europe is shown by the fact that after the fall of Constantinople, Ukraine began to adopt the cultural achievements of the West. In the first half of the 14th century Latin, the then international literary language, became the second official language of Western Ukraine. The Romanesque style of architecture was introduced earlier. According to some archeologists, the cathedral erected in Halich in the second half of the 12th century was in that style, as well as the 13th century Church of St. Panteleymon in the same city, the only remains of this type of architecture still standing in that turbulent part of Europe. In the 14th century we already have in Western Ukraine examples of Gothic, both in architecture and painting.

The fall of Constantinople and of that culture which flowed thence to Ukraine either directly or, later, indirectly through the monasteries of Athos, inclined the Ukrainian people to seek connections with the center of Christianity—Rome, with a view to effecting a union of the

Ukrainian Church with the Papacy. Such attempts were constantly repeated, beginning with the Council of Constance (1414-1418) and, later, at the Council of Florence (1439), as well as through the numerous connections of leading Ukrainians, outside the Councils, with the Vatican, until finally, towards the close of the 16th century, the Ukrainian Church joined the Roman Church at the assembly which effected what is known to history as the Union of Brest (1596).

The Ukrainian Renaissance and Baroque

After the fall of Constantinople, when that hearth of culture so declined, Ukraine took part in all the spiritual movements which rolled over western Europe. Dozens of young Ukrainians left their country to study in foreign lands, Italy (Padua), Germany (Wittemberg) and France (Paris). They brought back with them the new movements and tendencies which were being nurtured and fostered at that time in western Europe. By this means Humanism and the Reformation reached Ukraine, and, in their wake, the Catholic Counter-Reformation in the shape of Jesuit colleges.

Under the influence of Protestantism there appeared translations of the Sacred Scriptures in the Ukrainian language, in the form in which it was then spoken by the people, with but slight additions of Church Slavic, which up to that time had been the standard literary language of Ukraine. Across Ukraine there rolled the wave of Protestantism of all shades—Lutheranism, Calvinism, and even such radical movements as Socinianism (Antitrinitarianism). The Protestants established in Ukraine their own schools, printing presses, organized their local congregations, and published their books, often in the speech of the people (Catechism of Simon Budny).

Protestantism drew to Ukraine the active army of revived Catholicism—the Jesuits, who covered Ukraine with a thick network of their humanistic colleges. Although these colleges represented Latin Catholicism, a type culturally alien to the Ukrainian people and their 500-year-old tradition of Christianity of the eastern rite, still those Jesuits institutions educated hundreds of Ukrainian youth, including the leader of the Ukrainian uprising against the Poles, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Even those who were hostile to the Latin Catholic propaganda of the Jesuits in Ukraine were enthusiastic about the humanistic outlook of the Jesuit colleges, and many came to the conclusion that a Ukrainian could not be considered as really educated if he had not been

graduated from a humanistic institution. The testament of a Ukrainian nobleman Vassil Zahorovsky (of the second half of the 16th century) regarding the education of his children is a documentary proof of the influence of western humanistic ideas on the life of the Ukrainian people.

Humanism, Protestantism and the Catholic Counter-Reformation became the factors which hastened the reform of the educational system and church life in Ukraine. The newly established schools at Ostroh (1580) and the urban school of the Stauropygian Brotherhood in Lviv (1586) added to their programs of studies also the teaching of the Latin language which was then considered to be indispensable to a well educated person. The best organized school in Ukraine was the Kiev Mohyla Collegium, later transformed into an Academy. It accepted not only Latin as one of the main subjects in the curriculum, but also philosophy and law, expounded according to the humanistic methods of the day.

The Ukrainian Catholic educational system of the Basilian Fathers was patterned on the Jesuit humanistic colleges. The Basilians succeeded even in the 18th century in competing with the Jesuits and supplanted the latter's colleges by their own. They educated in their humanistic schools not hundreds of Ukrainian students, as had been formerly done by the Jesuits, but thousands, and by this means gave Ukraine the character of a European country. In a word, Ukraine took part in the spiritual movements of western Europe and considered itself a part of it.

Humanism and the Renaissance revealed themselves in Ukraine not only in education but in all aspects of Ukrainian art: architecture, painting and sculpture. While during the existence of the Byzantine cultural influence Ukrainian art was patterned mainly on that of Byzantium, and monuments of Gothic or Romanesque architecture appear but rarely, now monuments of Renaissance architecture are quite frequent. One has but to stop at the main square in Lviv and before his eyes there will appear fine examples of it—the *Voloska* Church with its wonderful tower, the Korniakt palace and several homes belonging to the local notables. Western Ukraine had many more such palaces and churches. It is not known whether these vital witnesses of Ukraine's connection with western Europe still remain after the last War.

The Renaissance period left its mark also on Ukrainian painting.

The influence of Albrecht Durer and that of the Flemish school are particularly to be noted.

Even more numerous are the Baroque monuments in Ukraine. Just as in the West the Baroque became the style of the Jesuits, so did it become, in Ukraine, the style of the Basilians. Most of the churches of the Basilian Fathers were built in that style. The fashion of the Baroque spread throughout Ukraine, not only where the church union or Catholicism of the eastern rite prevailed, but even in that part of Ukraine which lay to the east of the Dnieper, where Catholicism of the eastern rite did not exist. The Baroque reached the furthermore limits of Ukraine, Kharkov itself, where the cathedral is in that style.

The Baroque is likewise represented throughout Ukraine by numerous secular buildings. It stamped its influence on Ukrainian painting, sculpture and engraving, especially during the hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa, who was an outstanding protector of art and culture in general.

It follows from what has thus far been said that Ukraine took constantly an active part in all the cultural movements of Europe. On the other hand Muscovy took no part in those spiritual movements which were akin to it or appeared only accidentally. In fact Muscovy did not deem itself a part of that cultural world which Europe is generally considered to be.

The System of Ukrainian Law

The law of ancient Ukraine, at the time of the Kiev *Rus'*, was based not only on the written law of precedent; it also took advantage of the legal aspects of the Roman-Byzantine Code, as well as that which was brought from Scandinavia by the Varangians. That law of the *Rus'* state, *Ruska Pravda*, ("Justice of *Rus'*"), complemented by the orders of the princes in matters of administration and finance, conformed to the needs and to the ethical outlook of the Ukrainian people, because it was here that this system of law took rise. It was only natural for the princes to seek to spread this law and make it binding throughout the entire *Rus'*, hence even on the territories of the present White Ruthenia and Muscovy. That attempt continued as long as the unity of the ancient Kiev state existed. Shortly after the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1054) Kiev *Rus'* began to disintegrate, and eventually new state organisms rose out of the ruins of that integral State, each with its own laws.

For that reason the system of *Ruska Pravda* was binding only on

a voluntary basis, depending on whether a given state considered that system appropriate to its needs or not. The system of *Ruska Pravda* was preserved intact in Ukraine, and was maintained for centuries on the territories of Great Novgorod and White Ruthenia; but it did not prevail for long on the territories of Muscovy which found that system inappropriate to its needs. Muscovy formed its own laws which were codified several times in the course of the 15th-17th centuries.

The historians of Russian law emphasize that in the legal system of Muscovy there was no continuation of the system of the *Ruska Pravda*; on the other hand, this was continued in the law of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenia peoples in later centuries, especially in the excellent Lithuanian Statute which was codified for the first time in 1529. In other words, the law of the old Kiev *Rus'* continued in Ukraine and White Ruthenia, but did not in Muscovy.

The old legal system of Ukraine and White Ruthenia was quickly modernized by its gradual acceptance of the new elements of the law of western Europe, such as the Urban Law of Magdeburg, the Saxon Law, the Laws of Emperor Charles V, and other western codes of laws. In a word, the legal system of Ukraine, while maintaining its ancient Ukrainian basis, was brought up to date by the incorporation of the legal views of western Europe. It is important to note that the system of the Lithuanian Statute was preserved in Ukraine a long time, long after the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian state when it was under the sway of Russia. Up to the middle of the 19th century it remained as the local law of Ukraine.

Even in the last decade of the existence of the western Ukrainian state, especially in the cities of Ukraine, the Magdeburg law began to spread and move ever eastward. It was accepted in the Ukrainian cities west of the Dnieper and, in the 17th century, reached even the region east of the Dnieper. The Magdeburg law, and the so-called Saxon law, *i.e.*, the German *Speculum Saxonum* (*Sachsen-Spiegel*), when appropriately applied, became the standard code in most of the cities of Ukraine. The use of both these legal monuments, well known in Germany and in the entire Europe, make it quite clear that the system of Ukrainian law was closely connected with that of western Europe.

The apparent synthesis of all the legal systems of western Europe, which Ukraine had been accepting throughout the centuries, came in the codification of the Ukrainian Kozak law, known under the title: "Laws, according to which the Little Russian People are Judged"

(1743).¹ Although the heading of the Code Ukraine is denominated by the term Little Russia (*Malorossiya*), in conformity with the Russian government's demand, the Code itself showed the close connection of the legal system of Kozak Ukraine with that of western Europe. In that Code there were excerpts from the Lithuanian Statute, the Magdeburg law, the *Speculum Saxonum*, laws of Emperor Charles V, as well as Roman law. On the other hand, there is not the slightest trace in that synthesis of the laws of the Muscovite protector of Ukraine. That was perhaps the reason why this Code of law for the Kozak state was not sanctioned by the tsar.

Ukraine in the 18th Century

Perhaps no other age in the history of Ukrainian people gives such a clear picture of the cultural affinity of Ukraine with the western world as does the 18th century. The beginning of that century was marked by the mighty uprising of hetman Ivan Mazepa to free Ukraine from the Russian rule and to make it an independent nation. The uprising itself was caused by the unbearable pressure of Muscovy to absorb the Ukrainian nation into the Russian political and cultural organism. That, of course, was tantamount to a complete annihilation of the Ukrainians as a separate nation. The pressure of Russia to make Ukraine a part of Russia, as *Malorossiya* (Little Russia), came exactly at the time when the Ukrainian people had closely linked itself culturally with western Europe and come to regard itself as a part of the European cultural community.

The entire Ukraine west of the Dnieper became Catholic, and the Basilian colleges continued to educate the young generation in the spirit of western civilization. That part of Ukraine which lay east of the Dnieper, at that time an autonomous entity under the protectorate of Russia, was being agitated by a vigorous move toward independence and a distinct tendency to oppose the Russianization of Ukraine. That movement was quite noticeable within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as in the entire population. The standard education of the enlightened strata of the Kozak Ukraine in the Kiev Mohyla Academy was conducted in the spirit of western civilization. Every graduate left it with a fairly adequate knowledge of the Latin tongue, and many knew French as well.

In everyday life the enlightened members of the higher society

¹ Publ. in *Kiřskaya Staryna* by prof. Aleksander Kistiakowsky.

accepted French customs as their own. Western literature and art were popular among them. Muscovy, which was their hated protector, the Ukrainians considered as a barbarian from whom they had nothing to learn, and who, on the other hand, had much to learn from them. The more ambitious individuals actually moved from Ukraine to Muscovy where they gained great honors for their services. Some of them were so influential at the court of Peter I that one must consider them as co-builders of the modern Russian Empire (Prokopovich, Yavorsky, Tuptalo, etc.).

Briefly, Ukraine in the 18th century was a nation which regarded itself as a part of the western world, quite in accordance with the old tradition of Ukraine in the times of the *Kiev Rus'*.



The end of the 18th century brought the liquidation of all autonomy for Ukraine, which, after the partitions of Poland, with the exception of Galicia and Carpathian Ukraine, found itself under the rule of the Russian tsars. For almost a century and a half the Russian government struggle with the western elements of Ukrainian spiritual life. The Catholic Church and the Ukrainian cultural institutions were liquidated, as though they had been poisoned by western culture. The Ukrainian people were driven perforce to a national union with the Russians by all the means at the disposal of the Muscovite Empire—by the instrumentality of its state apparatus, and that of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as by the Russian language and Russian culture.

The struggle against the western mentality of the Ukrainian people was taken over from the White tsardom by the Red tsardom which is continuing it by the same methods. The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, the suppression of the spiritual connections of the Ukrainians in matters of literature and art with western Europe—continue. What's more, the Bolsheviki are spreading the conception that Ukraine has always been in spiritual affinity with Moscow. These are the old and well known methods by which Moscow struggled, and continues to struggle, against the national individuality of the Ukrainian nation which is inseparably a part of the western world.



CHARLES DICKENS PUBLICATION ON TARAS SHEVCHENKO SEVENTY YEARS AGO

ON MAY 5th, 1877 there appeared in the weekly magazine *All the Year Round*, published in London (England) under the editorship of Charles Dickens, an interesting biographical sketch on the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. The four pages long article bears no author's signature but its sympathetic approach and its comparisons with conditions in England make it an interesting reading. It was written only sixteen years since the death of the great poet, well within the living memory of the readers of the magazine. The author concludes his sketch with the words: "Whatever you may think of him (Taras Shevchenko) as a poet, he has made such a name for himself that you ought to know something about him."

Although the article includes some historical inaccuracies, which we leave unchanged, as well as the indiscriminate use of such names as Russia, Little Russia, South Russia for Ukraine, which is evidently influenced by the official routine of the Russia of seventy years ago, the article is doubly interesting. It presents one of the first biographies of Taras Shevchenko published in the English language and, it forms a link, although indirectly, between Taras Shevchenko and the great English writer Charles Dickens, the editor of the weekly magazine which printed the biography.

In the United States of America the first biography of Taras Shevchenko (in English), as far as we know, appeared in the periodical *The Alaska Herald* (established in 1868), published by Agapius Honcharenko, in San Francisco, California. The paper was printed in Russian and English languages.

V. J. KISILEWSKY,
Ottawa, Canada.

A SOUTH RUSSIAN POET*

TARASS CHEVTCHENKO was born a serf; and serfdom is not a wholesome condition for a human creature. Under a good lord the serf's lot might be superior to that of the English labourer in some of those dreary villages where there is no resident squire, and where the farmers are more than usually hard and unenlightened; but all masters are not good, and the mischief of serfdom and slavery is, that they leave too much to the individual. Man needs checks and all kinds to keep him straight. In England if one farmer is exceptionally hard, the labourers will go to another and there are various courts of appeal, unestablished but none the less influential, which help to keep things straight. Where serfdom was the rule, poverty was not—as theoretically it ought to have

* *All the Year Round*—A weekly journal conducted by Charles Dickens. Volume XVIII. London 1877. (Issue of May 5, 1877. No. 440, pp. 220-224.)

been—abolished; and, worst evil of all, the disposition to help distress in general was lessened because it was each owner's business to look after his own serfs; he was their "father" and to interfere might be resented as an affront. Moreover, Chevchenko belonged to a race among whom serfdom was a recent introduction. This South Russia, or Little Russia of which he is a popular poet, is what we also call the Ukraine—the land of Cossacks, who were free till the middle of the seventeenth century. Free they were, but not safe, with their loose organisation of village communities—not centralised enough to bear the pressure of modern times—and with eager enemies, Poles, Turks, Russians, watching them all around. Of these the Poles were the worst.

Poland has suffered a great deal, no doubt of it. Her sufferings are a disgrace, not only to the arch-robber and persecutor and to the other two who shared in the spoil, but to all the other "powers" who looked on, and did nothing—did not even get up a conference on the occasion. But then, Poland, in her time, was a hard mistress, deservedly hated by her kinsfolk of Little Russia. She had "annexed" them as far as the right bank of the Dnieper, and had made her rule odious, by that petty kind of tyranny which it is the hardest thing in the world to forgive. For instance, the Poles then, as now, were zealous Romanists, and they worried the schismatic Cossacks by putting all the church-lands in their part of the Ukraine into the hands of the Jews. Worse still, every church matter was transacted through Jews; the wafers for consecration could only be bought of Jews, who, the Cossacks believed, never sold any, without first desecrating them by stamping them with some unholy mark. So, when it seemed needful to choose a protector, less the other half of the Ukraine should likewise be swallowed up, no one thought of the Poles; the question was: "Turks or Russians?" Many were for the Turks; they were a strong nation then, and they had won the respect of their neighbors by a habit of truth-telling, not over common in any part of Christendom, and especially rare to the eastward. Moreover, they were tolerant. If their Christian subjects would pay tribute, they were safe to be undisturbed in the practice of their religion. During the two centuries of Tartar rule in Russia, when the Grand Duke of Novgorod,¹ or by whatever other title he styled himself, was the humble vassal of the "Golden Horde," the churches rarely or ever suffered, the bishops were protected. However, the hetman of the Cossacks, Bogdan Chmelnitsky, decided for Russia, and, in 1651,² the Ukraine put itself under her protection, stipulating that she was to be as free as ever, and

¹ The author has apparently in mind Moscow.—Ed.; ² In reality was 1654—Ed. n

to be ruled still by her own chiefs, the hetmans and kochovys. Just so the horse made all sorts of stipulations when, in his struggle with the stag, he took to man to help him. Very soon the native rulers were abolished, and "Great Russian" laws, administered by "Great Russian" functionaries, were introduced. The Cossacks had to submit, except those who lived among the almost inaccessible islands, hidden by the reed beds of the Dnieper. Even Peter the Great left these to themselves; but Catherine the Second at last conquered even them in 1775, all except a few hundred who on board of their light boats, dropped down the river by night, and settled on the right bank of the river Kuban, under the skirts of Mount Caucasus, where their descendents are still called Black Sea Cossacks. Catherine determined to make sure work of her new conquest, by introducing throughout the Ukraine the new institution of serfdom. The chiefs, seeing resistance hopeless, submitted with a good grace, it was not bad change for them, looking at the matter from a selfish point of view, to become, instead of patriarchal heads of clans with very limited authority, nobles, with all the power which the Russian nobles wielded till the recent emancipation. But the clansmen were naturally disgusted; and a larger emigration took place, colonizing the Dobroduscha—the Delta of the Danube, as muddy and reedy as the island of the Dnieper themselves. There they lived their wild life under Turkish rule, whilst those who were left seems with their freedom, to have lost their self-respect and their energy. They sank to be mere clods instead of enterprising fellows, ready for a foray across the steppe, or a raid with boat-flotilla up or down the river, and actually ready for any trading enterprise that had a spice of romance in it. Before fifty years were over, all the trade of the country had passed into the hands of "Great Russians," or of Jews. In education also there was a lamentable fall. Kiev had been the cradle of Russian thought; its university for a long time had ranked high, in theology especially; anyhow it was the only university between the Black and White Seas; the men who helped Peter the Great in his civilising work were educated there. Schools, too, were numerous; there were, for instance, three hundred and seventy-one in two districts of the government of Chernigof; there are now only two hundred and sixty-three in the whole government. Even now that the serfs have been emancipated, the Little Russians have not got the full benefit of the change; the zemstvos (general assemblies, folksmote), which exist in every other district, have not been permitted in Western Ukraine, for fear of the Polish proprietors; and even on the left bank the language used is Great-Russian, therefore

those who can only speak Little Russian don't know what is going on. Hence they will be slower than the other Russians in profiting by their freedom. During less than a century of serfdom they seem to have lost more than their brethren did in long ages, and it will take a great deal to rouse them out of the sleepy distrustful state into which they have got. Of old times they have kept nothing but their poems—the songs of the kobzars, who used to sing at banquets and tribal gatherings, as bards or minstrels did in Western Europe. Chevchenko is a modern Kobzar; only his poems, instead of ringing all about love and war, and raids on the Mussulman, and glorious expeditions down the river, and even to the walls of Stamboul itself, are more than half about serfdom, the degradation that it brought to all, to the women especially. For, as I said, he was born a serf in the government of Kiev, just forty years after serfdom had been established by Catherine, that is, before the memory of the old freedoms had died out. His grandfather must have been free; his father may probably have enjoyed some years of freedom. And he died early in 1861, just when all Russia was ringing with the news that the serfs were set free.

The future poet was one of five children when his mother died, and his father, at his wits' end how to manage such a tribe, took a second wife. She turned out a cruel stepmother to them all, especially to young Tarass, whose high spirits and sense of justice angered her. He was made family swineherd, and was sent out with a bit of black bread to spend the whole day upon the steppe. Here he would sit for long hours at the foot of one of the barrows so common on the steppe, listening to mysterious voices that seemed to come to him from within. "What is there in the world beyond, and how far does it go?" he used to ask himself; and, one day, leaving the pigs to the best they could, he walked on and on to find the world's end, and the iron pillars on which he fancied it rested. Fortunately he was picked up by some people who knew him, and brought back half dead with fatigue—he was barely five—to his native village. When his father died, his stepmother sent him to the sacristan, who kept him and several other boys as drudges, in return for a few lessons in reading, writing, and plain-song. Russian priests are a disgrace to Christianity. "He has priests' eyes," is a proverb which means that the person so characterised is lustful, greedy, and self-seeking. Moreover, they are, in a drunken nation, the most drunken. A friend of mine, who stayed several months at a Russian country-house, says it was a common sight to see two priests lying in a cart, as pigs do when they are driven to market. One saint's day he tells me, the

priest came to chapel too far gone to read the service; instead of being struck dumb with shame, he actually whined out an apology: "We poor fellows spend all our time in praying for others, and have no one to pray for us; no wonder, therefore, we fall under the temptation." Things are just as bad in Bulgaria; an English engineer who has just written a book of his experiences there, went over one Sunday to attend a church, whose "pope" had a great reputation for sanctity. There was no service for the "pope" was lying dead drunk among the nettles at the back of his vodka (whisky) shop. "I heard," quaintly adds the writer, "that for five previous Sundays his place had been among those vegetables." Is it any wonder the Turks look on a religion which has such teachers as fitter for swine than for men?

Priests being such, what can we expect sacristans to be? Tarass' sacristan was a drunken brute who beat his boys, and on whom they in turn played off all sorts of unhandsome tricks. Tarass, however, managed by dint of perseverance to pick up reading and writing and a little knowledge of accounts, and to learn to chant the service; nay, by-and-by, his master would send him to take his place at a funeral giving him one of the ten kopecks which he got as a fee. While here, Tarass became exceedingly fond of drawing, covering every scrap of paper that he could pick up with sketches of everything that he saw around him; but at last, the beatings were too much for him. He ran away—how, he details with utmost simplicity. "One day, the sacristan, more drunk than usual, had fallen into heavy sleep. I picked up a stick, and, in one sound drubbing, paid him our with interest for all the floggings he had given me. Then I made off, having first pocketed a little book with hideous coloured engravings—how beautiful they were in my eyes! I can't tell now, as I look back on that time, whether I thought he owed me the book for his ill-treatment, or whether my desire to possess it wholly silenced the voice of conscience. Brought up as I had been, I think I'm rather to be praised for not sinning more grievously." After his flight, he first took service with a deacon, who was also a painter; but with him only stayed three days, for he found that his master, though, glad enough to have an intelligent lad to fetch him water and grind his colours, had not the least intention of ever putting a brush into his hand. Next he found another sacristan, whom the country-folk looked on as a veritable Raphael. "Let me look at your left hand," said the painter, before engaging him; and, having studied the lines on his palm, he said: "You'll never do—why, you haven't enough notion of form to be even a tailor." So Tarass, in

despair, went home and took to his swine-herding." "At worst," thought he, "I shall have my days to myself, and copy quietly the pictures in my little book." But before many months were over, he was rudely reminded of his position by being taken into the steward's family as kitchen-boy. From this he was promoted to be kozatchok in the great house. These kozatchoks—*i.e.* "little Cossacks"—were half-pages, half-jesters, in the houses of South-Russian nobles; they wore the old Cossack dress, the professed object being "to protect the Ukrainian nationality," and their place was in the antechamber, ready to do any little thing that their masters wanted. Tarass had now plenty of time to himself. He listened greedily to all the kobzars' songs about the old Cossack glories, and whenever he was out of sight, he went on with his painting. Moreover, as his master travelled much, he saw many new places, delighting himself with the illustrated "posters" with which in Russia, as well as in England, town-walls are liberally ornamented. These he used to copy when he could; sometimes he even picked them off the walls, and transferred them to his portfolio. One night, when he was about fifteen, when the family had gone to a grand ball, and the servants were in bed, he was copying a coarse print of Platof the Cossack, when all at once a smart box on the ear laid him flat on the ground. His master had come back, and took that way of reminding him that his time was not his. Next day, the coachman was ordered to give him a good flogging: not for drawing, but for doing what might have set the house on fire. But three years after, at St. Petersburg, his master, finding he made but an indifferent page, yielded to his entreaties, and apprenticed him to some daubing fellow who called himself a painter. Now began a golden time for the poor lad; living in a garret, ill-fed, and worse clad, he was supremely happy, working for dear life, and when he walked, going to the "summer garden" to copy the statues which are there ranged in the shrubberies. One day an artist from his own province saw him sketching, and said: "You've got a talent for likeness. My advice is, go for water-colour portraits." Chevchenko did as he was told, and got a fellow-servant to sit for him. The kind fellow sat twenty times, and at last something like a likeness was the result. His master saw it, and forthwith installed the ex-page as his painter in ordinary. He was now twenty-three years old, when the artist from Little Russia, who had become his friend, introduced him to a set of artists and poets—one of them tutor to the Czarovitch, the present Emperor. "We must send Tarass to the Academy," they said; but, of course, the first thing was to make a free man of him; to which end the painter

Bruloff gave a picture, and the others got up a raffle for it; thus raising two thousand five hundred roubles, the young serf's price.

Freedom gave a new impulse to Chevtchenko's genius. During the six years that he was studying at the Academy, he wrote some of his best pieces. Looking back, he was better able to measure the evils of serfdom. More than half his pieces bore on this subject. It seems never to have been out of his thoughts. Not long before his death, he sent a short autobiography to the editor of some work like *Men of the Time*; the last paragraph runs thus: "There is scarcely one thing in my early life on which I can look without horror. It was wretched; and the horror which I look back on it is enhanced by the thought that my brothers and sisters (of whom I have not spoken in this little history—it would have pained me too much to do so) are still serfs. Yes, Mr. Editor, they are still serfs. I have the honour to be," etc. etc. Pages of declamation could not speak so eloquently as that strangely abrupt conclusion; we can fancy something almost choking him, as he penned that closing sentence. Nor were his appeals against serfdom fruitless. He was, as we have said, the pet of a number of literary men, some of whom were about the court. Nothing could be done with the iron Nicholas; but there is no doubt that Chevtchenko's poems helped to determine Alexander in the work which he accomplished much more from emancipation than any legal change could bring about. Voluntary degradation will always exist in the world, so long as there are mean, base spirits who seek it, or fools who plunge into it lured by the glitter wherewith it is often disguised. But then it is a measureless gain that the degradation should be voluntary. Some of Tarass' saddest poems would apply, almost word for word, to our own land; but there is just this difference, that feudalism in England is weak. Americans wonder how strong it still is; yet we know that feudalism among us is weak indeed compared with what it was in Russia a few years ago. And feudalism meant degradation, as matter of course, of one class to the other—degradation not sentimental but actual, such as has not existed here since the last of the Plantagenets, at any rate. Emancipation, then, was to be a panacea for all the ills of society. Tarass never seems to have imagined it possible under existing social conditions. It must come, he thought, as part of an ideal republic—a poet's dream of the restitution of all things; such a reign of justice and brotherly love as seems very glorious when we read about it in Isaiah, but very dreadful when fifth-monarchy men or socialists try to carry it out in practice. Under such a republic all the Slav states would form a grand federation; the Ukraine should be once

more independent, its Cossacks as free as in the old wild days—free, but not savage as of yore.

All this was not likely to please Emperor Nicholas; the Pan-Slavism that he favoured meant something very different from a federation of free states. So, one day, Chevtchenko was put into the army; and then at once drafted off to a little fortress on the Sea of Aral. It was such a lonely station that the garrison was relieved every year—with one exception. "Leave Number So-and-so behind, and don't let him have any books or writing materials," was the order to each successive commandant. For several years Tarass was driven to write with a bit of charcoal on such scraps of paper as he had managed to hide between the upper and under soles of his boots; by-and-by, when they relaxed a little, and gave him pens and paper, the poor fellow found he couldn't write at all. He took to drawing, the commandant kindly winking at the breach of rules. One martinet colonel, a man after Nicholas' own heart, reported him. "I'm deaf in that ear, colonel," said the commandant, looking stern and disgusted, "please to say what you've got to say on the other side." The colonel saw what was meant and changed the subject. When Nicholas died, the poet's friends made interest for him, and after eleven years of banishment he got back to St. Petersburg, where he found a group of authors from Little Russia ready to receive and worship him. But his spirit was broken; all his old ambitions were killed out; he longed to get back to the banks of the Dnieper, and to settle down in peaceful obscurity, marrying some peasant girl; an orphan serf he would have and none other, one of about whom he had so often written such pathetic little poems. But women look for other things in a husband besides the power of stringing verses together. Tarass was old and worn, and moreover during those sad eleven years he had got to be too fond of drink. The girls would have nothing to say to him, and the poor man never recovered from the shock. He had given up his life to sing the woes of serfdom; and now his reward was that, while literary friends admired and the Russian world read him greedily, the very people whose lot he had set forth in its full degradation seemed to shrink from him. His heart was broken, though he wrote on to the end. Not a strong man, you will say; not gifted with elasticity which is sometimes the accompaniment of genius. And the Little Russian race you will rightly characterise as not a strong one; else less than a century of serfdom would not have broken it down, while other races have resisted long ages of oppression and servitude. But the Little Russians believe in a future for them-

selves. That is why they worship the memory of Chevtchenko. They think that their race has only been under a passing cloud, and they hail the serf-poet, who is read not only throughout Russia, but in Serbia, in Galicia, in Bohemia (the last complete edition of his works was published last year in Prague), all Slavdom over, as proof that the cloud has a silver lining. There are fourteen millions of them, a good slice of that strange conglomeration of peoples who make up the Russian Empire; and now that nationalities are so much talked of, they will scarcely be content to give up their language and customs—to be, in fact, Russianised. Chevtchenko's more than popularity is one sign of the inherent weakness of that huge colossus which, in the fears of so many, threatens to bestride not Europe only but Asia. How if the Russian Empire is, after all, a thing of pasteboard and buckram, destined to melt into a federation of kindred states? Whether or not, our poet is the people's poet of his own land. He is buried, as he wished to be, on the top of one of those kourganés (barrows) which were the wonder of his childhood; and thither from the first day of spring to the last autumn the pilgrims throng, singing his songs, talking over his history. They are not the educated class; one who has been among them says it would be hard to find another instance of such poetworship among the poor and untaught. Strong or weak, Chevtchenko has stirred the heart of several millions of people; and so he has another claim to our attention, besides the share which he had in settling the serf-question. I should like to give samples of his poetry; but I am no Russian scholar, and translation of translations, paraphrases of the French and German prose into which he has been rendered would be worse than the brick which the dullard carried about as a sample of the house that he had to let. So I shall leave you to form what notion you can Chevtchenko's Songs of the bold Cossack, and his touching serf-girl tales, from M. Durand or some of his other translators. Whatever you may think of him as poet, he has made such a name for himself that you ought to know something about him.



AN EPISODE IN THE LIFE OF LESYA UKRAINKA

By PERCIVAL CUNDY

IN the library of the Academy of Sciences in Lviv, which formerly belonged to the Shevchenko Scientific Society, there is a large amount of material preserved which throws new light on the life and work of Lesya Ukrainka.* The material came from three sources: the accumulation sent by the poetess herself from Helwan, near Cairo in 1913; papers from the archives of various Galician publishing offices, principally from the manuscript collections of Ivan Franko, Vasyl Lukych and others; and finally a most valuable collection of documents preserved by Lesya Ukrainka herself which were in the possession of Olha Kosach-Kryvenyuk in Kiev. The latter took them with her when she fled during the German occupation, and on her way to her sister in Prague, she left them for safe-keeping in Lviv. Although much of the hitherto unpublished material in the collection was printed in the 12 volume edition of the works of Lesya Ukrainka issued a few years ago in Kiev by the State Publication Trust, there still remains enough unprinted to fill a few more volumes. This embraces plans, outlines, and beginnings of projected poems. Lesya Ukrainka used to call such scraps and fragments "wrung necks" or "drowned infants." How deeply she felt about these unfinished works or rather, works hardly begun, is seen from one of her letters to the novelist, Olha Kobylyanska, dated February 26, 1906. As will be noted, she was prone to the use of indefinite pronouns to designate herself and her correspondent, at least in writing Kobylyanska. She wrote: "And does anyone know that someone has not yet finished Cassandra?" (This dramatic poem had been begun in 1902 and was not completed until 1907.) "And does anyone know that someone has five poems not yet begun and three unfinished stories on hand and is altogether unable to reduce them to order? And wouldn't anyone say that such a one ought to be thrashed, when all the time that someone is thrashing herself?"

Besides the projects and fragments mentioned, the collection also contains an hitherto unknown portion of her lyrics. These are poems which would not have passed the censor at the time when they were

* For a sketch of Lesya Ukrainka's life and work, see the *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Spring 1946, Vol. II, page 252ff.

written or poems she poured out in moments when her soul was dominated by a mood of black depression, and strangely enough, some of them are intimate love lyrics, dedicated to her friend Sergiy Kostyanovych Merzhynsky (1870-1901), who consorted with progressive, revolutionary circles in Kiev. One of his friends in his memoirs described him thus: "A typical Ukrainian intellectual, he never completed his university course, but gadded about taking private lessons, as did so many of his kind. His countenance with its fine, delicate features always bore an expression of sadness, yet he was popular with the young and made a charming impression; his external appearance gained sympathy for him. He had a finely chiseled profile, a pale complexion which often glowed with an unhealthy, ardent flush, a black beard and black wavy hair—here you have an inadequately drawn portrait of Sergiy Kostyanovych, the eternal student, hurried off into a premature grave by galloping consumption."

Lesya Ukrainka was introduced to him at Yalta in 1897, became his firm friend and, like the heroine of her own poem *Isolda of the White Hands*, remained faithful to him until the very end of his brief life, and her own was not so very much longer. Writing to Kobylanska, January 16, 1901, she said: "That friend of mine, about whom I told you once some time ago, is living here at Minsk. He has been sick the whole of the past year. I visited him oft and on, and last September I came here specially on his account and spent ten days with him. Now I am here again and am staying, waiting to see what will happen. And it seems as though it will not be anything good. For almost six months he has been absolutely unable to get out of bed; he coughs and spits blood, has practically lost his voice, has incessant fever, and has no more strength than an infant. The doctor says it is galloping consumption with little hope of recovery. Meanwhile I have been here a week and see no signs of improvement—on the contrary, he gets worse. My life here is rather tragic. I have to appear the calmest and most assured of all, although I personally have no illusions and consequently no hope—the doctor was perfectly frank with me. Every day my friend talks (his toneless voice no more than whisper) about when we two will go abroad together, to Switzerland, and how lovely it will be to meet with spring there. But I am so afraid of the spring, I fear it as something I dare not name. Yet I assure him that I will accompany him, that I will stay with him until he gets well again. The truth in what I tell him lies in the fact that I will not abandon him as others of my

friends have forsaken him. I will stay with him as long as I am needed. You understand me."

A few days later, January 20, 1901, she wrote again to Kobylanska, "Things are going very badly with my friend, and he no longer believes that he can get better. His condition has become altogether desperate and there is no hope of improvement. He can no longer lift up in bed. I write his letters for him, even those to his most intimate friends. He doesn't care to listen to my reading aloud, scarcely speaks, and is unable to bear the sound of music. Only today he said, 'Maybe before long I'll feel a little better and then you can play for me.' He says that he loves my calmness and strength of will, and so in his company I always appear to be calm and strong. I never even let a sigh escape, for then he would be afraid for me, and as he now believes I can endure anything, I will not destroy that faith of his in the last friend he has left. Perhaps it is because of this that he is so tranquil, marvellously tranquil, when he talks about his approaching end, although as a rule he is very nervous. Sometimes he talks about what a lot it means to him to have me with him and regrets that I could not have come earlier. And to think that I must lose such a friend!"

Her friend died, March 15, 1901. On the 23rd she wrote to Kobylanska as follows: "Today it is just ten days since the death of my friend, a week since he was buried. But I, you see, am still alive, although I cannot say whether in health or not. I am not at all sick, but the head on my shoulders doesn't feel like my own, my hands do not obey me, and I betake myself to any task with great unwillingness. I don't seem to desire anything much, there's nothing I greatly need, and I have to force myself to want something, to persuade myself there's something or other I need. I am fearfully tired, physically and morally. It seems as though I ought to sleep on endlessly, yet somehow I can't sleep much, and sometimes I merely lie for whole days on end. But I still have one desire, a really definite desire, and that is to travel to see you in green Bukovina. I want to hear your quiet speech, to see your gentle look, to listen to your music, which I have not yet heard. I feel an attraction to your mountains, which are dear to me though as yet unknown, and to all that country of yours about which I have so often dreamed."

A visit to Bukovina spent with Olha Kobylanska really did deliver her from the black moods of despair she had been experiencing. She poured out her deep melancholy and grief in song, and her need of friendship and tenderness overflowed in contact with Kobylanska.

The latter's calm tranquillity and gentleness exercised a healing influence on the poetess' shaken nerves. Her moral strength was renewed and retempered so that she became strong enough in turn to support Kobylyanska in her hour of great sorrow when it came. Then Lesya Ukrainka wrote to her, again making use of her indefinite pronouns: "Someone has not been forged from base metal but out of noble ore, and therefore must be tempered in the fire and not break. It is a hard thing not to say, 'I can't stand everything,' but let someone say to herself the things she said to another in similar circumstances, and then unfold her pinions and strike out upwards to the heights . . . Not everyone possesses what someone has: a divine spark in her heart, a fire in her soul. This, perhaps, will not bring happiness, but it gives something greater and higher than happiness, something for which there is no name in human speech."

Among the hitherto unpublished lyrics of Lesya Ukrainka mentioned above, there is one dated 1900, that is, during the period of Sergiy K. Merzhynsky's last illness. While it contains no internal evidence to connect it directly with him, it certainly does at least reflect the poetess's prevailing mood during the time that the thought of death was so much in her mind. It bears no title in the original.

Do you remember that time when I spoke
These words: "If certainty lay in my ken
Of when I'll die, I'd make a will to have
The music played I've loved so greatly, when

They bury me." No sooner had the words
Flown from my lips, than all began to laugh:
"Perhaps you'd like to see your friends compelled
With song and dance to write your epitaph?"

And then began a funeral colloquy
That would not seem worth while remembering.
But I remember every word—the jests
Woke something in my soul that left a sting.

My soul seeks no repose "with all the saints,"
No "memory eternal" wishes sung;
Those strains and words alike are strange to me,
As are the brazen bells with sounding tongue.

When comes the time to mourn o'er my remains,
 Let then the music wordlessly sweep on
 With tears and laughter, joy and grief confused,
 Like to the song raised by the dying swan;

And let the ones who in the morning grieved
 Go to the dance at eve in merry throng.
 You think it strange—a funeral, then a dance?
 'Tis but a common end to mournful song.

I do not wish that aught should be disturbed
 By my plunge into an amnesic destiny.
 I would not that my death should wound a soul
 So much as life itself has wounded me.

THREE POEMS BY LESYA UKRAINKA

Translated by PERCIVAL CUNDY

WHERE ARE THE STRINGS?

Where are the strings, where is the mighty voice,
 Where is the strong and winged word,
 To sing of all these evil days—a cry
 By which both joy and grief are stirred?

To carry what's immured in prison walls
 Far off into the spacious plains?
 To translate into human speech the song
 Which clanks from fetters and from chains?

With endless fires to warn posterity,
 Great Dante's Hell is still aflame;
 A hell far worse burns in our native land,
 Why can we not a Dante name?

Jerusalem had once her Jeremy,
 Who in the deserts cried aloud;
 Why have we not a Jeremy to speak
 Of our lost freedom, ravished, cowed?

O lightning, sister of the thunderbolt!
Where art thou? Break this evil spell!
Let us speak out and thunders prophesy,
As clouds in spring the storms foretell!



The First of the "SEVEN STRINGS"

For thee, O Ukraine, O our mother unfortunate, bound,
The first string I touch is for thee.
The string will vibrate with a quiet yet solemn deep sound,
The song from my heart will gush free.

My song o'er the world's distant reaches will fly in its task,
And my dearest hopes be its guide.
Wherever it speeds o'er the world among mankind 'twill ask:
"Know ye where good fortune doth bide?"

And maybe out yonder my song solitary will meet
With other such wandering lays,
And then, joining in with that loud-singing swarm, will fly fleet
Away over thorn-studded ways.

'Twill speed over ocean's blue bosom, o'er mountains 'twill fly,
And circle about in free air;
'Twill soar ever higher far up in the vault of the sky,
And maybe find good fortune there.

And finding it somewhere, that longed-for good fortune may greet
And visit our dear native strand:
May visit and greet thee, Ukraine, O my mother most sweet,
Ill-starred and unfortunate land.



SING, O MY SONG!

Long has my song been held captive in silence,
Like bird in a cage shut away from its flight;
Long is it since it expanded its pinions,
In bondage to sorrow, to grief's bitter blight.

Now is the time, O my song, to go roaming,
To try out by wings torn and ragged by pain.
Now is the time, O my song, to seek freedom,
To hark how the winds freely sport o'er the main.

Roll, O my song, like the swift-ranging billow,
Which never demands where its course it shall trace.
Fly, O my song, like the swift-flying seagull,
Which never is daunted by ocean's wild space.

Sing then, my song, like the winds freely blowing,
And roar like the billow roars back at the sky!
Have not a care that the winds leave no echo,
And but for a moment the wave charms the eye!

METROPOLITAN SLIPY—THE UKRAINIAN STEPINAC— IN A LABOR BATTALION

THE CRIME of the Tito government over Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb moved the dormant conscience of the world, but almost unadvertised is the persecution of the Ukrainian Stepinac, Metropolitan of Lviv Joseph Slipy, Primate of the Greek-Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, along with his four suffragan bishops.

After they in early 1945 refused the appeal of Moscovite Patriarch Alexius to join the Russian orthodoxy, they were imprisoned by the NKVD and deported to the east. Their trial was prepared with demagogic advertisement by the Soviet General Attorney in Kiev; collaboration with the Germans, in accordance with the Soviet pattern, was advanced. Materials were industriously collected in the order to make a public show-trial for Western Ukrainians.

But while one year of silence enshrouded this case. The resistance of the Western Ukrainians against Russian communistic persecution of their church, of their bishops as well as their Ukrainian national culture, influenced the Soviet government to resign from the planned showtrial. As a result a clandestine trial had been arranged in one of the eastern Ukrainian cities, probably in Kiev, as the Ukrainian Press Service announced.

Metropolitan Joseph Slipy was condemned to eight years of hard labor, the aged bishops to six years each. Who of them remained alive is unknown because of the Soviet iron curtain. The Primate of the Western Ukrainian Catholic Church, a prominent scholar and former President of the Theological Academy in Lviv, is working now in Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, in a famous Soviet labor battalion. What has been the fate of his suffragan bishops is unknown.

No doubt the Stalin Constitution, published in several languages of the world, provides a full guaranty of religious freedom for all Soviet citizens as well as just democratic trial. Only the capitalistic world does not understand what is the nature of this religious freedom, what is the just democratic trial in the terms of Russian conceptions.

BOOK REVIEWS

FACT AND FANTASY IN WORLD POLITICAL THOUGHT

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD, by James Burnham, N. Y.,
The John Day Company, Inc., 1947, 248 pp.

THE SOVIET IMPACT ON THE WESTERN WORLD, by Edward
Hallett Carr, N. Y., The Macmillan Company, 1947, 113 pp.

It is not without the greatest significance that these two works, purposed expressly to provide a working interpretation on the nature of Soviet-Western relations, appear at this time. The hour could hardly be more propitious, the authors more eminently authoritative, and the results more sharply divergent. The one author, Professor Burnham, a professional American philosopher specializing in socio-political theory, had been actively engaged in leftist movements and is best known for his remarkable work, "The Managerial Revolution"; the other, Professor Carr, an English political scientist, has achieved renown by his stirring book, "The Conditions of the Peace," and has, as a matter of patent fact, consistently manifested a sympathetic leaning toward totalitarian organization. Now the two focus their thoughts on one of the timeliest issues of the day.

At first, even a casual reading of the two expositions will reveal to an objective mind that the one conveys a courageous interpretation based on a wide range of presupposed facts and a logically incisive treatment of the most delicate problems, while the other represents a general attempt to establish the now overworked "understanding of the Soviet Union" on the basis of a conveniently "adjusted" historical account and a successive array of high-sounding platitudes that to an informed reader smack of political fantasy. In brief, Mr. Burnham's general thesis is that the interests of Soviet politics and those of the United States, most powerfully representative of the Western world, are irreconcilable, and that under the spectre of atomic warfare in its broadest sense, the United States, in order to avoid the full crystallization of World War III, which in its initial skirmishes has already begun, and the possible annihilation of Western civilization, must now begin to pursue a militant general policy with world-wide bearings aimed at the systematic inclosure and eventual asphyxiation of "Rus-

sian" communism and at the parallel achievement of a liberal American empire founded on the federative principle. On the other hand, an almost diametrically opposite position is maintained by Mr. Carr who argues that the framework of Bolshevist organization, thought, and activity is of Western origin, and in its economic, social, political, and ideological impacts upon the West, characterized respectively by the necessity for economic planning, the superiority of collective responsibility predicated on nondiscrimination as to sex, race, color or class, the solidarity of unified Soviet conduct in international affairs, and the magnetism of Bolshevist dogma, comparable in attractive power to that of the Catholic Church, "Soviet democracy presents to the western world . . . a challenge to complete the unfinished revolution." Thus, in contrast to Mr. Burnham's concrete militant policy based upon the premise of an unbridgeable cleavage between Soviet and Western interests, Mr. Carr's thesis, resting on a presumed common historical origin of the two types of society and the corollary of unavoidable intercourse between them, points finally to an abstract synthesis of the individualist values of the West and the new forms of social and economic action of the Soviet Union, each partaking of the other to form the new society of the future, and optimistically disallowing any grounds for intrinsic inconcinnity.

Each of the theses is, of course, grounded in an extensive elaboration productive of sub-generalizations upon which criticism should be concentrated, for upon these rests the validity of the thesis. First concerning those in Mr. Burnham's treatise. At the outset it can justly be said that Mr. Burnham serves as the best American expression yet of some fundamental ideas long entertained by countless Europeans as a result of direct experience and sound reflection. In this respect, then, many of his ideas are not unique except as they will so be received by the more provincial Americans. But this is mentioned without any intention to detract from the logical cogency, lucidity, and empirical truth of his argument. On the contrary, he himself states as much in his references to the immaturity of the United States in the world context, which in itself causally necessitates his proposal to describe for Americans the world situation today in reality and the alternatives of political action at their disposal, as well as later on, causes him to feel that the United States will probably pursue a policy of vacillation, instead of embarking upon a program of action such as he recommends, with the grace consequences of ultimate political defeat. His observation on American immaturity is substantially correct and requires no further

confirmation than the many disillusioning effects of our appeasement policy toward the Soviet Union; but that the United States is probably to be committed to a policy of vacillation may well prove to be another of Burnham's awry but extraneous predictions, as some in his previous works were, and especially in view of recent steps taken toward Greece and Turkey. The United States may mature in the paramount matter of essential policy more quickly than he thinks, regardless of its lagging cultural standards.

A second vital point of his general thesis concerns the groundwork that has already been laid for wars of decisive extermination, morally by the established precedent of "unconditional surrender" and physically by the appearance of atomic weapons. The author rightly regards these two phenomena with the utmost seriousness, and it requires little thought to appreciate his judgment on atomic weapons as a symptom of an acceleration in the rate of historical change especially in view of their power to convert our urban-centered national units into hovels of mire. The immensity of political power associated with the production of atomic weapons is obvious. A monopoly in such production at present rests with the United States. What Burnham fears for world peace and the United States is the emergence of a duopoly in such production, with the USSR as the only other capable party. The question that one may raise here is whether the very existence of a duopolistic state might not insure a neutralization in the use of atomic weapons by virtue of a mutual realization of the probable devastating bilateral effects, as in the field of economics where two large contending units refrain from price-cutting tactics on the basis of mutual disadvantage. Mr. Burnham answers no—monopoly constitutes the only stable basis for peace. He rules out, after careful and proper definition, a world government because of the absence of certain conditions necessary for its existence and thus its monopolistic possession of atomic weapons. The pathetic proceedings in the United Nations, which in a sense may be regarded as a preview of the tenseness and instability of the duopolistic state, furnish sufficient testimony as to the ability of that organization to effect the necessary monopoly. Consequently, says Burnham, the only practicable method available and most suitable to prevailing circumstances is the achievement of World Empire, and the USSR and the USA are the only real contenders for it. Moreover, on the basis of his previous discussion on the current acceleration of historical change, time is short.

These facets of his thesis deserve special attention. First the time

factor. According to him, it may be ten years, perhaps five, maybe even sooner for large-scale conflagration to burst forth. Many critics will undoubtedly counter this with the usual "generation principle" on the recurrence of warfare, or, since the Soviet Union and the United States are the subjects at large here, with the possibilities of a liberalization of the Soviet government, or an internal revolution there, or the greater effectiveness of the United Nations, or the mentioned neutralizing qualities of atomic duopoly, or even a naive belief that the two can live happily together in this spacious world. A little reflection on each of these points will raise rather convincing counter-points, in addition to illuminating the prodigious element of risk to safety and life involved. For one, the "generation principle" is outmoded by atomic potency which is capable of producing a quick paralysis of any major nation today without requiring the psychological recuperative period implied by the extensive industrial and military preparations that accompanied previous wars on lower levels of military technology. Concerning the longed-for liberalization of the Soviet government, such a criticism smacks more of wishful thinking than of a reasonable hope justified by the real facts as to the history of that machine and its essential nature. The same may be said for the wish of internal revolution, especially in the light of the hyper-centralized form of Soviet economic and political organization. In preferring the strengthening of the United Nations, can one overcome the veto issue? Also, accomplish it in a sufficiently short time to render it effective in the control of atomic weapons *everywhere*? Here, again, more wishful thinking is involved than a rational grasp of the sad experiences of that body on these matters in the past year. The possible neutralization of power under atomic duopoly due to mutual recognition of the horrific potentialities involved is an enticing idea which begins to languish when one gives thought to the mission of communists in the world, the "World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics," the way in which the Soviet government is independent of the hidden will of its peoples, the sublime attractiveness of world conquest, and the aggressive capacity of the Soviet government as confirmed by experiences in the Ukraine in the 20's, in Poland in '39, Finland, the Baltic countries, and now in all of eastern Europe through the deceiving medium of "intensive revolution." In short, the strategy, the will, and the evolving capacity to pull the trigger first are all present: after the first shot, there will conceivably be no other. And finally, that the two can live happily together, even Stalin contradicts this.

To informed readers who have followed Dallin's works and those of Timasheff, Kravchenko, Eastman and numerous others, what Burnham has to say about the Soviet Union and its Fifth Column abroad is quite familiar. Here one may profitably compare his realistic observations with the idealized dream-world of Professor Carr's work. Moreover, by them Burnham shows conclusively why Soviet interests are irreconcilable with those of the West, and notably the United States. Parts of his analysis here are, nevertheless, deficient by reason of critical omission. Apparently relying on Dallin, as witnessed by his quotation of Dallin concerning the identity of Soviet "neo-Russian" imperialism with "revolutionary emancipation" as applied in the Baltic countries in 1939-40 (pp. 77-78), Burnham, if he were more acquainted with the historical facts of eastern Europe of the 20's, would have been able to see, and therefore manifest greater breadth of understanding, that the testing-ground of the above principle was non-Russian Ukraine where it was first applied. Dallin can falsely continue to nourish his archaic sympathies for the glory of "Great" Russia, but that is no reason for Burnham to become innocently afflicted by them by this important omission. As one might expect, this omission leads to others, thereby creating an unfortunate slant in his presentation. For example, in his remarks on the tactics of the Soviet multi-national program, which again originated in the 20's, he mentions their application to Czech, Polish and other national sentiments, despite the fact that in the course of the war, American papers were blooming with news on the magnificence of the Ukrainian armies, the courage of the Ukrainian peasant, the adulation of Taras Shevchenko, to such an extent that what Burnham intimates as "semi-barbaric" Americans finally came to know that a Ukraine even existed, although it is common knowledge elsewhere. Another far more important error of omission committed by Burnham, because of the direction it stands to give to the propaganda aspects of his general policy, in addition to the possible reorganization of eastern Europe should the present Soviet regime fall under the weight of Western pressure, concerns his remarks pertaining to the unique concentric diagram which he skillfully employs to clinch his points. His statement that "the whole set of relations within the system of rings is summarily epitomized by the 1939-40 history of the Baltic states" (p. 104) is true, but how much more vital and significant would his observation have been, had it pointed out instead "epitomized by the 1920-1924 history of Ukraine, the incorporation of which by force made possible the evolving existence of the Eurasian fortress (the Soviet

Union) and therefore the present set of relations." The pertinency of this needed modification Mr. Burnham alludes to himself when he points out in another context that the major industrial and agricultural projects were, significantly enough, effected in the resourceful south of the Union. Finally, related also to the original omission is the author's reference, in his chapter on "Is War Inevitable?", to General A. A. Vlasov's army "as the *only* large unit representing resentment against the communist regime." Again, had Mr. Burnham inquired into the recent history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, his attention would have been invariably directed to the operations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which began at the beginning of the past war and have continued down to the present, over 40,000 strong despite continuous turnover. True, only after the war have American papers publicized this group, and at that unfairly. Yet the information could have been acquired elsewhere. Moreover, one need not think twice of the importance of this army to the realization of Burnham's recommended general policy. Vlasov's aggregation was by comparison puny and is no more. This far larger unit continues to live, enough to cause the dispatch of Zhukov to Odesa, Kaganovich to Kiev, the military units of Poland and Russia to the Carpathian hills.

That a communist world is undesirable, Ukrainians and Russians and now others know only too well. Consequently, Mr. Burnham speaks not only to Americans and other western peoples in the interest of their civilized values, but also in behalf of the sorrows and agonies of the already submerged when he calls for a forthright world policy on the part of the United States to prevent communist domination of Eurasia, combat communist infiltration at home, and establish an American Empire on the federative principle, such as the technologic and institutional components of world development now demand and to which the hard-pressed may rally. If Mr. Burnham seems too logical, it is because he sees the issues sharply and clearly: if he seems too alarming, it is because he takes the experiences of others seriously and instructively: if he seems too impressed by power, it is because he understands the heart-tick of politics and sensitively appreciates the age of material power in which we live: if he seems to be too ungracious toward human hopes and ideals, it is because he seeks courageously to preserve and augment them through realistic instrumentation. That Professor Burnham's message must be heard and discussed soberly and dispassionately goes without saying.

It is not without injustice that only a few paragraphs are necessary

for an opinion of Professor Carr's work for the simple reason that his main points are nothing more than a more dignified re-hash of what one may now rightfully classify as "Wallacian klyukva." A few examples will suffice. In describing the several alleged impacts of Soviet "democracy" upon the western world, Mr. Carr cites the cult of the "common man" in English speaking countries as "the first result of the impact of Soviet democracy" (p. 12). Nowhere does one observe, in the first instance, any discussion and definition of Soviet "democracy" or the "common man." The only indication is furnished by his oft-repeated reference to "economic and social equality." What is the nature of this "equality"? Improvement in the standard of living and opportunities and nondiscrimination, replies Mr. Carr throughout. Such vague generalities are used freely in the entire work without even an attempt made to verify any improvement in the standard of living in the Soviet Union, which as a matter of fact has been consistently low, or the disposition of opportunities, or the reality of nondiscrimination. The very correlation of Soviet "democracy" and the "common man" cult is itself inane when one considers the background of the latter in the United States since the end of the 19th century.

A further correlation, which is to prove the economic impact, is between Keynesian economics and Soviet planning. The modes, objectives, and results of the two are so widely apart that this parallel appears equally nonsensical. Yet, Mr. Carr is apparently so obsessed by the necessity of a planned economy that no distinctions are allowable and that of the Soviet Union represents the best standards. Such matters as real cost, efficiency, coercion and so forth are immaterial so long as there is planning. As a sample of the quality of his entire discussion the following is highly representative: "Conception of planning implies that society has the right and the obligation to decide by a collective act what is good for the society as a whole and to make that decision binding on the individual" (p. 45). From this, *ex hypothesi* arguments flow as to the representativeness of the Soviet government of its peoples, the absence of strikes, the truthfulness of Soviet propaganda, the reason for concentration camps and so forth. If Burnham is impressed by power, Carr certainly succumbs to it. Briefly, Carr is in print what Wallace is in talk, and one might well wonder whether even the Krem-linites have insatiable appetites to stomach so much "Wallacian klyukva" endlessly.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

UKRAINE'S CALL TO AMERICA, by Honore Evach. Published by the Ukrainian Cultural Society of Detroit, 1947, pp. 173.

In the American capital of the automobile industry exists a Ukrainian society whose membership consists of ninety-five per cent of industrial workers and five of small businessmen. The aim of the society is not to fight for higher wages or certain working condition. Their aim, instead, is to help Ukrainian kinsmen in Europe through dissemination of information of their American fellow citizens on the Ukrainian culture. This is a short history of the appearance of this new book *Ukraine's Call to America*.

The Call was written by Ukrainian-Canadian writer and poet, Honore Evach, who associated himself with the noble work of these Ukrainian people in Detroit. The book consists of three parts: Ukraine's Story, Ukraine's Literary Aces, and the Ukrainian Language.

The popular character of the publication provides concise information on the tragic Ukrainian Story and Ukrainian Literature, so strongly persecuted by foreign domination over Ukraine. This is a real call of the free working people of Detroit to American public opinion, so misinformed on the national problems in Soviet Russia by the communist and fellow travellers' propaganda.

Reading this book, created by the sincere endeavors of common men and the author, the English-speaking public will get a true picture of Ukraine because the author is highly familiar with Ukrainian cultural life in the past as of today in all its manifold aspects.

N. C.

THE STORY OF THE UKRAINE, by Clarence A. Manning. Philological Library, New York, 1947, 326 pp.

A comprehensive history of Ukraine which will inevitably precipitate a fundamental re-orientation of views on the part of Anglo-American scholars and writers on the history of Eastern Europe is presented concisely by Clarence A. Manning, Professor of Eastern European Languages at Columbia University, in this highly readable and clearly-written work. Due to the illness of our designated reviewer of this book and to the fact that this work by its nature demands utmost care of scrutiny and examination, a detailed review by a competent person in this field is being scheduled for the next issue of this journal.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"Places for Displaced Persons," by Alvin Johnson. *The Yale Review*, A National Quarterly, Spring 1947, New Haven, Conn.

Mr. Johnson is the well-known director of the New School for Social Research and widely honored for his astute social thinking. In this article his interests are humanely and economically directed toward the pressing problem of western Europe's displaced persons. With characteristic sound reasoning and determining factual support he demonstrates the facility and the insurance of ultimate benefit with which the United States can profitably accept 900,000 Displaced Persons over a period of short time. In all this he is on solid ground. But he unfortunately symptomizes the factual misinformation that seems to afflict the observations of most Americans concerned with this problem when he refers only to Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians in this composition of displaced persons. Although the fault is not entirely his, since Ukrainians here have not sufficiently propagated their cause, thus accounting for little influence on American intellectuals and leaders, yet Mr. Johnson should know that there are also over 200,000 Ukrainian displaced persons whose talented resourcefulness qualifies them for acceptance into any Western nation.

"Soviets Stress Collectivization" and "Assassination in Poland," in Comment on the Week. *America*, National Catholic Weekly, April 12, 1947, New York City.

In this lively Catholic periodical, space is given to two significant recent developments concerning Ukrainians in the Soviet areas. The first pertains to the enforcement of rigorous agricultural collectivization by the Kremlin in the newly-acquired Western Ukraine, repeating the macabre performances and results of Eastern Ukraine a decade ago. The usual ideological pluck on kulak notoriety is advanced. "The kulak, or prosperous and independent farmer, has again become the chief enemy of the system." Aside from brutalities and execution that normally characterize this "social act," the two major consequences are

already appearing, as in Eastern Ukraine earlier. First, the lower productivity at a time when famine is raging in Ukraine as a unit; secondly, further centralization of economic power to solidify the Kremlin's political grasp on the lives of its inhabitants.

The second highly important comment is on the assassination of General Swierczewski of the Moscow-led Polish government by members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. An excellent synopsis is given on the development of Ukrainian insurgency since the days of German domination of Ukraine when its guns were directed against the Germans. Today the sole enemy remaining is communist domination. As the comment rightly concludes, "this latest incident highlights the fact that Russia and Poland's hold on Ukraine is at best an uneasy one."

"The Return to Political Orthodoxy in Russia," by J. A. *The World Today*, Chatham House Review, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England, 1947.

Tightly packed in a few pages is a detailed description of the current ideological regeneration enforced in the Soviet Union, especially in Ukraine. The author of this brilliant article wisely comments that the phenomena of this crusade "have a close bearing on the Soviet Union's attitude to the outside world and to international problems." The main point of this wisdom hinges on the fact that, as his facts concerning Ukraine. Russian history, the writer Zoshchenko, Anna Akhmatova, and innumerable violations and deliberate inefficiencies show, the current regeneration of communist ideology is indispensably based upon the evil of "bourgeois" culture as the historical enemy of the "Good Society." For those passionately preaching on the necessity for an "understanding of the Soviet Union," this well-written article can serve as a splendid point of departure.

"In Defense of My Country," by Alexander Kerensky. *Plain Talk*, April, 1947, New York City.

For a superb account of the meaning of the past war in connection with the tragic retention of the Kremlin's domination over the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union, this article is deserving of much praise. It serves many purposes. It demonstrates that Stalin has not violated the oath he took at Lenin's grave in January, 1924, to work for the Communist International; that the Kremlin above all is aware that faith in communism has been shattered in Russia more than any-

where else in the world; that the myth of Bolshevik overthrow of Czarism, advanced to hide the notorious Lenin putsch of 1917, still persists in the unhistorical minds of even educated Americans; and that Stalin skillfully used the war, under a facade of patriotic national survival, to preserve his regime for the continuation of universal communist aspirations which have since been revived with ideologic fervor and expansive territorial prominence. Yet, despite all these truths, an implicit contradiction always lurks in Kerensky's writings. He wants freedom for his Russian people, but he is unwilling to offer it to the non-Russian Ukrainians and others. He will speak of the "peoples of the USSR," but always identifies them with the Russians when political practice is involved. Thus correlated with this, his imperialist leanings appear when he admits, as here, that he was in favor of the "restoration of the frontiers lost in the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, but with Poland and Finland excluded" and "that on the issue of the Dardanelles the case presented by the Kremlin was stronger than that put forth by Washington." If Kerensky sincerely desires that America show compassionate realism toward his Russian people, then the first step would be to cleanse his own political soul toward the aspirations of other peoples.

"Displaced Persons," by Lt. Col. L. W. Charley, O.B.E. *The Contemporary Review*, April 1947, London, England.

Colonel Charley, a former acting-director of the Displaced Persons Division, Control Commission for Germany (British element), presents in this article a very cogent and sober analysis of the displaced persons problem, ending with the significant recommendation that the million of unfortunates in western Europe be as quickly as possible re-settled elsewhere. In utter respect of the human wills of these beings, he points out not only the futility, but also the unprincipled character, of a policy of coercive repatriation to lands they no longer desire, such as UNRRA is attempting to enforce now. Of interest to Ukrainians and those concerned with the Ukrainian aspects is that the author's table of estimates places them at 120,000 among the DP's, whereas the figure approximates in reality over 200,000. More intriguing is his statement that "it should not be forgotten, moreover, that all these Displaced Persons, with the exception of some of the Ukrainians, are Europeans..." This characteristically suggests the historically inaccurate conception of Westerners who mistakenly confuse Ukrainian history with the

Russian and thus seriously ignore the peculiar Western orientation of the former as against the Eastern of the latter.

"Poland—Past and Present," by William J. Rose. *International Journal*, Quarterly of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Winter 1946-47, Toronto, Canada.

The writer of this fairly synoptic and comprehensible account of Polish history to recent times is a director of the school of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London, England. One sometimes wonders when these Anglo-American experts will become accurately informed on Eastern European history and affairs, but it is encouraging to note that in their intellectual evolution they now have begun to recognize the existence of Ukraine, although they are still far from understanding it. Mr. Rose, for example, discusses the Polish ambition to restore in 1919 what he calls the "federated Joint Kingdom of Poles, Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians of earlier times," which, stated as such, would suggest to uninformed readers that a genuine federation ever existed among all four. Then, partly because of this attempt to restore essentially Polish hegemony, he concludes that an "unfortunate and unnecessary war was fought in 1919-20" on the part of the Poles against Moscow. The whole crucial Ukrainian episode, hinging on independence of both Eastern and Western Ukraine from Russian and Polish domination respectively, is irresponsibly ignored. The key to such inexcusable ignorance, as witnessed by this article, rests fundamentally on the basic misconception such authorities harbor concerning "Russian" Kiev and Russian Muscovy, a myth that only in time will disappear. They have at least made a good start by incorporating the word "Ukrainian" into their vocabularies.

"Russia and the World, A Soviet Review of Diplomacy," by Max M. Laserson. *International Conciliation*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 1947, New York City.

Dr. Laserson, author of "Russia and the Western World" and lecturer in economics at Columbia University, continues to disseminate among well-meaning Americans the traditional brand of Russian historical mythology on the origins of Russia in Ukrainian Kiev and its great development from the ninth century on. He does this by approvingly amplifying in large measure the Soviet work, "A History of Diplomacy," which starts from these mythical premises to run into three

volumes covering developments down to recent date. The New York Times, in one of its leading editorials of recent date, presented in a few synoptic sentences a truer account of early history in the Ukrainian region than popularizers, even for the Carnegie Endowment, are able to distort in a pamphlet or books.

"Limits of Terror," by Josef Guttmann. *Modern Review*, the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, April, 1947, New York City.

The author of this deeply interesting article, a former Czech journalist now on the staff of the Yiddish Scientific Institute, describes on the basis of documents in the archives of the Institute and with seeming authenticity the sequence of Nazi promises of freedom to the Balts and Ukrainians, followed by barbaric German domination, and then the Ukrainian nationalist onslaught against contemplated German hegemony. Puttmeister Freiherr von Richthofen's report in 1943 on the "many atrocities committed by the Germans, especially in connection with conscription of Ukrainians for forced labor in the Reich" is representative. "On October 21, 1943, Ministerialdirektor Taubert reported: 'As known, the whole of Wolhynia is in the hands of partisans. It is strange and surprising that these partisans are not Bolsheviks but exclusively Ukrainian partisans (nationalists, followers of Bandera and Melnik)'. " These and other disclosures conclusively give the lie to communist-inspired designations of these armies as "bandits." They fought in common with the Allies against Nazi totalitarianism: today, their gallant resistance against Red totalitarianism may well presage world opposition, of whatever nature, to continued tyranny. Terror has its own limits.

"Change and Permanence in Soviet Policies," by Waldemar Gurian. *Thought*, Fordham University Quarterly, December, 1946, New York City.

A considerably instructive essay on the expedient variations and basic strategy of Soviet policy is presented here for a more balanced view on Soviet-American relations that such individuals as Mr. Wallace can profit by immensely. Professor Gurian takes seriously, as it should be, the communist distinction between tactics and strategy, the correlates of his "change" and "permanence," and depicts their characteristic manifestations with penetrating insight.

"The Present Purge in the USSR," by Barrington Moore, Jr. *The Review of Politics*, January, 1947, Notre Dame, Indiana.

In this concise article, the writer, associated with the University of Chicago, portrays with exacting regard for up-to-the-minute news reports the current purge in the Soviet Union, supporting his thesis that it represents essentially a reaction to long-standing strains in the system purposed to consolidate the Party's control. In his reference to the "bourgeois nationalist deviations" in the Ukraine, accounting for rigorous reorganization there, he safely concludes "that the Soviet minorities policy has not been the unqualified success some authors have claimed." As for his observation that the resettlement of Crimean and other small republic inhabitants because of collaboration with the Germans is "something new in Soviet domestic politics," recent news releases would not help him in discovering the mass transfers of Ukrainians to Siberia during the 30's, surpassing in absolute amount the very population of Crimea.

"Soviet Reign of Terror in the Ukraine," by James F. Shiel, T.O.P. *The Keryx*, St. Basil's College, January, 1947, Stamford, Conn.

An excellent birds-eye account of the historical background of Ukraine, followed by a description of the current Muscovite persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, is presented in this essay. There is an unfortunate use of the nomen "Ruthenian" in application to Western Ukrainians that stands to confuse unnecessarily an American reader and is not strictly valid as applied here. Yet the quality and informativeness of the article serve to indicate the nature of the general standards of literary proficiency underlying this interesting publication of the Ukrainian Catholic institution at Stamford.

"The Non-Orthodox Religions in the USSR During and After World War II," by John S. Curtiss. *The American Review On the Soviet Union*, November, 1946, New York City.

Similar to the usual articles appearing in this publication, this one is packed with much interesting but uncoagulated information drawn from innumerable sources, some of which are questionable in authenticity. In several places the writer quotes I. V. Poliansky, head

of the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults, on the strictly religious privileges of Catholics in the Union. In another, on the difficulties between the Vatican and the Kremlin, he states: "It is difficult to see, for example, how the Soviet government, with its claim for the full support of its citizens in all respects, can accept the Pope's claim to infallibility in matters of faith and morals." A flagrant contradiction appears here. Either the Professor is unfamiliar with the doctrine of papal infallibility or he places unlimited faith in Poliansky's assurances. For the doctrine essentially re-asserts the basic Catholic dogma in which all Catholics believe. If their essential beliefs are allegedly respected, then why this disacceptance of a claim to infallibility in matters of really already accepted truths? The same lack of acumen is seen in the writer's easy acceptance of "guess-timates" on religious adherents in the Soviet Union where the Party in power is openly anti-religious and at the same time sole dispenser of economic and political favors. Curiously, also, no mention is made of the imprisonment of hundreds of Ukrainian Catholics in Western Ukraine in this "sunnier land of growing religious tolerance."

SUNDAY BOOK REVIEW SECTION of the *New York Times*, April 27, 1947—provides us with a review by H. E. Salisbury on two new published books on Soviet Russia: "Why They Behave Like Russians," by John Fisher and "Stalin Must Have Peace," by Edgar Snow. The reviewer rightly asserts that "the torrent of books about Russia which is now pouring off the American presses inescapably reminds us of the fable of the blind man and the elephant. There is so much disagreement in these reports on Russia—and so much of it is fundamental—that there are times when it hardly seems possible that the writers are speaking of the same country."

The contents of this quotation is absolutely true even concerning the reviewer himself. Most authors on this subject, the reviewer included, must of necessity make fundamental mistakes on the Soviet Union because they fail miserably to exploit in their writings the fundamental sources on Russia.

For most of these authors and reviewers it seems to be sufficient to "know" the Soviets on the basis of two or three trips through selected parts of the Union. For others of like kin, official Soviet releases or Soviet scholarly publications are presumably adequate in their study of this country.

Everyone knows, who is free-minded enough, that all Soviet publications, even apparently scholarly research works, must under compulsion apply the principles of so-called Marxist dialectics and the tenet of expediency that all is "true" which is profitable to the cause of the communist-dominated proletariat.

On the contrary, most American authors and reviewers possess an understandable aversion toward the exploitation of genuine information of writers, scholars, and serious researchers who lived under the Soviet regime over twenty-five years. Such informants are in abundance—westward of the Soviet iron curtain. Strange that their experientially-founded opinions are totally neglected and ignored, although through experience, they stand as first-class informants on Soviet Russia.

Furthermore, such authors and reviewers as Mr. H. E. Salisbury are curiously disinclined to utilize for their conclusions on Soviet Russia facts proved in the last years of the past war even by American official sources.

It is generally accepted today that the paramount reason for Hitler's collapse in the East was due to his policy toward the peoples of the Soviet Union, especially the Ukrainians. The Nazi racist doctrine and hostile behaviour toward the Slav peoples—Ukrainians, White Ruthenians—and the Balts, etc., decisively conduced to the great advantage of the Kremlin.

It is also today a generally known fact that the Ukrainian underground, the so-called UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) fought the Nazis with the same vigor as they today fight the Soviets and communist Poland. For Mr. H. E. Salisbury, the former manager of the United Press bureau in Moscow, these facts and national problems evidently don't exist if he irresponsibly writes in his review the following: "He (Fisher) encountered the serious political problems of the Ukraine, problems rooted in centuries of nationalistic agitation *revived* by the Nazis, of re-awakened capitalistic impulses and of newly incited anti-Semitism." The quotation is an exact reprint of Bolshevistic propaganda against the Ukrainian independence movement. The arguments of Bolshevistic propaganda evidently are more convincing for the writer than the proven facts as to how the Nazis "revived" Ukrainian nationalistic aspirations by incarcerating thousands of Ukrainian nationalists in the concentration camps. How could it possibly be that capitalistic impulses are re-awakened among the Ukrainians as a nation

which is peculiarly marked by the absence of capitalists? The anti-semitic decoration, in turn, is the regular supplementary argument for all enemies of the Ukrainian independence movement and likewise, on the basis of overwhelming evidence, blatantly false. The irresponsibility of such authors and reviewers is inexcusable: the tragedy is that they pass as "experts."

