
THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. III Number 3

The Nationalities-The Vulnerable Spot of the Soviets	<i>Editorial</i>
Ukraine and the 1848 Year	<i>Clarence A. Manning</i>
Ukraine in the Economy of the U.S.S.R.	<i>Dr. T. S.</i>
The Basic Traits of the Ukrainian People	<i>Ivan Mirtchuk</i>
Peter Mohyla, Ecclesiastic and Educator (1647-1947)	<i>Geo. W. Simpson</i>
The Ukrainian Theater as a Political Factor	<i>C. H. Andrushyshen</i>
The Beginning of Russian History	<i>Nicholas D. Chubaty</i>
Professor Burnham and Ukraine	<i>Lev. E. Dobriansky</i>
Dr. Percival Cundy (1881-1947)	<i>Editor</i>
Book Reviews. Ucrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	

Published by Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

Edited by Editorial Board

Editor-in-chief Nicholas D. Chubaty

Associate Editors, Lev E. Dobriansky, Stephen Shumeyko

*Published by Ukrainian Congress Committee of America with support of
Americans of Ukrainian descent.*

PUBLISHER'S REMARK:

The volume cycle of "The Ukrainian Quarterly" in the past commenced with October and ended with September of the succeeding year. This arrangement proved to be inexpedient for our yearly subscribers who were anxious to obtain a complete volume of issues during the calendar year. Because of this and for others reasons, we see fit to modify this schedule by identifying the volume cycle with the calendar year so this issue is presented as volume III, number 3, Spring-Summer, and the following as volume III, number 4, Autumn. Thus with new calendar year a new volume cycle IV will begin.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Nationalities-The Vulnerable Spot of The Soviets <i>Editorial</i>	197
Ukraine and the 1948 Year <i>Prof. Clarence A. Manning</i>	205
Ukraine in the Economy of the U.S.S.R. <i>Prof. Dr. T. S.</i>	215
The Basic Traits of the Ukrainian People <i>Prof. Ivan Mirtchuk</i>	231
Peter Mohyla, Ecclesiastic and Educator (1647-1947) <i>Geo. W. Simpson</i>	242
The Ukrainian Theater as a Political Factor <i>Prof. Constantine H. Andrushyshen</i>	249
The Beginning of Russian History <i>Nicholas D. Chubaty</i>	262
Professor Burnham and Ukraine <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	274
Dr. Percival Cundy (1881-1947)	286
BOOK REVIEWS	
Istoria SSSR (History of USSR) edited by Historical Institute of The Academy of Sciences U.S.S.R. Editor-in-Chief, Prof. A.P. Pankratowa <i>N. D. Chubaty</i>	289
Why They Behave Like Russians by John Fischer <i>Ivan Petrushevich</i>	292
The Story of the Ukraine by Clarence A. Manning <i>Dr. Roman S. Stocky</i>	295
Ucrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	300

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS NUMBER

CLARENCE A. MANNING Ph. D. Professor at Columbia University, Department of Eastern European Languages. Specialist in Russian and Ukrainian Literatures. Author of "Ukrainian Literature", "Story of the Ukraine" and others. Translator of several works of Ukrainian Literature into English.

DR. T. S. Ukrainian Economist, formerly Professor of political economy at Soviet universities during twenty years. Presently living in Germany as D.P. and working on a book on "The Economy of State Capitalism in The U.S.S.R." For obvious reasons of personal safety the full name of this contributor has been confidently withheld.

IVAN MIRTCHUK Ph. D. Professor of Philosophy at Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany, and Dean of Philosophical School. Author several works on philosophy and Ukrainian culture.

GEORGE W. SIMPSON Ph. D. Professor of History at University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon and Author.

CONSTANTINE H. ANDRUSHYSHEN Ph. D. Professor of Slav Languages at the Saskatchewan University, Canada.

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY PH. D. Historian, former Professor at Theological Academy in Lviv, Western Ukraine. Author of several works: "Western Ukraine and Rome", "Surway of Ukrainian Law's History" and others. Editor of "The Ukrainian Quarterly" and contributor to American Journals.¹

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, instructor of economics at New York University, Associate Editor of "The Ukrainian Quarterly".

¹ In previous issues of this journal the name of this contributor was indicated Nicholas D. Czubytyj, but to approximate it more to the English phonetics the transliteration from Ukrainian written in Cyrillic characters has been adopted and will be used hereafter.

THE NATIONALITIES—THE VULNERABLE SPOT OF THE SOVIETS

(Editorial)

On May 12 the Associated Press News Agency announced that a pact had been arranged between the Soviets, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the purpose of mutual action against the "banditry" which has taken root in the boundary districts of those three countries. An international pact between the greatest Continental power, Soviet Russia, and her satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, for the purpose of destroying banditry is a thing that is truly interesting. Evidently, the activity of the boundary police of these three nations has not been sufficient to destroy the bandits, because the Pact speaks of mobilizing troops, tanks, and of employing planes. It is apparent that banditry has increased to such proportions that it has now become a serious threat to the three countries in question.

That banditry in central Europe should assume such proportions that each nation individually could not cope with it—is an unheard-of thing. For that reason it deserves to be considered more carefully. It is well known that the Bolsheviks have always termed as "banditry" all the movements of liberation and rebellion in the Soviet Union against the bloody dictatorship of the Kremlin. The Bolsheviks applied this name especially to the Ukrainian rebellious movement of independence which in the years 1921-23 quite seriously threatened the Bolshevik rule over Ukraine.

In the past few months the Ukrainian insurrection in the boundary regions of the Soviets, Poland and Czechoslovakia has been extensively dealt with by the Polish Press Service and by the foreign correspondents in Poland. The Polish Press Service also has termed "banditry" the actions of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army which is operating in the Carpathians, in the area where the three contracting nations border on one other. It has also reported three court actions against members of the U.R.A. In the latest there were among the prosecuted two young women, one of whom was sentenced to death. The court proceedings

and under the most cruel moral and physical torments. Only recently it has been reported from Uhnov, a town on the Polish side of the Curzon Line, that the military government had driven away all the older people, and had separated young women between 18 and 20 years of age from their parents, retaining them evidently for the military bordellos. Desperate efforts on the part of the parents to regain their children meet with the invariable reply that they are retained under the "protection of the military". In the course of two years the communistic Polish government, with the assistance of the Soviets, has destroyed the Ukrainian people and their Church on a territory the size of the state of Connecticut, and thus furnished a classical example of a mass genocide.

A similar, although somewhat less brutal policy has been instituted by Czechoslovakia against those Ukrainians who found themselves on her territories. First, the Czechs transferred to the Soviets all the Ukrainians from Carpathian Ukraine who had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. In Prague they arrested a parish priest of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. In that part of Carpathian Ukraine which remained under Czech rule, the government began, on the one hand, to implement the policy of Russifying and Communizing the Ukrainian population, and, on the other—the policy of driving the Ukrainians into the Sudetenland, to the places from which the Germans had been driven out.

The anti-Ukrainian policy of Poland and Czechoslovakia is dictated by Russia, and its purpose is to destroy the Ukrainian people as a social group outside the Soviet boundaries, where the idea of Ukrainian cultural and political independence might be cultivated.

It is no wonder then that this Soviet policy of extermination levelled against the Ukrainian people evokes a bitter reaction among the Ukrainians in their own land as well as among those who have emigrated. Within the boundaries of its own country, the Ukrainian Rebel Army is operating against the Soviet government, which only with great difficulty succeeds in coping with those partisans who are ready for anything. Three times the government of Soviet Ukraine has announced an amnesty for the members of the Ukrainian resistance movement, but three times the Ukrainian Rebel Army has rejected that proposition and continues its seemingly hopeless struggle against the Red Russian rule in Ukraine. The Ukrainian revolutionaries believe that the crisis between the democratic world and the world of Red totalitarianism is inevitable,

and that their struggle against the Red Russians will soon become one of the important sectors of the democratic nations against Red fascism.

Ukrainian resistance is now undoubtedly the most serious movement against the sway of Red Moscow over one-sixth of earth's globe; but it is not the only one of its kind. Besides the Ukrainian resistance, there exist similar movements in White Ruthenia and in the Baltic countries. The rebellious movement seems to be well organized in Estonia and Lithuania. It is quite active in the Caucasus, among the Georgians and Azerbaydjani. It exists likewise among the Turkestani. More than ten years ago the rebellion of the so-called "Basmachi" against the Soviet rule in Turkestan became a hard nut for the Soviets to crack.

During the War, Crimean Tatars had been active on the side of the Nazis, as were also some Caucasian races. After the War their republics were abolished and their populations exiled to Siberia. There is no doubt that these anti-Soviet movements were, held down during the last War, to mere sporadic rebellions on account of the Nazi policy of extermination levelled against non-Germans.

The Nazis, considering the Slavs and other races inferior to the Germanic race, began a policy of extermination of these races, and they, in spite of their hate for the Soviets, turned against the Nazis and helped to deal them the deadly blow. After their initial victories the cocksureness of the Nazis in Eastern Europe was so irrepressible that they became certain of their eventual success in employing those races as manpower working for the ruling German race, for the lords of the Third Reich which would be expanded to include the entire Eastern Europe. The German made policy in national matters became a decisive factor in their defeat and in saving the Kremlin.

The peoples of the Soviet dungeon of nations found themselves between Scylla and Charybdis. They hated the Nazis, but they hated the Communists no less. The rebel armies of these subjugated nations were often forced to wage a desperate struggle against the former as well as against the latter. Such a situation not infrequently led the less revolutionary-minded groups to collaborate with the Germans against the Soviets when it appeared that the Nazi devil was less horrible than the Kremlin fiend. To others it appeared otherwise, and they collaborated with the Red Russians against the Nazis. Only a sound study of the national problems of Eastern Europe can fully explain the facts which are often incomprehensible to the average American.

In the East-European national problems is also to be found the key to the understanding of the present problem of a million displaced persons from Eastern Europe. Often these persons are the cream of their nations, and are determined to suffer the worst rather than return to live under the rule of their deadly enemy, the Soviets. On the other hand, the Soviets are trying by all means in their power to lure these people back even if they are so dangerous to them, in order to liquidate them eventually. To one who is well-versed in the national problems of the Soviets, the attempts of the recent UNRRA, or of the present IRO, to persuade these people to return home appear simply childish. It is a hopeless cause, for they would rather go into the impenetrable forests of Paraguay or to the pampas of Argentine than return to the Soviets.

But on the other hand, what a great loss it would be for the United States and for the entire democratic world if these people disappeared, for they possess an excellent knowledge of the Soviet political, economic and cultural life. Besides, the Anglo-Saxon world, detrimentally to itself, seeks to dispose of these people who, in the event of a new international crisis, would become first-rate experts on the Soviet realm, of its pluses and minuses, and intrepid fighters against the dictatorship of the Kremlin.

The national question of the Soviet Union, the foremost problem of to-days politics, has been too much neglected by the Anglo-Saxon world. The Communists and their fellow-travellers are spreading abroad the cry about "ethnic democracy" in the Soviets, about the first example in the world of the solution of national problems in the country which is a mixture of nationalities. The existence in the Soviets of an "ethnic democracy" is just as much a bluff as is the existence of liberty, democracy, a free press, economic equality, etc. in that land of terror. Ethnic democracy has never existed in the Soviets, and does not exist there to-day.

The Soviets form a state which is wholly centralized, with strict Russian domination, with the precedence given to Russian language and culture, and with the distinct policy of further Russification of subjugated peoples. This policy does not diverge one iota from the plans of the tsarist policy regarding the "singleness of the Russian people" and the "singleness of the Orthodox faith". The Bolsheviks follow the same course, but they go about the realization of these plans more expertly. Instead of a single Russian people, their aim is to create a single Soviet

people. In the place of the Orthodox faith, they have established the Communism of the Moscow brand,—i.e. "Lenino-Stalinism".

Besides, the unscrupulous destruction of Catholicism in Western Ukraine, as well as in Carpathian Ukraine, with the simultaneous implantation of Orthodoxy, makes it plain that the Kremlin has not altogether cast the tsarist Orthodoxy out of the list of those means whereby the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians are to be Russified.

Ukraine, as it now exists within the framework of the Soviets, does not possess the characteristics of an autonomous state. Everywhere and always the Russian language prevails, and throughout the land a strict economic dependence on the Muscovite center, and a political dependence on the Politburo of the Communist Party in Moscow, are greatly in evidence.

The Kremlin has been and continues to be a past master in creating effects that are meant to prove that there exist in the Soviet Union certain rights, which, in fact, do not exist there at all. The Red Russians similarly create false effects in connection with the national policy of the Soviet Union. For effect, they order the languages and cultures of the primitive Siberian races to be developed. These peoples frequently are insignificant, numbering from 50 to 100 thousand. Nevertheless, that creates an effect of ethnic democracy. It is only too obvious that it does not harm the Kremlin to publish a grammar and an elementary reader for the Yakuts, who, to be sure, cannot use that language practically, because the entire administration and Party leadership are wholly Russian, as the late Wendell Wilkie confirmed, especially with regard to the Yakut race, in the account of his itinerary in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the language of the Yakuts has not the slightest prospects of ever becoming important in literature, science, or in practical life, because it is the language of a primitive race, without a scientific or technical terminology. This development however, does not threaten anybody and will die of its own weakness.

But the case is different in connection with a people whose language and culture have attained a higher degree of development and which are even older than the Russian language and culture. This refers especially to Ukraine. There, on the other hand, systematic Russification is being conducted, in the administration, party, literature and science, and in other spheres of life. The Ukrainian language is being artificially Russified and driven back to the villages, as was the case in the tsarist

times when the tsarist officials contended that the Ukrainian speech is the language of peasant swineherds. To that same "cultural" level the Bolsheviks today are attempting to reduce the Ukrainian language and culture, and, as a result, to make the Ukrainians a part of the single Soviet people, i.e., Russians.

All this, however, is but a pious wish of the purblind Red Russian communists who are continuing the struggle against the flood of dynamic national movement in the U.S.S.R., and certainly with negative results. Red Russia is a bad reproduction of the old imperial Austria; and for that reason, as a patchwork of peoples, it must share the fate of old Austria and break apart into really free national states which, united in a free alliance of East-European peoples, will become a blessing to humanity and a pledge of peace to the world. The national problems of the Soviets are their most vulnerable spot. The suppressed nations are the most certain allies of democracy against the Red tyranny. They will surely mark the beginning of the downfall of the Kremlin dictatorship in the sixth part of the earth's globe.

UKRAINE AND THE YEAR 1848

by Clarence A. Manning

Just one hundred years ago, in the spring of 1847, the Emperor Nicholas I tried to end the Ukrainian aspirations for freedom and independence by breaking up the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev as a dangerous revolutionary society and by imprisoning and deporting its members. Thus, for example, Taras Shevchenko, the poet of Ukraine, was sent for an indefinite term to the Orenburg Separate Corps, a disciplinary unit of the Russian army, "under the strictest supervision with a prohibition of writing and sketching". Lesser punishments were administered to the other members of the Society as Panteleimon Kulish, Nikolay Kostomarov, and Opanas Markovych, the future husband of Marko Vovchok.

What was the nature of this Society which so gravely imperilled the safety of the Russian Empire that it was suppressed so ruthlessly? Was it a widespread conspiracy among the masses of the population of Ukraine who were prepared to take up arms under well-trained leaders with the support of all the enemies of Russia abroad? Had it made its plans for almost immediate action and was it waiting only the appointed day when the standard of revolt was to be unfurled and Ukraine and the whole of Russia was to be devastated with fire and sword?

It is a remarkable fact that the Imperial authorities throughout the first half of the nineteenth century were impressed with the danger of a revolt in Ukraine. From the day when the last Hetman, Cyril Rozumovsky, laid down his "dangerous post" at the request of Catherine the Great the Russian authorities maintained a double policy. On the one hand, they emphasized before the world the essential and absolute unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and they held that the abolition of Kozak and Ukrainian liberties was justified by the logical and benign policy of the Empire. On the other hand, by the forceful closing of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775 and by the measures which they took to enforce order, they showed clearly their disbelief in their own theories and tried brute force to preserve that superficial calm which alone could offer

to the world convincing proof of their preaching. Their anxiety became greater after they were confronted with the Decembrist rising among the Guards Officers in St. Petersburg in 1825 which demanded the introduction of western ideals of liberty into Russia and still more after the Polish revolt of 1831, when the Poles made a desperate effort at armed rebellion to restore their national independence.

This same dualism was shown by the fact that at one and the same time it was Russian policy to regard the post of hetman in the Hetman State as a purely honorary and fictitious title and on the other to remove from official service and to place under a more or less open ban all persons, even successful and trusted servants of the crown who had too close relations by family or tradition with the various hetmans. Thus for example, Prince Nykola Reprin, the governor general of the country, was removed from office on the charge of separatism, largely because his wife was a grand-daughter of the last hetman.

This fear was well expressed in the report of Count Orlov, the Chief of the Gendarmes, to Nicholas I in regard to Shevchenko after the investigation. "With his poems which were beloved in Little Russia there could be sowed and consequently take root thoughts of the so-called happiness of the times of the Hetmanate, the happiness of bringing back those times and of the possibility of Ukraine existing as a separate country." These words speak eloquently of the fact that even among the Russianized Ukrainian nobles of the day, there still remained resentment against the arbitrary policy of the Russian tsars who had abrogated those promises of maintaining the old liberties of the Kozak Host that had been made by Tsar Alexis to Khmel'nitsky two hundred years before.

Yet this does not answer the charges made against the members of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Among its members there was not a single one who had any special training in military affairs. There was not one who was connected by birth or tradition with the old families who might have been expected to share this anti-Russian feeling. There was not one who had been trained in conspiratorial methods or who had showed any inclination to resort to arms or violence. They were for the most part more or less conservative university students, the children of fairly successful people who were without political ambitions. Shevchenko was born a serf and had received his freedom because influential friends in St. Petersburg had bought it for him, so that he could study in the Academy of Arts. In a word, the members of the Society were almost ex-

clusively recruited from those classes who were interested primarily in questions of culture and that at a time, when the Imperial Government was itself vitally interested in exploring the customs and the folklore of the peoples under its control.

There is something paradoxical in this situation and it would be only too easy to believe that the attack was based upon the purely arbitrary fears and prejudices of Nicholas and his associates and their constant preoccupation lest dangerous ideas be set adrift amid the Russian populations. Yet perhaps a deeper instinct told them that there was more of a potential menace in the dreams of these young scholars and artists than there had been in the thunder and fury of the Polish rebels of 1831 with all of their energy and readiness to die upon the field of battle.

The significance of the Society did not lie in its immediate political and military potentialities but in the philosophy that lay at its roots and that could not be reached by any aggressive action of the police of Nicholas I. In fact, the seizure of its members was perhaps the one thing that the Society needed, if it was to pass out of an enthusiastic gathering of idealistic students and become a movement which was destined to embrace an ever-increasing part of the population of whom they spoke so glowingly and with such real feeling, for the Society was in fact the belated Ukrainian reaction to that great movement of thought and of feeling which had been spreading with rising force for over a half century among all the oppressed peoples of Europe and which was already menacing in other lands the stability of the old order in Europe.

The eighteenth century had been an era of reason and enlightenment. It was an age when men sought through their intellects the solution of all human problems. They attempted to gather into one set whole all possible known facts about the universe and in this inquiring atmosphere it was only right that there should be concern with language and with the literary productions of the world.

A little later, the German philosopher and poet Herder started the taste for popular poetry and folklore. He taught very definitely that as Homer was greater because of his naturalness than was Vergil, so the poetry of the more undeveloped races was better than that of the courts and highly cultured society and this gave an impetus to the study of folk poetry and of folk customs.

If it was the influence of the older schools that affected Kotlyarevsky

in his Eneida which was written under the influence of the Kievan school tradition and the clear, if somewhat cold and jesting, mind of the eighteenth century, it was the second influence that aroused in Ukraine the desire to collect and analyze the various folkrites and customs and that brought home to all thinking Ukrainians the many differences that existed between them and the Great Russians. It was a sober and a scientific interest that first served as the conscious organ of differentiation.

Then came the ideas of Rousseau and soon after the American Revolution and the establishment of the Republic of the United States. This was followed by the French Revolution with its slogan of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and Europe was in a turmoil. New political ideals were evolved and a new hope was born in the souls of the great masses of the population.

To add to this political turmoil, there was added the ferment of the Romantic movement which glorified the Middle Ages and sought its heroes in those bold and daring individuals who with limitless courage and passion dared to defy the smug sentiment of their own days. It was the period of Schiller and of Byron, of Schiller who pictured the liberty-loving heroes of the past and of Byron, who crowned his own poems with his death in the Greek struggle for independence.

The results differed in the various lands. In those as England and France, where the political boundaries were already well established, the results were purely literary or found their outcome in definitely organized political movements. In other as among the Germans and the Italians where there were many small, isolated states, these ideas enkindled a desire for national unification. In each case the students formed themselves into secret societies and looked back to some assumed Golden Age in the past in the hope that it might soon be realized again in the future. Now and then these societies began to indulge in conspiracies but very few of these resorted to the cruder methods of murder and bloodshed. In all of them idealistic motives prevailed and they were politically ineffective but at the same time they rapidly increased their prestige among the younger people, especially the students in the universities, who dreamed of a Europe in which the rights of the individual man would be protected.

This combination of admiration for the great days of the past and of ardent hope for the future could not fail to have its effect upon all the Slav peoples. It gave rise to the early dreams of Jan Kollar, a Slovak

Protestant pastor, writing in Czech, who was present in Jena at a great demonstration of the German students of the Tugendbund (League of Virtue) in 1817 and inspired him to write a series of sonnets, the Daughter of Slava, in the hope of arousing interest in an ideal Pan-Slavism especially among the Western Slavs. It inspired Vaclav Hanka to "discover" ancient Czech manuscripts prepared in the Romantic spirit and glorifying unknown rulers of the Czechs in early antiquity. It inspired various Southern Slav poets and authors to dream and work for their part in a new united Slavia which would hold out to the Slavs all those blessings which other peoples were demanding and which some had already received.

This Romantic agitation among the Czechs and the Southern Slavs was also accompanied by serious study of the past as it existed in sober reality. It caused thinking men and scholars to go back to the actual legal situation as it had developed especially in the Hapsburg lands and both in Bohemia and in Hungary, leaders who were often essentially conservative, looked at the old charters and constitutional provisions and began to ask why many of the privileges which their peoples had been guaranteed in the past had been abrogated or neglected. It led to a new demand that the old agreements entered into centuries before should be revived and reactivated. It was in vain that the forces of reaction and of the governments tried to suppress all such questioning. Every attempt at repression only served to increase the agitation and it was difficult to oppose it, since it was so well buttressed by documents of undoubted authenticity.

This agitation for a broad interpretation of Slav rights was weakest in Russia and in Poland for contradictory motives. In Russia, even the liberal elements had been won over to the old theories of the Third Rome and the essential unity of the state and of all the territories that were under the sovereignty of the tsar. The leaders of the liberals, even among the Decembrists, were unable to bring themselves to listen to any of the complaints of the subject peoples and sought to introduce the desired reforms and still maintain the complete unity of the country or to decentralize it on lines which ignored the various nationalities in the land. In Poland, where national independence had been lost for barely a quarter of a century, the same reforming tendencies revived hopes of a success-

ful revolt against their conquerors and led to an ardent isolationist political movement which culminated in the revolt of 1831.

On the side of the literary Romanticism, there came the same differentiation. Poland had had a rich and colorful past and the Romantic writers were well supplied with themes from their country's history. It is true that some of them recognized the wealth that they could draw from their country's long domination over Ukraine and developed a so-called Ukrainian school in Polish literature. Yet they never forgot the difference between themselves and the Ukrainians and used the stories of the Kozaks and the rich scenery of Ukraine as a background for their own tales. In Russia on the other hand, with its long tradition of submission to the Mongols and the Tatars, Romanticism never struck any deep roots. The few authors who really sought Romantic themes, were compelled to seek them in Ukrainian subjects and passed these through the typical Great Russian filter so that they emerged merely as examples of heroic effort in the Great Russian past, but they soon wearied even of this, and with the downfall of the Decembrists, Russian literature was ready to renounce the heroic tale and resume its old course of progress.

Where did all this leave the Ukrainians? The destruction of the Sich in 1775 and the complete annihilation during the following decade of all the legal and official remains of the Hetman state prevented the growth of any movement as that in Bohemia to bring back the old situation legally. In addition there was no possibility of any formal political agitation to secure any rights for the Ukrainians. Politics in the Western sense was utterly taboo in the Russian Empire where the tsar and the bureaucracy with the aid of the police maintained an iron control of the population, whether it was Russian or Ukrainian or anything else.

Yet the Ukrainian tradition lived on in the memories of the peasant serfs. There were still living old men who had taken part in the last struggles against Poland, the Koliishchina of 1768. There were still kobzars and wandering bards who sang at peasant weddings and at inns the tales of Kozak heroism and who recalled the old days when the Kozaks in their light boats dared to raid the suburbs of Constantinople and rescue Christian prisoners from their prisons in the outskirts of the Sultan's capital. There were Russian and Russianized nobles who effected a certain love for antiquity and caricatured the past by dressing their serf retainers in Kozak costumes and by having the old Ukrainian songs sung

at their banquets as examples of a past from which they were happily now free.

All this furnished a rich field for Romanticism, if only a poet speaking for the Ukrainians could be found to put in literary form the heritage of the past, since this past corresponded so well to the moods and desires of the present. Europe wanted tales of heroic adventure. Ukraine had them in abundance, for during the great age of the late fifteenth century the Zaporozhian Kozaks had been doing on land and on the Black Sea exactly what the seadogs of England and the conquistadores of Spain had been doing on the Atlantic Ocean and in the New World.

Yet there was one sharp diversion from reality. At the time when the Kozaks were at their Romantic and heroic height, the enemy was not Russia but the already humiliated and vanquished Poland. The memories of the popular songs dealt with the struggle against Poland, for at the time when those memories were first recorded in the popular consciousness, Moscow was an indifferent landlocked state, interested only in her eastern contacts and spurning all relations, be they hostile or friendly, with the rest of the Orthodox and Western worlds.

Taras Shevchenko was the answer to the need. In his early poems (save for *Katerina*), Moscow plays little or no part. *Perebendya*, *Ivan Pidkova*, *The Night of Taras*, *Hamaliya*, and the *Haydamaki* all deal with subjects drawn from the conflicts with Poland and Turkey, from that vanished past which could not be restored in view of the many changes that had taken place since the drama of history had taken place. Every Ukrainian recognized that the long needed poet had appeared. The more cultured Russians joined in the paean of praise but the Russians intelligentsia, imbued even in their hostility to Nicholas I, with the idea of Russian solidarity, refused to notice. Even the great Belinsky, already acclaimed as the leader of Russian progressive thought, showered Shevchenko with abuse and laughed as loudly as did the bureaucrats at this young man who dared to use for great poetry the despised "Little Russian dialect".

In 1843, Shevchenko paid a visit to Ukraine. This visit opened his eyes to the reality of the present with all of its cruelty and oppression. For the first time he realized clearly the difference between the old Romantic Kozak life and the brutality of the present. He saw that, in the Dnieper valley, Poland was no longer the menace to Ukrainian development but Russia and from this time on, he abandoned his old Romantic attitude

to put his pen into the struggle against the modern evils. Then in 1845 as a graduate of the Academy of Arts, he went back to Ukraine with a minor post on the Archaeological Commission.

In the meanwhile there had permeated into Russia the ideas of Kollar on Slav solidarity. His *Daughter of Slava* had appeared in at least two editions in Russia. Osip Bodyansky, a friend of Shevchenko's, had acquainted him with the work of Safarik, one of the leaders of the idealistic Pan-Slav movement which had taken its rise in Prague. The Czech dreams of including Russia in the new Pan-Slav movement had even led such men as Havlicek to St. Petersburg and the Czech ideas of a new and idealistic Slav union were drifting in the air.

They were of course rejected by the Russians. Russian pride could not consent to accept the other Slav nations as brothers. Especially after the Polish revolt of 1831, the Russians had no use for the Poles, they despised the Ukrainians, and visualized a Slav unity as an extension of the Russian Empire, in which the controlling power would be in their own hands. It was a recurrence in modern form of the old Moscovite attitude, toward the Slavs, if not toward the entire West.

When Shevchenko, imbued with these notions of Slav brotherhood and with a new consciousness of the real nature of the opposition to the Ukrainian aspirations, reached Kiev in 1845, he found there a group of young men who under the leadership of Prof. Maksymovych were studying scientifically the folk songs and rummaging in the archives and libraries for all those old histories of Ukraine which detailed the slow but persistent whittling away of all of those rights and privileges guaranteed by Tsar Alexis at the moment when he made a treaty with Khmelnytsky. It was a scientific confirmation of his own impressions.

Now we can understand the significance of the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius. It represented for Ukraine that union of all the threads of rejuvenation. Into its spiritual content went the Romanticism of literature, the idealistic dreams of the Golden Age of the past and the certainty that the dead bones of a free Ukraine might once again be restored to life. There came the products of the ethnographical school which had searched out in the highways and byways the survivals of Ukrainian folklore and village customs. There came the writings of the historians who had by painstaking effort reconstructed from written documents the sad tale of the downfall of the Kozak Host, who had worked out the

glorious days of Kiev, and who in simple language were trying to tell the story of their people.

All these threads were brought together but there was no political action possible. There was no way of starting a Ukrainian political party. These scholars had no taste for launching an ineffective conspiracy or for indulging in petty banditry or in promoting political turbulence. The young men were filled with enthusiasm. They proudly declared that, in the ideal Slav world of the future, in that United States of Slavia which was going to rise as the next step in the free association of brother peoples Ukraine would have its own respected place. They prepared a banner for Ukraine in the great republic of the future. They indulged in solemn vows and promises.

Yet they felt that more was necessary. If Ukraine was to made worthy of her destiny, it was their duty to help the Ukrainian people by education, by moral suasion. Ukraine needed their assistance and in their own way they sought to do it. They realized the magnitude of the task. They estimated rightly the obstacles which they had to face but they still believed the task was possible. They still believed that right would triumph and that with the aid of their brothers, the new order would be introduced.

Nicholas I thought differently. He was convinced that the Imperial Government and its officials were the destined saviors of the world. He had dealt ruthlessly with those Russians who had dared to doubt his infallible judgement. He had suppressed with fire and sword the Polish Revolution. Now he was not going to allow a group of young men in Kiev to raise again the vision of a Ukraine with those privileges as an equal Slav nation that Empress Catherine had suppressed. Ukraine was to be happy under the Russian yoke. For that purpose he ignored all the beneficial work of the members of the Society and struck hard and forcefully. Ukraine was to learn again once and for all what it meant to defy the wisdom of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Shevchenko went to a disciplinary battalion. Others met a less harsh fate and the Society was crushed.

It was not dead and its spirit did not die. The songs of Shevchenko and the ideas of his companions remained alive and found an echo in ever widening circles. Seventy five years later an independent Ukrainian Republic appeared on the map of the world. The dreams of the Society had succeeded and though that Republic soon vanished, the new tactics of the new autocrats of the Russian Empire, the leaders of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, found it expedient to introduce into the United Nations their puppet appointees under the name of representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Today they are still at work through arrest, deportation, execution and starvation to wipe out the Ukrainian national spirit. The world will be compelled to notice, and in the atomic age, more than ever before, the need for a free and independent Ukraine cooperating peacefully and harmoniously with the rest of the world is becoming one of the prime considerations of world peace and human survival. May the world recognize the situation and do it soon!

UKRAINE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE U.S.S.R.

by Prof. T. S.

**"Ukraine is an extremely rich country endowed
with all the treasures of nature."**

. . . Jean Benois Cherrer (1738)

Certainly there is no other land whose fate has been more tragic than that of Ukraine. From the time of its appearance on the historical scene, more than a thousand years ago until the present time, the Ukrainian nation has had to fight in defense of its land. The Tatar hordes of the XIII century were later followed by the Turks, Poles, and Russians. Short periods of independent existence of Ukraine have interchanged with long periods of occupation by hostile nations.

Finally the last, and most savage fight between Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia for the possession of rich Ukraine brought about the "unification" in the hands of the Soviets of all the Ukrainian lands. However, the Ukrainians, as before, remained a stateless, occupied and subjugated nation.

What are the causes of this continual aggression against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people? Why in the course of centuries has Ukraine been the coveted land for all its close and distant neighbors?

The struggle for Ukraine is, in the first place, the struggle for the possibility of exploiting the enormous natural resources in which she is so richly endowed. The Ukrainian lands are located immediately to the north of the Black Sea and include its northern shore. This has not only an economic importance (Black Sea ports) but also a strategic significance. Of course, the natural wealth of Ukraine is the main attraction. An Englishman, Joseph Marshall, who traveled in Ukraine in 1769-1770, observed that "Ukraine, because of her natural richness, is the most important province of Russia." In general, one can note that Marshall not only was impressed by, but also admired Ukraine. He wrote that "The Ukrainian peasants are the best agriculturists in the whole of Russia." Comparing the level of contemporary agriculture in Ukraine and Eng-

land, he stressed the fact that "he has not seen yet any other country that was so strikingly similar to the best provinces of England."

Another traveler, the French Marshal Marmon, who visited Ukraine in 1831, also emphasized that "the wealth of Ukraine is known to everyone; it is the most productive country in the world. The agricultural land, black and deep, is characterized by great fertility." It is true that the Ukrainian "chornozem" belongs to the best soils of the world. Its area is about 70 mil. ha (second place in the world after U.S.A.). About three-quarters of all the Ukrainian lands is located in the "chornozem" belt. Coupled with this is a very good mild climate of Ukraine with a sufficient amount of light, heat, precipitation and an optimal temperature, which is favorable for the growth of all plants of temperate climate. The land and the climate of Ukraine long before the first World War were the main factors in making Ukraine "the granary of Europe," and in supplying 20% of the world's export of grain.

The Ukrainian rivers (Dnieper, Don, Dniester, Boh, Kuban) are very important not only from the viewpoint of communication and general economics, but as a source of power, tentatively estimated as 9 mil. kw. In addition to that, Ukraine has enormous resources of useful minerals which are the basis for the development of industry. The coal deposits of the Donets basin, estimated at 79 billion tons, occupy seventh place among the coal deposits of the world. In Europe only the Ruhr and the Saar basins are larger. The iron ore deposits at Krivy Rih are believed to be equal to 1.5 billion tons. In quality, purity and the amount of metal the Krivy Rih deposits are the best in the world. The deposits of iron ore of poorer quality in the region of Kerch are estimated to be coal deposits, the distance varying between 100 and 450 km while in Russia the Siberian coal of the Kuznetsk region lies at a distance of over 40 to 50 percent of the world's deposits.

Thus Ukraine, as no other country, has enormous deposits of coal and iron ore—a prerequisite for the development of heavy iron industry. A favorable factor in this setup is the relative proximity of the iron and coal deposits, the distance varying between 100 and 450 kw., while in Russia the Siberian coal of the Kuznetsk region lies at a distance of over 2,000 km. from the Ural iron deposits.

Ukraine has brown coal, peat, petroleum and natural gas; she is rich in mercury (deposits estimated to be up to 4.3 million tons), rock salt (1.8 billion tons), potassium salts, chalk, phosphates. In addition to that,

Ukraine has, in various amounts, building stone, clay and kaolin. As a base for the cement industry, there are large deposits of merle, lime and chalk. Only the deposits of colored metals are weakly represented.

The natural resources of Ukraine open unlimited possibilities for her economic development. By the combination of the Donets coal and the iron ore from Krivy Rih and Kerch, a powerful metallurgical industry can be established, which is the basis of the machine-building industry. Having in a sufficient quality almost all kinds of raw materials, Ukraine can develop various branches of industry that would safeguard a many-sided harmonious industrial development. Possession of the best lands in the world forms the basis for the development of intensive agriculture and cattle raising which would not only provide for the food needs of the urban and rural population but would also give the necessary raw materials (cotton, hemp, flax, potatoes, sugar beet, meat, sunflower, tobacco, etc.) for the development of the food and textile industries. It should be mentioned here that on the eve of the second World War there were about 50 million people in the Ukrainian territories. And it is known that the Ukrainians belong to the most industrious peoples of the world. Should we be surprised then that Ukraine attracted and still attracts the attention of all kinds of Hitlers and Stalins?

Colonial exploitation of her natural resources and her population was the object of all invaders of Ukraine, though each of them approached this task in a different way. After destroying in the XVIII century the remnants of Ukrainian independence, the Russian government began an open colonial policy in Ukraine. The existence of Ukraine as a political or national entity was denied. Officially Ukraine was an ordinary province of the Tsarist Russia, and no distinction was made between her and other Russian provinces. However, its colonial status in the political-economic system of the Tsarist Russia leaves no doubt and can be grasped the best from the analysis of the trade balance of Ukraine on the eve of the first World War.

Various investigations show that the active business balance of Ukraine for 1913 was from 331 to 528 million gold rubles. According to the optimal calculations, Ukraine on the eve of the war exported various products in the sum of 744.5 million rubles, and her import was equal to only 313.3 million rubles. Consequently, during the year the value of

products exported from Ukraine was equal to 413.2 million rubles. The active balance of Ukraine exceeded that of Tsarist Russia to a great extent. Without Ukraine, Russia would have had a passive business balance. In other words, part of the export from Ukraine went abroad as a payment for the products which were imported not to Ukraine but to Muscovy.

The colonial status of Ukraine becomes still more evident when one analyzes the Ukrainian export and import in detail. The export from Ukraine, totaling up to 744.5 million rubles, consisted of about 80% of food products of which the value of the agricultural products was equal to 275 million rubles (36.9%), that of sugar—264 million rubles (35.6%) and that of the cattle and meat products—53 million rubles (7.1%). These numbers emphasize the agricultural character of Ukraine. The rest of the export (152.5 million rubles) consisted mostly of raw materials—iron and manganese ores, coal, coke—and of semi-finished products—pig iron and steel. The export of finished products, mainly those made of metals, had a secondary significance. The imports to Ukraine were of an entirely different character. They consisted exclusively of finished products. Out of the total sum of 331.3 million rubles, the value of manufactured products was equal to 197.4 million rubles or 59.9%. In addition to this, the import consisted of wood products, some food and colonial products, petroleum, etc. Of industrial products, metal and leather goods, confectionary, etc. were imported. Russia exported from Ukraine leather, imported leather products, and exported metals, imported machines.

The Tsarist Russia was not interested in the development of the textile and machine building industries in Ukraine, although as we have already seen, the latter had all the necessary prerequisites for these industries. The economic policy of the pre-revolutionary Muscovy toward Ukraine was concentrated upon restricting the latter firstly, to the production of grain; secondly, limiting her to the production of raw materials and semi-finished products for the heavy industry of Russia, and thirdly, in transforming Ukraine into a market for finished products from Russia. Actually in 1913, Ukraine produced 8.6 million tons of export grain, which was 41.3% of all the needs of Russia. In addition to that, the share of Ukraine in the all-Russian production was: in coal, 87% (25.3 million tons); in iron ore, 72.6% (6.9 million tons); in cast iron, 67.4%

(3.1 million tons); and in steel, 64.1% (2.5 million tons). As we have already mentioned, the import of manufactured products from Russia to Ukraine was equal to 59.5% of all imports (197.4 million rubles).

The Soviets have been following this trend in their economic policy toward Ukraine. The latter is, primarily, the object of a colonial exploitation, although it should be stressed that the policy of the Soviets is more cunning and built on entirely different political principles. ✓

The Tsarist Russia, in general, did not recognize any Ukraine. The Soviets, however, after destroying by military aggression the true, democratically elected government of the Ukrainian National Republic, created—for the sake of publicity—a seemingly independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic which, according to the constitution, is an independent and sovereign state. Having conquered the Ukrainian people militarily, and having completely subdued them socially, politically and economically, the Soviets are trying to prove that it has “liberated” the Ukrainian nation from capitalistic slavery and exploitation.

Actually, the “independence” of Ukraine is, and has been from the beginning, only on paper. It cannot be anything else because, as all the other republics in the U.S.S.R., she is too strongly unified with Muscovy by iron knots of party directives and economic enslavement. In connection with this, it is of interest to note that during almost 30 years of the existence of the “independent and sovereign Ukraine” there has not been a single case when a Ukrainian became the secretary of the Communist party of Ukraine, i.e., the right hand of Stalin and a factual dictator of Ukraine. These have been Molotov (Russian), Kaganovich (Jewish), Kosior (Polish), Postishev (Russian), Khrushchev (Russian) and again Kaganovich.

During all those years when Ukraine has been under the Soviet occupation up to the present time, her economy has played a secondary function as an addition to the economy of Russia and has been an object of colonial exploitation by the metropoly, although the forms of this exploitation have changed constantly.

In 1921 at the 10th convention of the Russian Communist Party, Stalin, in stressing the necessity for federalizing all Soviet republics, said: “The general interest of the defense of the Soviet republics on one side, the reconstruction of the productive forces destroyed by the war on the

other, and the necessary help in food from the food-producing republics to those lacking it have made such a federation imperative." However, even before the formation of such a federation in 1922, the food taken from the Ukrainian Republic to those "lacking it"—principally to Russia—acquired large proportions.

The military struggle of Muscovy with Ukraine in 1917-1921 was not only a war for political conquest but for economic enslavement as well. In the first place, it was the struggle for the Ukrainian land. Lenin underlined that when he said: "Without the grain from Ukraine we cannot maintain our power," and "the struggle for grain is the struggle for socialism." The Ukrainian peasant was inhumanly and mercilessly robbed. He was forced to give, according to the law of food requisition, all his so-called grain "surpluses." Special plenipotentiaries from Muscovy were sent for this task. Special military detachments were formed which took by force the grain from the peasants free of charge. For a better execution of such work special "committees of paupers," consisting of declassed and russified elements, were established in the villages whose task it was to rob, and take from the more prosperous peasants all that could be taken away.

The Ukrainian peasants put up a very strong resistance to this robbery by the "brotherly" Muscovites. In one secret Soviet publication issued in 1921, this period is described in the following manner: "During 1919-1920 more than a million Ukrainian insurgents were fighting against us. During this period they killed one hundred and forty thousand red army soldiers, chekists, communists and workers of the grain requisitioning detachments. During the same time the organs of the cheka and special military group, according to the official reports only, shot more than four hundred thousand of the insurgents and their helpers—and in spite of that, in the spring of 1921 we have a new wave of rebellions."

It is obvious that in the years of the so-called militant communism in the U.S.S.R., Ukraine was the reservoir from which the Soviet rulers forcibly took the necessary grain and other food products.

As is known, the economic policy of that period was a complete failure. It resulted in a complete degeneration of the national economy of Russia and other Soviet republics: most of the factories were idle, the mines were flooded, the transport did not function. Enough to mention that the

production of pig iron in 1921 was equal to 116,300 tons or only 3% of the pre-war production.

The terrific famine of 1921 was the result of such a policy. Ten million people suffered from famine in Ukraine and two million of them perished from hunger. "Military communism was an attempt to take the citadel by a direct attack. In this offensive the party went too far, risking to lose the connection with its base. Lenin made a proposition to retreat somewhat for the time being to the rear in order to begin a prolonged siege of the fortress, and conserve the forces for the new onslaught." In such words in the "History of the All-Union Communist Party", the causes of the change to the economic policy (NEP) which began in 1921 with the substitution of food taxes for forcible requisition were explained. The peasant now, after giving to the State a certain part of his production at a definitely very low price, could sell the rest on the free market at current prices.

It is necessary to stress that in connection with the change to the new economic policy some progress was made in the development of the Ukrainian culture, although with the constant requirement that this culture should be "national in form but socialistic in its content." The beginning of this "Ukrainization" (changing the official language in all party, state, professional and commercial organizations from Russian to Ukrainian) was introduced with the intention of "building socialism" (the Ukrainian peasants do not understand Russian), and, on the other side, it was done for the purpose of bringing into the open the most active and nationally conscious Ukrainian elements with an intention of destroying them later under one or another pretext.

There was no change in the economic relations of Ukraine. Ukraine, as before, was treated as a colonial dependency of Muscovy and an object of exploitation by the latter. The following facts will illustrate this statement: In 1928, because of a crop shortage, only 12.8 million tons of grain were harvested in Ukraine, instead of the normal 17.6 million tons, or about 27.2% less. In spite of this shortage, great quantities of grain were exported from Ukraine, and a state of famine resulted in several places. In 1927, when the municipalities of Kiev, Odesa, Kharkov sent a petition to the central government asking for permission to build textile factories in Ukraine, the answer was that such factories would be

built only in Muscovy. At that time the role of Ukraine in the production of raw materials for heavy industry was as follows:

TK

TABLE 1.

Production of raw materials in Ukraine in 1927.

(Millions of tons)

Name	Total production in U.S.S.R.	Produced in Ukraine	Share of Ukraine in total production (per cent)
Coal	35.4	27.3	77.1
Iron ore	5.8	4.4	75.9
Pig iron	3.3	2.4	72.7
Steel	4.1	2.1	51.2

At the same time the head of the Ukrainian government, Petrovsky, complained that "the budget of the Ukrainian Republic does not exceed that of the Muscovian region." Some Ukrainian economists openly wrote at that time (in 1928 it was possible; later, however, they paid with their heads for their courage) that "a very large percentage of money goes for satisfying the requirements of the Union" and that "the manner of setting up the budgets in the central government makes a fiction out of the rights of Ukraine to fix her own budget."

At the end of 1927 the XV convention of the All-Russian Communist Party studied the first draft of the first five-year plan. It is interesting to note how in this plan the role of various constituent republics was interpreted. One of the participants at the convention said: "It seems to me that we have to accept a very definite goal which must be based on the realization that our constituent republics should perform clear-cut functions in the economy of the Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of these functions, on the basis of completion of a fixed task, which constitutes a part of the ultimate goal, the industrialization of our Union,—the economic growth of the constituent republics should be adjusted." Thus it was clearly stressed that "the constituent republics should perform definite functions in the economy of the Union." In other

words, in the first place, the economic needs of the Union must be computed and satisfied, and then later also the needs of the constituent republics should be taken into consideration.

Ukraine is not an exception to this rule. The conception of the Muscovite professor Grinevetsky about the postwar perspectives of the development of the Russian industry, which he expressed in his work written in 1919 at the time of the existence of an independent Ukrainian National Republic, found the very warm support of the Soviets. In spite of the fact that this professor was an enemy of the bolshevists and of the Soviet System and was an emigrant from Russia, his book was reprinted. The fact of reprinting the work of a political emigrant is unheard of under the Soviet conditions. Apparently the explanation of this fact should be looked for in the contents of the book. Prof. Grinevetsky in his work forcibly stressed the necessity of the union of Ukraine with Russia in the interest of the reconstruction of the economy of the latter. He dwells especially on the importance of Ukraine in the development of the imperial metallurgy and on the role of the Ukrainian market for the Russian textile industry. At the same time the role of Ukraine in the economy of Russia as the chief source of food and sugar supply is stressed. Thus this work advocates also in the postwar period the previous status quo of the role of Ukraine in the economy of Russia.

Soviet Russia quietly but consistently from the first days of its existence had chosen to develop the economy of Ukraine as a supplement to its own economy. The most striking embodiment of this trend in the economic policy of Russia toward Ukraine, along the trend of tsarist days, is found in the five-year plans for the economic development of the Soviet Union.

As is well known, the aim of the collectivization, which was forcibly introduced in 1930-1933, was (through the requisition of food products from peasants) to develop a strong industry and in such a way to increase the military potential of the Soviet Union. Of course, the requisitions were first applied to the peasants. However, the urban population no less felt the burden of the new duties and there came a sharp decline in the standard of living. The beginning of the collectivization in Ukraine was connected with the liquidation, as a class, of several hundred thousands of the well-to-do peasants, the so-called "kulaks." All the possessions of the kulaks, including their personal belongings, were confiscated. Together with their families they were thrown out of their homes when the

temperature outdoors was 20-25 degrees C below zero, and deported under horrible conditions to concentration camps in Siberia. Part of these unfortunates perished during transportation, part at the points of destination.

The peasants of Ukraine had no desire to go to the Kolhoz. They resisted, because they did not want the Soviet state to rob them in the name of an incomprehensible and alien goal—the building of Communism throughout the world.

Finally, in order to put an end to this resistance, the Soviet government artificially created in the years of 1932-33 a state of famine in Ukraine. As a result the population of Ukraine diminished by 7.5 million (4.8 million persons died of actual starvation and 2.7 million were lost due to the diminishing of the increase in the population because of the famine). Of course, there were denials of the famine. At the time when people were dying daily by the thousands and cannibalism was occurring, in the unified Soviet newspapers there appeared letters of the "happy" kolhoz members from the "flowering Ukraine" in which they thanked father Stalin "for plentiful and joyful life."

The introduction of collectivization, however, solved two very important problems: (a) it increased the production of grain, and (b) it simplified the technique of grain collection because it became easier to get surpluses from a few thousand of kolhoz headed by the representatives of the party than from millions of dispersed peasant holdings.

The total grain crop of the U.S.S.R. increased from 72 million tons in 1913 to 108.8 million tons at the end of the second five-year plan (1937). At the same time the total grain production in Ukraine increased from 19.7 million tons to 27.2 million tons. The share of Ukraine in the total production of grain in 1913 and 1937 is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2.

**The share of Ukraine in the grain production
of the U.S.S.R. (million tons)**

Years	Total Grain Crop		Surplus Grain for Export			
	Total crop of U.S.S.R.	Crop in Ukraine	Ukrainian crop in total (percent)	Total for U.S.S.R.	Ukraine	Ukrainian Surplus in total (percent)
1913	72.0	19.7	27.3	20.8	8.6	41.3
1937	108.8	27.2	25.0	27.2	19.5	71.7

From the table it is evident that the share of the Ukrainian surplus grain in the total grain surplus of the U.S.S.R. has increased from 41.3% in 1913 to 71.7% at the end of the second five-year plan. Ukraine was forced to give to Russia almost 20 million tons of grain. From 1913 to 1937, the total grain crop in Ukraine increased 1.4 times while the amount of exported grain increased 2.3 times. At the same time there was a significant increase in population. The result was a considerable worsening of the living standard of the rural and urban population of Ukraine. At the same time Ukraine produced 78% sugar, 75% canned goods, 15.2% of the cattle and 30% pigs of the total U.S.S.R. Thus it is evident that the grain, sugar and meat of Ukraine played a considerable role in the economy of the Soviet Union.

The production of coal, iron ore, pig iron and steel was as follows:

TABLE 3.
Production of coal, iron ore, pig iron and steel in 1937 (in million tons).

Name	Total Production of U.S.S.R.	Production in Ukraine	Share of Ukraine in total production (per cent)
Coal	128.0	69.0	53.8
Iron ore	27.8	17.2	61.9
Pig iron	14.3	8.8	61.5
Steel	17.7	8.4	47.4

It is evident that of the total produced in U.S.S.R., 53.8% of the coal, 61.9% of the iron ore, 61.5% of the pig iron and 47.4% of the steel was produced in Ukraine. The latter also supplied 25.7% of the total electric power of the U.S.S.R. At the same time the manufacturing of machinery and metal products, because of the colonial status of Ukraine, was equal to only 17.2% and the production of textiles amounted to only 0.03% of that of the Union.

How and according to what plans will the economic development of Ukraine proceed after the end of the second World War? What will be the role of Ukraine in the economy of the U.S.S.R.? The new five-year plan for the years 1946-1950 gives the answer to these questions.

As is well known, even before the war, the economic policy of the Soviet Union was directed toward the intensive development of heavy industry in the eastern region of the U.S.S.R., i.e., in the region less

exposed to the new methods of warfare, mainly in the Ural-Kuznetsk area, this second coal and metallurgical base of the Soviet Union, which is spread over a large area from the Ural to the Enisey rivers. The basis of the Ural-Kuznetsk combination is the complementing of the iron ore of the Ural (Magnitka mountain) with the coal of the Kuznetsk and Karagandinsk basins. The industrialization of this region, started already in the thirties, has made an enormous progress. At the beginning of the war (1941) more than a thousand large factories were evacuated from Ukraine to Siberia and remained there after the end of the war. On the other hand, during the war many new factories were built with the help of the allies in this region.

The new five-year plan emphasizes the orientation on this eastern region. However, Ukraine, with its production of coal, pig iron, and steel, still occupies the second place. Nevertheless, according to the new plan, only 49.5 billion rubles or 19% of the total capital investment of the U.S.S.R. is assigned for the reconstruction of Ukraine while for that of the Ural and Siberia which, as is known, were not devastated by the war, 36 billion rubles are apportioned. And this is in spite of the fact that two waves of invasion passed over through Ukraine and almost entirely ruined her industry and agriculture. The material losses of Ukraine, not counting losses in life which are impossible to calculate, are equal to about 285 billion rubles (714 cities, 28,000 villages, more than 16,000 industrial establishments, 20,910 kolhozes, 872 sovhozes and 1,300 machine-tractor stations were destroyed).

The capital apportioned in the all-Union budget for the reconstruction of Ukraine does not correspond either to the importance of the Ukrainian economy in the economy of the U.S.S.R., or to the terrific ruin in which the war plunged this land.

When we compare the rate of the planned development of Ukraine with other parts of the U.S.S.R., we find it to be considerably slower. It is enough to mention that in 1950 the industrial production of the U.S.S.R. in monetary estimate will increase by 48% in comparison with the pre-war level, while that of Ukraine only by 15%.

During the new five-year plan the output of heavy industry in Ukraine on the whole does not increase, however, much in comparison with the pre-war level (Table 4).

TABLE 4.

Production of coal, pig iron, steel, electric energy and locomotives in Ukraine.

Name	Production		Increase (per cent)
	Plan in 1957	Production For 1950	
Coal (mil. tons)	77.6	86.1	10.9
Pig iron (mil. tons)	8.8	9.7	10.2
Steel (mil. tons)	8.4	8.8	4.8
Electric power (bill. kw.)	9.3	13.7	47.3
Locomotives (units)	880.0	1,200.0	13.6

The role of Ukraine in the production of basic materials of the U.S.S.R. still remains quite considerable (Table 5).

TABLE 5.

The place of Ukraine in the production of the U.S.S.R. (estimate of the new five-year plan for 1950).

Name	Total for U.S.S.R.	Total for Ukraine	Share of Ukra- ine in total of U.S.S.R.
Coal (mil. tons)	250.0	86.1	34.4
Oil (mil. tons)	35.4	0.3	0.9
Pig iron (mil. tons)	19.5	9.7	49.7
Steel (mil. tons)	25.4	8.8	34.6
Coke (mil. tons)	30.0	15.5	51.7
Locomotives (units)	2,200	1,000	45.5
Box cars (thousands)	146	55.5	38.0
Potassium salts (thousand tons)	800	448.0	56.0
Sugar (thousand tons)	2,400	1,637	68.2

Thus Ukraine as before will constitute a very important part in the production of basic materials for U.S.S.R. and will play a considerable role in the economy of the latter.

Scrutinizing the new five-year plan of the U.S.S.R., we notice that the character and the methods of development of the economy of Ukraine is entirely subordinated to that of Muscovy. The new five-year plan is a logical continuation of the policy of the Tsarist Russia for the econ-

omic exploitation of Ukraine on the part of Muscovy. The role of Ukraine is narrowed to that of producing and supplying cheap raw materials (coal, ores, pig iron, manganese) and agricultural products for Muscovy.

There is not the slightest indication of the development of a Ukraine as a special unit. Ukraine is forced to specialize in the production of only those kinds of raw materials which are necessary for the economy of the metropolis and prevented from establishing those branches of industry which would be necessary for the development of a complete Ukrainian economic life. As has been pointed out, the share of Ukraine in the production of metals before the war was more than 60% of the U.S.S.R. production, while the machine building industry formed only 17.2%. The factories for production of motors, turbines, automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, textile and precision machinery, radios and measuring instruments are concentrated predominantly in the Moscow industrial region.

Only the less important branches of the machine industry were present in Ukraine. The new five-year plan considers only the reconstruction of the destroyed machine plants. An exception is the automobile industry. It is planned to build a plant in Dniepro-Petrovsk with a capacity of 60,000 cars a year, and car assembly plants in Lviv and Odesa.

Not much place is devoted in the new five-year plan for the development of either the food or the light industries of Ukraine, in spite of the fact that the latter has considerable reserves of raw materials for them. The U.S.S.R. continues the old policy of restricting or entirely avoiding the reconstruction of light industry in Ukraine. For instance, in 1950 only 1,637 thousand tons of sugar will be produced in Ukraine, while before the revolution in good years this production was up to 2,500 thousand tons.

Three-quarters of the Ukrainian industries were concentrated in the left bank Ukraine where there is coal, ores and metals. The economically backward and agriculturally overpopulated right bank and western regions of Ukraine are very inadequately industrialized. Apart from a small number of sugar factories, alcohol producing plants, shoe, tobacco and some other factories that utilize mostly agricultural raw materials, there are no other industries or establishments. As in the former years, little attention is given in the new plan to the economic development of the right bank and western Ukraine. The Soviet government, being probably afraid of the separation of Ukraine, artificially maintains the economic backwardness of these regions. Except for establishing several new coal

mines, some larger factories in Lviv and a small number of local industrial plants, nothing will be done in the right bank and in western Ukraine.

Unfortunately the new five-year plan does not give any data for the grain production of Ukraine, although the sown area for Ukraine is fixed in 1950 as equal to 30.5 mil. ha. and the grain sown area to 19.6 mil. ha. The number of heads of cattle is estimated to be 12.2 million and that of hogs at 9.6 million heads.

It is difficult to compare these data with those before the war because in their computation the newly annexed territories of western Ukraine and Northern Bukovina are included. However, a preliminary computation shows that in the period of 1937 and 1950 the number of heads of cattle increases by 9.7% and that of hogs relatively even diminishes.

That the conditions of cattle raising in Ukraine are not bettered according to the new plan of 1950 is evident indirectly from the data on meat production. In 1950 there will be 6.1 kg. meat, 1 kg. butter and 2 kg. fish per person per year. For the whole U.S.S.R. the corresponding number will be 6.2 kg. meat, 1.3 kg. butter and 10.5 kg. fish. However, only 612 kg. grain and bean products for each inhabitant of the U.S.S.R. in 1950, or about a quarter less than in 1937, is planned.

There are no separate data for Ukraine in regard to the production of clothing and footwear. For the whole U.S.S.R. the norms of production per person for 1950 will be: cotton materials, 22.3 meters; woolen materials, 76 centimeters; footwear, 1.5 pairs, including rubbers, textile and sport footwear.

Thus the problem of the improvement of the living standard of the population of Ukraine is not solved by the new five-year plan. The living standard of the masses will not be better than in the pre-war years. The new five-year plan is based on the excessive exploitation of the population, and on its systematic undernourishment.

The colonial status of Ukraine in the system of the U.S.S.R. is markedly demonstrated in the relation of the budget of Ukraine to that of the All Union. As is known, the budget, especially in the socialized countries, gives an expression of the level of satisfaction of the social, cultural and economic needs of the population. The budget of Ukraine in 1937 formed 4.1%, and 10 years later—in 1947—it is only 3.8% of the budget of the U.S.S.R., while the population of Ukraine comprises about 18% of the total population of the Union.

It is apparent that the Ukrainian people, as up to the present, will be kept on a very low level not only politically and nationally, but culturally and economically as well.

Such are the estimates of the new five-year plan and such are the real perspectives which it projects for the national economy of Ukraine and its people. Undoubtedly such a situation will continue as long as Ukraine is occupied and oppressed, as long as it forms a part of the Soviet Union.

We firmly believe as did the traveler who visited Ukraine in the second half of the XIX century, that such a status must change: "There is not the slightest doubt that sometime the great body of the Russian Empire (now the U.S.S.R.—author) will fall apart and Ukraine will become a free and independent country. This time is approaching, slowly but inevitably. The Ukrainians are a nation with their own language, culture and historical tradition. Temporarily Ukraine was divided between her neighbors (in 1945 it was unified under the U.S.S.R.—author). But the material for the building of the Ukrainian State is ready: if not now, then tomorrow a builder will arise who will build from these materials a great and independent Ukrainian State." (Johann Georg Kohl, 1808-1878, *Die Ukraine—Kleinrussland*).

THE BASIC TRAITS OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

by Ivan Mirtchuk

The cultural influences at work for thousands of years since the Secondary Stone Age in Ukrainian territory have naturally left their traces: though the contribution of each has varied, they have combined to shape the spirit of the Ukrainian as we see it in all his actions and thoughts, in his whole conduct of life, or, to put it in general terms, in his view of the world. And when we pause to seek the basis of the specifically Ukrainian view of the world, our consciousness is suddenly flooded with the certainty that the spiritual life of the entire nation has its deepest source in an intimate relation to the soil, to Mother Earth.

The Ukrainians are a people of peasants. There is no question of that. Even a hasty review of the history of the Ukraine provides incontrovertible proof that it is not only an agricultural country to-day, but that it has been an agricultural country for hundreds, nay thousands, of years. This means that the population of these areas has always been in close touch with the soil and that this intimacy with Mother Earth is particularly characteristic of the entire Ukrainian peasantry even in our own days. This orientation of the inner man holds not only for one class, but for the entire nation; for the intelligentsia of to-day, the intellectual leaders of the people, have, in the main, sprung from the peasantry and the purely urban population, middle-class as well as laborers, is composed either of foreigners or of immigrants from the open country. The entire Ukrainian nation is to-day deeply rooted in its native soil, a circumstance which it regards as its most effective weapon, with the help of which it has managed not only to cling to the land given it by Fate, in spite of the numerous violent onslaughts by nomads both ancient and modern, but also cherishes no mean policy of expansion even in modern times. We find sufficient examples in the settlement of Siberia and other territory in the Far East, and the emigration of agricultural workers to Canada and the United States. It is self-evident that such an intimate connection with the soil for almost a thousand years makes itself felt in the spirit of the Ukrainian people. An extraordinarily

strong and organic dependence of man on the soil that he cultivates and that nourishes him is everywhere clearly reflected in language and literature, in habits and customs, in manifestations of religious life, in the cultural process, in music, art, and philosophy.

Taras Shevchenko, the intellectual leader of the Ukrainian people and the national poet, was indissolubly bound to the black soil of his home, *glebae adscriptus*, the son of a serf, for whom a ransom of 2500 rubles had first to be paid by friends before he was physically free from the chains that bound him to the earth. To free him spiritually from Mother Earth was an impossibility, for the poet's soul was so firmly rooted in his native soil, that to have severed it from its roots would have meant his spiritual death.

It is not merely striving for external effect, but a genuine symbol of the spiritual make-up of the Ukrainian people that its national poet, though no longer a serf but a feted artist and poet, welcome in the best society of the Russian capital, is mostly portrayed in peasant costume and is handed down to posterity in this guise. Shevchenko, as a poet, was the people itself, so that the external events in his life acquire a symbolic significance for the entire nation. Ivan Franko, the most eminent poet of Western Ukraine, also a man of the people, bears witness to the peasantry as the foundation of a new period in the development of man.

"I am a peasant—prologue, not epilogue."

Another prominent champion of intellectual life in Ukraine is Skovoroda, a philosopher who lived in the 18th century. He is the Ukrainian Socrates and is a product of his native country, intimately connected with his surroundings and his time. We would be puzzled by his work if it were viewed apart from his relation to the broad mass of the peasantry; the whole significance of his teaching and influence can only be grasped if we remember that he was in direct contact with those elements in Ukrainian intellectual life which were deeply rooted in and inspired by the Black Earth.

W. Lypynskyj, the Ukrainian historian and sociologist of to-day, sums up and evaluates this intimacy with the soil in his "Letters to my Brother Farmers" which appeared in 1921-22; he was the first to emphasize this essential feature of the national ideology and to make a militant peasantry the foundation and the pillar of the modern Ukrainian state.

We find an astonishingly simple, but profound synthesis of this entire peasant philosophy, the product of the soil, in "The Soil", a short, moving

story by Vasyl Stefanyk, a writer of the early part of this century; "Our destiny is the soil; forsake it and you are lost; cling to it and it will develop all your powers and draw out your very soul in the hollow of its hand; embrace it, subject yourself to it and it will suck the life-blood out of your veins—but in return, you have herds of sheep, and horses and full stock-yards; and for your strength it will give you a cabin full of children and grand-children whose laughter is like silver-bells and whose cheeks are red as the fruit of the snow-ball tree . . ."

The profound love of the Ukrainian for the beauties of Nature springs from: his connection with the soil, a love which seems to be firmly anchored in the depths of his soul. This aesthetic sense which is nurtured by natural forms, is reflected by the deep longing to express beauty of form, harmony of color and originality of theme in domestic surroundings, in dress or in the utensils of everyday life. Aesthetic, and not practical considerations always play the most important part, whether it be in the construction of a church, the planning of a garden round a cottage, the weaving of an apron or a kerchief, the making of a table or a bench.

It is obvious that the rich and valuable folk music and the no less rich and original folk poetry are also based on laws of aesthetic pleasure, derived from intimate intercourse with Nature and experience of her beauties.

The Ukrainian traditional and age-long contact with Nature is the tenacious bond between him and his culture and that of Western Europe, while at the same time it distinguishes him from the Muscovite, his neighbor in the north-east. The latter people never had any feeling for the soil; they regard agriculture not as an expression of love for Mother Earth, but as a necessity, or as a chance of making money. On the other hand, the Muscovites are the best traders among the Slavonic peoples. The real farmer, too firmly rooted in the earth and in his functions, who remains in the same place for generations, becomes too fixed in his habits and loses the mobility which is naturally the first essential quality of nomad peoples and which brings great advantages in trade.

The Ukrainian view of the world is based very definitely on idealism. The actions and resolutions of the Ukrainian are based not on objective reality as it confronts us, but on an ideal "reality" which contains many elements derived from imagination and fancy. Ukrainian history offers

us many examples of this. I quote only two prominent instances. Kostomarov, the Ukrainian historian, inspired by Messianic ideas, wrote a gospel of the Ukrainian people, proclaiming its destiny as a leader in the history of mankind. The aim of this work was to bring new strength to the oppressed nation and to give new content to its life which was founded on a very sad reality; it soared so high in the clouds of idealising speculation, and was so oblivious of actual facts, that it was scarcely possible to establish a connection between it and real life. While it may be maintained that a people cannot be solely guided by conditions of life here and now, that it cannot do without ideals, that on the contrary, development and progress are impossible without any inciting aim, even if it is beyond human grasp—nevertheless its efforts to rise must spring from its actual surroundings and not from the fantastic realm of the imagination.

Franko, in spite of the sad experience of his own life suffering, is also an idealist who believes in man, in his innate goodness, his love of beauty and moral conduct. All the characters in his books, even the worst of them, often display good traits, or at least traces of a positive attitude to life which suffice to keep the chances of improvement open. It is more than obvious that these characters are not bad by nature, but that they have degenerated under the influence of untoward circumstances. Some critics assert that it was only this belief in an idealized humanity, in the possibility of progress, that gave Franko the moral courage to carry on in spite of bitter disappointment, and to work like possessed one for the welfare of his people and its culture.

The Ukrainian tendency to idealize is also expressed in the relations to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealized and spiritualized form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness.

The sense for actual reality is almost completely hidden by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life—national heroines like Marusya Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom, like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction, like Shevchenko's Katerina, and finally prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned

plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages.

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece, philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness, as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality.

Here the Ukrainians, in contrast to the Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced any philosophic systems of their own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or as the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the rights of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of the will.

The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of the individuals and as such, is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society, in the Ukrainian "hromada", is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organization of the Zaporogghian Kozaks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty to-

wards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up the state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called the "mir", is diametrically opposed to this; it goes to the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency, as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this Divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is most favorable condition for the birth and development of every form of an absolute regime.

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the Slavophiles that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property: its preference for collectivistic forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshtshina". And the collectivistic experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that the collectivistic measures of the communists met with no important resistance in Russia proper, while the peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death for the principle of private property as the foundation of western culture, and, in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so.

If we wish to evaluate adequately the principles of the Ukrainian view of the world, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire

philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work.

Love plays a great part in all spheres of life in the Ukraine, though it is less connected with eroticism than in other countries; it is first and foremost the product or the accompaniment of the relation between mother and child. Maternal love, in all its possible manifestations, is one of the spiritual prisms through which most of the phenomena of public and private life are regarded and acquire their particular color. Love comprehends an enormous complex of motives which have found permanent expression in literature, art and music.

I do not intend to dwell on the manifestations of this emotion in daily life, but I should like to refer to Jurkevich, one of the few Ukrainian philosophers in the 19th century, for he gave his countrymen what may be called a philosophy of the heart, a system ruthlessly opposed to the materialism then in vogue and also to the almost mechanical rationalism and intellectualism.

In analysing the problems of contemporary philosophy, Jurkevich comes to the conclusion that a system of philosophy expressed in terms of the reason is quite incapable of including the entire and real human being. A certain modesty with regard to the limits of human knowledge is characteristic for Ukrainian philosophers. These limits are the result of the fact that human reason and its capacity of knowing the world hide another, more profound, function of the human spirit on which reason is based and which provides it with possibilities of development. This original function of the human spirit, which is fully acknowledged by Skovorda but mentioned by I. T. Stavrovetsky as early as the 17th century, is **the human heart**. The philosophy of the heart which Jurkevich has developed in his work on "The Heart and Its Im-

portance for the *Psychic Life of Man*" is the most characteristic feature of the transition from Platonism to recent philosophy; but it is directly opposed to Kant and his school.

I have deliberately dwelt on Jurkevich as a representative of Ukrainian philosophy, as his theory is doubtless influenced by certain characteristics typical for the Ukrainian view of life. One of Jurkevich's pupils, Vladimir Solovjov, later a famous Russian thinker, when writing of his teacher, rightly emphasizes the Ukrainian elements in his nature: "Jurkevich came from the Province of Poltava and was therefore a Ukrainian, a fact which left traces on his language and character."

Of course I do not mean to say that the Ukrainian does not fully appreciate the powers of thought, or that he is hostile to them. On the contrary, the intellectual representatives of the Ukrainian people, such as Drahomaniv and his school, or Lesya Ukrainka, are loyal adherents of rationalism and Ivan Franko bears on his banner the proud motto "ratio vincet". But if we study these men more carefully, we come to the conclusion that their rationalist views are a concession to the spirit of the times and are perhaps more in the nature of a mask which hides the emotion they are loath to admit than the decisive factor in their psychic make-up.

The peculiar character of Ukrainian intellectual life emerges most distinctly from a comparison with the fundamental features of the German psyche: "The peculiar character of German thought," Paul Menzer says in his book on the character of the German spirit, "may be best studied in German philosophy—a belief in system is inherent in it, the view that it must be possible to classify reality in a series of notions or conceptions". This naive belief in the omnipotence of the idea is most apparent in Christian Wolff who thinks it is possible to solve all questions of knowledge, action and feeling by means of the reason. The entire attitude to life is to be regulated by reason, all spontaneous decisions arrived at by impulse, are forbidden. There can be no doubt that life, conceived thus, must atrophy, but we must admit the great sweep of such a systematic experiment. In practice, Wolff's philosophy involved a pedantic training for the Germans but this has its good effects as confirmed by no less a man than Kant in his famous "Praise of the Spirit of Thoroughness". If we construct the direct opposite to the characteristics of the German spirit described by Menzer, we get the Ukrainian way of thinking; in place of exaggerated systematization a lack of all

system often replaced by the intuition of genius which, unconsciously, builds up on feelings; no thoroughness, no pondering and consequently restricted action, but, on the contrary, too great an expansion of the sphere of interest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, makes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

In connection herewith I shall merely touch on the third sphere of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on one another, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair.

The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is in the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasize the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of the modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of Romance peoples, in particular from the French, and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race. Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all the leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians, or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fanatic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let itself put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself.

In spite of this general, common background expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is

never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially, must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms, such as has become a plague with Russians, is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kiev State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kiev princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and the Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers, in a word, began to build that way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a role which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world—the Eastern conservative addition to religion, included many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilize every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and compels too much respect for the opinions of others for him to make diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses this attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words—*gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum*." Know thy self. According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to the Christ, and Hebrews alone, but also the pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, since it had many emin-

ent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

LITERATURE

- Paul Menzer: "Deutsche Philosophie als Ausdruck deutscher Seele", u Kantstudien Bd XXXIX, Heft 3-4. Berlin 1934.
- Iwan Neczuj Lewyckyj: Switohlad ukrajinskaho naroda. Lwiv 1878.
- O. R. (ylskyj): "K izuczeniju ukrainskaho narodnaho mirowozrenia." Kyjiw. Staryna. 1888, 11, 1890, 9-10, 1905, 4-5.
- O. Bulaszow: Kosmohiczeskyja wozzrenija ukrainskaho naroda. Kijiw 1908.
- Wolodymyr Antonowycz (Nyzenko): "Try nacionalni typy narodni". Prawda 1888r.
- Mykola Kostomariw: "Dwi ruski narodnasty". Ukrajinska nakladnia 183-184. Kyjiw—Leipzig.
- Czyzewskyj, D.: "Holowni rysy ukranjinskoho switohladu," w Ukrajinskij kulturi, Podiebrady 1940. Stor. 121-122.
- Mirtschuk, I.: "Die geistigen Merkmale des ukrainischen Volkes" im Handbuch der Ukraine, Leipzig 1941. Stor. 74-83.
- Paul Menzer: Das Wesen des deutschen Geistes. 1925.

PETER MOHYLA, ECCLESIASTIC AND EDUCATOR

1647-1647

by *Geo. W. Simpson*

Peter Mohyla was born on December 21 (31), 1596, and died on January 1 (11) 1647. He was one of five sons born to Simeon Mohyla, Hospodar of Moldavia. While the family of Mohyla originated in the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the chief center of Peter's activity was the ancient political and cultural capital of the Ukraine, Kiev. In the year of his birth there had been established the Uniate, or Greek-Catholic Church; in the year of his death the Ukraine was on the eve of one of the greatest upheavals in its history.

Between 1596 and 1647 Europe was passing through a particularly stormy period marked by Civil war in England, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the monarchical crisis in Russia, and the turbulent *Kozak* forays in Poland. The great religious passions of the Reformation period had not yet subsided while the play of dynastic ambitions was steadily rising. Out of the turmoil arose such men as Richelieu and Cromwell who left the imprint of their strong characters upon the political institutions of Western Europe. From the very centre of strife emerged the figure of Jan Amos Komensky, the protestant Czech exile, who gave a clear, steady light to the reformers of education in Northern Europe. As a contemporary of these men Peter Mohyla gave a decisive turn to the extremely mixed and contrary religious and educational currents which were running muddy and swift in Eastern Europe between the Polish Vistula and the Ukrainian Dnieper.

The religious situation in the great Polish-Lithuanian state had been characterized by the fact that in the east and south-east the population belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church while in the western Polish area the Roman Catholic faith was the accepted religion. In the beginning of the sixteenth century both churches were sadly in need of reform. The Protestant movement struck the Roman Catholic Church in Poland with such force that at one time its very foundations seemed threatened. However, the Counter-reformation, initiated chiefly by the Jesuit Order, ral-

lied to the protection of the ancient faith. The educational institutions established by the Jesuits, beginning in 1565, were particularly successful in building up the intellectual resources of the Church, in confirming loyalties, in training leaders, and in creating enthusiasm. Not only did the Roman Catholics recover ground from the Protestants but they began to press more vigorously against the Greek Orthodox Church, reviving the dream which indeed had never ceased to haunt their memories since the fateful schism of the Christian church in 1054. To bring back the Greek Orthodox Church into the papal fold seemed an ambition worthy of rulers, saints and priests alike.

Meanwhile the weakened Greek Orthodox Church among the Ukrainians was gaining some additional support from the energy and enterprise of a few nobles as well as from a guild type of organization which had grown up around the church. These organizations, supported by artisans and merchants, were known as Brotherhoods. The most notable of these was the Assumption Brotherhood in Lviv. Under the spur of rivalry this Brotherhood had established a printing press in 1574; and in 1586 they had founded a school where classical learning was taught.

A further challenge to Orthodox custom was incidentally thrown into the religious arena with the authorization by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 of a corrected calendar. It was the sort of issue which could seep into the lower levels of ignorance and prejudice and be used to influence decisions of real consequence.

In 1595 a rift in the Greek Orthodox Church within Poland occurred when the orthodox bishops negotiated an agreement with the Pope. According to this agreement the Orthodox were to adhere to Catholic dogma and belief and to recognize the headship of the Pope, while the latter was to permit the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) to retain their distinctive rite, language and customs. With the sanction of the Polish king a general Council was held at Brest Litovsk the following year attended by church and lay representatives to confirm the agreement. Rival feelings based on national as well as religious grounds were roused to a high pitch. Many of the Ukrainians opposed the move viewing the agreement as a Polish and Latin device for purposes of domination. Armed conflict was narrowly averted. The total result, however, was that the Polish government recognized the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church as an existent fact. Wherever possible the property of the Greek Orthodox Church was turned over to those ecclesiastical authorities adhering to the Uniate

Church. In some cases the local opposition was so strong that the Orthodox group retained possession. Nevertheless the demoralization of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland was very great and might have been catastrophic had it not been for the growing, tumultuous power of the Kozaks in the Dneiper area and the decisive character of Peter Mohyla.

The Kozak movement in the Dneiper area was in part a rugged frontier movement in which a unique organization of hunters, fighters and settlers kept extending a protective screen southward against the Tatar regions of the Crimea. It was in part a social movement of those fleeing from, or opposed to, the harsh conditions of serfdom, increasingly characteristic of Polish land-lordism. It was in part a political movement which began with attempts to secure advantage and easement with respect to the Polish authorities and ended with an increasing mass awareness of group separateness and consciousness of power. It was in part a revival of cultural life. Behind the protective and defiant Kozak screen cultural traditions were revived and Kiev again became a flourishing center.

Among the traditional institutions of culture the Greek Orthodox Church had played an important part. But now at the beginning of the seventeenth century the long years of neglect and the new Uniate movement threatened its extinction within the Polish Kingdom. The bishoprics, one by one passed into the hands of the Uniates until only a single bishopric remained. The strongest opposition showed itself in the province and city of Kiev. Because of the opposition of the Kozaks it proved impossible for the Uniates to take immediate possession of the offices and livings which officially had been transferred to them. Taking advantage of this protection a number of Greek Orthodox leaders hastened to Kiev in order to build up there the cultural defences of their church. Ecclesiastical and political opposition joined forces and secured short breathing spells. During this time significant steps were taken.

Under the energetic leadership of Pletenitsky the administration of the ancient Monastery of the Caves was reformed. A printing press was established and in 1616 brought out the first of its books. In the next fifteen years this press printed more books than had hitherto been printed in the entire Ukraine. In 1605 a Brotherhood was established with considerable funds at its disposal. In 1617 part of these funds was used to establish a school which met with immediate success.

The most urgent matter however, was the re-establishment of Orthodox hierarchy on a sound ecclesiastical basis. Metropolitan of Kiev Michael Rahoza joined the Uniate camp with all bishops except two (1596) and from this time on the Metropolitans of Kiev were Uniates. The orthodox hierarchy 1620 was limited only to one bishop of Lviv. It so happened that the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophan, was passing through Kiev in 1620. He was induced to ordain Boretsky, as Metropolitan, along with other Bishops, according to the correct procedure of the Greek Orthodox Church. So precarious was the situation in Poland, however, that only the Metropolitan Bishop could enter upon his duties and Theophan himself had to be escorted to the frontier by the Kozaks in order to ensure his safety. But until some recognition could be exacted from the Polish King the permanence of the arrangement would depend on the support of the Kozaks and the skill with which the ecclesiastical position in Kiev could be consolidated.

It was in this period that Peter Mohyla came to Kiev. Not a great deal is known regarding his youth and early education. As a member of an aristocratic family he had wide connections throughout Central Europe and he travelled freely. It is thought that he spent some time in study under outstanding teachers in Lviv. Later he went to Western Europe. He attended courses in the University in Paris and possibly spent some time in the University of Oxford. He went to Poland where he became fully acquainted with the Jesuit schools which had been established there. After serving for a short time in the Polish army he entered a monastery. When he arrived in Kiev he associated himself with the new Metropolitan, Job Boretsky. It was partly through the support of the latter that he became in 1627 Archimandrite, or Abbot-General, of the famous monastery of the Caves, rich in tradition and in material resources.

From now on Peter Mohyla began to gather into his hands directive power with respect to Church matters. He realized that he must defend his own position with energy and, if necessary, with force. He decided to uphold the traditional Greek Orthodox faith and Church organization. He was, however, under no illusions as to the power of the opposition embodied in the Uniate church backed by Polish king Sigismund. He knew that he could count on local Kozak force but this did not eliminate the necessity of careful diplomacy and at times of conciliatory action. He knew that only by uniting all the existing church resources, by es-

tablishing a broad basis of education, and by training a succession of leaders could the Orthodox Church be re-rooted as a strong institution. The lesson which the Catholic Church had learned from the Jesuits in Poland was now to be employed against that Church in the Eastern Ukraine.

Peter Mohyla lost no time in accelerating the printing activity already being done under the auspices of his monastery. He gave immediate attention to the school which had been established by the Brotherhood in 1617. When some of its leaders opposed his intervention he proposed to start a school of his own. The leaders quickly compromised with the result that in 1631 Mohyla was able to take over the school and transform it into a College. It was provided with ample revenues. A program of studies was elaborated and outstanding teachers were recruited. Soon students began to flock to this new Eastern center of learning.

In April 1632, the Polish king, Sigismund Augustus, died. His successor, Vladislav IV, was willing to make concessions to his Orthodox subjects. They were given the right to practice their faith, establish schools and build churches. The Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev was officially recognized as head of the Orthodox church in the Ukraine, and the Cathedral of Saint Sophia along with the Monastery of the Caves were allotted to him. In addition to the Bishopric of Kiev three other orthodox bishoprics were officially recognized. Thus after thirty-six years of violent controversy the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland emerged considerably diminished but nevertheless officially intact. For the Ukrainian people this was indeed a fateful outcome.

In 1633 Peter Mohyla was elected Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev and his election was duly recognized by the King. The new Metropolitan now devoted his entire energy to his work as ecclesiastic and educator.

In connection with his administration of the Church he reminds one of his English contemporary, William Laud, who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1633, the same year that Mohyla was elevated to his high office. Both men sought to reform, to repair, and to discipline after a prolonged period of neglect, controversy and doubtful practice. Mohyla created a special office to supervise the clergy and he also established an ecclesiastical court of justice. Gradually he restored discipline and revived confidence. For better or for worse the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland regained a balance of power.

It is, however, as an educator that Mohyla is chiefly remembered. In

addition to the College at Kiev he established a similar institution at Vinnitsa in 1634 and another at Kamenets in 1636. The College provided for a seven, or eight, year course. The greatest attention was paid to language studies. Latin occupied the leading place both as an object of study and as the language of instruction. Polish was also taught. Limited attention was paid to Greek, although Mohyla himself frequently used that language for writing. A certain amount of time was spent on the Church Slavonic. It was particularly unfortunate that the contemporary, living speech of the Ukrainians was neglected by Mohyla at a time when in Western Europe the vernacular languages were being moulded into instruments of fine literary expressions, and in the Ukraine itself popular speech was vigorously developing. Hence the College studies in rhetoric and dialectic tended to develop an artificial flamboyancy. Nevertheless the rigorous training in the classics did put the scholars in touch with western learning and tradition and gave to Kiev scholarship a distinction which it maintained for over a century. In addition to language study there was also the study of philosophy and theology. Altogether the instruction at the College was the sort of study deemed suitable for the training of Churchmen, Diplomats and Secretaries, and for those who mixed in the higher ranks of society.

Along with direct instruction Mohyla encouraged publishing and printing. A great number of text books and theological treatises were produced for the use of his students. Among these perhaps the most notable was the "Lives of Local Saints" published in 1635 and throughout all Orthodox lands.

Like most brilliant leaders Mohyla was successful also in attracting a group of outstanding scholars and collaborators and in training a further group of exceptional pupils. The imperious Metropolitan, nevertheless, dominated the College which he established; so much so, that it became known as the Mohyla College. When he died in 1647 the institution had laid down in spite of the political upheaval which followed.

In the place where this article is being written, in the center of the great Canadian prairies, there is a Mohyla Institute. So great is the shadow of a powerful man, that exactly three hundred years after his death, in a continent which to him was unknown and in an area which in his day was still unexplored his name is now held in reverence and high esteem.

It is somewhat beyond the scope of this article to indicate the immense

influence which Ukrainian scholars from Kiev had on Moscow intellectual life after the period when the eastern part of the Ukraine became politically linked up with Muscovy. It is also beyond our scope to examine the decline of the Kiev Academy (as the Mohyla College was later called) in the middle of the eighteenth century. Divorced from the life of a people already sinking into political and social servitude it gradually withered away.

One may, however, conclude with a sort of political footnote. Peter Mohyla was first of all an ecclesiastic. His educational activity served his dominant interest. He was not a born Ukrainian. He skilfully made use however, of the political situation. So long as the political life was vigorous there was parallel activity in the Church and the Academy. This was evident not only in Mohyla's life time but equally evident in the Mazepan period.

If one may draw a conclusion it is that the cultural life of a people is not something divided into separated sections but in periods of vigor it manifests itself in every direction and is endlessly intertwined. Furthermore if church and educational institutions are to survive they must be rooted not only in fundamental principles but also deep in the lives, language and experiences of the great mass of people whom they serve.

THE UKRAINIAN THEATER AS A POLITICAL FACTOR

by C. H. Andrusyshen

No nation has owed its preservation to the various forms of its literary art so much as has Ukraine. In the blackest hours of serfdom, persecution, her entire people sought refuge in the songs and poetry which seemed to rise out of their hearts extemporaneously. Kotlyarevsky revealed to them the beauty and melody of the Ukrainian language; Shevchenko inspired it with his prophetic fervor, and Franko made it a medium whereby Shevchenko's idealism might become a reality, flowering in peace, freedom and happiness after centuries of toil and struggle. Without the benefit of the theater, however, their efforts would have been much more difficult and their influence less pronounced. To use a metaphor, Kotlyarevsky plowed the field, Shevchenko sowed it, and Franko harrowed it; but it was the Ukrainian drama which, although humble in itself, proved like a soft rain that fell on the literary field of Ukraine to make the seed grow. It was only natural for that theater to have played such an important role, for from its very beginning it was distinguished by its ethnographic aspect. In it the Ukrainian peasant saw his entire existence mirrored, and was therefore drawn to it as to a lodestar. Since it was accessible to more people than were the works of the literary stalwarts, and since it was made of the stuff that could thrive under the most unfavorable conditions, it is no wonder that its lowly condition, made itself felt so potently throughout the entire land.

Its origins and initial development are analogous to similar periods of the European drama:— interludes, moralities, miracle plays with their attendant personifications of abstract ideas and phenomena, and with their endless allegorical conduct. At first, as in all Western Europe, these dramatic pieces were an extension of the liturgy, an illustration of the spiritual values involved in the liturgical drama; and their moralizing biblical and apocryphal characters were invariably Christ, Mary, and the saints, with the fiend playing the villain and being continually discomfited for the general merriment of the naive and gaping audience.

In time the religious theater left the sacred precincts to become an asset to the schools and academies affiliated with it. There, those pieces continued to preserve their religious character, but they were subjected more and more to the popular needs and requirements. Under that influence they gradually became secularized. The dramatic forms — miracles, moralities, allegories, interludes — remained, but their elements became less rigid and more prone to allow more than an ordinary admixture of profane elements, as is evident in the case of the scholastic (academic) dramas which flourished especially at the time when Poland ruled over that part of Ukraine which lies to the west of the Dnieper.

The scholastic drama was fostered both in the Jesuit colleges scattered throughout Ukraine and in the schools attached to the Orthodox churches. The former used it as a vehicle for spreading Catholicism as well as Polish political propaganda among the Ukrainians. The Orthodox schools reacted against this manner of political activity. Whereas the "Jesuit" plays were written in Polish with a marked tendency to serve the interests of Poland, the "Orthodox" plays extolled the Kozak movement which stood as a bulwark against the Polish advance. Thus it was that the theater became not only a moralizing and educational medium, but also a political factor in the growth of Ukrainian nationhood.

With the major exception of the "Jesuit" drama, which was written in Polish, the strength of the Ukrainian theater lay in its popular speech. Considered lowly and coarse, and suited only for the humble and ludicrous themes of the peasantry, it none the less proved a powerful factor in irrevocably cementing the foundations of the national character of the Ukrainian people. On the strength of the popular speech which it employed, the Ukrainian drama exerted a patriotic pressure on the minds of the receptive multitude long before the advent of Kotlyarevsky and his school.

The beginning of Ukrainian drama dates back to 1619, in which year two interludes, written in Ukrainian, were presented at a fair in the town of Kaminka-Strumilova. These were given between the acts of a Polish tragedy dealing with the beheading of St. John the Baptist. There had been, to be sure, other Ukrainian interludes written previously, but these two are the first which a historian or a student of Ukrainian literature can find in extant texts. Their documentation, however, is meager, and affords us precious little knowledge about the birth of Ukrainian drama.

Perhaps the most important piece in the seventeenth century was Christ's storming of hell, a fine representation of the miracle category. This play as yet gives no indication of the impending transformation of the theater into the secular order. That evidence is shown, however, in the plays of Danilo Tuptalo (1651-1709) who wrote under the pseudonym of Dmitro Rostovsky. His originality consisted in incorporating the secular scenes of the interludes into the serious drama, and thus intermingling the ludicrous with the serious. That example was followed by Theophan Prokopovich (1680-1741), the theoretician of the pseudo-classical trend of Ukrainian drama in his times. This high prelate at the court of Peter I was also a successful dramatist, and is now known chiefly as the author of the play about Prince Volodimir of Kiev, which was the first drama in Ukrainian literature the theme of which was not borrowed from the Bible or from the Lives of the Saints, but was based on a historical episode.

The political events of the eighteenth century had great influence on the drama, particularly in effecting its transition to the secular sphere. This current is quite noticeable in the tragi-comedy entitled "The Grace of God, Which Through Bohdan Zinovius Khmel'nitsky, the Renowned Hetman of the Zaporoggian Troops, Had Saved Ukraine from the Intolerable Injuries of the Lyakhs" (1728). Three characteristics distinguish this play from those written and presented up to that time: its genuine patriotism, its democratic spirit, and its close approach to the popular speech. The chief *dramatis persona* is the personification of Ukraine itself in all the glory of her strivings for a life of freedom and independence.

Then tendency of the Ukrainian playwrights of the eighteenth century, such as G. Konisky and I. Nekrashevich, to have their characters employ the speech of the common people, prepared the way for the renaissance of Ukrainian literature at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Their successful attempts to liberate the drama from the spiritual restrictions and gradually to emphasize the satirical element, made it easier for Kotlyarevsky to give fresh impetus to the Ukrainian comedy and melodrama with his *Natalka-Poltavka* (1819).

The development of Ukrainian drama now differs at this point from that of Western Europe by the regrettable fact that while in the rest of Europe the academic drama evolved into a serious literary form, in Ukraine it "degenerated" into comedy at the peasant level. Since

Ukraine was devoid at that time of a nobility and lacking an imperial court, the "noble" drama was not even to be thought of, since it had no lofty stratum of society upon which to base itself. The only base was the peasantry. It was for that reason that Ukrainian drama followed, so to say, the rustic trend.

Being "rural" in character, the Ukrainian theater was inspired by the two vital characteristics of the peasant: — stubbornness and tenacity. It needed both in a high degree, for shortly after the battle of Poltava, Peter I, and later Catherine II, forbade all publication of books in the Ukrainian language, except church missals and religious tracts. Simultaneously began a persecution of the theater. But even when scholastic plays were discontinued at the Academy of Kiev, no sense of loss was felt, because by the middle of the eighteenth century the scholastic theater was completely outmoded by its secular successor. No amount of repression could destroy the lively, satiric comedy whose possession of the popular imagination was so irrepressible.

Another factor working to save the Ukrainian theater from annihilation in the second half of the eighteenth century was the *Vertep* (Cave), a representation of Christ's nativity in an encased miniature stage surmounted by a star. It was simply a variant of the marionette theater and could be carried around and displayed especially at Christmas time. Besides the usual angelic, human and animal figures connected with Christ's birth, marionettes representing popular types were added, such as an old man and woman, a gypsy, a Pole, a Jew and his wife, the devil himself, and a kozak whose dealings with a female tavernkeeper furnished one of the comical reliefs of the performance. The kozak, to be sure, was the most important character of all in the *Vertep*, since he was presented as the defender of the poor, the protector of the persecuted, a bold and powerful warrior in the struggle for truth, justice and freedom for his people. In view of these added characters, the nativity theme itself became a mere pretext, and its subject matter became secondary to the secular matter which usurped its place of prominence. The setting of the *Vertep* was religious, but the content of its drama was quite worldly, and at times even naturalistic. Often this **Punch and Judy** was extended into a regular play in which real people took the place of the dolls. But in whatever manner it was presented, its satiric verses and dialogues continued to thrive in spite of the strictest prohibition. It was mainly through the process of change which the scholastic drama under-

went in the *Vertop* that the secular drama evolved.

The "theater of the serfs" was likewise a secular institution. It was an importation from Russia; and, being stagnant, had only an insignificant influence on the free theater. It was maintained by some of the greater landowners for their own entertainment and that of their friends; and in some cases provided for them an easy and cheap means of practicing prostitution.

Kharkiv was the first Ukrainian city to boast of a permanent theatrical group (1789). Kiev had to wait fifteen years longer for a building to house its theater (1803), and Poltava several years more. The latter center proved the most important in the first half of the nineteenth century, because it was there that Kotlyarevsky, "the father of the Ukrainian literary renaissance", gave the drama a new impetus and direction, chiefly by means of his *Natalka-Poltavka*. This he wrote at the instance of his friends, especially Prince Repnin, in order to destroy the influence of the inane, utterly ridiculous, sentimental and wholly unaesthetic musical comedy, *The Kozak Poetaster*, written by one Shakhovsky in a macaronic Slavic which could not but jar the ears of the reformers grouped around the Poltava theater. Shakhovsky's vaudeville was altogether overwhelmed by *Natalka-Poltavka* in which the sentimental influence of the contemporary Italian and French theaters is only slightly less in evidence than in the "Poetaster". Its strength, however, lay in the fact that it was written in the language of the people, except in the case of the one character whose official capacity makes him use a Ukrainian adulterated with Russianisms. The play is profusely interspersed with popular songs and dances, and so falls into the category of an operetta. Kotlyarevsky's second musical comedy was *Moskal Charivnyk* ("The Wonder-Working Moskal"). It is a primitive, ludicrous piece which Vasyl Hohol, Mikola's father, reworked to a greater advantage for the Ukrainian theater, and renamed *Prostak* ("Simpleton"). The improvement is so great that the elder Hohol's work is considered by many as the first genuinely serious Ukrainian comedy.

Other writers whose plays served to strengthen the secular theater were H. Kvitka-Osnovianenko and Taras Shevchenko. The former, the author of *Marusia* and the well-known director of the Kharkiv theater, wrote, among other pieces, the comedy *Svatanya na Honcharivtsi* ("Love Suit at Honcharivka"), a comedy very similar in content, resources and effects to *Natalka-Poltavka*.

Shevchenko's only play *Nazar Stodolya* is a serious drama based on a Kozak theme. It is realistically developed and still remains vital on account of the poet's fine delineation of some of its characters, especially that of the old kozak type Hnat Kary. In these two respects Shevchenko's play surpasses by far Kostomarov's historical plays written earlier, and served as a pattern for later dramatic pieces of a historical nature. Neither is there in it so much saccharine sentimentality as prevailed in other Ukrainian plays of the period. All in all, Shevchenko's drama was the best written up to that time.

In the first half of the nineteenth century professional actors were gradually bringing their influence to bear on the drama. The two greatest of these were M. Schepkin and K. Solenik. Although the latter was a better actor, the former exerted greater influence; and it was chiefly through his efforts that the Ukrainian theater eventually became free of the sing-song recitative manner, of the hyperbolic histrionism and artificiality of movements and actions, which all made the actor and his art appear baroque indeed. And yet, this style of interpretation was so ingrained that it was only in Kropivnitsky's time that the lingering vestiges of excessive histrionism, artificiality and sentimentalism were attacked and finally sent to oblivion.

The life of an actor in those times was quite unenviable. In order to gain a tolerable livelihood, he was forced to take to the road, move from town to town under most adverse conditions, and to depend wholly on the good will of the rural communities, and especially the peasants who gathered at town fairs. Many a time the auditorium was a large stable, in which the people were divided from the beasts by a cloth partition through which the mooing, neighing, bleating, and other animal sounds unhappily mingled with the declamations of the actors, and even amid most tragic moments created a regrettable comic interlude. On such a basis therefore the actor's security was almost negligible. There was a keenly felt lack of native repertory, and the actors had to depend on Russian plays and on translations into Russian of other foreign plays. If one considers that Ukrainian audiences were indifferent to plays in a language not their own, and that the actors were practically forced to present Russian plays, one cannot but well imagine their plight. An analogous condition prevailed in Western Ukraine (Galicia) where Polish and German were the languages which all but stifled the drama in Ukrainian, whose beginnings were dependent on the halting fortunes of the the-

spians of the Dnieper region.

Here, in spite of these negative omens, the golden age of the Ukrainian theater was already in the bud. In Kiev, the well-to-do Mikhaylo Staritsky was expending his time, energy, fortune, literary and dramatic talent towards furthering the development of the native theater. This Maecenas can hardly be considered original, however. As a director and actor he belonged to the old declamatory school, and was enamoured of the melodramatic, ornate, and sentimental. Almost every play, which he remodelled from older dramatic texts, he interwove with popular songs, choral interludes and folk dances. For that purpose he formed in Kiev a permanent dramatic and choral company for which he engaged the services of the foremost Ukrainian composer Mikola Lysenko with whom he formed a friendship similar to that of Gilbert and Sullivan. Their common products proved both impressive and popular, especially *Rizdvyana Nich* ("Christmas Eve") and *Chornomortsy* ("Black Sea Rovers"). Later, however, Staritsky, as did Kropivnitsky throughout his career, allowed the musical side of the drama only a secondary role. That change is evident in his drama *Ne Sudylos'* ("It Was Not Fated" in which the social import predominates over the musical and the histrionic.

In 1876 a tsarist *ukaz* prohibited the publication of all books in the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian literature became a martyr, but it did not cease to exist: it was nurtured and supported by its own offspring—the drama, which had by that time become such a sturdy and well-rooted growth that no *ukaz*, however tsarist, could destroy it. The printed word was obliterated, but the uttered word resounded from one end of the country to the other. The entire Ukraine became a stage from which the artists bore witness to the deathless spirit of the Ukrainian genius. It was precisely at that time of persecution and stress that the Ukrainian stage became a mighty fortress of culture, a vital means of national existence. And its coryphaei were Staritsky, Kropivnitsky, the three Tobilevich brothers (who worked under the pseudonyms Karpenko-Kary, Sadovsky, and Saksahansky), such actors as Maria Zankovetska, and a host of others whom the Ukrainian public considered as the torch-bearers of freedom and general enlightenment. It was, in fact, the dramatists and actors who, in the second half of the nineteenth century, became the

leaders of the Ukrainian nation.

To realize what these leaders had to contend with, even in times of relatively normal conditions of censorship, one has but to remember that

even translations of the ancient Greek dramatists, of Moliere, Shakes-prepare, Schiller, as well as each new play had to pass through a severe Russian censorship, the process of which in many instances was protracted to several years' duration. Even the most innocent plays of a thoroughly ethnographic character were subjected, comparatively speaking, to excruciating Star Chamber methods. At times when the Ukrainian repertory suffered for lack of normal expansion, this determined effort on the part of the enemies of the Ukrainian theater proved well-nigh annihilating. There were even efforts to do bodily injury to the actors, attempts to dispose of them altogether, as happened when the background decoration fell on Kropivnitsky, not at all accidentally, and knocked him unconscious. So great was the martyrdom of the Ukrainian theater that Sadovsky in later years selected a crown of long spiked thorns as an emblem of his troupe.

Even under fairly tolerable conditions the Ukrainian theater was restricted to the ethnographic category, and portrayed, with but rare exceptions, the life of the village folk. It is true that on many occasions that life assumed tragic proportions; yet it remained on a lowly level, with hardly an opportunity to evolve out of its sheer provincialism into a higher social sphere. The repressive measures caused it further to lag in the backwoods of humanity. The language itself, as was the case in Ukrainian literature in general, was likewise restricted to commonplace matters, and in plays of the period was spoken only by those characters who represented the peasants and menials, because the language was thought fit to express only mean sentiments, coarse feelings and low merriment. Characters of higher categories, expressing "noble" and serious sentiments, spoke Russian. This, in a way, was somewhat realistic, because the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century bore the stamp of the Russian influence so deeply, that a Ukrainian landowner or a city dweller could rarely be found who knew Ukrainian. Even among the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement there were many who spoke Ukrainian only with the common people, especially when jesting, and Russian with their equals or superiors, even when the latter were their countrymen.

Yet, this drama, wrapped, so to say, in ordinary workaday apparel, proved a powerful means of instilling into that high society the sense of belonging to the Ukrainian race. In the ethnographic beauty of a simple life, in the vivid manners and customs, in the melody of the language, in

comic, the aristocrats and the landed gentry felt something innate, something very close to their hearts. The living work uttered from the Ukrainian stage gradually melted the crust of their indifference to their racial origin, or fanned the spark of any warmth that yet remained in them towards their native land into an ever increasing flame of enthusiasm. If one bears in mind that in spite of oppression and persecution, there were towards the close of the last century, some seventy-five travelling theatrical groups in Ukraine, their collective influence on the minds of the general public may well be imagined.

Following the Kotlyarevsky period, a new impetus to Ukrainian drama was given by Mikhaylo Staritsky (1840-1904) who, as director of the first theatrical organization in Ukraine, enriched its repertory by about thirty plays, which he, in the main, borrowed from other sources and rewrote to suit his melodramatic and romantic mood. Staritsky was especially fond of historical drama, of which his two outstanding pieces are *Oborona Bushi* ("The Defence of Busha") and *Marusia Bohustavka*. A play which became a perennial with Ukrainian audiences is *Oy ne khody Hritsyu* ("Beware of Deception, Hritz") Its plot is as simple as it is tragic: Hritz loves Marusia, but later falls in love with another; after vain attempts to win him back, the thwarted maiden poisons him. In spite of its triteness it has two qualities that make it one of the most popular plays: its intense love element and its vivid local color.

Staritsky was not a first rate dramatist. In his plays one monotonously finds the same traditional decor and milieu with detailed manners and customs predominating over the artistry of composition and dialogue. In the main, however, it was he who, by expending goodly sums of money from his own funds, and by whatever talent he possessed in playwriting or in the capacity of a *regisseur*, maintained in Kiev a choral-dramatic group which was an example for other centers to follow and use as a model. Later on, better groups were formed, but none equaled Staritsky's in that influence that was so much needed when Ukrainian drama was in its infancy subjected to all manner of malevolence and abuse from the seats of the inimical mighty.

Marko Kropivnitsky (1841-1910) was both an excellent playwright and an outstanding actor. His dramas, like Staritsky's, are noted chiefly for their ethnographic content for they depict contemporary manners and customs as well as those in the period of serfdom. In the plays relating to both these periods he vividly presents the life of peasants and serfs in

the songs and dances presented by the Ukrainian drama, both serious and the clutches of greedy and cruel lords, the license and immorality of the upper classes, their abuse of the less fortunate ones, and especially their violation of a peasant girl's honor. In his *Hlitay abozh Pavuk* ("The Bloodsucking Spider") he presents a new slave driver in the type of a peasant who had grown rich after the abolition of serfdom had freed the serf from the cruel lord and exposed him to the tender mercies of the greedy, grasping and unscrupulous parvenu. This type was simultaneously developed by Karpenko-Kary (Ivan Tobilevich).

In most of Kropivnitsky's plays one notes that his greatest characteristic is the knack of observing and seizing the smallest detail of a given episode and making it stand out to artistic advantage in the expansion of his scenes. In spite of this asset his dramas lack continuity and wholeness, because he devotes more attention to the individual scenes, which he develops almost to perfection. But while individual episodes are well fashioned, they are in many instances hardly related to each other, so that the linking texture of the whole appears loose indeed. To use a comparison, his scenes are like roses rising individually out of the ground instead of growing on a rose bush.

Of this trinity Ivan Tobilevich (Karpenko-Kary) (1845-1907) surpasses the other two by the power of his literary talent and by the originality of his subjects. The drama of manners and customs has but an insignificant or, at most, a secondary place in his repertory. Instead, he is interested in the social problems which arise out of the new post-serfdom conditions, which Tobilevich seeks to analyze, and the problems of which he seeks to solve. Being to a large degree tendentious, his plays may well be placed in the category of *drame à thèse*. Tobilevich is likewise more realistic than any of his contemporaries, especially in presenting the new conditions of existence created by the appearance of the bloodsucking peasant capitalist who is bent on exploiting his former fellow-beings, now his hirelings, on whose misery he grows in wealth and luxury. By means of lies, embezzlement, and exploitation, the "bloodsucking spider" continues mercilessly and egotistically on his way to self-aggrandisement; and in the pursuit of personal happiness he unscrupulously tramples on all and sundry who stand on his way to it. "On the misfortune of the one rises the fortune of the other," says Tobilevich; or, to apply a fine Ukrainian saying, "the chicken had to die to make good cheer for the wedding guests." In this world of primitive materialism, where everybody seeks

to snatch as much as possible by good means or foul, all things have a money value, including intelligence, honor, law, and conscience. These and other virtues are respected only insofar as one is able to translate them into hard cash and material profit.

This inexorably parasitic type embodying these characteristics appears in practically all of Tobilevich's plays except a few, among them — *Pomād Dniprom* ("Along the Dnieper"). Here, a new type is drawn — an educated peasant who, although possessing the means of exploiting his less fortunate fellows, refrains from taking that advantage; instead, he employs his knowledge and talents to enlighten his benighted countrymen. With that end in view, he instructs them how best to cope with the misery and injustice besetting them. Tobilevich's former chief characters were men without a heart, here, he finally finds and portrays a man with bowels of compassion for the common people, with principles of morality, in short, with a conscience.

Tobilevich's dramas are rife with problems of a social and psychological nature. Such dramas, if they are to ring sincere, must of necessity have strong characters who are able by the sheer force of their will or intellect to solve those social problems. These types are quite well developed by Tobilevich who, in addition to this mastery, possesses a sense of dramatic composition. His method is to develop his scene around a single psychological center, each scene tending towards it with an ever increasing intensity. In this he is unlike Kropivnitsky, whose dramas are lax in composition, or to Staritsky whose melodramatic and sentimental pieces do not call for strong characters or for a strict adherence to the sense of proportion or verisimilitude.

Among the lesser dramatists the chief are Boris Hrinchenko and Volodymir Samiylenko. Their talents, however, were greater in other fields of literary endeavor. In drama they are minor. Minor in drama is likewise the otherwise great writer, Ivan Franko, whose *Uchitel'* ("The Schoolmaster") and *Ukradene Stchastya* ("The Stolen Happiness"), in spite of their obvious limitations, nevertheless proved a highly vital transfusion into the anemic body of the drama in Western Ukraine, which continued to lag behind her *alma mater* in the Dnieper basin. In the Dniester region popular theater was being readily fostered by "Prosvita" as a part of its movement of general enlightenment, and by its rapidly increasing affiliates throughout the land, each of which became a center of adult education and used the theater as a means of furthering that end.

The psychological element in Ukrainian theater instilled by Tobilevich into his dramas, increased under the influence of such foreign dramatists as Hauptmann, Schnitzler, Chekhov, and Ibsen. Later, the symbolism of Maeterlinck, and Verhaeren's drama of sociological import made itself felt when the more westernized minds in Ukraine demanded a drama of mood in which they might see the inner workings of the human mind. Under pressure from all quarters, each demanding that the theater conform to this or that facet of intellect, the actor lost his previous importance and became merely an instrument, a tool of the regisseur whose main purpose was to interpret, by means of his actors, the thesis posed by the dramatist. In other words, as Professor D. Antonovich suggests, "literature had thus gained mastery over the theater."

The theater of mood has as its chief representative Lesia Ukrainka whose plays are so filled with erudition that it is almost impossible to stage them with success. They are thoroughly modern in spirit, although their scenes are antique in setting and date back to the times of ancient Egypt, Babylon, Greece, Rome, or to the later periods of European or Asiatic history. All her plays Lesia Ukrainka presents in their true historical setting, but the breath which enlivens both the characters and the surroundings in which they move, is modern in the sense that she makes the psychological and social problems posed in them conform to the similar problems obtaining in her own day. In some plays she even grafts modern problems on the lives of the ancient peoples. The poetic form in which she couches their philosophy makes them, in a sense, poems in dialogue poems rather than dramas as such.

Symbolic drama was cultivated by Oleh Oles' who is noted more for his lyrical than dramatic flights. The latter, however, are above the average. His pieces remind one of the allegorical types of the Middle Ages, but are, of course, on a higher intellectual level. This manner of drama becomes at times psychological or sociological in character, while preserving its symbolic semblance. As such, it found its retainers in Hnat Khotkevich and Spiridon Cherkasenko.

The greatest of the Ukrainian dramatists of the present century is Volodimir Vinnichenko, equally well known as a writer of naturalistic novels. As sociological essays, his plays may well be compared with the world's greatest of that type. In some of them Vinnichenko, perhaps too rashly, attempts to solve the "problem" of sex relations. In this respect his dramas serve only as a complement to his novels, in which he, as an inveter-

ate socialist, attempts to invent a morality that is to take the place of the old capitalistic conventionalized moral code. Here, most surely, Vin-nichenko "overleaps and falls on the other," for in his zeal he rejects all traditional morality and boldly proposes the spectacle of free love. This raw theory prevailed only for a very short period in Ukrainian literature. Socialism, and even Communism, rejected that conception as exaggerated and detrimental to the well-being of society.

Considering the Ukrainian theater as a whole, in all its spiritual and secular aspects, one cannot but arrive at a conclusion that it proved a political factor in the life of the Ukrainian people. Again to quote Professor Antonovich, "in Ukraine the theater has never been considered merely as a form of art: it has always been a means of popular movement, a national weapon in the struggle with the enemies of Ukrainian culture and nationality." For that reason the Ukrainian theater was exposed to continual danger from those to whom its development spelled a curtailment of their imperialistic expansion at the expense of the Ukrainian people whose ethnic progress it fostered. For over three hundred years (ever since 1619, when two Ukrainian interludes were given between the acts of a Polish play) the Ukrainian theater was the butt of an ugly reaction; and yet, it remained a sturdy offshoot of the Ukrainian genius which no blight or storm could destroy. Compared with the drama of Western Europe, it appears, to use a colloquial expression, like its poor relative. One would seek in it in vain for the breadth and power which inspirited the drama of the western nations. No Shakespeare, Racine, Lope, Ibsen, Shaw, or Maeterlinck appeared to woo the Ukrainian Melpomene. She remained lowly throughout the centuries of her existence. As art, the Ukrainian drama cannot be placed on the level of the all-European dramatic productions. In appeal it is not universal, because its themes, with but rare and only recent exceptions, are ethnographic in nature, with local color and regionalistic manners and customs predominating. And yet, in spite of its frequent simplicity, sentimentality, naiveness and rusticity, it nevertheless proved a rampart of granite against the onslaughts of the forces of injustice, oppression and persecution. Its chief purpose was to preserve and maintain the spirit of Ukrainian nationhood. In that task the Ukrainian theater rose to the emergency and revealed itself ample in its ability to foster the material and spiritual culture of the people it served.

THE BEGINNINGS OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

by Nicholas D. Chubaty

In the summer of 1946 there appeared in the world press excerpts from the statement of Mikita Khrustchov, who at that time was still General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine, regarding the purge in Ukraine. This involved not only the administrative apparatus and that of the Party, but likewise the ranks of Ukrainian scientists and writers. M. Khrustchov brought the serious charge against the Ukrainian men of learning:—that they had “become infected with the nationalistic and bourgeois opinions of Mikhaylo Hrushevsky.”

The ideas of Professor M. Hrushevsky, the greatest historian of Ukraine and the author of a ten-volume history of his nation, were closer to socialistic doctrine than to the national or bourgeois standpoint. He died thirteen years ago in exile, after the Bolsheviks had forced him out of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, which they had at that time begun to Russianize and transform into an instrument of Russian domination over Ukraine. When Khrustchov termed Hrushevsky's point of view nationalistic and bourgeois, he did so for the same reasons that the Bolsheviks to-day brand as fascist the democratic elements of the Anglo-Saxon world. Why then are the historical views of M. Hrushevsky so dangerous to the Russian Bolsheviks that they persecute them even thirteen years after the death of their author?

The scholarly views of M. Hrushevsky are dangerous to the Kremlin mainly because this historian of Ukraine rejected the claim of the official tsarist historians that there existed but a single Russian nation and a single Russian history in eastern Europe. The official Russian historians denied the very existence of the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian nations, and with the aid of a falsified history sought to prolong Russian domination over both these nations. The scheme of the history of the east-European peoples, which Hrushevsky worked out, proves that in that part of Europe there did not exist a single Russian nation, and therefore there can be no history of a single Russia. In eastern Europe there are three separate Slavic nations, and each with its own separate history which

must be treated separately—Russia, Ukraine and White-Ruthenia. The historical views of the official Russian historians as to a single Russian nation, according to Hrushevsky, lack a scientific basis, and were invented only to strengthen the imperialistic aims of Moscow. It is true that the more progressive men of learning of tsarist Russia did not agree with the official rejection of the very existence of the Ukrainian people as a separate ethnographic entity. The Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg in 1905 came to the conclusion that the present-day difference of the Ukrainian language from the Russian tongue is not only a fact proved scientifically, but that this difference dates as far back as the eleventh century, i.e., to the time when there existed the first Ukrainian State known in history as Kievan Rus. But even these scholars, while they recognized the existence of separate Russian, Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian peoples in eastern Europe, with only rare exceptions, clung to the view that in the political sense these nations formed only a single state, which is Russia. In this they radically differed from the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian historians whose views Prof. M. Hrushevsky incorporated into the scientific scheme of his history of east-European peoples.

As a matter of fact, the views of the progressive historians of Russia differed only slightly from those of tsarist official historians. The latter considered the Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians (Little Russians and White Russians in the official terminology) as speaking only dialects of the Russian language and possessing merely a regional culture of a kind; the former were willing to see in the Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians something more than mere ethnic groups, (separate peoples, to be sure), but not nations possessing a right of aspiring to national independence. Even progressive Russian men of learning desired to see Moscow's sway eternal in Ukraine and White-Ruthenia. In the political sphere, they agreed to grant Ukraine, at most, a cultural autonomy. To the White-Ruthenians the progressives did not grant even this right.

Both these categories of Russian historians considered the first period of Ukrainian history, that of Kievan Rus as part of Russian history, in spite of the fact that this history had taken place on the territory of the present-day Ukraine, and that the historical actors of that age were Ukrainians, since the Russian, or the Muscovite people did not even exist at that time.

The views of the Russian progressive historians are to-day accepted

and propounded by official Soviet historiography, regardless of the formality that in the membership of the United Nations, Ukraine and White-Ruthenia appear as separate nations. For Soviet historians the history of the Russian people, for some reason, also begins in Kiev, on the territory of Ukraine; and the ancient idea of the tsarist historians finds its echo even in the Soviet state anthem which hails the ancient common Rus as giving birth to Russia, Ukraine and White-Ruthenia. The only difference lies in the fact that the Soviets replaced the old political term of "Russian nation" with such phrases as—"Soviet nation" and "Soviet people," in order to be the better able, by means of this confusing term, to unite all the peoples of the Communist Russian Empire into a single nation, just as tsar Peter I at the beginning of the eighteenth century sought to accomplish this by means of the official term "Russia."

The tsarist men of learning scornfully spoke of the lesser importance of the "Little Russians"; while the Soviet learned men repeat thousands of times the hackneyed phrase about the friendship of the older Russian brother for his younger Ukrainian brother, in spite of the fact that the "older brother", the Muscovite, did not even exist when the "younger" Ukrainian brother was creating, under the influence of the Byzantine Greek culture, a powerful political and cultural center in Kiev. There is no doubt that the historical science of the former tsarist Russia as well as that of the present Soviet Russia, with but rare exceptions, has been, and still remains, in the service of the imperialistic policy of Moscow. That precisely is the reason why the Bolsheviks are now repressing the historical views of Prof. M. Hrushevsky.

As a further consequence of this theory, these official men of learning of both tsarist and Red Russia consider the entire culture of Ukraine between the tenth and the fourteenth centuries as the property of the Russians (the more progressive admit the Ukrainians only as equal possessors of that culture), regardless of the fact that at least ninety per cent of the culture of the ancient Kievan State flourished in Ukraine as a result of the spiritual power of the Ukrainian people themselves. With the spirituality, mentality and culture of the Russian people Ukrainians have very little in common.

In this respect, the reactionary historians in the tsarist times were even more logical than were the progressive historians, or those in the present Soviet Russia. They understood that the culture created on the territory of Ukraine (Little Russia, according to their terminology)

could not have been in those early Middle Ages the property of Russia (Great Russia, in their terminology), so they invented the theory of the northward migration of the Slavs from the Dnieper basin to the territory of Muscovy during the period of the Tatar invasion of eastern Europe (Pogodin). Thus, according to those historians, the culture of ancient Kiev, was created by the Russians who, in the thirteenth century, wandered off to settle the territory of Muscovy.

For that reason it is now quite easy to understand why the historians who support the theory of the northward migration of the Slavs, commence the history of Russia from the beginning of the ancient Kievan Rus, and it is likewise clear why they regard the entire spiritual heritage of the Slavs of the Dnieper basin as the spiritual property of the Russians.

Ukrainians, ("Little Russians") are, in their opinion, a migratory element which began to flow into the Dnieper basin from Halichina (Galicia) sometime in the fourteenth century, and, under the influence of Poland, developed the dialectal differences in both language and culture. It was formerly fashionable for the Russian reactionaries to credit the Poles with the Ukrainian national rebirth, and to restrict Ukrainian independence to Halichina which was then under the rule of Austria, and so beyond the boundaries of tsarist Russia.

Although the theory of the northward migration of the ancient Slavs of the Dnieper region is more logical than the views of the progressives and the Soviet historians about Rus being common to all the Russians, Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians, it nevertheless has no historical foundation, and is simply an invention for the purpose of solving a political difficulty with the "Little Russians." We have no historical proof that such a northward migration of the population from Ukraine to Muscovy ever took place, especially at the time of the Tatar invasion. It is an historical fact that the Tatars occupied the Muscovite territories more than a year earlier than they did the Ukrainian regions; for that reason there was no sense in leaping from the frying pan into the fire.

The depopulation of southern Ukraine continued during the twelfth century under the pressure of the Asiatic nomads. From the steppe region the Ukrainian population withdrew into the northern belt of the wooded Ukraine, into the regions of Chernihiv and Polissya, or they went westward to Halichina, as is shown by the rapid growth of the Halich-Volynian State in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. From its shelter in the north and west, the Ukrainian population, in the

process of a leisurely colonization, turned back south-eastward when conditions became more peaceful, or they returned northward and westward when times became turbulent.

That this theory of migration is without foundation is proved likewise convincingly by modern anthropological researches which reveal that the Ukrainians and the Russians are quite distinct anthropological types. The Ukrainians and White-Ruthenians represent the element of the Dinaric race, the main race of the southern and western Slavs; the Russians, on the other hand, are of a different anthropological type with but a small admixture of the Slavic. Racially, they are more related to the people of Ugro-Finnic, i.e., Ural-Altai extraction.

In opposition to the official views of the Russian Tsarist and Red historians, Prof. Hrushevsky boldly advanced his own logical scheme of the history of the East-European Slavs, and maintained that the history of Russia began and was continued on the territory of the Russian or Muscovite, people; that the history of Ukraine began and was continued on the territory of the Ukrainian people, and that the history of White-Ruthenia followed a similar course. All the cultural achievements gained on the individual territories of each of these three peoples belong individually to that one of the three. For that reason the history of Russia cannot appropriate to itself the ancient history of the Ukrainian people, or that of the White-Ruthenians. The Russian people have no hereditary right to any of the cultural advances which were made in Ukraine or in White-Ruthenia.

The historical views of M. Hrushevsky have been already accepted by the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian historians, and have found their place in historical science. A few Russian historians also accepted them in the first years of the Russian Revolution, until the time when the Kremlin adopted the imperialistic plans of the tsarist Russia, and it ordered the direction of the Red official historical views into the former pre-Revolutionary channels. The historical views of Hrushevsky were repressed both in the time of the White tsar as well as now under the Red tsar. At that time Hrushevsky's historical views were branded as "Ukrainian separatism"; now they are repressed as being nationalistic and bourgeois. In fact, both seek to suppress Hrushevsky's historical views, because they undoubtedly have a powerful influence on the political convictions of the Ukrainians.

Yet these obviously tendentious views of Russian historians have been accepted, through the medium of Russian official sources, by quite a few people in the United States and in England who have been engaged in research work on Russia. These views are to be found in learned and popular journals and pamphlets dealing with the history of Russia, and even in the press. The mistaken translation of the word "Rus" which is the name of the ancient Ukrainian state, as "Russia" causes great confusion in the understanding of the history of eastern Europe. In the mind of a foreigner it leaves the impression that ancient Rus and modern Russia are quite the same, and that the history of modern Russia is simply a continuation of the history of ancient Kievan Rus. Here one overlooks the fact that the name "Russia" was given to Muscovy by tsar Peter I in 1713 for political reasons, and that for four hundred years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the present Russian nation was known to the entire world under the name of Muscovy. In securing the application of the name "Russia" to Muscovy, tsar Peter I had to a great extent gained his purpose.

Historical facts and the results of modern anthropological research prove that the history of Muscovy, renamed "Russia" at the beginning of the eighteenth century, commenced only in the twelfth century; and that the first political organism of the present-day Russians was the principality of Suzdal which, in the middle of the twelfth century, rose in the north-eastern areas of the Kievan State.

The ancient Kievan State which emerged on the historical horizon in the first half of the ninth century was ethnically not a homogeneous state. The southern and north-western parts of that state were populated by Slavic tribes; on the other hand, the north-western part of that State had only a small Slavic element, while the majority of the population extending up to the present-day (a name of Finno-Ugric origin) Moscow consisted of the Finnic tribes which belonged to the Ural-Altai, i.e., the middle Asiatic group of peoples. The area had a non-Slavic population, which spoke a language not at all understood by the Slavs. In comparison with the other parts of the ancient Ukrainian Kievan State, the population here was at a lower level of civilization, and for a century after the adoption of Christianity in Kievan Rus, paganism dominated. Even at the close of the tenth and at the beginning of the eleventh centuries, it is possible to distinguish in Kievan Rus four ethnic regions.

The first region consisted of the southern portion, which was the

political core of the State, the present day Ukraine. At that time this was inhabited by the Slavic population which from the sixth century had been known to the Byzantine writers by the name of Antae. It had a very ancient agricultural civilization which had lived there for over two thousand years and had survived the successive invasions of the Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths, Huns and Avars. The Antae were under the powerful influence of Greek culture, as there were many colonies along the shores of the Antae, i.e., the northern shores of the Black Sea.

The Antae, according to the testimony of the Byzantine sources, governed themselves in a democratic manner; and the power of their princes was restricted by the council of the heads of the families (Clans). They possessed a well developed sense of liberty and a fondness for art. Women played an important role in the life of the Antae and were free and equal to men. The Antae inhabited the regions on both sides of the Carpathians and extended eastward to the Don. They formed the most civilized part of the State. The greatest progress in civilization was made by the tribes which lived on the two sides of the Dnieper, the commercial waterway from the "land of the Greeks to the land of the Normans", i.e., the route extending from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The oldest Ukrainian chronicle, that of Nestor, enumerates these tribes and dwells upon their more developed forms of family life. These were the Polyane, Ulich, and Tiveryane. The region northwest of their area was settled by the second group of Slavs which comprised mainly three Slavic tribes, the Krivichi, Radimichi, and Drehovichi. Their political center was the city of Polotsk, which was the first in the State of Kievan Rus (as early as the times of St. Volodimir) to become autonomous. Just as the southern group, the Antae, remained under the influence of Greek civilization, so the north-western group of the tribes of that ancient Ukrainian State underwent Scandinavian-Germanic influence. In time it entered the orbit of the Hanseatic League, a union of the commercial cities of northern Europe. This group developed into the White-Ruthenian people, and the differences became even more marked when the White-Ruthenian tribes became the most important component of the so-called Lithuanian-Ruthenian State. Under the influence of the Hanseatic tradition a republican form of government took root in the White-Ruthenian cities, and this form was also accepted by the third region of the ancient Ukrainian State of Kievan Rus, Great Novgorod, still further to the north.

It cannot be decided whether the Slavic tribe of Slovincs who inhabited

the area around Great Novgorod belonged to the White-Ruthenian tribes, or if it constituted the nucleus of a separate fourth nation which rose within the boundaries of the Kievan Rus.

As in Polotsk, which was the centre of the White-Ruthenian group, a republican form of government evolved and prevailed in Great Novgorod and in the neighboring Pskov.

In the economic system of the Kievan Rus, Novgorod played a very important part. It was the northern capital of the State, and served as the terminal of the commercial river route from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The southern, i.e., Ukrainian influences were very strong in Novgorod in both the economic and cultural spheres. At the time of the integrity of Rus as a state, there lived in Novgorod quite a numerous colony from the capital city of Kiev, especially in the commercial and cultural quarters of that northern city. After the disintegration of the Kievan State, Great Novgorod became an independent commercial-aristocratic republic with its sphere of influence reaching north-eastward as far as the Urals. In time it became an important factor in the political equilibrium (balance of power) between the Lithuanian and Muscovite States, until, in the second half of the fifteenth century, it was conquered by Moscow and annexed to Muscovy, a nation completely different in its political system. The Novgorod group was in time assimilated with the Moscow group, and at present constitutes a part of the Muscovite ethnic organism.

The fourth region was formed by the north-eastern territories, i.e., the stretches of the upper Volga and its tributaries. As mentioned, the population of these areas was only partly Slavic, and this part was represented by the tribe of the Vyatichi. The remainder of the population was of Ugro-Finnic extraction. Thus the expanses of the upper Volga and its tributaries was an area colonized by Ukraine-Rus in the political, economic and cultural aspects. In these north-eastern regions, Kiev organized two principalities—Rostov and Murom, and these later united and established their center first in Suzdal, later in Volodimir-on-the-Klyasma, and finally in Moscow. The Rostov and Murom territories, being non-Slavic areas colonized from Kiev, took no part in the development of the Kievan culture, quite unlike Great Novgorod, Pskov and the other cities of the north-western territories of the Kiev State. In every respect they were merely passive consumers of the civilization coming to them from the south.

The administration of these areas was not conducted, as was the case in Polotsk, Novgorod, and Pskov, with the aid of the local Slavic population, because that element here was insignificant. The administration sent from Kiev by the Princes brought with it not only the military personnel but also civil servants who ruled and administered the regional affairs arbitrarily, without the assistance of the local population. The administration was followed by merchants, craftsmen and clergy. The last brought with them not only Christianity but also enlightenment by means of the Church-Slavic language. Thus the absolute rule of the Princes became well-rooted and remained strong even when the local population after through the adoption of Christianity began to undergo a cultural assimilation. The outstanding heads of families (clans) took the place of the boyars in the courts of the princes, but they did not gain for themselves the same importance as that enjoyed by the boyars in Ukraine or by the rich merchants in the White-Ruthenian republics and in Great Novgorod.

In the process of assimilation of the local population the accepted official language, Church Slavic, underwent radical changes; and at that point a separate Russian language began to form, as well as a distinct world-outlook, quite different from the freedom-loving characteristic of the Ukrainians, White-Ruthenians and Novgorodians.

As long as it remained strong, the central government of Kiev held the groups of both Slavic and non-Slavic population on the fringes of Ukraine in strict dependence. The integrity of the Kievan State was still intact in the reigns of Volodimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise. After the death of Yaroslav the Kievan State broke up into several sections, partly on account of the seniority right of inheritance as instituted by Yaroslav before his death. Each territorial portion was ruled by one of his sons, each of whom attempted to make his reign secure and strong in order to be able eventually to launch from there a war for the control of Kiev, the senior capital of that free union of principalities. Thus Kiev became the prey of continual warfare until finally it was crushed in the struggle of the princes.

The least interest in the affairs of the capital of the ancient Ukraine-Rus was shown by the princes of the Suzdal branch of the Ruric family. As absolute rulers, they began to increase the territories of their principality and to increase in military strength. The grandson of Yaroslav the Wise, Yuri Dowhoruky made the first step to become wholly inde-

pendent from Kiev. After the fall of the central political government in Kiev, the only moral unifying force of the ancient integral state was the Church metropolitan in Kiev. Not only were all the bishops of the separate territories dependent on the metropolitan, but the metropolitan often spoke even in the name of the already divided Kievan State, for its interests as a whole.

In order to free himself from moral and ecclesiastical dependence upon Kiev, Yuri Dowhoruky began in Constantinople, in the middle of the twelfth century, an endeavor to persuade the Patriarch to appoint a separate metropolitan for Suzdal. It is true that at that time the Patriarch rejected this ambitious request of the Suzdal prince, but the very fact of the request is evidence that the land of Suzdal no longer felt morally bound to Kiev, "Mother of all the cities of Rus". On the colonial territories of the ancient Rus there began to form and emerge a new Suzdal-Muscovite nation.

The breach between Suzdal and Kiev was widened by Yuri Dowhoruky's successor, Andriy Boholubsky (1157-1174). It was he who began to build and develop the new capital of his state, Volodimir-on-the-Klyasma, which was intended to eclipse Kiev. So in the midst of the continual wars for the possession of Kiev, he sent his Suzdalian army against the "Mother of all the cities of Rus," destroyed it and plundered even its monasteries and churches (1169). Whatever he had stolen of cultural value, he transported northward for the beautifying of the new capital of the Muscovite people.

Andriy Boholubsky intensified his absolute rule to such a degree that the local boyars assassinated him. This tragic end of the destroyer of Kiev changed neither the system of absolute rule nor the relation of the new state to the old metropoly. At the very time when Ukraine was withstanding the attacks of the barbaric hordes which were pressing from Asia into the steppe region of Ukraine, the interests of the growing Russian nation were centered only around its own local affairs. At the moment when the battle with the Polovtsi was raging and threatening all with a catastrophe (1185), the author of the ancient Ukrainian epic, "The Tale of the Campaign of Ihor", exhorted also the prince of Suzdal-Volodimir, Vsevolod, to join his forces with the others in the defence of the civilization of the Kievan Rus. The appeal, however, fell on deaf ears. Vsevolod preferred to extend the boundaries of his State southward by conquering another Finnic tribe, the Mordvins, in order to proclaim

himself as soon as possible the "great prince of Volodimir-on-the-Klyasma."

The first State of the Russian people went its own way to political and cultural independence from Kiev. Kiev has fulfilled its civilizing role in the beginnings of the history of the Russian people. The mixture of the primitive culture of the Slavic and Finnic tribes living in those territories, together with the ancient Ukrainian culture of Kiev, produced, as a result, a new people—the Suzdalians, or Muscovites, or, as they finally denominated themselves—Russians. The twelfth century became the century of the birth of a new nation in eastern Europe.

The emergence of the new Muscovite nation occurred in the same period when the splendor of Kiev was becoming dimmer and dimmer, and as the center of the political existence of the Ukrainian State was being transferred to Western Ukraine. At that time the Cathedral of St. Sophia, with its frescoes and mosaics, was an ancient structure in Kiev. About a hundred years before began the compilation of that code of law the "Justice of Rus" which, in the second half of the twelfth century, became the legal system of the ancient Ukrainian State. Even at that time there existed the earliest known Ukrainian chronicle, that which was written or compiled by Nestor, and the best examples of Ukrainian literature, both original and in translation. Independent of any influences of the Suzdal-Volodimir population, in the second half of the twelfth century there appeared the greatest epic poem of Ukraine, "The Tale of the Campaign of Ihor." The new Muscovite nation had no part in the creation of these works of culture which are not merely Ukrainian in scope, but universal in their appeal and value. The growing Muscovite nation developed and was raised on these works of Ukrainian genius, but it did not create them.

The relation between the ancient Ukrainian Kievan State, called Rus, and the new Muscovite nation was similar to the relation of the Roman provinces to Italy and Rome. Rome was the creator of the lion's share of the works of Roman culture. The Romanic nations of the old Roman provinces were brought up on Roman civilization. Rome gave them the Latin tongue and the impress of its culture during the period of its strongly centralized power over the provinces. As soon as Rome's power weakened, the Romanization became only an external coating from under which there emerged new nations, new cultures, brought up on the Roman languages and on Roman culture. In like manner Ukrainian Kiev

brought up its pupil-nations on its Church-Slavic literary tongue, on its Eastern Christianity, in a word—on its ancient Ukrainian civilization. These pupil-nations were those peoples which rose on the ruins of the Kievan Rus—Ukraine; in the first place Muscovy, which at the beginning of the eighteenth century was renamed Russia. The fact that the Muscovite pupil, born three hundred years later, became in time much stronger, and seized his teacher in his sinewy arms, does not change the fact that Ukraine is not Moscow's younger brother, but its educator and civilizer.

PROFESSOR BURNHAM AND UKRAINE

by Leo Dobriansky

"UKRAINE'S WOUNDS, NOW THE WORLD'S PAINS" was the unfashionable theme developed by this writer over a year and a half ago at a time when, immediately after the conclusion of World War II, the peoples of the Western World, overstuffed with war propaganda, naively continued to nourish the false hopes of an easy and automatic peace once Germany and Japan were politically sterilized.¹ After a preceding account of the nature of communism, the thesis advanced then and so factually substantiated since, was that the tested political techniques employed by Soviet Russia since 1920 in the systematic subjugation of Ukraine are now being applied in necessarily varying degrees toward identical ends throughout all of Eastern and Central Europe and Asia.² The irreconcilable interests of Russia and the West implicit in this thesis were soon thereafter elaborated upon in detail in a succeeding article which concluded with an enumeration of some cardinal points of general policy that the United States and other democratic powers must adopt if the current diplomatic warfare between the West and Russia is not eventually to burst forth in overt military action and the open skirmishes in such areas as Greece and China are not to be extended throughout the world.³ Then, partly completing this cycle of thought on contemporary international political reality, there appeared a more detailed treatment of the communist cells in the article on the "The Outlawing of Political Outlaws."⁴ What is still left for a full completion of this cycle of thought is a more pragmatic delineation of defensive and offensive action by the West, led by the indispensable United States, against the immutable

1. "Ominous Features of A Divided World", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, v. II, no. 2, Winter, 1946, pp. 142-152.

2. "Ukraine In Mid-Twentieth Century". *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, v. I, no. 4, September, 1945, pp. 330-341.

3. "The World of Freedom and the World of Tyranny", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, v. II, no. 2, Spring, 1946, pp. 274-284.

4. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, v. III, no. 1, Autumn, 1946, pp. 38-55.

strategy and changing tactics of the Soviet Union and its marionette satellites.

—*"The Struggle For The World"*—

The need for a more pragmatic explosion of the West's policy toward Soviet Russia has been more than satisfied in the recent work by James Burnham—"The Struggle For The World."¹ Professor Burnham performs a great service in providing intellectually alive citizens with a synthetic outlook on the nebulously complex international situation. The daily newspapers, radio commentations, and periodicals bombard us with such an avalanche of disconnected facts occurring with such unparalled swiftness in the international arena that the work of rendering them intelligible by showing their interrelations has itself become a specialized task. One of the unfailing marks of a clear and well-balanced thinker is his demonstrated ability to perceive a real unity in the multiplicity of facts and to furnish a cohesive pattern of thought in which each detail finds its appropriate place. Anyone who has read Prof. Burnham's book, which has been one of the best sellers for several months and should be read by everyone seeking a sober and fearless analysis and a synthetic interpretation of current political international movements will undoubtedly agree, if he is at all honest with himself, that Burnham is such a thinker. In sharp contrast to the fatuous exhortations of a Henry Wallace or the errant garrulity of a Max Lerner, the realistic approach adopted by Professor Burnham entails a dispassionately logical and fact-founded examination of conditions as they manifestly are the world over, in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Once these conditions are properly understood, a proviso which seems to be Wallace's ever-vanishing end, the groundwork is then established for an intelligent evaluation of realistic policies. Such a truth-finding course to which Mr. Burnham rigorously adheres dispenses with much irrelevant controversy over "ideals", the early realization of which present facts stubbornly resist. Logically, before one proceeds to discuss what is to be done, one must first understand what is. If the latter is not understood or misunderstood, then the former is worthless.

On the basis of these considerations one can rightly discern today four distinct positions on this vital question of the policy of the West, in reality that of the United States toward the Soviet bloc: (1) That of the

1. *The Struggle for the World* by James Burnham. New York: The John Day Company, Inc. 1947, 248 pp.

communists who by their convictions of the need of destruction of the culture, morality, and institutions of the West for the establishment of the illusory "workers' paradise" place themselves beyond any rational intercourse: (2) That of the American isolationists who from a sincere and respected conviction are bent upon the conservation of American resources and the exemplary preservation and development of American institutions while the rest of the world returns gradually to sanity through the hollowness of its unrealistic plans and the centripetal attraction of American performance; (3) That of the intellectually anonymous dreamers who with sometimes questionable purpose avoid stubborn facts to revel in high-sounding ideals that serve to assuage the peace-loving hearts of countless innocents disturbed by the powerful realities of international life today; and finally, (4) That of the realists, such as Burnham, who know intimately the communist character, sympathize with the isolationists but consider them in error, have no respect for the formless thinking and exhortatory declamations of the factually ignorant or fact-avoiding "peregrinates", and attempt to produce action in conformity with the forceful drift of present-day fact in the political world. The communists cannot logically desire peace, and the other two groups have no stronger desire for it in the world than the realists. The question is fundamentally not whether peace is desirable, but how it can be permanently secured. But this major question depends fundamentally on the arrangement of conditions for such a realization. This is the basis of Burnham's attempt at analysis.

"The Struggle For The World" is undoubtedly the best American work yet on the relations of the West with the Soviet orbit. In large measure, however, most of its ideas have been long entertained by European intellectuals who have personally witnessed the operations of Russian communism at first hand. But what is of prime significance for us here is the limited perspective of the author in his treatment of his basic ideas, due doubtlessly to his relative unfamiliarity with Russo-Ukrainian relations. Correction in this direction bears more on errors of omission than of commission and to this degree reinforces, rather than detracts from, the general thesis expounded in his work. Moreover, it serves to recall the resounding truth that "Ukraine's Wounds Are Now the World's Pains."

—*Ukraine In the Burnham Thesis*—

As one would expect, before any policy in any sphere of human life

can be rationally formulated, an understanding of the object of its application must be logically arrived at first. Strikingly similar to the cycle of thought developed by this writer in the aforementioned articles, Burnham's analysis follows this rule scrupulously by examining the nature of communism and the main institutional facets of the Soviet Union. The facts on these matters are so abundant today through the highly serviceable works of Dallin, Kravchenko, Eastman, Timasheff, Hook, Manya Gordon and others that it is inexcusable for any honestly inquiring mind to remain unacquainted with them. What is mainly noteworthy here is that communist literature is strikingly devoid of any counterevidence to the solid array of facts as set forth, for example, by Dallin's "The Real Soviet Russia". Moreover, except for the usual run of intractable communists and the oft-times self-contradicting and fact-flouting Wallace who beyond the pale of direct opposition exhorts courageously, but meekly shys away from public debates, as in the recent challenge by Norman Thomas and A. Adolf Berle, it is equally noteworthy that none of the foremost representatives of the other positions cited above has dared to deny the basic facts concerning the Soviet state. That its present government originated through violence and an unlawful coup d'etat, that no democratic opportunity of objective approval or disapproval by the people of the government and its policies has ever been afforded, that rampant terror through the original Cheka and its transformations into the present M.V.D. has been an integral part of the political machinery, that successive organized liquidations have been effected to quell opposition, that religious persecutions have been expediently periodic, that a chain of concentration camps overflowing with slave labor exists, that the standard of living for the general population, exclusive of the tightly-knit elite, is abominably low, that its hypercentralized economic and political organization vests a small ambitious groups, operating necessarily on a ninety-hour work-week,¹ with incredible monopolistic power over the livelihood and cultural activities of the subject population which under the penalty of death is prohibited from emigrating from the proletarian paradise of Father Stalin's blessings—these are the substantial undisputed facts which stubbornly outweigh all others in the appraisal of this stratocratic state. The mere contrast of these officially-sponsored acts with the established institutions of the West suggests the renaissance of Asiatic barbarism.

1. Kravchenko, Victor A., "Who Will Succeed Stalin?", *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 22, 1947, p. 52.

—1. *The Ukrainian Resentment Against the Communist Regime*—

These stubborn, hard facts, far outweighing any heap of platitudinous slogans and empty promises sanctified by wordy constitutions, Burnham carefully notes. Except for the insular communists, the exponents of the other positions, such as Colonel McCormick and Max Lerner, agree that these institutional components of Russian communism have no place in the traditional culture of the West. In the light of the prevailing conditions upon which such an agreement is attained, the pertinent question arises here as to why during the past war there was no major revolt against this gruesome state of affairs in the Soviet Union. Mr. Burnham bears on the matter in his reference to General A.A. Vlasov's army "as the only large unit representing resentment against the communist regime". As concerns the Russians themselves this is a true statement which even then does not explain the total situation of the time. It must not be forgotten that from the outbreak of the Soviet-German phase of the war to the end, the Soviet government submerged completely its communist propaganda in favor of Russian nationalism and the historic Fatherland, and thereby deceitfully whipped up the hopes of the Russian population for a change in governmental policy and buttressed further the accepted necessity of preserving the sacred soil of historic Russia against the foreign German enemy. In addition, the police controls over the population were further tightened. Under such converging conditions, coupled with the fact that the German armies barely reached the territory of Russia proper, but concentrated their onslaught on strategic Ukraine, it is even remarkable that the Vlasov resentment expressed itself.

In Ukraine, the situation was radically different, however. First, because of their historic struggle for independence from Russian domination and their sufferings under the Five Year Plan, marked by the brutal governmentally-sponsored famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, which exceeded anything the Russian people have had to bear, the Ukrainian people were prepared, as far as it was possible, to revolt against the Russian communist hegemony. Upon the German invasion of Ukraine, as the Kremlin well anticipated, a mass revolt was started but only to be stifled by the idiotic German occupation administration which thereby undermined its own position in Eastern Europe.¹ The Swedish author of the book, "Behind the Steel Wall", vividly depicted how the German High

1. Guttman, Josef, "Limits of Terror", *Modern Review*, April, 1947.

Command counted on some 2 million Ukrainian fighters against Russia, only to be checkmated by the obtuse policy of the Nazi politicians who in vain sought to substitute their domination for the Russian over rich Ukraine. The final outcome was the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which concentrated its partisan efforts against both the German and Russian overlords.¹ The endless trouble that is caused the German authorities is conclusively shown in the original German documents disclosed by Mr. Guttman. Its work in the destruction of German train and truck movements behind the lines of battle was a prime factor in the German defeat at Stalingrad. Following the end of the war with Germany, this Ukrainian Insurgent Army, numbering 40,000 and constantly replenishing itself, turned its efforts against the communists, and has continued in full strength to this very day. It has become sufficiently dangerous to cause the dispatch of Zhukov to Odessa, of Kaganovich to Kiev, of military units of Poland and Czechoslovakia to the Carpathian mountains and to assassinate the high-ranking communist, General Swierczewski of the Moscow-led Polish government. The Vlasov rebellion was indeed the only Russian expression of resentment against the communist regime, but the far greater Ukrainian resentment against both the Nazi and communist regimes continues to express itself forcefully in the form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army which deserves the serious backing of every democratic power seeking to contain communist barbarism.

—2. *The Ukrainian Base of Soviet "Neo-Russian" Imperialism* —

The internal situation of any totalitarian power cannot be really divorced from its external behavior. The one is essentially intertwined with the other. As in the cases of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the totalitarian communist regime likewise harmonizes as closely as feasible its internal situation with its external maneuverings, whether for purposes of public distraction from internal deficiencies or honorific adulation of its leadership in the fructification of its international ambitions and world mission. A dictatorship, in contrast to a democracy, can always more efficiently correlate the two.

The Burnham thesis interprets the expansion of Soviet dominance in the affairs of other states since the absorption of the Baltic countries in 1939-40 as a movement of "neo-Russian imperialism" with "revolutionary

1. Csabaty, Nicholas D., "The Ukrainian Underground", *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1946, v. II, no. 2, pp. 154-166.

emancipation". The strategy of communist expansion through Russian might is the same everywhere and is directed from Moscow. The tactics today are revealed in the current movements of intensive national revolution undertaken by native communists in various nations who are in essence outlaws operating legally by virtue of their undying allegiance to the dictates of the Russian Kremlin. These native communists are of the same character as the Russians, working assiduously for the establishment of communist dictatorships in direct accord with Moscow, even at the risk of death. They deliberately distort the truth to serve any of their momentary tactical ends which in essence are only to achieve efficiently their ultimate ends, and without any conscience they murder any opposition which stands to impede their realizable goals. But, continues Burnham, the base of operations is always the Soviet Union, the dominant influence of which has continued to radiate along concentric lines of expansion since the submergence of the Baltic nations in 1939-40.

Except again for the insufferable fanatics, the isolationists understand this trend, but feel legitimately confident that so long as mass privation and general destitution are absent from the American scene, no bold communist usurpation, which since its Russian origin in 1917 has always thrived only on hopeless impoverishment and public distress, is possible here. The "peregrinates", who have an opinion on everything anywhere, presumptuously assure us that the Soviet Union is seeking only security. Security against whom? Devastated Germany, disemboweled Japan, economically weak England, impotent Spain, or the United States which, in significant contrast to the Soviet Union and its militarized satellites, took the dangerous lead in the reduction of its military power which is now far below that of the Soviet Union alone? Or is it against the American possession of the atomic bomb which the United States, in the interests of peace, is ready to relinquish to an international authority provided it is empowered to inspect minutely the uses of nuclear fission anywhere in the world, including Siberia? Moreover, at what concrete point does the Soviet search for security stop, and what of the inalienable rights of smaller nations to self-government and free expression, so that they can participate in the economic rehabilitation conference in Paris without the bulldozing pressures of Moscow? Mr. Wallace or Max Lerner of the self-designated progressive group never answers these crucial questions; they simply piously exhort.

Here again, the Burnham thesis provides a true observation, but not a really complete one, again by reason of the author's relative unfamiliarity with Russo-Ukrainian relations. As a matter of concrete historical fact, the imperialist expansion of Soviet Russia did not commence with the absorption of the Baltic states in 1939-40, but really with the subjugation of the independent Ukrainian republic in 1920-24, in addition to the forceful annexation of Georgia, the Don Cossacks and others. It is also fundamentally important that this occupation industrial and agricultural resources necessary for the consolidation of rich Ukraine provided Soviet Russia with the indispensable of its Eurasian fortress, as its major investments in following twenty years well show. How powerful would Soviet Russia be without this Ukrainian base? With it, it is powerful enough to submerge the Baltic states, to subordinate Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the Mongolias to its will, and to send its spy operatives throughout the world, from the top of the globe to the bottom, to prepare the native disciples in the arts of "intensive revolution."¹ These arts had been successfully employed in Ukraine in the 20's, and contrary to Mr. Burnham's notion that the Soviet grants in the matter of national culture "everything except political power," even this promise is not realized. The experience of the Ukrainian people in this respect have been revealed at length in the many issues of this journal. Suffice it to quote here the "liberal" position of the Communist Party journal, "Bolshevik", which superciliously maintains that the Russian people culturally are "The most outstanding nation of all the nations in the Soviet Union."²

—3. *The place of Ukraine in the General Policy of the United States and the West Against Worldwide Communism—*

In the light of these remarks concerning the essence of any Western policy toward the Soviet Union, the Burnham thesis, before outlining the realistic contours of the only practicable policy for the West, devotes serious consideration to the new psychological and physical pre-conditions to any unwanted World War III. The first is the innovation of "unconditional surrender" as an obvious psychological preparation, sanctified by precedent usage, for a war of decisive extermination. The second is the efficient means for the physical effectuation of such a war as seen in the appearance of atomic weapons.

1. E.g., see the Frederick Oechaner reports on communist activity in Latin America, New York World-Telegram, March, 1947.

2. The Associated Press, Moscow, Dec. 24, 1946.

The emergence of atomic weapons bears a greater significance than the sheer potency of far-flung destruction. First it symptomizes the acceleration in the rate of historical change in the modern world. As the rapid succession of the crises the world over signifies in our day the real contraction of time in the preparation of peaceful settlements, so the dreadful power of atomic weapons to transform our exceptionally vulnerable urban-centered national units into hovels of mire spells the shortness of time in the effectuation of a reasonable policy aimed at the prevention of such a unhappy exigency. Atomic military power is essentially a technologic fact which promises, from all sober reports, to produce with considerable accuracy a devastating degree of national paralysis upon its formidable release.

Secondly, the reality of atomic weapons signifies the immensity of political power associated with their production. At the present time, as far as we know, this power rests with the United States, although it is known that feverish efforts for its rapid acquisition are under way secretly in several distant Siberian cities,¹ probably under the able direction of the Soviet-seized Ukrainian, Dr. Peter L. Kapitza, whom a writer in the *New Leader* last December reported as exiled to Siberia. The probability of a duopoly in the possession of atomic power by the only two countries that are of industrial consequence is fraught with unimaginable danger to the interests of the West and to world peace. To suppose that such a duopoly will entail the possibility of neutralization of its use by a mutual recognition of reciprocal devastation is only wishful thinking, especially in view of the independence of the Soviet government of the will of its peoples, its established and active network of fifth column throughout the world, its past record of broken promises and treaties and onslaughts on smaller nations, its present record of obstruction in the rehabilitation of war-torn areas and purposeful neglect of reciprocal relations with the West, and finally the sublime attractiveness of world conquest for the establishment of the "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" for which all the faithful yearn and work hard. The key to this grandiose mission is in atomic weapons upon which any dictatorial state of Russia's resources can easily concentrate, even to that relative neglect of economic products for its subject population which seems to be peculiarly representative of the Soviet economy. In effect, lest we forget too quickly the gyrations of the Hitler dictatorship, the Stalin

1. Kravchenko, Victor A., "Stalin's Mystery Cities of Siberia", *The Saturday Evening Post*, November 30, 1946.

dictatorship has the strategy, the will, the evolving capacity to pull the trigger first: after the first shot, there will conceivably be none other.

A monopoly in the possession of atomic weapons, such as Burnham advocates, is the only safe basis for world peace. Time is short. To speculate, as countless do on the principle that after every war a period of psychological recuperation for a generation is necessary is to disregard wantonly the potency of atomic might which may well dispense with **extensive** military preparations in the near future. To long for a liberalization of the Soviet regime is to flout its history and the nature of its machinery. To hope wishfully for a fruitful revolution in the Soviet Union is to misunderstand the hyper-centralized form of its economic and political organization. To dream that the West and the Russian fortress can live happily together in this one world is to escape from the reality of daily events; and even Father Stalin unprovidentially denies you this wordly beatitude.

Wherein, then, is this monopoly to rest? The "peregrinates" clamor for the United Nations is its resting place. This organizational babe, unbaptized, unconfirmed, and adolescent in its aimless quibblings, is held fit to cope with the giant problem of atomic control. What of the fundamental veto issue? What of inspection everywhere and at anytime? As it stands now, the United Nations is the sounding-board for purposeful Soviet sabotage of any measure proposed to stall its tactical advances in the world at large. So far on sixteen occasions the Soviets have utilized the veto power to prevent U. N. action. How many more are required to convince the West of the Soviet policy of systematic sabotage? Happily, there are indications today, as in the Greek situation, that the United States is of Soviet-inspired necessity pursuing a course of seeking immediate U. N. action on vital issues, but failing this, of applying its own pressures as demanded by the sheer urgency of the situation. If it is so incredibly difficult to vest monopoly in the United Nations with an absolute control over all its members, one need not think twice of the practicability of a world government at this stage of history.

Under these conditions of the world in our stage of history, the only safe-keeping custodian that remains is the United States. The Burnham thesis sees an American-led world Empire linked with the monopoly of atomic weapons as the only solution. The connotation of the term is understandably unsavory. Yet, upon adequate reflection of both an analytical and historical character, a liberal empire founded on the federa-

tive principle is not self-contradictory. But if it has been so difficult to form a federated Europe alone, how much more will it be on a world scale, exclusive of the Soviet orbit? If anything, what will probably be is the informal association of states led by the power of the United States as we are witnessing today in the progressively clearer division between the Soviet East and the democratic West.

What is immediately far more important concerns the functional rather than the structural features of monopolistic possession of the atomic weapons. The Soviets possess a world policy, a permanent, unchanging strategy which the United States must necessarily parallel. The recent formation of a new policy staff in our State Department, concerned mainly with long-range considerations of our foreign policy, as against the traditional fragmentary considerations of each case on its own merits, is a notable step in the right direction. In the face of the facts examined above, the policy of the United States and the West must, as Mr. Burnham emphasizes, be both offensive and defensive. Offensive through the attraction of all non-communized states, and even the communistic ones wherever possible, to its liberal and free institutions, afforded by an unimpeded intercourse of peoples and goods, substantial aid in the economic rehabilitation and improvement of friendly countries, and the confidence of its wisdom to undertake the role of world leadership acquired by its economic power and the outcome of the past war. By such a worldwide offensive one can begin to think in terms of an American-led World Empire, liberally founded on the federative principle.

But equally, if not more, important in the immediate future is the defensive portion of a rational policy. In recognizing that the interests of Soviet politics and those of the United States are intrinsically irreconcilable and under the spectre of atomic warfare, the United States, in order to avoid the full crystallization of World War III, which in its initial skirmishes has already begun, must direct its efforts toward the systematic inclosure and eventually sure asphyxiation of Russian communism. It must therefore prevent at any cost the European peninsula, Greece, the Middle East, India and China from being incorporated within the communist Eurasian fortress, Japan and Germany necessarily serving as its outposts. It must, also, weaken the ugly tentacles of the Russian octopus by eliminating necessarily traitorous native communists from positions of power. Lastly, by seizing the initiative and thereby placing communism on the total defensive, it must undermine communist

power in Eastern Europe, northern Iran, Afghanistan, China, Manchuria, and northern Korea.

In this global program for the survival of basic human values and genuine progress toward stable world peace and increasing prosperity the isolationist cause, logical and respectable as it is, has of course no place. The fatal criticism of isolationism is its unrealism concerning the worldwide implications of atomic military power beyond which no nation can safeguard itself through sheer neutrality. The "peregrinates", on the other hand, rant about peace, but ignore the responsibilities associated with the power of the United States to achieve the peace. They are in essence the voluble exponents of "misplaced concreteness", urging us to rely upon the United Nations while the debating society verbalizes over the communist rape of Hungary, the communist invasion of Greece, the communist war in China, the communist agitation in the colonial states, India and elsewhere. They magnify the regimes of Spain, Greece, China and Argentina as undemocratic while in fact they are ants compared to the snarling bear in the international arena. In a word, they are intellectually irresponsible with a fenzied passion of public exhortation.

But what Professor Burnham critically omits in his general policy is the potential significance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Ukraine in the systematic undermining of the Soviet fortress. After the publication of his work, in conversations with this writer, he came to recognize the historical integrity of the two and their intrinsic affinity to the context of his thesis. As many other American authors in time will come to know, the Insurgent Army stands as a symbol of sustained resentment against the Soviet regime, and may well be utilized as the first quard of Western democracy in the midst of barbaric totalitarianism. Ukraine, the real base of the Soviet fortress, the first to be chained to the Russian communist will, may well serve as the first target for the American advance against the fortress—the "soft-belly" of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin masters may sing "The Little Cuckoo", a Ukrainian song arising from the wars between Turkey and Ukraine,¹ but the lamenting echoes may yet resound throughout the communist world.

1. Kravchenko, Victor A., "Who Will Succeed Stalin?" *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 22, 1947.

DR. PERCIVAL CUNDY 1881-1947

The editorial staff of our Quarterly recently suffered a staggering loss. Hardly had our previous issue appeared, when death took our literary contributor, Rev. Percival Cundy.

Calling on me at our editorial office not more than a week before his decease in West Collingswood, N. J., he looked full of energy and was cherishing far reaching plans for completing some translations of Ivan Franko, preparing for publication a new volume of Lesya Ukrainka's selected works and delving into a translation of Olha Kobyljanska's novel, "She Dug Herbs on Sunday Morning." His last plans were to devote all his time to the translation of various Ukrainian authors in order to make them accessible to the Anglo-Saxon world.

In particular he held in high esteem the poetical works of Lesya Ukrainka and considered her as one of the most outstanding poetesses not only in the Ukrainian language but of world literature at large. On his last visit Mr. Cundy brought us for publication a short article filling an unknown gap in the life of Lesya Ukrainka as well as translations of three of her poems. At the same time he left for the editor's portfolio an article on the Ukrainian novelist Marko Vowchok, intended for the current issue.

The enthusiasm of the late Mr. Cundy in expanding on his desire to acquaint the Anglo-Saxon world with Ukrainian literature induced me to publish all the material brought in by him including the article on Marko Vowchok which was in the previous issue, as I hoped that our prolific and industrious contributor would still provide us with something for the current issue. No one, and least of all the author of the present "obituary", expected that this current book of the "Ukrainian Quarterly" would bring to its contributor a "Sit Tibi Terra Levis" as a parting farewell.

Mr. Cundy's literary studies and production as a translator are an object lesson of perfection as he was a descendant of an entirely different culture and a person of foreign background. Dr. Percival was of English descent born in Nottingham, England. As a young student he emigrated

to Canada where he graduated from the University of Manitoba and the Presbyterian religious seminary. In consequence he became a missionary of his "denomination" in various parts of Manitoba and met in this way the Ukrainian peasant population that at that time was beginning to flow in waves into the prairie province of Canada. Cundy became acquainted with these pioneers of distant Ukraine who were coming in under Austrian and Russian names, depending upon the passport that gave them admission.

Nevertheless Cundy discovered early that these people were of the same speech and culture and he began to love them and study them. In the Canadian Ukrainians Cundy discovered another Slav race which was most numerous after the Russians. Soon he acquired such a perfect understanding of all the nuances of the Ukrainian language that he made the most difficult translations from Ukrainian into English and was able to render truly and accurately not only the ideas and sentiments, but also the aesthetic form of Ukrainian poetry into English. Doubtless he was indebted for that ability not only to his studies but to his inherited poetic talent.

The main achievement of his studies of the Ukrainian language and literature over a number of years was the collection of Ivan Franko's poems published under the title "A Voice from Ukraine" in Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Ivan Franko was the first Ukrainian author and scientist who attracted Dr. Cundy. Franko's rationalistic view seemed to appeal more to his Anglo-Saxon type of mind than the sentimentality of other Ukrainian authors and characteristic of many products of Slav writers. The following years of Cundy's work were devoted to translation of other works of I. Franko such as the "Landlord's Jokes", "Faded Leaves" as well as his masterpiece, "Moses."

In the meantime Dr. Percival Cundy moved to the United States in 1937 to make his permanent abode in West Collingswood, N. J. His contacts with Ukrainian intellectuals encouraged him to continue his studies in the field of Ukrainian literature. Then he became acquainted with the modern Ukrainian novelist Michael Kociubinsky, Marko Vowchuk, Vasyl Stefanyk, the photographer of the Ukrainian peasant's soul, and Lesya Ukrainka, the poetess of wide education and deep understanding.

In his later literary studies his admiration and enthusiasm were

aroused for Lesya Ukrainka, the poetess with a frail body but a strong spirit. In summing up his literary criticism of Lesya Ukrainka's words Ivan Franko gave the following characteristic of her writing: "The poetess Lesya Ukrainka in her poems is the most vigorous man in the whole Ukrainian literature." This powerful intellectual type of poetess won the attention of Dr. Cundy who began not only to study her life but also to translate her poems. In later years his devotion to the translation of Ukrainian literature became so intense that he decided to retire in order to be able to realize his extensive plan mentioned at the beginning of these lines. Unfortunately his premature death cut short this work to the inestimable detriment both of Ukrainian and English translated literature.

In the second year of our Quarterly's existence Dr. Cundy became our literary contributor and reviewer. On these pages were published Dr. Cundy's article "Lesya Ukrainka," further "An Episode in the Life of Lesya Ukrainka," "Three Poems of Lesya Ukrainka" and a literary critical essay: "Marko Vowchok." In the book review section Dr. Cundy gave a review of Prof. C. A. Manning's "Taras Shevchenko: Selected Poems." During his year's collaboration in our journal, the late Percival Cundy's share was considerable and consequently our loss is irreplaceable.

The late Dr. Cundy was a man of outstanding intelligence. At the same time he was modest, exceedingly courteous, always ready to cooperate and an ideal member of a journal's editorial staff. We say this farewell to him with deep sorrow as parting from a sincere friend.

Editor

BOOK REVIEWS

ISTORIA SSSR (History of USSR) Edited by the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences USSR. Editor-in-chief, Prof. A. P. Pankratova. Vol. I-3, Moscow 1943, 1944, 1945. Vol. I—224 pp. and 5 maps; Vol. II—272 pp. and 5 maps; Vol. III—336 pp. and 6 maps.

After the pogrom of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (1930) the Soviet government closed all the institutes of Ukrainian history in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The Patriarch of Ukrainian historians, Prof. Michael Hrushevsky was sent into exile. His pupils were ordered to repent and to repudiate the teachings of their master. The historical journal "Ukraine" edited by Prof. Hrushevsky was stopped for a year and a half. After a long interval one more volume of that journal appeared and its first article was written by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin on the theme: How to write the History of the USSR, and was translated for the Ukrainian journal from the Russian. In that article Comrade Stalin taught the historians of Russia, Ukraine and the other nations of the USSR how the history of the Soviets should be written.

In the western world an article of this kind written by a person who never had anything to do with historical studies, and consequently was an amateur, would have met with a derisive smile. But not in the Soviets where Stalin's word must be sacred and precious to the Soviet historian who wants to save himself. In this manner an official method of writing Soviet history was adopted, which is different from the heretofore traditional way of writing history by Russian historians. Old Russian historians always used to begin the history of Russia from a definite point; the founding of the ancient Ukrainian Kiev state, then they used to pass to Muscovy, and left alone Ukraine and White Ruthem's for a couple of centuries, in order, in the XVII century to amalgamate Ukrainian history with Russian.

Stalin's article "How to write the history of the USSR" advised historians to talk about all the territories which since the most ancient

times formed part of the USSR. Consequently in the new history of the USSR we find part of the history of ancient Assyria, Persia and other countries, because parts of those ancient empires now are included in the USSR. In this fashion the whole history of the USSR is written, and published by the Historical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as a school manual and for private study.

The authors of this three-volume manual are: Prof. R. Bazilevich, S. Bakhruskin, Lect. A. Fokht, and Prof. A. Pankratova, who is at the same time the editor-in-chief of the publication. The editor-in-chief is known to western European historians from her participation in international historical congresses; she evidently enjoys the confidence of the Soviet government as she was entrusted with the editorship of this manual, which is to become the basic book for the political education of thousands of Soviet citizens, and reflecting accurately the national Soviet policy.

This last objective is fulfilled by the manual, because regardless of the fact that there exists a formal federal system of the Soviets and that there even are "independent" states like Ukraine and many others, the whole Soviet Union in the manual is "our country", the Russian nation "is the elder brother," from whom all other peoples received their education and in whose image they grew, regardless of the circumstance that the Russian people are culturally so much younger than the people of Ukraine, the Caucasus and Turkestan.

An alleged economic and spiritual dependence of these peoples upon the Russians is the leading idea of the work and this is extended even into the eras when the said people had little to do with Muscovy or even to the times when Muscovy didn't exist.

This treatment applies particularly to the Soviet version of Ukrainian history and particularly to its oldest period in the Kiev state. In this regard the Soviet history differs little from the old tsarists histories, and in defining the name of the country they deftly avoid the application of the name Ukraine to the Ukrainian territories but call its inhabitants either "South European Slavs", or Kievan Russians in spite of the fact that the name of Russia is applicable to the oldest era of Russian history.

The USSR manual adheres strictly to the principles of Marxian dialectics, and this can hardly be done without making facts fit the argument or altering history fit the Marxian doctrine.

Concerning Ukraine, this history of the USSR contains certain material which enhances its value. On the other hand events pointing to a difference or even an antagonism between Ukraine and Muscovy are either omitted in the manual, distorted or handled with little respect for truth. In this history of the USSR Ukraine of the old Kievan era is mentioned as Southern or South Western Russia. By juggling with the names of Rus' and Russia and above all with the adjective Russians it is made to appear as if that masterpiece of ancient Ukraine, her heroic epic, "The Tale of the Campaign of Ihor" was a Russian poem, as if it had taken place not in Ukraine, but in the region of Moscow, and as if the heroes of that poem were not Ukrainian princes, but princes of the Suz-day-Rostov or Muscovite region.

The same kind of Muscovite cultural imperialism manifests itself in the manual with regard to the people of Asia and the Caucasus regardless of the fact that during the existence of the Kievan state they were either independent countries or belonged to other Asiatic states in existence at the beginning of the second millennium of the Christian era.

Why Ukrainians or White Ruthenians of the 14-17 centuries, who lived in the Lithuano-Polish state should have possessed a "Russian-national culture" the manual does not explain.

Critical events in the Ukraine-Russian relations like the revolt of Hetman Mazepa against Muscovy are presented with a bias, while the revolt of Hetman Mazepa is here reduced to a personal row; instead being regarded as national uprising of Ukraine against Muscovy, as it was in reality.

Naturally the most conspicuous partiality is found in the most recent Soviet events. The struggle of the Ukrainian people in the World I for liberation is presented as the action of the bourgeois elements opposing the interests of the workmen and peasants of Ukraine, although exactly the contrary was the truth. The Ukrainian people were struggling against the Russian domination of Ukraine and only the intervention of the Red Army from the North gave the advantage to a small group of Ukrainian Quislings.

On the events of Russian history this work gives a great deal of interesting material which is presented clearly and concisely. Consequently the manual is easy to read, and gives good information about Muscovite history and the development of Moscow into an empire.

The USSR manual of history published by the Soviet Academy of

Sciences, under the editorship of A. P. Pankratova is interesting from another angle. It is being used in the Soviets as a manual for the same type of school as the American High Schools, and therefore it is a standard and obligatory manual for the education on and the political training of youth at the age of its maturing ideology. Such a manual is forced by Moscow also upon the schools of Ukraine, White Ruthenia and other nations. It is written strictly in the spirit of the Russian highly imperialist patriotism which represents other cultured nations of the USSR, as the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Uzbeks, Armenians, Georgians as minor satellites around the Sun of Muscovy.

The object of such a presentation of the USSR is to generate in these people a feeling of inferiority with regard to the great Russian nation.

N. D. Chubaty

WHY THEY BEHAVE LIKE RUSSIANS by *John Fischer, Harper Brothers,*
New York, 1947—262 pp.

John Fischer does not pose as an expert on Russia, but his account of life and conditions in the USSR is convincing and makes absorbing reading. An earnest student of Russian affairs since 1933, he spent two months in Ukraine as a member of an UNRRA mission. Meeting in his official capacity a number of Moscow officials, he was able to verify his previous observations. It is his analysis of the USSR, not his picture of life in Ukraine, that represents the backbone of his interesting study. His anecdotal conception of Ukraine as a free, independent, almost sovereign country, and his description of the Ukrainians as the friendliest, most hospitable, even if slightly disgruntled people owing to national pride, does not detract from the fact that in the structure and in the long range policy of the Muscovite empire, Ukraine forms the unwilling but essential key-stone. The immense significance of this fact becomes more striking in the same ratio as we become acquainted with the background and the true character of Muscovy.

Geographically, strategically and economically the USSR apparently

rests upon foundations of great potential security. On the other hand her political framework reveals something entirely different. The extreme nervousness of the real rulers of Russia indicates that they live in a state of acute fear. In fact nothing could testify to the severe jitters of the Kremlin rulers than that episode described by Fischer on pp. 1-3. No set of rulers in the world ever needed to have their every step watched so carefully as do the members of the Politburo in the Kremlin.

"One report which I believe to be reasonably accurate" says Fisher, "placed the internal security budget for 1945 at 7,000,000,000 rubles, which sum in view of the country's enfeebled position is not a trifle. Who is then so scared? And why?"

"In the background there is always the NKVD, beyond question the most efficient and most pampered organization in USSR. Its special Army, including Border and Internal Security forces, probably numbers less than a half a million men, but they are the best trained, best equipped and most handsomely uniformed troops in the Soviet Union. Its secret police is at least two or three times as large. No foreigner, and for that matter no one outside the Politburo, knows, but the estimate given me by a number of diplomats with long experience in Russia, never ran to less than two million."

It seems significant that any government should feel the need for such lavish precautions, especially a government which has just crushed its only foreign enemies. But evidently "papa" Stalin knows best.

Only if we consider the true political anatomy of USSR, is it possible to understand, in view of the above, what makes the gigantic Russian clock tick and what makes the men who keep it wound shudder with fear.

We know that the population of the USSR is not organized into nationalistic, cultural, denominational, economic or partisan groups. There are no national constructive political interests holding the huge USSR together. Any two or three persons caught whispering may, and often do, disappear suddenly, never to be heard of again. But there exist natural centrifugal forces tending to disrupt the Muscovite empire, although no one dares to breath a word about them.

In addition to these internal hostile forces the world seems to have scanty reasons to regard with sympathy the aggressiveness and the predatory character of the Muscovite empire. The whole world knows Russia as a child of Asia with all the Asiatic rapacity and autocratis

habits; it is well known now that the USSR owes its aggressive position to a series of ghastly blunders committed by the allied leaders. Consequently it is difficult to interpret the ominous ticking of the USSR machinery as anything else but a menace and a terror, internally and externally.

There are at least five separate elements in that pattern of fear that hangs around Russia like a nightmare.

"One of these, no doubt, is sheer personal anxiety. The men behind the red wall remember how they rose to power and they do not intend to leave that route open to any other group of determined conspirators. Many Russian rulers died by violence. Most of all they remember the murder of Sergei Kirov."

When Kirov was shot in his Leningrad office, he was Stalin's closest friend and heir apparent. He was killed by a comrade Nicolaev, until that moment a trusted member of the Party. For sixteen years there had been no attempt to assassinate a leader in the Soviet hierarchy and all the costly and sensitive antennae of the secret police had failed to transmit any hint of danger.

For forty-eight hours after the shot was fired Stalin seemed to trust no one in Russia. He hurried to Leningrad to question the murderer personally. For three years afterwards Russia trembled from fear under Stalin's purges and vindictive persecution.

The other reasons for fear are Russia's geographical position, the traditional distrust of foreigners, the immensity of the economic task and, finally, the tremendous risk involved in expansion. The rulers of the USSR know that there is no other force to keep the empire intact than terror exercised by the Communist Party, which is a conspiracy ruthlessly disciplined and masked by secrecy. At the same time it is not a party. Today's Soviet regime resembles nothing quite so much as it does the government of medieval Spain. The Conspiracy—called 'the "Party" for obvious reasons—like the ancient religious order, places its dedicated men in most, if not all, public offices. It alone purveys the True Faith, and its Inquisition, the secret police of the NKVD, mercilessly ferrets out heretics. It sees its mission as the salvation of all mankind and any tolerance for the heathen abroad can be nothing less than sin. Its missions carry the gospel to benighted lands at the risk of prison, hardships and sometimes of life itself. The original Catechism of Faith has been preserved.

Becoming a Communist is as difficult as joining the Jesuit Order. The canons and precepts of St. Ignatius Loyola in severity and strict accuracy are not a sky beyond the discipline enforced in training Communist missionaries. After a long apprenticeship in good works and the study of sacred books, the candidate's name is put forward by three old members and if his record, character and knowledge of Marxian scriptures can pass the examination of the hierarchy, he finally is sworn into the order. From that day forward, his life belongs to the Kremlin.

There is hardly any wonder that with such a tightly disciplined organization guiding the USSR, Allied efforts cannot make a scratch, let alone a dent in Muscovy's crucible steel armor.

Ivan Petrushevich

THE STORY OF UKRAINE: by Clarence A. Manning. *Philosophical Library* New York 1947. Pp. 1-326.

The growing importance of Ukraine drew during the last years at last also the attention of the science of the Anglo-American world. There appeared in 1940 the work of W. E. D. Allen. "The Ukraine", Cambridge a strange book, anti-Ukrainian, anti-Russian, anti-Polish in tendency.

In the U.S.A. was published in 1944 "Ukraine: A Submerged Nation" by W. H. Chamberlin—a very precious sketch by this worldwide-traveled publicist whose Christian conscience compelled him to understand the roots of a problem he saw and felt in the Soviet Union. And now appears the first short history of Ukraine by a distinguished American scholar of Columbia University, Prof. C.A. Manning who for a decade has undertaken the same role in the elucidation of the scientific truth about Ukraine in American historical science as Prof. Seton Watson played for Czecho-Slovakia in English historical science.

Prof C.A. Manning presents not only to American but also to Slavonic science a book of great lasting value. The first time a American historical book on Ukrainian history, an American who deeply believes in American ideals which have built up his nation and mighty state, who instinctively has grasped the basic relationship of the Ukrainian spirit and ideals with the ideals of America.

This right apprehension of the democratic spirit of the Ukrainian people gave Prof. Manning the possibility to present by a comparative method Ukrainian events with the history of Europe and the United States in a quite extraordinary broadness of view and with a deep understanding of the creative ideas of the times . . . This constant comparative synthetic outlook on Ukrainian history with quite new glimpses and connections to American ideas and events, really enriched historical research.

This book will give to the American of Ukrainian extractions, who have not seen Ukraine, the right standpoint for their minds and hearts to understand the country of their ancestors and I am sure ,it will also deepen the love and respect for these ideals which constitute the spiritual and moral foundation of this country.

Prof. Manning gives in 27 chapters the history of Ukraine throughout the ages. He presents in broad lines the geopolitical position of Ukraine, its economic resources and explains real meanings of terms "Rus" and "Ukraine", a very important matter for the right understanding of East-European history. He concentrates his representation of Ukrainian history on the Kievan Rus, the kozaks with their leading statesmen, Khmelnycky and Mazepa, the national revival in Eastern Ukraine, which led to the revolution of 1905. Separate chapters embrace: World War I—Ukraine's independence and fall, Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, so-called "Soviet Ukraine" and finally World War II. Special chapters are devoted to the cultural influences which Ukraine received and which Ukraine exercised on Moscow.

I should like now to attach to several chapters a few remarks—partly as suggestions for the second edition, partly to the connections of Ukraine with the West which may interest an American partly as comments on points about which the scientific debate is not yet as closed.

It would be useful to mention before the chapter on Kievan Rus the great role which the Ukrainian territory play in Teutonic history throughout the Great Gothic Realm. Realm and its contact with the Greek Byzantine World was the cradle of the creation of the Gothic alphabet of Wulfillas bible-translation and the acceptance of christianity by the Goths.

There are many traces from the linguistic point of view that christianity in a very vague form had found already in these old times entrance to the Slavonic ancestors of the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky even accepts a great influence on military and organizational matters, Scher-

bakivsky on the whole family structure (the old matriarchate was replaced by the patriarchy). Also would be very helpful for the right estimation of the present "eurasianic" talk to give a few lines about the family relation of the old Rus-Ukrainian dynasty to the dynasties of Western Europe especially Scandinavia, England, Germany, Poland, Austria and France. To France old Ukraine gave the famous Queen Anna, who brought to Paris an old Ukrainian gospel—the book on which the French kings took their oaths during the coronation until the Revolution.

In the next chapters is a very important idea not clearly enough formulated. After the downfall of Kiev in 1240 Ukrainian culture and its political traditions continued to flourish in the Galician-Wolynian Kingdom under the rule of a very capable dynasty, and later under the protection of the expanding Lithuanian Kingdom. The study of Lithuanian history taught that the conception "from the Baltic to the Black Sea" formulated in the slogan "from sea to sea"—falsely attributed to the Polish and therefore hated by all Western Ukrainians—is in reality a Lithuanian conception and originally a Lithuanian slogan. As the Lithuanian state at that time was completely under the influence of the Kievan culture and Ukrainian traditions, I am convinced that this conception had originated with Ukrainian and White Ruthenian influences. The idea of the federation or a dynastical union of Lithuanian White Ruthenia and Ukraine—(Gediminas, rex Lithuanorum et multorum Ruthenorum; Witold, rex Lithuaniae et Rutheniae)—was politically and geographically a great achievement of the early Ukrainians.

I should like in original Lithuano-White Ruthenian-Ukrainian idea to see a natural antagonist to Moscow. Here the nucleus of "a commonwealth of peoples" with the Lithuanian program. "We respect the old traditions of the other nations and don't introduce undesirable novelties (national or religious restrictions)"; there in Moscow the idea of the asiatic despotism of the Golden Horde—the tsaristic absolutism. Already in these times the two opposite ideas for the organization of Eastern Europe were crystallized.

I understand that the problem of the Church-Union is very complicated. But I decidedly cannot follow the author's opinions on this matter. I don't think that all Poles considered the Union only as a means for polonization, such personalities as Sigismund III and Skarga certainly not. On the other hand I believe that many Ukrainian leaders were deeply conscious of the great advantages of the Church-Union not only as a

religious idea but also as a spiritual-cultural orientation to Western Europe, to be a part of which was always the wish and will of the Ukrainian nation.

The roots of these traditions extend down to Danylo who received the King's crown from the Pope, to Kievan Princes who supported as founders the monasteries at Bamberg and Regensburg—till to the St. Olga . . . The Turks had in these times put an end to all cultural influences of Byzantium, therefore only in the West shone for Ukraine the sun of civilization. In the chapter about Mazepa, it is worth mentioning that the economic policy of this great hetman of Ukraine drew the attention to the Ukraine of A. Smith (*Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*), one of the founders of the scientific economics. Surely, of considerable interest to the Western reader would be the activity of the Mazepian emigration under the leadership of P. Orlyk, whose immensely valuable memoirs have been found in the Archives of the Quai d'Orsay, the French State Department (partly edited by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute Volume XVII).

His son, a French Marshal, who fell in battle against the Prussian, was the instigator of Voltaire's, "*Histoire d'Ukraine*" in which the famous French writer declared: "Ukraine a toujours aspirer d'être libre!" One more remark: that after the liquidation of Mazepa's rise, Tsar Peter proposed the Hetman-ship of Ukraine to the Duke of Marlborough, the ancestor of W. Churchill. The descendant of the last Hetman Rozumowsky was sent as Russian ambassador to Vienna and with him the whole family was practically exiled in order to annihilate every semblance of the Hetman traditions, after which they then accepted Austrian citizenship. This ambassador was the protector of Beethoven, whose many compositions were dedicated to Count Rozumowsky.

The awakening of Ukraine in the last two centuries was the result of manifold influences of Western Europe, its literary and political movements and the creation of new sciences. Herder, naturally, had a tremendous influence on the Slavonic world, but it is important not to forget that the original roots of his ideas had been in England. That Kulish was also the translator of the Bible and Shakespeare's immortal plays is of importance for Western students to remember because it explains the spiritual climate the then leaders of Ukraine lived in.

To understand Ukrainian political life under Tsarism as well as in present times—one must constantly bear in mind that all Ukrainian pol-

itical actions were conducted underground by secret centres. Two examples (which explain some parts of the respective chapters) may be enough: Drahomaniw was the envoy of the Kievan "Stara Hromada" sent for a well-considered political mission to Western Europe in order to defend Ukraine, to mobilize European public opinion to its support after the terrible blow—the prohibition of the Ukrainian language in Russia, to coordinate action with Galician Ukrainians and by printing books in free countries to oppose by establishing of facts this barbarious tsaristic policy. A similar mission had Prof. Michael Hrushevsky overtaking the chair of Eastern European history at Lviv university.

Exceptionally fine is the chapter "Developments in Western Ukraine." The most recent times are too rich in events that we understand the difficulties of the author to condense the historical material. Current events as usual could be disputable. At the end is an omission of the book which arose, in my opinion, by the intention of the author not to touch hot current politics. Yet it is impossible to evade this necessity and not to include in the next edition a chapter about the "Activity of Ukrainian Political Emigration between two World Wars". Such a chapter is necessary to understand the present times.

Professor C.A. Manning is decidedly right in calling Ukraine one of the great problems of the world. This problem interested previously Bismark and Napoleon and the present occupation of Ukraine by Moscow is the geopolitical reason of all the problems of Europe and the Near East. This occupation is also the reason why there is no peace in the world. The future development of Ukraine, Prof. C.A. Manning is absolutely right, depends "on the future of the democratic ideals which have been held by England, the U.S.A. and the whole Western Christian civilization and which are now challenged by new ideas of the Soviet Union".

It will remain Prof. C.A. Manning's great merit in such a late hour to arouse the public opinion of the U.S.A. about the gravity of the coming decisions which approach the democratic world with rapidity.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"NOS COMPATRIOTES UKRAINIENS", by V. J. Kisilewsky. *Relations, Revue du mois, July, 1947, Montreal, Canada.*

In this remarkably informative periodical under the able direction of the Jesuits of Quebec appears the above titled article by a Ukrainian-Canadian with the obvious objective of acquainting non-Ukrainian Canadians with the background and general significance of their compatriot Ukrainian Canadians. Within the space allotted him, the author performs an excellent service in presenting compactly the salient facts concerning the 300,000 Ukrainians of the Canadian population—the comparative recency of their immigration at the end of the 19th century, their geographical distribution in Canada, especially in the Prairie provinces, the difficulties involved in the registration of their country of origin, the economic motives of their migration, the agricultural tradition of the Ukrainian stock, and pertinent details on the Austro-Hungarian background from which they largely came.

"REMINISCENCES FROM LWOW, 1939-1946", by Zygmunt Sobieski, *Journal of Central European Affairs, January, 1947, Boulder, Colorado.*

The author of this profoundly interesting report on the chaotic conditions in Lwów, Western Ukraine, from 1939 to 1946, was a secondary school teacher there during this period and witnessed at first hand the macabre activities of the Russians and Germans during their respective occupations of the area. The article is literally packed with concrete data which provide a fairly broad picture of the gruesome events that occurred at that time. It is to the great credit of the writer that this vivid portrayal of these intimate events shows concretely the substantially identical propaganda techniques and methods of systematic coercion, climaxed always by unimaginable mass brutality and extermination, of both our allied Russians and the German enemy. The Russian massacre of about 12,000 interned Polish officers in the Katyn forest is held up as an indisputable fact for Poles generally. The technique of "in-

tensive revolution" now so methodically utilized by the Russian communists is also shown in bold use to win over the Ukrainian population of Western Ukraine. Yet, despite these noteworthy features, the essay is unmistakably marred by several fatal weaknesses arising from illegitimate abstractionism, evident personal bias, and ambiguities verging on open contradiction.

Thus, in his depiction of the first Soviet occupation of 1939-41, the author conveys the unfounded notion that Ukrainian nationalists were then blissfully enjoying a conspiratorial respite awaiting the inevitable Russo-German outbreak to erect their united Ukraine, and only the helpless Poles were being deported to Siberia. But, as a matter of stubborn fact, an equally significant mass deportation of genuine Ukrainians occurred at the same time and accounted thereby for the thousands of Western Ukrainians strewn presently about Asia, while Ukrainian "sell-outs" remained to occupy administrative positions in the execution of the communist program. With this seemingly purposeful omission of vital facts, the author then proceeds to attribute a pro-German orientation to Ukrainians generally in the period from 1941-44, during which time they allegedly collaborated with the Germans against, again, the helpless Poles. As in many other countries where certain small fanatical groups tied their opportunist future to the Nazi mission, so their here in Western Ukraine a blind minority attached itself to the German machine. But to generalize this, as the author unabashedly does, smacks of a lapse in integrity, especially when the facts of the early partisan opposition to German subjugation, as authoritatively revealed by Josef Guttmann in his article on the "Limits of Terror" in the April issue of the *Modern Review*, show clearly the deep resentment of the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians against the Nazi refusal to grant independence to Ukraine in the early stages of German occupation. Finally, as a sort of climax to his abstractionist construction of the facts, the writer does not hesitate to stress the point that the Germans since the beginning of this century have utilized the Ukrainian elements to create political tension in Poland, and thus implies, therefore, that without the former, the latter would have probably not occurred. Anyone, even casually conversant with Polish-Ukrainian relations in this area, knows the value of such an observation. This deliberate stigmatization of the Western Ukrainian population is finally explained when the writer states that the final Soviet occupation sought to eliminate the Polish

population from this region in order, by a *fait accompli*, to deprive Poland of ethnographical arguments at any future Peace Conference. That Poland has any such valid arguments concerning a territory historically not its own is good cause for amusement.

The telling of incidents bearing especially on personal experiences is always of keen interest to any live reader, but it is bad taste to distort them by innuendo. Further, to cast them in ambiguous statements bordering on contradiction forces one to lose confidence in the author's ability to present the facts candidly. For example, on the first page, the writer indicates in statistically inaccurate terms that the Ukrainian "majority" in Lwow during the designated years was only 15%, but later, in discussing the religious character of the population, he states that the "Greek Catholics represent the **absolute majority** of the population". These Greek Catholics are Ukrainians, while the Poles in the main are Roman Catholics. What, then, is the obvious conclusion? Yet, the last sentence of the article, in the face of historical fact, runs, "Lwow was no longer a **Polish city**."

"THE WESTERN FRONTIERS OF RUSSIA", by Robert Strausz-Hupe. *The Review of Politics*, July, 1947. *The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana*

This well-balanced article, written by a member of the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, concerns itself with a consideration of the geographic and ethnographic factors determining the "natural" frontiers of Russia in Europe. Finding both unsatisfactory for any clear-cut delineation of a natural frontier, the author maintains that the frontier policies of Russia are dominated essentially by strategic consideration. Thus in the expansion of Russia, the new Soviet-Polish frontier is viewed as satisfying minimally the needs of Russian defense by vesting it with control over the northern and southern approaches of the Pripet Marshes. Further satisfaction of these needs is seen in the extension of the Soviet Sphere of Influence which equips Russia with strategic power in the Baltic area and in the Danubian Basin. Finally, concludes the author, the U.S.S.R. is meeting its first test in the cultural and political assimilation of these various peoples within the spheres of domination. Force and Marxist dialectics will not permanently solve the "struggles for national and cultural independence" of these peoples and meet the "centrifugal tendencies" of world trade and the urban civilization of the West which affect them.

The descriptive aspects of this analysis, as far as it goes, are instructive and the truth of its conclusion on the intrinsic impermanency of rule by force is well taken. Yet, the article is lacking wholly in perspective and historical vision. The writer recognizes the utter indispensability of Ukraine to Russian power, in fact the Russian life line runs from Moscow to Kharkov and he is aware of the existence of Ukrainians in former Poland, but he leaves all this as just incidental facts without a past, just facts in an historical vacuum. Consequently, many of his assertions, made within the acutely limited context with which his knowledge of Eastern Europe provides him, are proportionately limited in perspective. Thus, first, the historical character of Western Ukraine is completely overlooked; instead, an intimation of its erroneous Polish complexion is given in the statement that "a more westerly demarcation . . . would have doomed Poland to the loss of **additional historic territories**". Secondly, the article manifests further unfamiliarity with Eastern European affairs and history on the part of the author when he asserts that "Eastern Europe, with its long history of struggles for national and cultural independence, cannot be likened to the multi-national, yet parochial Soviet state". It would be highly instructive to be told by the writer where in Eastern Europe has there been any such struggle more lengthy and persistent than in Ukraine. And as for the "worth of the Soviet system (meeting) its first major test on **alien soil**", the author would profit immensely by an investigation of Russo-Ukrainian relations since 1709. All the techniques of "intensive revolution" throughout Eastern and Central Europe now being employed by Russia, the ethnic boundaries of which are truly those of the Russian republic of the Union, have been already tested on the alien soil of Ukraine.

"THE WESTERN CHURCH LOOKS EASTWARD". *editorial. America, a Catholic Review of the Week, May 10, 1947, New York*

In its concise synopsis of the religious schism existing between the East and West, created originally on "relatively insignificant" grounds, this editorial points to the attempted reunion of the 15th century when the document of union was signed in 1439 by Cardinal Isidore, Metropolitan of Kiev, only to be repudiated in 1472 by Constantinople. However, by 1595 partial union was effected when millions of Ukrainians led by six bishops, headed in turn by Metropolitan Rohoza, joined the Roman communion.

..... It is encouraging to note the recognition on the part of the editor

at times, of fellow Catholics of Latin rite". Reference is evidently made here to the several persecutions of Ukrainians by their Polish Catholic brethren. Also, note is taken of the current Moscow attempt to force these Ukrainian Catholics into the Russian Orthodox camp in order to sever their loyal ties with Rome, but fortunately with little success. And lastly, the note that the editor strikes on the fundamental necessity for the "development of understanding between those of different rites" as a preparatory step toward greater Christian Union is unquestionably of deep and prayerful concern to all genuine Christians because "Rome (simply) stands ready to welcome back her dissident children." More than that will be necessary in relatively less essential matters of ecclesiastical organization and practice if the countless non-Roman Catholics of both East and West are to unite with Rome and confront the world once again with the greatest moral force in human history.