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Spring, 1954

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▨ Ukrainian ethnographic territory

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MORAL WORLD LEADERSHIP AND THE SUBJECT NATIONS

Editorial

In an address at the Commencement and 150th anniversary of the University of South Carolina, Hon. Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, said: "We cannot knock out false ideas by bullets; we must counter and destroy them with truth, with superior ideas and sound philosophy."¹ These are the words of a man who is regarded as one of the greatest industrialists in the United States; who to-day, under the President, controls in the name of the American people the most powerful weapons in the world, the immense American supply of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Yet, it is this man who sees the victory of freedom not in the American high industrial potential nor in the supply of super-weapons, but in the winning of the souls of the overwhelming majority of mankind in becoming the moral leader of the world.

Coming from such a man, these words have a deep meaning. At the present time, the two opposing camps, the free world headed by Washington and the enslaved world dominated by Moscow, both possess atomic weapons capable of destroying entire nations. Perhaps no political leader will deliberately start a war of global destruction; it is only by morally isolating the despotic leadership with the approval of the majority of mankind that the free world can win the victory. We must, therefore, fight for the souls of men. The Soviet Union can be defeated "if we make geography and peoples work for us and not against us" in the words of Hanson W. Baldwin, the military editor of the *New York Times*.²

Vice President Richard M. Nixon has clearly defined the way in which we can win that moral world leadership. Speaking at the outdoor Commencement exercises at Whittier College in California on June 12, 1954, he said: "The United States as leader of the Free World can defeat Communism in Asia only by recognizing that the aspirations of underprivileged peoples transcend material assistance. Along with the

¹*New York Times*, June 8, 1954.

²*New York Times*, *Sunday Magazine*, April 18, 1954.

economic progress, Asians want independence from any foreign domination; equal personal, cultural and religious dignity with the other peoples of the world."³ But this is not only true of the Asian peoples; it is true of all peoples and it is especially true of the peoples now dominated by the Soviet Union.

"We can win only if we associate ourselves vigorously and unequivocally with the aspirations of the people for economic progress, independence, peace and equality," the Vice-President went on.

"As a country that fashioned its own independence and gave independence to the Philippines, we are in excellent position to prove to people, who desire independence, that we are on their side."

The remarks of the Vice-President can be accepted without reservation, for we are in an excellent position to take over the moral world leadership, if we will act vigorously and unequivocally for the liberation of all peoples who are enslaved by any one.

Unfortunately, our present policy in this global struggle for the souls of the enslaved peoples is not too vigorous, unequivocal and effective. In support of this we need only cite the address of Hon. John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, before the 45th Convention of the Rotary International in Seattle, Washington, on June 10, 1954, two days before the ringing words of the Vice-President.⁴

Mr. Dulles stated that our policy "favoring increasing self-government of dependent peoples is guided by the Charter of the United Nations." Then: "It came naturally to the United States to take a lead in this matter. Yet American initiative has been hampered by the colonial interests of our allies; this has given the communists material to launch a vigorous propaganda against the United States and to charge this country with protecting colonialism. Those who most loudly attack 'colonialism' have themselves, during this same nine-year period, extended their despotism to over 600 million peoples and deprived all or part of eleven once free nations of any semblance of genuine independence. Never before has the art of the big lie been so outrageously and boldly practiced," he added with reference to the satellite states of the USSR.

Turning to Indo-China, the Secretary said: "What is going on in Indo-China is a classic example of the communist strategy. There a Moscow-indoctrinated communist, Ho Chi Minh, was sent to China and then to Indo-China to exploit the nationalistic aspirations of the people. In Indo-China he utilized a revolutionary movement that attracted much genuine native support."

³ *New York Times*, June 13, 1954.

⁴ *New York Times*, June 11, 1954.

Naturally Mr. Dulles, as the American official directly responsible for our foreign policy, does not have the same freedom as Vice-President Nixon. His statement shows how far our present policy is from that vigorous and unequivocal program of the Vice-President.

First, it is based upon the Charter of the United Nations. However, the chapter of the Charter dealing with the freedom of nations is already a dead letter, for Red Moscow is a signatory to it. Red Moscow has vetoed the admission of independent, peace-loving nations. It has enslaved its present satellites, even after it signed the Charter. It will veto any move of any kind which looks to the liberation of its victims, and therefore, our liberation program of peoples based on the section of the UN Charter will not work.

Secondly, the United States is still maintaining its strongly legalistic policy and is trying to infuse into it the spirit of morality and decency. Red Moscow is using revolutionary methods and pays no attention to the traditional principles of morality and decency and regards legalistic arguments as a device to fool its opponents. In such a conflict and on such principles, American policy can always be forced on the defensive.

Thirdly, our foreign policy completely ignores the modern dynamic force of nationalism which is so dear and close to Americanism. That spirit of nationalism is not only rising and dominating Asia and Africa. It is likewise on the march in Central and Eastern Europe in Western Asia, and in the Soviet Union itself. The "bourgeois nationalism" of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union is the weakest spot in the armor of the Kremlin, a permanent headache for any communist leader; in spite of this, however, we are unable to exploit it for the advantage of the free world.

Unlike America, the overlords of the Kremlin are carefully studying this dynamic force throughout the world, so as to direct it against us; especially, in those areas where American policy for the sake of expediency and the favor of our allies is urged to make some form of compromise with colonialism and oppression. The Communist leaders are well aware that America is not trying to turn that weapon against them. They know that America is not utilizing the nationalism of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and so, they can the more safely charge America with the "protection of colonialism" and not without success. This is why not only the people of Indo-China but all other colonial peoples inspired by the idea of national independence are becoming less friendly toward our country which produced the liberal ideas of the Declaration of Independence, the ideas of Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson and which should be the leader of national liberation movement over the entire world without any restriction.

This fact has not escaped the notice of our delegates at the last Assembly of the United Nations. Mrs. Frances P. Bolton and Mr. James P. Richards, both members of Congress, called the attention of the American people to "the unsympathetic and even inimical attitude toward this nation among representatives of nations normally regarded as friends and allies."⁵

We can understand the reason for this when we read that Mr. Dulles in redefining the American foreign policy speaks of the eleven nations enslaved by red Moscow. They are the eleven satellite states which have passed within the iron curtain. Yet every student of the Soviet Union knows that the Kremlin has enslaved and partially exterminated at least eleven other peoples who were earlier included in the Soviet Union and given the rank of component republics until it suited the Kremlin to apply its methods of genocide. Among them the sore spot of the Soviet Union is Ukraine, with her 40 million westerly oriented peoples, and the 10 million Byelorussians; Armenians and Georgians whose culture begins in the Roman epoch, and who do not exist in the redefinition of American policy made by Mr. Dulles.

Ukraine and the other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of the satellite states can be easily roused to suspicion of the sincerity of the American liberation policy, when the Secretary of State overlooks the fact that Soviet genocide has been applied with especial fury toward the enslaved non-Russian nationalities with no word from America. They cannot forget too, that after World War I, these peoples in their efforts at liberation from the Tsars received little or no support from America. President Wilson proclaimed the thoroughly democratic doctrine of self-determination of all peoples, but when the Russian Empire dissolved into its component parts, the American government had no understanding for the efforts of the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the peoples of Caucasus and Central Asia, who had declared their independence and were struggling to maintain it against the Red and the White Russians, strictly in accordance with the American doctrine of self-determination.

This passivity on the part of the United States allowed the triumph of the communists. Even to-day, thirty six years later, our country has not spoken unequivocally of the need of recognizing these aspirations of the non-Russian peoples under the Soviet yoke. It is small wonder that they do not know where America stands. They feel in their hearts the American love of liberty but they are perplexed at the American policy. In their minds they cannot know their fate, in case communism should

⁵ *New York Times*, April 25, 1954.

fall, and their hesitation is only confirmed when they see the temporizing policy of the United States and its unwillingness to speak clearly. The confused policy of such American organizations as the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism only increases their suspicions and excites distrust. It does more than that for the nations struggling against colonialism outside the iron curtain; they share this same hesitation, when they see the United States, in the life and death struggle for liberty, freedom and the survival of Western civilization, still silent on this all important subject and temporizing with colonialism because of its allies.

The old routine treatment of foreign affairs is not enough at the present time. The subject peoples of the entire world are marching toward a full liberation and independence. They want to be the masters of their own fate, the captains of their souls, the rulers of their own territories. The peoples of the Soviet Union, headed by Ukraine, are in the forefront of this movement. No power will be able to halt it. Even the brute force of the Soviet Union has failed in this. The Kremlin sees itself forced to make concessions to save its own skin; it relies also on the silence of America to allow it to bring the new satellite nations into the same positions as the Ukrainians and the others of thirty years ago. Undiscouraged as yet, the Soviet Union is taking heart to prepare a joint economy for itself and the satellite states, just as in the 1920's it prepared amid American silence a joint economy for the Russians and the non-Russian peoples of the USSR for the benefit of the Red Kremlin. American inaction encourages them and it discourages those who have risked everything to oppose the spread of communism.

Moscow proclaims independence for all the peoples of this world. It uses propaganda and the big lie to assure them of its interest. It uses revolutionary methods to fan the flames of nationalism for its own interests, while it treats as colonials not only the people outside its borders who are charmed by its siren call in the satellite states but those in Ukraine and elsewhere... America theoretically proclaims independence for all peoples but expediency and the desire to please our allies makes us hesitate and thus fall a prey for communist propaganda.

We draw back to please our allies. We follow a legalistic policy and to avoid interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union as of any other foreign country, we fail to make it clear that we really believe in universal liberty. Actions speak louder than words; and only our action can successfully compete with the big lie of the Kremlin.

If we would seize the world leadership on moral grounds — we must take a positive stand for the liberation of all subject nations. We must speak for Ukraine and Byelorussia' and the other nations oppressed by the Soviets as we do for those who are now threatened.

We cannot proclaim the march of truth as the Freedom Committee does, and bid it halt at the borders of the Soviet Union, the leader of the enslaved world. The free Voice of America cannot be silent on national oppression and the revolutionary movements of the peoples of USSR to be independent from Moscow. We must make it clear that colonialism must be destroyed and that that includes in the first instance the disintegration of the Soviet Union into free and independent states. We cannot stop halfway and rest content with old fashioned methods and theories, while communism is challenging us dynamically on every side.

We can win the moral world leadership but we must have a policy that applies to all peoples of the world. What shall that be?

1. We must proclaim a Universal Declaration of Independence for all peoples of the world and do our best to realize it.

2. That Universal Declaration of Independence must be applied, clearly and unequivocally also to the subject peoples in the Soviet Union and to the satellites, even at the risk of using revolutionary means and discounting our old legalistic formulas.

3. We must declare clearly and unequivocally that after the downfall of the Red Empire in Moscow, not only the satellite peoples swallowed up after World War II, not only the Baltic peoples sacrificed during the Soviet-Nazi flirtation, but all the nations forced into the Soviet Union will have the right to organize own governments on their own territories without foreign interference. The constituent assemblies of these today formally existing republics of the Soviet Union will then be duty bound to restore internal order and decide upon their relations with their neighbors.

4. America must abstain from any participation in efforts to help the powers practicing colonialism continue their methods. If that is true of the colonial powers of the present, so much more must America make it clear that it will not help emigres and refugees under a mystic banner to renew a dead colonialism of the past after the downfall of the Red Communist Kremlin Empire.

If America will take a firm stand for the liberation of all peoples, and will include the peoples like the Ukrainians and the other unfortunate groups that were forgotten thirty six years ago, it will substantially weaken the Soviet Communist propaganda inside and outside the Soviet Union. It will deprive the tyrants of its false claims to world leadership and will substitute the real faith in American liberty in the minds of millions everywhere. Then America will have truly the moral leadership of the world and can press on to its destined goal and be as it really desires to be the holder of the torch of liberty and of hope for mankind.

NATIONALISM VS. INTERNATIONALISM

By MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN

Member of U. S. Congress

The subject of Nationalism vs. Internationalism has been a topic of heated debate for well over half a century. Volumes have been written on the subject. Political parties and ideological movements have based their platform on one or the other side of this issue. Yet today there is great confusion and misunderstanding on just what these political terms mean. That is — there is great confusion in the non-communist world in general and among a considerable element of the non-communist intellectuals in particular. It can be said with certainty that this confusion does not exist in the ideological Marxist camp or among its multi-colored agents.

This confusion results mainly from a perversion of both political terms which has taken place in the last quarter of a century. The unhappy practice of fixing an evil and all inclusive meaning to words, a practice which received unusual impetus during the World War II, has also added to this confusion. In this atmosphere the advocates of Marxism have been enjoying an undisturbed political holiday. Their formula for maintaining an unchallenged right of way is to occasionally stir up the false beliefs they have created about nationalism while devoting a constant effort at promoting the type of internationalism best calculated to lead the way to world communism.

There is a healthy nationalism and a healthy internationalism — both of which are mortal enemies of Marxism in any form. When they are healthy they in no way conflict with one another, but in reality compliment each other. Properly nurtured and exploited these two political forces could lead the way in lifting the heavy chains of Russian Communism which now enslave a minimum of 29 nations and part of 4 other nations.

As a first step we must understand the component parts of healthy nationalism. The term nationalism is derived from and related to the term nation. The nation is best defined as a people having a common and distinctive heritage, culture, tradition, folklore and language which is supported by a geographical contiguity. When these basic factors are stimulated by one or several of the great inspirational forces of

religion, freedom or independence, the flower of nationhood blooms. Healthy nationalism places loyalty to one's nation very high on the scale of human values. In a popular sense it is best described by the inspiring phrase "Love of God and Country."

The American revolutionary war which gave birth to our nation has long been regarded as the first major demonstration of healthy nationalism. The deep political impact upon the world of our victorious struggle for national independence caused historians to refer to the 19th Century as the "century of nationalism." We as a nation and the policy we pursued in the conduct of our foreign affairs, from the birth of our nation up to 1920, associated our destiny with the forces of nationalism at work in the world. We had nothing in common with the imperialists or the autocrats of that period and in reality we were coveted by all of them. Standing as the solitary republic in a world divided by empires which constantly sought to extend their realm, we survived and grew to our present stature in the world arena by supporting the forces of healthy nationalism. The Monroe Doctrine is a classic example of the manner in which our foreign policy welded the forces of nationalism against the predatory schemes of empires.

World War I opened at a point in history when nationalism was the most compelling force in world politics. The era of empires was coming to a close as the popular demands of the many nations bound within them called out for national sovereignty. The Russian Tzarist empire, appropriately called the prison of nations, was seething with discontent. The Austro-Hungarian empire had already made many concessions to the various national elements within the realm in an effort to stem the tide. The Ottoman empire was tottering from the same internal pressures. As the war progressed into its final stages it became increasingly apparent that the demands of nationalism would have to be faced up to in the post war settlements. It was in these circumstances that President Woodrow Wilson advanced the political principle of national self-determination as the only just formula for bringing order out of the ruins of those broken empires. It is important to note that Wilson, in taking this position, acted in accord with the basic principle which had guided our foreign policy for over 140 years.

Even before the end of World War I national independence movements sprang up throughout central and eastern Europe and Eurasia. The non-Russian nations of the Russian Tzarist Empire, long held captive by the autocrats of Muscovy, lost no time in proclaiming their national independence. The Ukrainian nation, the largest of these captive nations, was in the vanguard of this movement. By the time the statesmen of the great powers gathered in Paris for the peace conference, the era of

empires was dead and had already been replaced by the young but vigorous era of national sovereignty.

But that golden era which held so much hope for suffering mankind was short lived. President Wilson soon learned that the European statesmen were unconcerned with the popular movements supporting his principle of self-determination. They were more concerned with settlements based upon power politics, the cornerstone of which called for the establishment of a cordon sanitaire in eastern Europe. While paying lip service to the program advanced by President Wilson, the European statesmen reshaped the map of central and eastern Europe to fit their selfish and shortsighted notions of contemporary peace.

The peace settlements following World War I set the stage for the events which inevitably led the western world to its present precarious position. In the period between the great wars, the United States pursued a policy of isolationism. The hard disappointments brought about by the power politics settlements after World War I played a major role in the establishment of that policy. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks had established total power in Moscow. After creating the Russian Federated Socialist Republic of Soviets they then embarked upon a series of aggressive wars to defeat and absorb the non-Russian nations situated east of the newly erected cordon sanitaire. They were engaged in those aggressive wars as late as 1923. It is an established fact that the Bolshevik masters of Muscovy met with all out resistance from the people of the reborn non-Russian nations which sprang up upon the ruins of the feudal Tzarist empire. War in the traditional sense was not in itself sufficient to put down the spirit of national independence which swept like wildfire from the Baltic Sea to the areas east of the Caspian Sea. The brutal tactics of forced starvation, forced population transfers and the vast network of slave labor camps followed quickly on the heels of the Russian occupation of these reborn nations.

It was in these circumstances that the masters of the Kremlin announced to the world in 1922 the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After they had managed by armed aggression and the crime of genocide to re-establish the largest portion of the Russian empire, they found it necessary to create a cover name in order to hide the terrible events which had taken place east of the European created cordon sanitaire. Moreover, the Muscovites were anxious to avoid the charge of a resurgence of Russian super-racism and to retain the support of the advocates of world socialism. Thus the high sounding and cleverly misleading cover of U.S.S.R was launched in the international political arena.

Shortly thereafter a new political force was injected into the same political arena. It became known as national socialism, then as Naziism, or Fascism, and finally as super-racism. Some astute political observers of that period were quick to recognize the inherent anomaly in the political label "national socialism." How was it possible to have the ingredients of nationalism and socialism mixed in the same political movement? Obviously it was impossible to mix two diametrically opposed political theories. It was not long before the one world propagandists worked out the formula to resolve the anomaly. Nationalism equalled Naziism — Naziism equalled everything that was evil — therefore Nationalism equalled everything that was evil. But what of socialism? By a queer turn of the propagandists pen, Socialism became the bulwark of democracy. Socialism was the political system of the USSR — therefore the USSR was a democracy. By this process the experts in the use of weasel words put an evil curse upon nationalism in any form, while at the same time manufacturing a dynamically effective cover for the Muscovite plan of world conquest.

We entered World War II the victims of this diabolical perversion of political terms. The same must be said about the other sovereign nations of the West which entered the struggle against the axis powers. This accounts, in large measure, for our failure to develop a positive plan for the reconstruction of the post war world along truly democratic lines, with governments representative of the will of the people. In larger measure it accounts for the success of the masters of the Kremlin in extending their empire of ruthless control over 800 million people covering an area encompassing almost one third of the earth's surface.

It is in this context that we can best understand the "new internationalism" peddled by the multi-colored agents of Moscow. Only a fool or the Ivory Tower Theoreticians will fail to recognize that the dominant school of internationalism operating in the world today is completely possessed by the Russian communists. To be sure there are other schools of internationalism seeking adherents and supporters which are not attached to the Moscow orbit. Unfortunately none of these competing schools possess any real political dynamics of a magnitude comparable to the Russian-Communist movement. Moreover, none of them are backed by aggressive military forces such as clearly support the "new internationalism" promoted by the Muscovites in their age long drive for world empire.

From this analysis one might too quickly conclude that the Russian imperialists have discredited and killed off healthy nationalism and healthy internationalism. So far as healthy nationalism is concerned, just the contrary is the case. The chauvinistic practices of the Russians have

tremendously increased healthy nationalism within the Russian-Communist empire. Within the past year the civilized world has had ample proof to support this contention. These two examples bear out the point.

1. Shortly after Stalin was eliminated, Malenkov and Beria became engaged in a life and death struggle for total power. Malenkov, a Russian, chose the course of supporting the historic cause of Russian super-racism. Beria, a renegade Georgian, attempted to harness the powerful nationalist forces of the non-Russian nations of the U.S.S.R. to his side. Beria, as head of the dread secret police and commissar of the slave labor system, certainly knew the most dynamic political forces at work within the U.S.S.R. Since he was in a life and death struggle, he naturally wanted these forces in his camp. Malenkov on the other hand was the darling of the Russian bureaucracy and he had to cast his lot with traditional Russian super-racism. This struggle raged for months during which time Beria was replacing the Russian pro consuls in the non-Russian nations with natives of those nations. To be sure those natives were tied to communism but they opposed Russian domination of the affairs of their nation. Beria came very close to winning that struggle — the effect of which might well have caused a great revolutionary outbreak throughout the U.S.S.R. Only a deal between the Russian bureaucracy and the leaders of the Red Army saved the day for Russian super racism. Beria was arrested by the Red Army and executed, but the seeds of internal revolt were increased in consequence of his struggle for power.

2. This year marks the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav — the instrument by which the Russians enslaved the Ukrainians. The Russians are using this occasion for a never ending series of pronouncements and celebrations, all of which seek to prove that the Russians are the true friends of the Ukrainians. The official announcement of the Kremlin inaugurating these celebrations admitted that every decent Ukrainian down through history had struggled for the goal of national independence. It also claimed that the Ukrainian nation had finally attained its age long struggle for national independence — “thanks to the Russians and the Communist Party.” But what kind of national independence? They define it as national in form and socialist in substance. This of course means no independence at all. However it is important to note the manner in which the Muscovites are associating nationalism with socialism. This is most reminiscent of the tactics of Adolph Hitler.

Healthy nationalism is very much alive in the world today. It is more vigorous within the Russian communist empire than elsewhere in the world. This fact must be understood and exploited by the leaders

of the free world if we are going to have peace and freedom throughout the world while avoiding World War III.

Unfortunately the same can not be said about healthy internationalism. Internationalism as a theory and as a political practice has been thoroughly infected by the goals of world Marxism. The Russian Communist conspiracy has taken over the leadership in this field. Movements free from this infection have neither the internal dynamics nor the military support necessary to offset those sponsored or controlled by the Russian communists.

But we can build a healthy internationalism and one that would be far more powerful in the political arena than the Moscow brand. To accomplish this goal we must understand healthy nationalism. Then we must foster and support it as a counteracting force to World Communism. Having done this we will have taken the first step in creating a healthy internationalism.

The second step in this process calls for the development and support of free regional federations. These regional federations would be comprised of a number of sovereign and independent nations which freely elected to become party to the regional federation. The economic, political and security advantages of the regional federation concept would lead the way in gaining the support of the member states.

This pattern is completely consistent with the charter of the United Nations. Indeed it springs from the basic idea which created the association of American States which stands as a regional arrangement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

It is a sound pattern because it recognizes that healthy internationalism must be based upon full recognition of healthy nationalism. Moreover it supports a political philosophy which is consistent with the American way of life and therefore the antithesis of World Communism.

RUSSIAN BLACKMAIL OF THE WESTERN WORLD

By DMYTRO ANDRIYEVSKY

In August, 1953, the whole world heard the speech of Malenkov at the regular meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was the answer of the Bolsheviks to the proposal of the Western Great Powers to decide together the still unsettled problems of the peace with Germany. After the death of Stalin the Soviets adopted a peace-loving tone and people with short memories expected that Malenkov, after defeating Beria, would find a word of peace for the Western world. Instead of this, the Kremlin oligarch began to talk about the hydrogen bomb and announced that the Soviets already had this weapon of mass destruction. In the same speech he emphasized the historical Franco-German quarrel, stressed the danger to France from an armed Germany and thus tried to frighten the French. The speech of Malenkov sounded as a demand on the Western Powers not to permit the arming of Germany and as a threat of the use of the hydrogen bomb, if they did not listen to the Soviets.

Wherein lies the reason for Malenkov's tactics, very often little understood by the West? That reason is known to the peoples of Eastern Europe, who are familiar with Russian Bolshevism. With his verbal outburst Malenkov was obviously blackmailing the free world and striking at the most tender spot in international relations.

This declaration of Malenkov is only one of the incidents of the great game which Moscow is playing in the international field by various means, which appear superficially not coordinated, and which are internally linked by the common goal, which is the preservation of Russian power and its domination over other peoples.

Another element in this game is the action and the positions of the Russian emigration which we can observe at every moment and hour in the free world. Although this emigration is not Communist and is even anti-Bolshevik, the line of its policy often coincides with that of the Soviets. Usually the methods of its policy and its tactics resemble very much the policy and tactics of the Soviets. This is not strange, for both sides, guided by national interests, draw them from the historical experience of Russia. It is more surprising that foreign leaders fall victim

to the blackmail of the Russian imperialists without realizing that they are playing into the hands of the enemies of their countries.

Let us refer to a former conversation with a high American officer. This soldier, who had experience in many fields, during our conversation expressed himself as follows: "The United States must think not only of the third but also of the fourth World War." He believed, that "we should not put Russia into a position, where robbed of territory, it would have to seek a way out of an economic strait jacket through a new armed conflict..." In his opinion Russia without Ukraine would not be capable of existing, and so to escape a fourth war it would be necessary to leave Ukraine afterwards under Russian domination. This idea is completely wrong and is supported not by the facts of economics but it is inspired by the blackmail of the Russian imperialists, who declare that they can never consent to the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

Let us see how the question of the economic relations of Ukraine and Russia stand. In 1939 Stalin declared at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party the following: "In the past three years the base of surplus marketable grain has been transferred from the Ukraine, which used to be considered the granary of our country, to the north and east, to the Russian SSR. It is well known that in the past two or three years the Ukraine provided about 400 million poods of grain annually, while the Russian SSR in these years provided 1.1-1.2 billion poods of surplus marketable grain annually."¹ So Russia can get along without Ukrainian grain without the danger of perishing from hunger. As regards hard coal, this product in former times and even more now, when Ukrainian industry has been still more highly developed, did not go and does not go across the borders of Ukraine. The products of the Ukrainian metallurgy in former times were more than half used in Ukraine and now with the development of Russian metallurgy beyond the Urals, they appear still less on the Russian market. Also the deposits of hard coal in the entire Soviet Union are estimated at 480 billion tons, and there are 60 billion tons in Ukraine, i.e. 12.5%. As regards iron ore, the deposits in the Urals are significantly greater, for they amount to 2414 million tons, while those in Kryvy Rih are 1490 million tons so that the deposits in Ukraine form only 40% of those of the entire Union. Thus in this field Russia is richer than Ukraine. Again the secession of Ukraine from the USSR would mean in no way the destruction of the exchange by economic channels with Russia or any other neighboring state.

It is interesting also to see the importance and the role of the Ukrainian ports in the exports and imports of Russia. In former times there were

¹ Balzac-Vasiutyn: *Economic Geography of the USSR*, New York 1949, p. 157.

imported through the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov only 6% of the goods, for the chief imports came through the Baltic ports. Although 30-40% of the imperial exports were channeled through Ukrainian ports, these were the products of Ukraine and not of Russia. Prof. Tymoshenko asserts that no goods from the northern areas of Ukraine were exported through the Black Sea, for again for these Russia used the Baltic ports.

Not longer ago than last year we had another conversation, this time with a well-known American professor, who diligently studies the problems of the East of Europe and especially questions of international relations. From him we happened to hear the idea that in Russia after the fall of Bolshevism there will be inevitably an upsurge of Russian nationalism and that its typical spokesman is the group of the NTS (Solidarists) in the emigration. Our conversation took place at a time when Kerensky had gone through his regular bankruptcy with the KTSAB and, to save his coveted position in the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, made himself an ally of these "clever peasants." The court case of espionage for the Soviets of a prominent member of the group of Solidarists shows what a dangerous ally Kerensky is and these words of the distinguished professor must be regarded as another example of the effect of Russian blackmail upon Americans.

The fact is that the Solidarists have no connection with the "new" Russia and the assertions of Mr. Boldyrev that his people killed Kirov and have positions in almost every Soviet bureau in Moscow, as he said once in *Life*, are nothing but a bluff. The Solidarists are a product of the younger generation of the old Russian emigration, especially in Yugoslavia.

One of the spokesmen of the new Russian emigration, Mr. B. Ivin, makes a study of this paradox and asserts that the new Russian emigration is absolutely alien to the old in their mode of living and in their social and political conceptions, that between the two groups there are "unsurmountable obstacles", that the "old" with all the power of their souls hate the new people from the Soviets and the "new" repay the "past" with an intense hatred. The author recognizes that the old emigrés, sometimes openly, sometimes secretly, follow in the international arena the same line as the Bolsheviks, while the "new" in their reaction against everything Soviet are rather inclined to go along with the non-Russian anti-imperialistic forces. He gives many examples in this article and points out that at the beginning of the Second World War, when it was still possible to believe the legend that Hitler was favorable to the Ukrainian independence, the Red Army Russians "along with the Ukrain-

ians and other nationalities of the USSR refused to fight against the Germans and surrendered in masses at Smolensk, Kiev and Vyazma.”²

Without paying attention to these generally known facts and events the Americans have still not learned, as Ivin says that “the masses of the Russians under the Soviets in a majority are absolutely indifferent to the question of the ‘one and indivisible’ empire or are little interested in it. In either case the scarecrow of the ‘dismemberment of Russia’ does not have for them the importance which the Russian imperialists give it.”

There are still American journalists as Mr. Don Levine, who in *Life* (March, 1953) tries to persuade his readers that “the fear that the Western powers are interested not in liberating Russian people but in dividing up their country has forced many a subject of the Kremlin to subordinate his hatred of despotism to national pride and patriotism.” Such assertions are in sharp contrast to the statement of the Russian Ivin. And when Don Levine attempts to represent the multinational structure of the “citizenship of the Kremlin” as a “Soviet nation,” he is in opposition to the American diplomat, Mrs. P. Mesta, who was recently in Ukraine and who has asserted that the Ukrainians are stoutly maintaining their nationality and are even aroused, when they are called Russians. Nevertheless in the political circles of the United States the views of the Don Levines have a priority.

Not so long ago I happened to hear from the lips of an American diplomat in Europe, also a person of good will, that the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism is perhaps right when it does not take into account the fact of the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and its membership in the United Nations and believes that Ukraine must still show proof of its desire for independence.

“No-predetermination” means for the Russian imperialists and their American friends in the American Committee the denial of all acts: legal, political, military, etc., by which the peoples enslaved by Moscow have shown in the past and have expressed their will to liberation from the yoke of Moscow and for an independent existence. They ignore as utterly non-existent facts as the formation during the period of the Revolution by these peoples of their own national states (e.g. the Ukrainian National Republic) with its own administrations, its own army, its own parliaments (e.g. the Ukrainian Central Rada); they depreciate the declaration of independence of these states (e. g. by the Act of January 22, 1918 for Ukraine), their recognition by foreign officials and their participation in international actions; they pass over in silence the armed struggle of these nations in the defence of their national territories (the war of U-

² See: *Osvobozhdenye*, New Ulm, 1953. No. 13.

kraine with Russia from 1918 to 1921) and the bloody revolts against foreign invaders (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in its battle against the Germans and Russians). The "no-predeterminists" opposed to a "premature decision" do not wish to take into account the fact of the existence of these states to the present time in the form of national republics of the Soviet Union, the fact of their bitter struggle for their rights and interests by forces of both the Communist and anti-Communist elements of their population, with innumerable sacrifices, as the peoples of the USSR have carried on and still are in their struggle against the Russian Bolshevik imperialism.

Also the American Information Service having to carry a psychological war against the Russian Communism carefully omits to mention the above facts. The responsible officers explain that America can not take a position to the liberating struggle of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR in order not to excite undesirable reaction of the Russian people. But why ignore those historical events, which are known very well to Russians themselves. It is also obvious that Russians in the USSR are acquainted with the existence of the national republics of the USSR as to a normal structure of the Soviet Union. By mentioning those natural facts the American Information Service can not offend the Soviet Russians. But by omitting them it can very deeply offend the non-Russian nations and to excite anti-American sentiments among them. Does not the last one perhaps be the real aim of Russian emigres, who are blackmailing Americans with the fictitious hostility of Soviet Russians?

The patriots of the peoples of the USSR have full grounds to beware of such interference, resulting only in worsening of friendly relations between America and the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. Through the efforts of Russian exiles and their American friends there are formed artificial organizations of a diversionary type, such as the so-called Federalists of the non-Russian peoples, called into existence with the help of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. Composed chiefly of unreliable elements which have no root in the social structure of the nations, which rely on no tradition, which have no cadres, these formations are an ordinary fraud. The so-called "Council of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement" claims to be formed from six parties, which were created in one night in October 1951 and which included 22 people altogether. Such groups are able to produce only confusion and disorganization in the emigration of the non-Russian peoples and in result cool them toward America. According to the idea of their instigators, these formations are sometimes to play the role of fifth columns in the conquest of the lands which might separate from Russia. So they are making attempts to include them in the common coordinat-

ing centre of the peoples of the USSR, as happened in the KTSAB, which finally fell apart. One must be blind not to see that this playing with fictions can only harm the anti-Bolshevik struggle. Such absurdities have been reached by the blackmailing tactics of the Russian imperialists and the lack of resistance to it in the political circles which are back of the American Committee.

In view of these facts and with a memory of other facts from the past, we must fear the future. At one time the legend of good "Uncle Joe", who agreed with the assurances of Benes and the conviction of President Roosevelt, was taken literally and cost the world half of Europe which was occupied by the Soviets. A new legend is about poor Russia, which for its support needs from the free world neighboring countries for its satellites and for its safety a free hand in enslaving the democratic nations behind the iron curtain.

But along with these legends there are also solid facts as, for example, that Hitler was ruined in his eastern campaign because he brought to the peoples of the USSR a new slavery instead of liberation, that the Soviets inspired the attack on Northern Korea, on Indochina, etc., facts which must be studied to show what must not be done. Other facts should teach the American Committee and the American statesmen behind it, that the peoples of the USSR will never renounce what they fought for during the Revolution, between the two Wars and after World War II. Among these goals are — the same existence of their national republics whether with a fictitious or non-fictitious sovereignty, their membership in the United Nations, and their equality with other nations of the world.

All attempts to force these peoples back to their position before the February Revolution are doomed in advance to failure, and a speculation on the avoidance of "premature decisions" is quite dangerous. With the tendencies that are shown by the members of the Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, the slogan of "self-determination" appears as an ordinary smoke screen. The enslaved peoples of the Soviet Union cannot believe words, if they are unsupported by deeds, which can serve as a guarantee for the future. That is why these peoples are waiting for deeds, for actions of America, the leader of the Free World.

THE TRIAL IN CHITA

By JOHN V. SWEET

Thirty years ago in Chita in the Trans-Baikal Province of the USSR, during the winter of 1923-4, a Soviet Court tried a number of Ukrainians. This was the first political trial involving charges of betrayal of the Soviet Union held in the Far East.

The Ukrainians form a majority of the population in the Amur and Maritime Provinces. They were well organized and politically minded during the Revolution, 1917-22, but the special political conditions of the time and the difficulties of the situation prevented them from attaining self-government.

During the colonization of the Russian Far East, especially of the Amur and Maritime Provinces, a large number of Ukrainians came to this new world. In the beginning of the century they were in the majority. Their love of the soil made them well fitted to be colonists and in this they differed from the earlier settlers who had failed to cultivate the land successfully. According to the census of 1923, the total population of the Far East was 1,056,000 and of these 50.6% in the Maritime Province and 58% in the Amur Province were Ukrainians.¹

These early Ukrainian settlers called the country the Green Wedge because of its shape. The present Soviet Far East borders in the east on the Pacific Ocean and touches the Yakut Republic in the north and Siberia along the chain of mountains and plateaus—the Stanovoy range. Administratively the region belongs to the Russian SFSR.

The name *Zeleny Klyn* or Green Wedge has been used since the second half of the last century. It was adopted by all Ukrainian publications and was very popular in the early days. One Russian journalist in an account of his journey through the Far East in 1905 used the name "New Ukraine" which was also popular among the Ukrainians.² He wrote that "the country has so large a Ukrainian population that it is hard to see any other. In all the villages and towns one can hear the Ukrainian language and see Ukrainians . . . it is really New Ukraine."

¹ Hluzdovsky, *Dalnevostochnaya, Vladivostok*, 1925, pp. 62-3.

² Steinfeld, "The Ukraine in the Far East," *Harbinsky Vestnik*, No. 649, Jan. 11, 1906, p. 2. Harbin, Manchuria.

During the Revolution of 1917, the first Ukrainian paper was called *The Ukrainian in the Green Wedge* but the official publication of the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat was entitled in 1921 — *The Calendar, the Nova Ukraina* — (New Ukraine).³

Prof. Clarence A. Manning used the name Green Ukraine in his book — *The Siberian Fiasco* (New York, 1952). This name came up after the Revolution and was used in Ukrainian publications especially in Europe and is now popular. None of these names are used by the Soviet publications.

After the Revolution of 1917, the Ukrainians formed hundreds of their own cultural and cooperative organizations. They also worked on a plan for a central organization and regarded the establishment of national independence as their definite goal.⁴ During the period of 1917-9, they held four Far Eastern Ukrainian Congresses and established as a central administration, the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat, with different sections. At the same time central organizations were formed on regional lines for cultural and political affairs, as well as the Central Cooperative "Chumak."

The constitution was written and approved at a session of the Far Eastern Rada (Council) and was submitted to the Fourth Ukrainian Congress. A fifth Congress was planned to proclaim independence but it was not held because of the Red occupation of the Far East.

A prominent Soviet authority wrote: "The majority of the rural population of the Maritime Province are Ukrainian in origin. The tsarist policy of colonization was intended to lessen the centres of agrarian movements. Among the rural population of the Far East it is impossible to find cases of Ukrainian nationalism. The Ukrainian organizations (the Rada) had dreamed of cutting the Far East away from the RSFSR (Russia) and establishing a Ukrainian colony but they found members only among the intelligentsia."⁵

Early Soviet publications noted the Ukrainian majority in the Far Eastern population but more rarely after 1932-33 and now, this fact is completely omitted. Its eclipse started because it was too dangerous and contradicted their new policy of Russification.

Other Russian publications have stressed the idea that the Ukrainian political national movement made no headway among the Ukrainian peasantry. The Russians are trying to conceal the real conditions and the desire of the Far East Ukrainians for national independence.

³ *Kalendar — Nova Ukraina*, Vladivostok, 1921.

⁴ O. Somov in *The October Revolution and Civil War in the Far East*.

⁵ *The October Revolution and Civil War in the Far East*. Introduction by O. I. Somov. ALGYZ, Moscow-Khabarovsk, 1933.

These efforts and actions of the Ukrainians were carried on under difficult internal and international conditions and without any outside help or sympathy. The Ukrainians stood alone to face hostile Russian armed forces, ignorant foreign armies and a strong political agitation throughout the area with an underground fired by Communist propaganda. In 1918 the first Ukrainian Consul General, Mr. P. Tvardovsky, arrived in Harbin, Manchuria. He visited the Maritime Province a few times. His arrival and his work was blocked at every step by the former Russian diplomatic representative in Peking, China, who continued after the Revolution the policy of the tsarist empire. Count Kudashev in Peking made every possible threat against the Ukrainian Consul and asked the Russian police in Harbin to arrest him.

The Ukrainian Consulate made a few important decisions and with the full cooperation of the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat presented to the commander of the Entente troops in Siberia, General Janin, a plan of raising a Ukrainian army of 40,000 men in the Far East to fight Communism and defend Green Ukraine. General Janin sent this with a recommendation to Paris but the French General Staff rejected it because they did not want to complicate still more the tangled situation in Siberia, where the Kolchak regime was steadily losing its power. The American and British military forces remained apart from these political problems. General Graves had special instructions from Washington to avoid any political intervention⁶ and the British commander worked as a rule in support of the White Russian generals and the Kolchak government. They did not have a factual understanding of the new conditions or the spirit of the times.⁷

Major Hodges understood the situation and wrote of the Russians and their politics: They (the Russians) had no patriotism, though they wept over holy Russia...they were cruel...they promised everything and did nothing." Sir Winston Churchill made the same comments in his last work *Triumph and Tragedy*, Vol. VI of his history of World War II.

The Communists did everything possible to undermine the political and economic stability of the country and resorted to all kinds of threats. It is well known how they burned the city of Nikolayevsk on the Amur in the winter of 1920-1 and killed over 10,000 people, including thousands of Japanese.⁸

⁶ General Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure*, Prof. C. A. Manning, *The Siberian Fiasco*, New York, 1953.

⁷ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis* Vol. III, 1929. Major Phelps Hodges, *Britmis*, London, 1931.

⁸ A. Han, *Gybel' Nikolayevska na Amure*, Shanghai, 1923. V. E. Ech, *Izcheznuvshiy Gorod*, Vladivostok, 1921.

Under such hostile and difficult conditions the Ukrainians in the Far East tried to solve their own problems. Their chief aims were to consolidate their position by building up their forces and to keep their rural population out of the political struggle for control. The Communists in their political manoeuvres and through their underground tried to induce the peasants to attack the foreign military forces. During the period of intervention in Siberia and the Far East, the Soviets issued a special appeal to the rural population to support them in the fight against the foreigners. They urged the Ukrainians to fight and also sent an appeal to the Ukrainian Secretariat. The latter answered the appeal with a counter circular, urging the Ukrainians in the Far East to keep out of the conflict and not to help the Reds, for there was "no conflict between the Ukrainians and the foreign military forces."

At exactly the same time, Mr. Tvardovsky, the Ukrainian Consul General, was having military and political discussions with the Allied Missions and their representatives. We cannot fully go into the very interesting, important and complicated questions of contemporaneous life in the Far Eastern areas.

In the summer of 1922 the Japanese Diet reduced their appropriations for their military operations in the Far East and Siberia. Their General Staff ordered the start of the evacuation of all Japanese forces from the former Russian territory. This was carried out in stages and the last regiments were to leave Vladivostok at noon, October 26, 1922.

The Japanese troops moved slowly to the south of the Maritime Province and the Reds under the command of Comrade Uborevich followed. The White Russian forces, chiefly members of the former army of General Kappel, engaged in a few local battles but they steadily retreated in the wake of the Japanese. Many political and administrative changes took place in Vladivostok. In July, 1922 a Provisional Monarchist Government under General Dieterichs was set up against the will of the population and with the open opposition of the commercial and industrial classes. The local assembly under the pressure of the army approved the changes. The rural population was in a hopeless situation. All were working to live and only the old generals and officers backed this short-lived anachronism.

At the beginning of October, Colonel Homi of the Japanese Military Mission sent Captain H. Terada to establish contact with the Reds, and a temporary liaison office was set up at Okeanskaya Station, about 15-17 miles from Vladivostok.

On October 19, General Dieterichs left Vladivostok in an effort to escape, for he had proved a failure as the head of a regime. On October 20, a Provisional Siberian Government was set up under Sazonov, a

prominent political leader of the Siberian independence movement. This government had as its one aim the helping of various persons to escape the Reds. For six days the evacuation went on very smoothly. Civilians and military men were sent to Korea and the Pacific fleet was sent partly to Manila and partly to Shanghai. Some units of the White Army went to Manchuria via Hun-Chun.

On the evening of October 26, 1922, the Red Army reached Vladivostok, after the last Japanese soldier had embarked. All Soviet publications treat the end of the foreign intervention as a military success of the Red Army and as a diplomatic victory for the Communists. It is the same lie as the "victory" over Japan in Manchuria in August, 1945. In the first case there was a Japanese evacuation and in the second an American victory over Japan.

Under the Red occupation of the Far East, the life of the Ukrainians and the rest of the population underwent radical changes. By military orders all national Ukrainian organizations were closed and their buildings and property were confiscated. Various persons were arrested throughout the country.

It is very interesting to note that former Russian officers and prominent members of the different governmental organizations, etc. were arrested much later than were the Ukrainian leaders. As one of the defendants writes in his memoirs, a special direct order was sent from Moscow to Comrade Uborevich, who was later shot in the 1935-6 Soviet purge, for Moscow watched closely the Ukrainian movement in the Far East and feared it.

In one night at Nikolsk (now Voroshilov) and Vladivostok many Ukrainians were arrested and sent to the central GPU in Vladivostok. Here they were told that they would be tried; they learned of other persons arrested in Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Svobodny, Chita, and elsewhere. The general conditions in the prison were very harsh, sanitary facilities were poor and the food was bad. Ordinary criminals and many partisans were herded with the political prisoners. The partisans were picked up everywhere. The Reds did not want these liberty-loving persons who had slight political knowledge, but who were chiefly not under Communist influence. Among these was the famous Shevchenko, formerly a peasant of the Maritime Province.

The Ukrainians, one by one, were called for examination at night. The examiners were young people without any experience. They differed in their methods but they were curious about the Ukrainian movement and organizations, their connection with foreigners, etc.

In December, 1922, when winter was at its height, all the Ukrainians arrested were sent to Chita in ordinary freight cars. The trip took 22

days and in every important centre new groups of imprisoned Ukrainians were added. The train reached Chita before January 1, 1923 and all the prisoners were taken to the ill-famed Chita prison. The assistant to the warden, a Ukrainian in origin, had held this position for a long time. Many regarded him as a good and kind man. He placed all the Ukrainians in one cell, a large and very clean room. Later in the evening the warden, Mr. Kantorovich, visited them and promised to do his best for them, because they were political prisoners.

Many officials at the time did not have special Bolshevik training and often had a human feeling for the prisoners. Even so, Mr. Kantorovich was exceptional and all the Ukrainians whom I met later told me that he allowed them more privileges than could be had anywhere else. Another explanation may be simpler. The Reds at the time in the Far East did not feel themselves strong and secure and they were very careful, especially when it was a question of trying part of the rural population.

The prisoners received two local newspapers, books, etc. Evenings they sang Ukrainian songs. On March 10, 1923, they received permission to organize a special celebration in memory of Taras Shevchenko the great Ukrainian poet. They arranged a very good program and other prisoners, especially political prisoners, were allowed to attend it.

After this, Mr. Y. Mova, the former Chairman of the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat, commenced regular lectures and he was joined by other men. These were on Ukrainian history, literature, political life, etc. The prisoners also prepared for their coming trial. This work gave excellent results, because the group became familiar with all possible questions and arguments and they knew what they would say when they were brought into court.

From time to time special investigators visited the prison and questioned the Ukrainians. Later these examined all the points asked by the officials and discussed the best defense which they could make. In this way the Ukrainians prepared a strong case and acquired confidence before standing trial.

In the spring of 1923, many of the defendants were granted their freedom on bail with the obligation to return for trial when they were called. Some of the more prominent leaders were not given this privilege. As we can see from the stories of various members of the group, the new Soviet administration needed specialists. One Ukrainian prisoner was sent from the prison to the Central Forest Administration in Chita as the temporary manager. This man is now in the United States. He has given us a good account of the trial and a copy of the verdict of the court.

Two defendants skipped bail and made their way to Manchuria. One printed in the *Manchurian Herald*,⁹ a Ukrainian weekly, his memoirs on the Chita Trial with much material on conditions in Green Ukraine and the various Ukrainian problems and organizations.

The Ukrainians enjoyed this liberal treatment until the middle of December, 1923, when a local paper the official Communist organ, *Dalnevostochny Put*, announced that a special section of the high tribunal in Moscow was coming to Chita for the trial of the Ukrainians. After this the local GPU summoned the defendants and sent them back to prison. A few days later, each prisoner received a copy of his indictment. Two lawyers were assigned by the court to each group of five or six persons.

The preliminaries went smoothly and as one defendant wrote, the lawyers were allowed to visit the prison and talk with the prisoners freely. The trial started on January 5, 1924. The newspapers printed articles about it and the local people in numbers attended sessions and took a great interest in it.

The presiding officer at the trial was Mr. Matvyeyev and two judges were selected from local workers. The attorney for the state, Mr. Stryjvsky, was a Russian chauvinist and made a special attempt in all his remarks to stir up anti-Ukrainian feeling.

The trial was badly organized and the members of the court showed from the beginning that they probably did not know what to do or what Moscow expected of them. The lawyers assigned to the case did their best to save the defendants from death sentences. Mrs. Rubinstein was especially effective and she attacked the attorney for the state so severely that the Presiding Judge many times had to call her to order.

The public reacted sympathetically and so did the guards. In general the Ukrainians had the sympathy of all present except the members of the court itself.

The defendants from the second day of the trial secured their own method of procedure and by strong protests they set up a good defense and by their knowledge of the facts, they beat off every attack of the prosecutor. Their defense was so well coordinated and prepared that at a critical moment the prosecutor had a stroke, collapsed and was carried helpless from the courtroom. He was unable to return to the trial.

Mr. V. Kiyovych, one of the defendants, in a carefully worded statement demanded that the defendants be furnished an official translator from Ukrainian into Russian. The court assigned one but he made several serious mistakes and was dismissed amid the laughter of the public. The

⁹ *Mandzursky Vistnik*, Vol. IV No. 28-33 and Vol. V, No. 1-5.

Presiding Judge then asked the defendants to choose from their number a good translator and Mr. Kiyovych was selected.

A few days before the end of the trial, the lawyers approached the defendants and asked them to write a letter acknowledging their misdeeds toward the Soviet government and renouncing their political beliefs and asking the Proletarian Court to be merciful. The object was to try to escape death sentences.

Only a few of the defendants were willing to sign the petition. The others flatly refused. These made it clear that the special session of the Court had gotten itself into a blind alley, because the Ukrainians had worked and made their important decisions before the Soviet administration was set up. They had been working legally under all the laws existing at the moment as well as during the existence of the Far Eastern Republic. This Republic had been recognized by Moscow and various articles of its constitution dealt directly or in part with the Ukrainian problem.¹⁰ Thus the Ukrainian Minister was appointed by the Government on the recommendation of the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat. On this basis it was clear that the court could not find any punishable offence against the Soviet government. On the other hand, it could not free the defendants, since it had been ordered by Moscow to try them. The petition would therefore be a recognition of the legality of the trial.

The next day the local Communist paper *Dalnevostochny Put* published the letter and some articles about the Ukrainians. These were mere fabrications intended to stir up feelings against the defendants.

The last session of the court was on January 12, 1924. The entire day was taken up by the recommendations of the prosecutor and the remarks of the defendants. The recommendations showed that Moscow wanted to see severe verdicts.

We have a copy of the court decision and here present a resume. The original consists of nine typewritten pages.

In giving its verdict the court held that the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the Far East after the February Revolution of 1917 had for counter-revolutionary purposes built up organizations and groups and had also supported both Hetman Skoropadsky and Petlyura, while they were heads of the Ukrainian government in Ukraine. These groups and organizations had been combined by the decision of the Ukrainian Far Eastern Congresses under the Far Eastern Ukrainian Rada (Secretariat was the term used by the Ukrainians) as the highest Ukrainian organ in the Far East. After the collapse of Soviet rule in the area in June, 1918, they had organized Ukrainian military units. Furthermore the Chairman of the

¹⁰ Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London, 1923, pp. 298-306.

Trans-Baikal Ukrainian Rada, St. Shvedin, had established contact with Ataman Semenov and received from him on July 11, 1920, a special recognition of the national and cultural autonomy of the Ukrainians in the area.

The chief defendants were P. Horovy, the Chairman of the Central Ukrainian Cooperative "Chumak", who had organized a chain of Ukrainian cooperatives; Yury Mova-Hlushko, the President of the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat; Vasyl Kosak, the Chairman of the Trans-Baikal Rada and the chief organizers of the Ukrainian military units, K. Strelbytsky, Col. E. Herutsky and others.

The prosecutor in his recommendations added to this condemnation of all Ukrainian organizational work a further statement that "they had a plan to detach the Far East from Russia and proclaim it as a separate state under the Japanese, American and other foreign capitalists."¹¹

The court omitted this declaration of the prosecutor, because it was a part of the Ukrainian idea and it was too dangerous for the Soviets at the time. The verdict passed over the main charges and stressed the minor details as the relations with Ataman Semenov, even though these were only incidents in the entire Ukrainian development in the Far East.

The trial which lasted from January 5 to January 13 showed that it had been ordered to suppress the Ukrainian movement and annihilate its leaders through declaring that all Ukrainian activity had been a crime against the Soviet regime as well as all Ukrainian relations with the Russian governments and movements in the Far East.

Of some 200 persons arrested, only 22 were tried at Chita and two had escaped to Manchuria, before the trial started. The others were released after the investigations, local GPU trials etc. without a word being printed about them. Only a few stories about them later reached Manchuria.

One of the Soviet difficulties and embarrassments lay in the fact that the leaders were men of peasant families which Soviet theory claimed as the basis of their regime. Petro Horovy was a former mechanic in the repair shops of the Chinese Eastern Railroad at Harbin.

Four of the defendants drew harsh sentences. Horovy was sentenced to death. Yury Mova-Hlushko received five years and V. Kosak and K. Strelbytsky three years each. Ten men were sentenced to a year in prison and the others were freed, because the court was unable to establish their offences. In the final paragraph of the verdict, Horovy's sentence was commuted to ten years in prison and the sentences of the others were

¹¹ *Dalnevostochny Put'*, Chita, January 3, 1924.

cut in half. Some of these later reached Manchuria and gave help to the Ukrainian movement there.

This was apparently a temporary retreat before the opposition of the entire Ukrainian community to the Reds. In addition throughout this entire trial, the first political trial in the Far East, the defendants enjoyed the sympathy and support of almost the entire population.

In addition to this the Soviets did not have at their service the proper personnel for handling this movement which offered many complicated problems and which had not been noticed by the pre-Revolutionary Tsarist regime. At the same time there were still partisan groups in the field and the Reds did not want to push the population too far.

More important, however, was the political situation. Large partisan groups were operating near the territory still held by Japan which also retained northern Sakhalin.

During the years after the Revolution, the Ukrainians made solid and substantial progress in the Far East and Siberia. In 1920-2, they had secured a firm legal position through the constitution of the Far Eastern Republic.¹² They had their own minister in the government and their own official centre, the Far Eastern Ukrainian Secretariat. Between 1925 and 1927, they secured the complete Ukrainization of ten districts in the Far East and were steadily acquiring a still stronger position. This was stopped when Moscow decided in 1932-3 to change the Ukrainian language to Russian in the government offices and took the same course later in the school system.

The Chita trial is also important for the future. By its revelation of the predominant position of the Ukrainians in the Far East, it offers hope for the free world and an assurance that the Far East will not be enthusiastic in its support of Communism as against freedom.



¹² Norton, *The Far Eastern Republic*, London, 1923, p. 154 and 299.

NATIONALISM, THE SOVIET CALCULATED RISK

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Western statesmen are anxious to-day about the calculated risk that they run, whenever they confer with the leaders of the Soviet Union on any subject for relieving the tensions of the present day, whether it is at Berlin, Geneva or Hanoi. They worry over the number of divisions that they can oppose at a given moment to a Soviet drive to the west or to the east. They are disturbed, and rightly, at the possibilities of Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs. The slightest demonstration of Soviet strength is sufficient to create a flurry in diplomatic quarters and a rise of neutralism or of despair among the civilian populations of the free countries.

They never stop to think that the Soviet Union is also assuming a calculated risk and that they themselves have the opportunity, if they will but grasp it, to make that risk incalculably heavier for the Soviets and infinitely more dangerous to the apostles of tyranny and oppression.

What is the essence to-day, as it has been in the past, of the Soviet calculated risk? It is the forces of nationalism both within and without the Soviet Union. The Soviets, now as ever since 1917, are gambling their future and the future of humanity on their ability to foster nationalism everywhere in the world and to check it with Russian arms. They have a supplemental gamble which is based upon their analysis of Western thinking and that is the insistence of the West in thinking of the world situation in a strictly legalistic and historical manner without examining the theories on which their thinking is based. A further reason for their gamble is their knowledge that for centuries, Western thinking and education has been based upon the conditions prevailing in Western Europe and has failed to view the world as anything but an extension of a relatively small area in the west of the Eurasian landmass.

Let us look a little more closely at the elements of this Soviet gamble for power and world control. During World War I and after the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, Lenin proposed a new theory of world organization. It is unimportant whether he did it for political, opportunistic or ideological reasons. He accepted in words the fact of the universality

of the human race and proposed a horizontal instead of a vertical organization of mankind. His plan in theory was simplicity itself.

It rested upon the assumption that mankind was divided into a series of classes; that there was for practical purposes an international of hereditary rulers who were in large part related by ties of blood. He assumed an international of scholars, of professional men, of business men, etc. and he called for an international of labor. It was his profound idea based upon the principle of the class struggle that the interests of the laboring class, the workers and peasants, were the same throughout the world and he identified those interests with the goal of Communism.

It was for that reason that he encouraged during the summer of 1917 all those centrifugal movements in the old Russian Empire which were aiming to restore liberty to the oppressed peoples of Russia, who were taking comfort and hope from President Wilson's idea of self-determination of all peoples. Lenin was confident that all of these demands for self-determination could be subordinated to the interests of the Communist Party and that in each of these centrifugal movements the workers and peasants would take over the control and join the Communist International.

At this moment he took the risk that the West would remain satisfied with the elimination of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and perhaps a further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire; but the statesmen of the democratic countries would not because of their unawareness look too closely at what was happening in the old Russia. He won his gamble. At a moment when the remains of the Russian Empire were rapidly disintegrating, the Big Four of Versailles listened to the pleas of the White Russian tsarist and "democratic" leaders and of their own unthinking idealists and came to the conclusion that a united Russia, red or white, was more of an element for world progress than was the establishment of a series of independent democratic states within the old Russian Empire, a process which was sneeringly referred to as the Balkanization of Europe.

The West refused to aid the democratic advocates of the nations struggling to be free and thus produced the debacle of 1920-1922. The Western statesmen have still not seen the error of their ways and they still listen to men who talk of Russia or Soviet Russia; they still receive the Kerenskys and their like into their councils and as the cold war becomes more and more menacing and the Soviet aggressions grow ever bolder, they become more convinced that there was and is some merit in the maintenance of a single and indivisible Russia which can be induced to turn against its Soviet masters.

They still refuse to realize that the existence of the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania for some twenty years, until they were overthrown by Soviet armed force, was but a sign of the fact that not a single people outside of the Great Russians has ever willingly come under Russian Communist influence, when it saw that influence directly across its own boundaries.

The West still does not give sufficient weight to the influences in real life of territorial nearness. They do not realize sufficiently that the small town banker, employer and workman have something more in common, when they live within a short distance of one another and all alike are involved in the same joys and possible sorrow than either of these men have with a person of their own class in New York, Moscow or Cairo.

It is an interesting but unprofitable exercise in theory and in surmise what Lenin would have done, had Germany and other Western countries in 1917-1920 accepted his theory of a class organization of society. The national states of Western Europe did not do it and the Communist International became a Russian organization supporting a mass of foreign emigres, discredited agitators, and flattering parasites. Whatever his original idea, Lenin rose to the occasion and grasped the possibilities in this game of deception for Moscow. Trotsky with somewhat more fervor talked of the permanent revolution. Stalin set himself to provide a political setup that would incorporate the new situation and keep the West still convinced that the unity of Russia was necessary as a means for further conquest and expansion. He early grasped the fact that he could secure the support for the main features of his policy from all those Russian emigres in the free countries, monarchists and democrats alike, who had consciously or unconsciously aided in the triumph of Communism by their insistence upon the unity of Russia.

Yet there was one obstacle. The West could refuse to recognize the vitality of the centrifugal movements of the non-Russian peoples during the Revolution and the civil wars. They could weep bitter tears over the senseless demands of these people for liberty and contain to talk of a great and democratic Russia that they sought as an ally. Stalin and the Communists in that unified country had to live with those centrifugal movements. They knew that they could not force the non-Russian peoples directly back into that blessed condition before 1917, when the tsar and his ministers could deny the existence of Ukrainians and non-Russian peoples at will.

So they set up — after the conquest by military force sent from the Great Russians and from the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic — Soviet Socialist Republics for each of the non-Russian peoples.

Then they united them in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; under conditions, however, that left the power in the hands of their Russian base. It was a bold stroke and a calculated risk, for at any moment the West could awake from its slumbers and see through the deceit that had been played upon it. Over thirty years have passed and the West has not yet awaked. It still slumbers with the same sleeping tablets given it by the Russian emigres.

Emboldened by their success the Soviet leaders went further. In all the republics they allowed the development of the national language and culture. This in the case of Ukraine was the period of Ukrainization. It saw a brilliant flowering of art, of literature, of science. It saw the growth of the Ukrainian consciousness and though that was distorted by the insistence upon Marxism and Marxo-Leninism, scholars grasped the slightest opportunity to express themselves in their own way and in accordance with their national traditions. This created a new menace. The Soviet leaders in Moscow carefully avoided the admittance of any of these Communist Parties in the new republics to the Communist International. They did their best to treat them as agents of their own nationality whether of the USSR or the RSFSR. To their consternation they found that even tried and tested Ukrainian Communists as Skrypnyk and Khylovy came under the spell of their own national traditions and insisted that Ukrainian Communism, while it was Communism, was still something different from Russian Muscovite Communism.

This was an unexpected turn which required the personal interposition of Stalin himself who bewailed the fact, that while the Communists of the world and the laboring classes for which they claimed to speak, were supposedly looking with admiration and longing for the time when they too would be brought into the Communist paradise, the Ukrainian Communists were preaching "Away from Moscow". It was bad enough for the victorious march of Communism which was now fully identified with the Russian centre to be stopped on its western borders by non-Communist states that persisted in maintaining their own national unity. It was infinitely worse when within the Soviet Union itself, the non-Russian republics felt that same urge for national unity and dignity.

To stop this new menace, the Soviet leaders coined the phrase "bourgeois nationalism" and they commenced to arrest and to execute and deport the intellectual leaders of the non-Russian republics on the ground that they were the agents of the capitalists of those Western states that were still under the spell of a great and unified Russia. They set themselves to break in this name all the evidence of nationalism.

Yet they had won a certain advantage. The relatively free development of the twenties had shown the authorities in Moscow the new

leaders. The men who had come to the top during the period, whether within or without the Communist Party, were the ablest men of the people. Moscow gambled again that the crushing of these men would eliminate the menace in future. So we had the great purges in Ukraine, the introduction of collectivization and the enforced famine which wiped out the intellectual leaders of the Ukrainian people, the thrifty and hard-working farmers and industrialists and all who might be regarded as capable of saying an original word.

Yet even so, the authorities in Moscow did not venture to wipe out the fabric which they had created. They proposed the phrase "Socialist in essence and national in form." In a sense it doomed Ukrainian literature and culture to sterility. It made the thirties a sad and uninteresting period. Yet, by hypothesis, there could be no bourgeois nationalism in the Russian Soviet Republic. Side by side with the rewriting of the past, the crushing of the present and the denial of the future to the non-Russian peoples, Moscow began the glorification of Peter I, of Ivan the Terrible, of Suvorov and Kutuzov and all of the old Russian traditional figures of tsarist history. It was bourgeois nationalism for a Ukrainian to question about Russian nationalism. On the other hand, it was a deviation for a Russian Communist to criticize the past of Moscow and to overemphasize the ways in which Communism there was revolutionary and not a fulfillment of the natural trends and aspirations of the Russian people, and, as result, there were few deviationists. It was easy for the Russians to see the light.

It was easy to misinterpret this to the West. At first the Soviets blandly denied the famine. Later they interpreted it as the opposition of the Russians to collectivization and talked of the necessity of increasing grain production, if Soviet Russia was to fulfill its mission. They did not need to explain that mission, for there was always some Russian emigre at hand, who was noted for his opposition to Communism to point out that Soviet Russia was an entity and that disobedience was something that the old Russian had always been forced to oppose. The rise of Nazi intolerance and bigotry offered a convenient excuse and the popular fronts engineered by the Communists were only too willing to take up where the emigres left off.

The same mood continued into World War II. The significance of the Nazi-Communist understanding to wipe out the Baltic republics, to divide Poland and Romania, the revelation of Soviet Russian purposes in the unwarranted attack on Finland — which led to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the dying League of Nations — were all forgotten in the outburst of sympathy for the unhappy Soviet Union which had been attacked by the Nazis. It made no difference that in the first days of

the Soviet-Nazi War, millions of non-Russians forced into the Red Army had surrendered or deserted. It made no difference that it was Nazi cruelty and shortsightedness that created the underground and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in eastern Europe. The Western leaders still hoped that the government of a united Soviet Russia would seek a firm friendship with the free nations of the West. To win this, they returned millions of refugees, they allowed the Soviet forces to overrun the states on the western border of the USSR and to set up the iron curtain to divide the world. They admitted the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Republics into the United Nations and never asked themselves why Stalin in the name of the Soviet Union did not ask a place for the Russian Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Union alone of the great powers looked at the situation as it was. Stalin and his friends saw that they had succeeded in their desperate gamble and they were prepared on a larger scale to apply the same tactics all along their borders in Asia. If they had been able to lull the West to sleep in the case of countries that were still within their orbit of thinking, what could they not do in Asia, where the national boundaries were vague, where there was a hatred for colonialism, where whatever unity existed, had been the product of Asiatic rulers who had never consulted the wishes of the people or had been the product of Western conquerors? It was a larger gamble but the Soviets took it. They played upon Chinese credulity and provincial difficulties and at the critical moment they had control of China. They played at one and the same time upon the dissatisfied elements of Iran and they intrigued with the Azerbaijanians to destroy Iran. They are doing the same in Tibet, in Indo-China, everywhere where there is not a sound adherence to the principles of self-determination and the West has still not found the answer.

At home, however, despite their banishments, their threats and executions, they have not achieved their goal, even though they have wiped out and annihilated some of their own national units in their efforts to produce a real Soviet patriotism which shall be Russian in essence and Communist in form. They are still faced with the same problem that appeared in the days of Ukrainian Communism and was not solved by the suicide of Skrypnyk and of Khvylovy.

Some new form had to be found.

This was the sense of the theses of the Communist Party on Ukraine and the Treaty of Pereyaslav. With their usual disregard of the past, the Soviets now postulated a great unified Russian state with its capital at Kiev before the rise of Ukraine. They waxed eloquent over the efforts of the Ukrainians to restore their old unity with the Russians. They did

not need to produce evidence. The word of the Kremlin was sufficient. We can be very sure that if the men in Kremlin see any possibility of success in this experiment, they will go further. They will discover that all the Slavs, East, West and South, formed at a still more remote period part of that original Russian state which the Slavs are desirous of joining. Pushkin remarked that the Slavic rivers had to flow into the Russian sea or it would dry up. The Kremlin can prove that the Slavic rivers started in the Russian mountains and after devious courses flowed into the Russian sea.

It is a new gamble, a new calculated risk, a new trust in the efficiency not only of their own propaganda but a new confidence that the anti-Communist Russians in the west will be able to supply in unlimited quantities those sleeping pills of the possibility of a Russian revolt against the Russians in the Kremlin, of the help of a future "democratic" unified Russia which should be placated and allowed to keep its illgotten gains, until it is too late. Let us admit frankly that so far in the cold war these pills have served their purpose, that the West has not given thought in Europe or in Asia to any other solution of the problem except one that is purely military or social. It has never thought of the national solution. It has not learned from thirty-five years of dealing with the Soviets that Moscow, willingly or unwillingly, has gone further in giving lip service toward the national problems than has the West. Yet, there can be no assurance in Moscow that some day the West will not wake up and apply to the Russian Communist menace sincerely the same treatment that the Soviets are employing with devastating effect.

That day will come when the West fully appreciates what the Soviets are doing and trying to do, when it realizes the marvellous mass of lies and subterfuges that are being played to use nationalism as a means of dividing and conquering with Russian Communist arms and experts. When the West forgets some of its old legal theories and begins to recognize boundaries for what they are and looks at the world as a collection of peoples living in adjacent areas and forgets some of the old historical claims based on dynastic rights and military accidents and endeavors to recognize the world on the basis of self-determination, the Soviets will have to revalue their calculated risk. They will see then that their dream of nationalism applied to the class struggle for the support of Russian domination will be a broken reed and the oppressed peoples of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians, and the others, who have struggled for centuries for independence will be free to take their part in the building up of a new world.

THE EXTERMINATION OF TURKO-TATAR POPULATION OF THE USSR

By ISKENDER AKCHURA

The regime of Russian imperialism under the conditions of Russification and colonization was not only a centuries long oppression of the Turko-Tatar nations of Idil-Ural, Siberia, Yakutistan, etc. but was really the great tragedy of the extermination of these nations.

It was only with the beginning of the February Revolution of 1917 that the Turko-Tatars in Russia had a short breathing spell, and by the path of revolution they won national independence and established the freedom of their state, which had been destroyed by Russian imperialism in 1552 by the violent military conquest of the Khanate of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible.

The efforts of the Turko-Tatar nation for independence, after the Revolution of 1917, began with their struggle against the Provisional Government, because the government of Kerensky showed itself the continuator of the policy of a "one and indivisible Russia".

The whole policy of the Kerensky government was carried on in opposition to the national revolutionary movement of the non-Russian peoples, among them the Turko-Tatars, who had striven for centuries for independence from Russia.

Thus by a decision of the Kazan Kurultay of July 22, 1917, on November 20, 1917, in Ufa, there was formed the first Milli Medzhilis (National Assembly). The session of the Medzhilis lasted until January 9, 1918. Of the various questions proposed and decided by the delegates, we can briefly mention the following:

1. The acceptance of the Constitution and the basic laws of the country as an independent nation.
2. The creation of a government staff in the form of ministries with the President of the Council of Ministers as the President of the country.
3. The establishment of a republican form of government with the name of the Republic of Idil-Ural.

The population was inspired by the democratic principles of the Constitution of the Republic and showed great patriotism and energy in strengthening the new ideas. But the young republic in the first year of


its existence became the arena of bloody battles against the white and the red Russians.

On April 12, 1918, overwhelming red forces occupied the Republic of Idil-Ural. In the beginning of the summer of 1918 on the territory of Idil-Ural, a Czech corps under the command of General Gajda in series of decisive battles shattered the occupying units of the red army in the Kazan district; they were forced in disorderly flight toward Moscow.

But soon the demands of General Gajda were met by the Soviet government and the Czech corps fully armed returned home through Siberia.

After this a civil war commenced on the territory of Idil-Ural between the red and white Russians. The republican armies of Idil-Ural suffered losses from both sides. In the second and final occupation of the republic in 1919 the leaders of the nation were killed. Those left alive were under terror turned into the slaves of the "socialist paradise". Many of the government leaders escaped the red terror by fleeing abroad. In the emigration the national figures and the party leaders did not cease their struggle against Bolshevism. They issued publications, carried on series of political lectures, etc. Among the periodicals, especially popular were the *Yanga milli yul* (New National Way), *Milli bayrak* (National Flag) and others.

According to the estimates of the Idil-Uralians up to the end of World War II in 1945 there escaped from the country and found refuge elsewhere about a million people. As a sad result of the agreements of the victors in Teheran (Iran), Yalta (USSR) and finally in Potsdam (Germany), many thousands of Turko-Tatars in the countries of Europe and Asia were forcibly handed over to the Soviets and carried off to the USSR for bloody punishment and annihilation.



The history of the Turko-Tatar people is marked by a series of unceasing revolts and of struggle against the oppressive regime of imperialist Russia and the tyranny of Communism. In the national traditions are pictured fighters, worthy of the name of heroes or batyrdars. But in the periods of armed revolts the Turko-Tatars suffered countless losses on the battlefields and especially by the fire and sword of the Russian punitive detachments. The Turko-Tatars truly showed that "freedom is better than life".

A convincing illustration of the countless losses in the centuries of struggle is seen in the black zigzag of the statistics of the diminution of the population of the territory of Idil-Ural in comparison with the average statistics of the natural growth of other peoples.

In 1552 after a century of struggle, the Russians by armed force captured the chief city and fortress of Kazan and destroyed the Turko-Tatar State (khanate). The history of the khanate of Kazan shows that the total number of the Turko-Tatar population in 1552 was some 3,000,000 people. At the same period the population of all the Russian principalities was about 8,000,000. The total population of the entire world was according to estimates some 400,000,000.

In 1875 the French scholar Meillet in one of his historical works determined that the Turko-Tatar population between the Volga and the Urals was 4,500,000. At about the same period (1881) Richard Andre, a German scholar, in an exhaustive survey of the peoples of Russia, placed the Turko-Tatar population from Nizhny Novgorod to Orenburg, i.e. between the Volga and the river Ural only at 3,626,000. In the same period the population of the world had multiplied four times and had increased to 1,600,000,000 people. If we accept these figures and the Turko-Tatars had increased accordingly, they should have numbered some 12,000,000 by natural growth.

What happened to this natural increase under Russian rule, when the European statistical scholars set the number of Turko-Tatars at 4,500,000 resp. 3,626,000? How can we explain the great losses of this people?

The living conditions and cultural level of the Turko-Tatar people were not lower than those of the Russians. They were even higher. Polygamy was widespread among the Turko-Tatar Mohammedans and we would expect a greater natural increase than among the monogamous Russians.

We are unable to find the explanation of the losses and the decrease of the Turko-Tatar people in the Russian histories of the tsarist times. Thus in the *Journeys of the Holstein Missions to Moscow and Persia* in 1684, 1686, and 1688, we are told that "in the districts of Kazan and Astrakhan the Turko-Tatar population of whole villages and even cities had been slaughtered by the Russians and piles of corpses lay unburied on the streets."¹

The tragedy of the Turko-Tatar people in the districts of Kazan and Astrakhan under Russian rule, as we see from the words of an eyewitness Olearius, needs no comment. It is reddened with blood from the mountains of corpses, unburied in the streets of the villages and cities.

¹ *The Journey of the Holstein Embassy to Moscow and Persia*. Adam Olearius. Leibnitz, Ed. of 1868 Germany. Translated by Barsov in Cht. O. I. and D. 1868. Tsyetayev, *Protestantism and Protestants in Russia*, p. 722.

That explains part of the loss of the natural increase of the population as a whole.

We can find some information on the sufferings of the people also in the materials of the tsarist regime and on the annihilation of the Turko-Tatars during the period of their national uprisings.

According to the history of the Turko-Tatar people, it is certain that Ivan the Terrible after his armed capture of the city and fortress of Kazan in 1552, killed the entire population of the city and in the neighborhood up to a distance of 50 *versts* (ar. 30 miles). All schools, houses of prayer, (mosques) libraries and buildings of public and state institutions were burned and destroyed.

In 1598, by order of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, the entire Tatar population of Kazan and the neighborhood, after various kinds of repression, were banished and deported. At the same time all rebuilt mosques were burned and ruined. The houses, schools and buildings of social institutions were confiscated and handed over to Russian settlers. In the same way the Nogaytsy and the Tatars were removed from Astrakhan.

The persecution of the Turko-Tatar people by all barbaric forms begun by Ivan the Terrible, was continued and widened by his successors on the throne of Moscow to the last years of the reign of Michael Romanov, i.e. until 1645. During this period even the temporary appearance of Turko-Tatars in the cities of Kazan and Astrakhan was forbidden.

Adam Olearius mentioned this in 1685: "Kazan is a comparatively large wooden city. Not a single Tatar is here admitted. . . In Astrakhan on an elevated spot has been built a kremlin with stone walls and towers. The Tatars are not allowed to have a permanent residence in the city."²

Especially severe forms of repression were adopted by Peter I, whom the historians of the Turko-Tatars called Deli Petro (Mad Peter). Thus by an order of January 20, 1718, "there was declared a mobilization of the Turko-Tatar Mohammedans from the ages of 15 to 60." Camps were opened for those "mobilized" in distant regions with the object of compulsory labor on various structures. Especially large camps were set up in the swamps at the mouth of the Neva to build the new capital of Petersburg.

In these camps there was established a regime of slave labor and no ending and no return home was foreseen for the men mobilized; they were doomed to destruction. The high rate of mortality among the Turko-Tatars in Petersburg camp can be imagined by the great size of the old

² Op. cit, pp. 201-4. Dm. Ilvovskiy, *History of Russia*, Vol. 4, Sect. 2 (Appendix).

"Tatar cemetery" beyond the borders of St. Petersburg. It was six kilometers (3.7 miles) in length and three (1.8 miles) in breadth.

At the same time that repression by forced labor was introduced under Peter, a rigorous persecution of the Turko-Tatars was being carried on because of their Mohammedan religion and all kinds of measures were adopted to force them to accept the Orthodox religion. For example, by an ukaz of Peter given to the Vice-Governor of Kazan Kudryavtsev "a Tartar who accepted Orthodoxy was for three years to be exempted from all state obligations and taxes". Then the newly converted were to be exempted from military levies. The money thus remitted was to be collected in full from the Mohammedans of their villages.³

By an ukaz of Empress Anna Ioannovna dated January 19, 1732, it was ordered that "boys of 11-12 years of a family of Tatars that had accepted Orthodoxy would be received in the Cadet Corps." By an order of Empress Elizabeth of October 28, 1743, it was decreed that: 1) Tatars unwilling to accept Orthodoxy should be resettled on unfruitful lands or sent to distant regions; 2) to burn and destroy all houses of prayer called mosques in the area from Nizhny Novgorod to the city of Yaik." In fact in 1743 the Russians burned 600 mosques and since Mohammedan custom a national school, a Mekteb or Medresse, was attached to every mosque, this meant the destruction of all the schools supported by the common efforts of the Mohammedans.

During the centuries the administrative pressure and persecution by the Russians did not stifle the freedom-loving and martial spirit of the Turko-Tatars. Turko-Tatar history knows the following periods of bloody battles during armed insurrections:

The 5 year national war, 1553-1557; revolt, 1634-1638; revolt of Bolat Batyr, 1670-1671; revolt, 1708-1709; revolt of Salavat Batyr, 1733-1735; revolt of Kilmak Aba and Karasakal, 1735-1740; revolt of the "dzhigits," 1812-1813; revolt of the Turko-Tatars in the Red Army, 1919; revolt in Siberia, 1919-1923; revolt of the Turko-Tatar "Vylochniki," 1920; revolt of the Turko-Tatars in Altay, Transauralia, Siberia and Trans-Baikal, etc., 1930-1935; the conspiracy within the Soviet government of Tataristan in 1928-1929 and in other Turkic areas of the USSR.

As can be seen, these revolts were severe and some lasted as long as 5 years. Russian historians have hidden these efforts of the Turko-Tatars for 400 years. The popular historian Klyuchevsky on these Turko-Tatar revolts says shortly: "Tatar raids were repeated and groans and howls came over the land."

³ *The History of Kazan*, Kazan, 1847, Part 2, p. 63. Also Dm. Ilvaysky, *History of Russia*, Vol. 4, parts 2-3, pp. 201-204.

Eye witnesses of the liquidation of the revolts by the Soviet punitive expeditions (composed chiefly of units of the Cheka and the NKVD) have confirmed the still greater ruthlessness of the Soviets both toward the rebels and their relatives and members of the same village. In many places the bloody vengeance of the Chekists ended with the burning and destruction not only of groups of houses but of whole settlements and the criminal extermination of the population. The writer of this article witnessed himself the frightful suppression of the Turko-Tatar revolt of the Vilochniki in 1920.⁴

In the inhuman conditions of the enslavement of the Turko-Tatar nation and the regime of extermination, we will find the main cause of the loss or diminution of their number as compared with the normal law of the increase of the population in the world. This short sketch of history explains the disappearance of 7,500,000 Turko-Tatars, the difference between the 4,500,000 found by European scholars and the 12,000,000 that would have survived by the application of the normal natural increase.

In 1950 the world population based on the censuses of the various nations shows a world population of 2,500,000,000 people. The Soviet census of 1950 shows the number of Russians as 90,000,000. If we compare the estimates for 1550 with those for 1950, we find that the number of Russians has increased 11 times, while the world population is only 6 times as large. The Soviet census of 1939 published after control in the Politburo gave the number of Russians as 99,000,000. The same census gave the number of Tatars as 3,000,000. If the Turko-Tatar population had increased even 6 times as did the average world population, its number in 1939 should have been 18,000,000. What happened to these people?

We will find part of the answer in the Soviet statistics of the census of 1939. From the Turko-Tatar population have been separated as separate peoples, 1,500,000 Bashkirs, 2,000,000 Chuvash, 750,000 Mordva, and others. Including these we find 7,500,000 Turko-Tatars. These Soviet figures when compared with those of the world show a loss of 10,750,000.

Is this not genocide?

This "national" policy of the tyranny of the Soviet government has caused a yearly increase in the number of Russians but a catastrophic decline in the Turko-Tatar population.

⁴ The details are in the sketches in the history, *The Struggle of the Turko-Tatar Nation for Independence* by Iskender Akchura.

The savage terror of the Soviet regime was continued after the ending of World War II and the entire territory of Idil-Ural was richly drenched with the blood of the victims. For the extent of this let us analyze the statistical material on the losses and victims as a result of World War II. Thus from the emigre press it has been shown that there were: former Ostarbeiter Turko-Tatars in Western Europe — 20,000; Turko-Tatars in German Army — 100,000; members of families of the above, counting 4 persons to a family — the total number 480,000.

Many of these were in 1945-6 shot by the Soviet executioners and the others were set to forced labor or put in labor camps where they were doomed to death. As we know, by the agreements of the allies, after World War II, citizens of the Soviets were handed over to them, wherever they were found in Europe and Asia and these were taken to the USSR for a bloody reprisal and annihilation.

Yet all this time the Russian population continued to increase. This is clear from the Soviet census of 1939. Between 1926 and 1939, i.e. in 12 years, the Russian population increased by 27%, and the non-Russian by 3%. If we look at the non-Russian peoples separately, we find that some even decreased in number. For example:

a) Ukrainians with 31,194,976 in 1926, went down to 28,070,404 in 1939

b) Kazakhs (Kazakhstan) with 3,968,289 in 1926 went down to 3,098,764 in 1939.

c) Byelorussians for the 12 years remained without increase at 5,267,431.

In the same period the Russians increased from 77,791,124 to 99,019,929.⁵

Scientific research has shown that the growth of a population has a direct relationship to the well-being of a people and the care of it by the state. Stalin indicated the improvement of life in the Soviet Union in his phrase "We have begun to live better, to live cheerfully." But the census of 1939 showed that this improvement was only for the Russians and not for the non-Russians under the Communist leadership of Russians.

So the black zigzag of the statistics of the Turko-Tatar people with its sharp decline, as shown by the Soviet statistics of 1939 and 1950 despite great terror cannot stifle the soul of the people. Every act of violence evokes a counter-action. The tyrannical regime has not stifled the national movement of a people for its liberty. No terror, no mass internment in concentration camps can stop the heroic struggle of the Turko-Tatar people for independence.

⁵ *Liberation*, (Osvobozhdeniye), February 15, 1953. New Ulm Germany.

THE DILEMMA OF STATE DEPARTMENT

ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

One of the most interesting and fundamentally important developments in Washington is the thorny logical dilemma which the Department of State has created for itself by its fragmentary and inconsistent determinations on the subject of American diplomatic relations with Communist governments. Three closely related phenomena have contributed to what is essentially a pressing problem of effective political diplomacy that the Department has been unable to cope with. They are the solid popular opposition to the recognition of Red China, the challenging House Concurrent Resolution 58, which calls for the extension of diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia, and Senate Resolution 247, proposing the complete severance of diplomatic relations with all Communist governments.

It would surely be a grave error of understanding to associate the existing dilemma of the Department to any seeming contradiction between H. Con. Resolution 58 and either of the other two proposals. On the contrary, the dilemma arises exclusively from the Department's own inconsistency of thought and action which so often in the past has produced situations that without specific accounting are ultimately written off at incalculable costs to the nation. In fact, the dilemma is related to an internal inconsistency of principles and criteria underlying judgments and decisions on the nature and direction of diplomatic relations and certainly not to any apparent or superficial irreconcilability between these proposals.

If rules of sound reasoning are observed in a critical analysis of this subject, the dilemma becomes strikingly evident and the common, essential character of the three proposals falls into full relief. It is assumed here that only rational argumentation will guide Congressional decision on this important matter, and thus assist in rectifying the unclear course pursued by the Department of State. Authoritative opinion delivered by the Department or any other source is scarcely valid when it engenders an internal contradiction that cannot be explained away by ostensibly qualifying factors of empirical evidence. If the dilemma is objectively re-

cognized, a rational judgment on the issue of diplomatic relations then becomes possible. In the spirit of all three proposals it will also be possible to cast our diplomacy into an effective weapon of political and psychological warfare which the contemporary scene clearly necessitates, but which could hardly be fashioned by those delicately bred in modes of thought and behavior that fall far short of the demands of the current situation. Congress, therefore, can and should exercise a responsibility in this regard. And the existing dilemma affords an excellent and appropriate occasion for such constructive action.

NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA

Viewing all three proposals in terms of their respective premises or criteria of thought, it is logically sound for one to advocate the non-recognition of Red China and simultaneously support H. Con. Res. 58 or S. Res. 247. First of all, the non-recognition proposal is obviously motivated by the common intent of employing diplomacy as a necessary and flexible political weapon against Communism. In reference to the House resolution, the Red China issue dwells on entirely different premises of thought. The House resolution is girded to an existing legal framework, whereas the non-recognition proposal rests on the motive of excluding Red China from this framework. Regarding the Senate resolution, this motive is really generalized in the proposal to withdraw all forms of recognition from Russian Communist-dominated governments. On net balance, the three ideas are by no means mutually exclusive, but rather tend to supplement each other once their individual contexts of thought are grasped. It is in the area of their contextual difference that the dilemma confronting the State Department is found.

Most likely, if it was not for the fact that an aroused public sentiment and the vigorous opposition in Congress, led by the Honorable Walter H. Judd and others, emerged with spontaneous report over the Red China issue, the Department of State would have been greatly inclined to extend diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime. The accuracy of this statement may well be measured by the fundamental criteria of diplomatic recognition recently set forth by the Secretary of State himself. Referring to the Red China matter, Mr. Dulles plainly stated in an address to the Overseas Press Club of America that — (1) "Generally, it is useful that there should be diplomatic intercourse between those who exercise de facto governmental authority...", (2) that "it is well established that recognition does not imply moral approval," and (3) that "In relation to Communist China, we are forced to take account of the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has been con-

sistently and viciously hostile to the United States." It is evident from this presentation of the Department's view that the third criterion alone, one of current intensity and power of hostility toward the United States, predicates our present withholding of recognition toward Red China.

These criteria must be borne in mind when consideration is given to the other two proposals. Mr. Dulles advanced them as the foundation of our general policy on diplomatic relations, and consequently they enjoy the status of general principles applicable to all instances. The dilemmatic position of the State Department is in part attributable to this fact. As concerns the proposal on Red China, which is preeminently derived from sources of moral disapproval, the Department obviously lends its present support to it not on the basis of any moral premise, but rather one of political expediency represented in self-legitimizing terms of consistent and vicious hostility on the part of Red China. This determining criterion can be interpreted only in relative terms for it is a basic truth that all Russian Communist-dominated governments are "consistently and viciously hostile to the United States." Thus, on this relativist basis of judgment, it would follow that any substantial alleviation of military pressure and aggression in Asia would justify, in the light of the Department's position, the diplomatic recognition of Red China.

This possibility in the future has already been accommodated in the Department's guarded statements on the issue. Terms, such as "at present," "at this time," "currently" and the like, are employed as levers of qualification. It may be axiomatic in the standard techniques of rote diplomacy always to keep the door somewhat ajar, but as cumulative experience with the Communists well shows, somehow their feet, not ours, seem always to be situated on the threshold of political initiative and effect. The time may come when the proponents of non-recognition shall have to intensify their efforts to thwart this potential tendency in the Department's position toward the diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime. Leaning on the first criterion of usefulness, it should not be difficult to establish from the primary angles of intelligence and symbolic value the far greater utility of maintaining diplomatic intercourse with the Nationalist Chinese government. From the overall viewpoint of political diplomacy, as distinguished from antiquated rote diplomacy, the non-recognition proposal serves as a major weapon against Russian-centered Communism.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 58

The State Department is perfectly consistent in its attitude toward Red China. Not only does it refuse to establish an embassy in Peiping,

but it opposes also the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations. To permit either would incur *de jure* recognition which the Red Chinese government so desperately seeks. Moreover, its position is internally consistent with the criteria or operational principles governing diplomatic recognition as declared by the Secretary of State. Now, however, when it comes to the second proposal, namely House Concurrent Resolution 58, we discover a glaring inconsistency which precipitates the dilemma now confronting the Department. The existence of this dilemma invites serious consideration of Senate Resolution 247 even without the postulation of any premise of moral disapproval. If this matter is thought through clearly without intrusions of unessential argumentation, this conclusion is the inevitable logical outcome.

In the final analysis, penetrating to the very core of the entire issue on diplomatic relations, what are the determining factors of advantage justifying the existence of such relations? Ultimately, there are two general factors. One is the establishment of friendly and peaceful relationships with the peoples involved for productive cultural and commercial intercourse. In the present context of affairs this primary objective is largely marred by the hostile propaganda and activities of the Communist governments in the Soviet Russian Empire. In a real sense this objective has been converted into one of symbolizing to the tyrannized peoples the hope of eventual liberation and freedom. This is what I referred to above as the symbolic value of current diplomatic relations.

The second important factor, which, today, perhaps takes precedence over the one mentioned, is information service. Embassies in foreign countries are important listening posts and sources of information reports that enable us to keep abreast of developments and events in these countries for purposes of accurate knowledge and calculation of policy. In considering this and the other objective, it goes without saying that the conduct of our foreign affairs should be rationally ordered and consistent with international law itself.

If these, then, are the basic considerations founding diplomatic relations, the opposition of the State Department to the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 58 should be very carefully examined. For several outstanding reasons its stand is both inconsistent and questionable. First, the resolution, as formulated by the Honorable Lawrence H. Smith, is securely based in our *de jure* recognition of the states of Ukraine and Byelorussia. In contrast to Red China, these two nations receive our *de jure* recognition by virtue of their legal presence in the United Nations. Thus, the question here is not one of recognition but rather an extension of diplomatic relations in the form of establishing American missions in the capitals of Ukrainian Kiev and Byelorussian Minsk.

With the element of consistency in mind you may well ponder the question, in the full light of aforementioned considerations, as to why this extension had not consistently succeeded the act of recognition.

Second, upon careful analysis one finds that the Smith resolution is completely in accord with the very criteria on diplomatic relations expounded by the Secretary of State.¹ Each of the three general principles enumerated above is thoroughly reflected in the resolution. Concerning the principle of utility in dealing with de facto governmental authorities, the cases of Ukraine and Byelorussia—the two largest non-Russian republics in the European sector of the Soviet Union—are exemplary, and supported by precedent and general opinion in international law, their respective governments enjoy de facto status in substantially the same manner as do the Russian-controlled Communist governments of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and others.² The nominal distinction of Soviet Union, which we disregard in the case of the Baltic states, is of no consequence. The second and third criteria, respectively relating to the absence of any moral approval and to consistent and vicious hostility, are also suitably satisfied by these two cases. In short, could it be that a divergence of thought exists between the Secretary of State, who has clearly expressed himself as to the bases of diplomatic relations, and the group responsible for the untenable, negative opinion on H. Con. Res. 58? An answer to this question should be sought.

Now, turning to the two major objectives of diplomatic relations, no reasonable person can deny that they are of momentous import when related to a concrete situation that is both quantitatively and qualitatively outstanding from the vantage point of American interest. The combined population of Ukraine and Byelorussia exceeds fifty million people. Ukraine itself is the largest non-Russian nation behind the European Iron Curtain. Strategically, each country is situated in a most advantageous position, the capital of Byelorussia being in close proximity to the entire Baltic area and that of Ukraine in the very shadows of the Balkan region, areas which are at considerable distance from Moscow. The group in the State Department may be blind to such elements, but if we are engaged in long-range planning, we might well take heed of the necessity, as Hanson W. Baldwin strongly points out, for "a psychological and political offensive in the Ukraine and satellite states..."³

¹ Secretary of State Dulles and House Concurrent Resolution 58, *Congressional Record*, June 3, 1954, pp. A4158-9.

² House Concurrent Resolution 58 Consistent with International Law, *Congressional Record*, April 14, 1954, pp. A2811-12.

³ War or Peace: Some Basic Issues, *N. Y. Times Magazine*, April 18, 1954.

Politically these two national states are the most troublesome to Moscow, while, economically, Ukraine is one of the most valuable to the colonial Russian power.

These few essential facts are adequate enough to explain why Ukraine and Byelorussia are the two most prohibited republics in the Soviet Union to foreign visitors. However, by the very nature of this case, we have the opportunity of penetration to the peoples involved. Thus in the light of the given facts, is it not equally important for us to symbolize the force of freedom in the native capitals of these large national states as we see fit to do in Warsaw and the capitals of even considerably smaller nations in Eastern Europe? Taking our second general objective, is it not even more important for us to establish observation centers in these highly restricted and strategic areas than, perhaps, anywhere else in Eastern Europe? In the framework of the analysis presented here, the answers to these fundamental questions are obvious. These are the questions that should be pressed by the members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs when the representatives of the Department appear to justify their negative stand.

It is at this point that the dilemma of the State Department crystallizes itself. In its statement on the resolution the Department committed other inconsistencies contributing to its present dilemma. For example, its primary argument is that an extension of diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia would lend to the fiction of their national independence. The logical retort to this raises the question as to whether the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and others certifies to their independence. As was demonstrated at the hearing on the resolution, the other arguments are secondary in character and just as inconsistent and irrelevant as this one.⁴

If our diplomacy is to be conducted with functional and political significance, then in the legal scope of this case the basic objectives of symbolic value and creative intelligence activity must be advanced toward realization. If, despite the sound legalities of the case and the substantiating criteria of the Secretary of State, the Department still sees no value in realizing these paramount objectives in Ukraine and Byelorussia, then, from the viewpoint of these essential objectives, how can it possibly justify the continued maintenance of diplomatic representatives in Russian Moscow, Polish Warsaw and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain? Surely we do not venture to symbolize freedom for some nations and not for others. And certainly expanded information, particularly

⁴ Special Subcommittee on H. Con. Res. 58, Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1953.

in these two areas, is not something we can afford to ignore in these times. If it is arbitrarily maintained that these factors bear no value in the tense areas of Ukraine and Byelorussia, then, quite rationally, it is most difficult to believe or imagine that they carry any weight of advantageous significance in Russia, Poland or anywhere else behind the Iron Curtain. Aside from any moral premises, a negative stand by the Department on H. Con. Res. 58 would furnish adequate justification for the withdrawal of all American diplomatic missions now behind the Iron Curtain.

SENATE RESOLUTION 247

It should be clear now as to how the Department of State stumbled into a dilemma really of its own making. The logical relationships between the three outstanding proposals should also be manifestly clear by now. It is clear that one can logically support *at the same time* the non-recognition proposal of Red China and either of the other two. Now it should be equally evident that, depending on the Department's resolution of its dilemma, there is a close logical relationship between the House and Senate resolutions. The two resolutions are not mutually exclusive in the proper order of time. If the Department persists in its negative stand on the House resolution, which, let it be emphasized, accepts and firmly rests on the determining premises and criteria of our present conduct of diplomatic relations, as well as being in full accord with international law, then its action invites serious consideration of the Senate resolution, supported by the pragmatic fact that there is no value, either symbolic or of intelligence worth, in the continuance of diplomatic relations with Russian-dominated Communist governments.

In premisal contrast to H. Con. Res. 58, Senate Resolution 247, sponsored by Senators Jenner and McCarran who propose the complete severance of diplomatic relations with all Russian-dominated Communist governments, is formulated on the basis of moral disapproval. Its first clause begins with, "Whereas it is morally wrong for the Government of the United States to maintain diplomatic relations with the band of Kremlin international outlaws..." This obviously is in disagreement with the second criterion stated by the Secretary of State above. Moreover, if carefully analyzed, the resolution is thoroughly consistent internally by indicating the logical outcome of such action. Because of the general nature in the application of *de jure* recognition, the necessary consequence of severance in relations is either the expulsion of the Iron Curtain representatives from the United Nations and other international councils or our formal withdrawal from these bodies. Legally, a permanent

boycott of sessions marked by the presence of these representatives would not do where we still would maintain membership. Therefore, the second part of the resolution plainly recommends "that the Government of the United States should convoke an international conference of the free nations of the world..."

The anvil of logical decision on this whole complex of diplomatic relations is obviously House Concurrent Resolution 58. The full burden of proof on the practical and tangible efficacy of our diplomatic relations with the Iron Curtain governments rests squarely on the shoulders of the State Department. For those considering these matters there are no other logical alternatives of action but these. First, if we are content to follow rote diplomacy in an adaptational drift with events and circumstances that accounts for the existent labyrinth of inconsistency and confusion, then the easiest and unthinking course is to let things be, with no support given to any of the three proposals. Second, if we are intent upon utilizing diplomacy as an effective instrument in the current mortal struggle, not merely one of words but of symbolic freedom value and strategic intelligence, then, conforming with the declared criteria of diplomatic relations and the rulings of international law, we have no logical choice but to support House Concurrent Resolution 58. And, third, if it cannot be established to our mental satisfaction that the maintenance and legally justified extension of diplomatic relations with Iron Curtain governments are productive of symbolic value and strategic intelligence, as, indeed, a negation of H. Con. Res. 58 unquestionably implies, then we are totally free to support Senate Resolution 247.

H. Con. Res. 58 poses the dilemma to the State Department, and challenges also the effectuality of our diplomacy. Although it establishes itself primarily on legal and accepted procedural grounds, it is vested with the aims of moral and psychological effect and the means of strategic planning activity. The denial of the possible realization of these aims and means is undoubtedly a black reflection on the functional utility and worth of our present diplomatic missions behind the Iron Curtain. Reason would dictate that these important elements must first be settled before we impute exclusive moral considerations to the problem of diplomatic relations. It will be interesting to observe to what extent reason will be employed in the settlement of this issue.

THE EXAMINATION OF A PRIEST IN THE BOLSHEVIK PRISON

My Memoir of a Bolshevnik prison in 1938

By M. KOKHANOVSKY

(Dedicated to Very Rev. DR JOHNSON, the Dean of Canterbury Cathedral)

It was the sixth night of my stay in a Bolshevnik prison in the USSR. I had gotten into "the conveyer of the NKVD"¹ as soon as I was arrested and I had already passed several nights at examinations without sleep. It is true that I had succeeded in sleeping three or four hours during the day but this gave little refreshment, especially in a cell.

I had not confessed what I had not done or signed the confession written for me by the examiner — in other words I had not been "broken in the conveyer."² The examiner told me that I still could look forward to "many pleasures" and among them the visit to the "room of laughter," the special torture chamber.

This night I did not feel very badly, because I had slept in the "dog house,"³ while waiting for the examination.

In the examination room a surprise awaited me; the examiner was not alone, opposite him at a table sat a prisoner, a little, stooped old man. It was easy to see from the greenish gray color of his face, a prison characteristic, that he had not just been gathered in "from freedom". His beautiful gray hair — the sign of a great and fine old age — framed his face with a white halo. He wore the black cassock of a priest and it seemed pitiful. The setting of the examination seemed strikingly new to him, for his eyes showed an extreme surprise mixed with terror.

"There's some filth, that doesn't confess," remarked the examiner sticking his finger in my side," but we'll make him."

Then he commanded me:

"March into the corner and stand properly."

¹ To get into "the conveyer of the NKVD" means to be called for examination every successive night in the Soviet torture chambers.

² Been brought to the point where the tortured person confesses what he is asked to.

³ The "dog house" is a cellar in the NKVD where there are wooden booths, each for a single person. The prisoners wait in these a call to the examiner and afterwards for their return to prison.

I went into the corner and stood "properly" with my face to the wall.

I had stood in this corner many hours other nights before tortures. There was a chest here and the night before the examiner had hit my head against it, because I had fallen asleep on my feet. It was forbidden to sleep, even standing up.

"So, father," began the examining man of the NKVD in a soft voice, (he was a powerful middle-aged man in an army uniform), "don't be stubborn. We caught you baptizing a child, caught you with a censer and a cross. I know, but I want you to tell me directly, where are your armored cars?"

"What armored cars?" answered the priest in surprise.

"Be less surprised, and confess more — that is my advice, — the armored cars of your priest' organization, that's what I mean" — here the examiner looked at his watch and yawned.

"I don't know any such organization. We're dying of hunger, our church government has been stopped, we're kept out of non-church work, we can only make a living by digging graves in the cemetery and I'm well past sixty, I have no strength, I can't dig many graves... I make very little... and I'm perishing... other priests are, and so are their families."

"You won't confess, look out for yourself" — said the examiner venomously. "Write down, father, who enrolled you and whom you enrolled in the organization — there's paper for you. Don't pretend to be innocent, for you work a machine gun well, you're a first class machine gunner. Where are your artillery, your supplies of arms, your explosives — dynamite, pyroxyline, what unit do you command — infantry, cavalry, — *write it all down.*"

"I, comrade examiner," — the prisoner began...

"A goose is not a comrade to a pig, to you I'm not a comrade but a citizen."⁴

"Citizen examiner," the old man began in confusion, "why should I lie about myself and others. What sort of a commander am I, how could I do it, I can scarcely crawl."

"Stop being clever, father, I see through you. You're a tank man, father. Ha, Ha, Ha! Or a destroyer pilot, the commander of a destroyer wing in a cassock. You, father," — and the NKVD man began to roar.

"You're making fun of my age," objected the old man.

"It's time for you to confess, it's past time," — the examiner yawned again, got up from his chair and lazily walked over to the old priest.

Then I heard a crash and the old man fell to the floor.

⁴ Throughout the examiner uses Russian and the priest Ukrainian.

"That's the first lesson for you, filth," — roared the torturer and wiped off his bloody fist with his handkerchief.

I heard the groan of the victim but I could not see because of the wall.

"You over in the corner, help the man, you see what happened, you heard his cry."

I took a few steps and saw the body stretched out on the floor. His face was in a pool of blood. From his open lips came a thick, dark red stream. The ends of his mane of white hair were soaked in blood and dyed in the color.

"Sprinkle him with water and sit him up" — thundered a voice above me.

I took a glass of water from the table, wet the head of the unfortunate man, lifted him and seated him with his back to the wall. His face looked terrible; his nose was broken and his upper lip cut open; one eye was blackened and closed. His hair was rosy from the mixture of blood and water.

"They insulted you, father, insulted you" — said the examiner in a kindly voice. "One blow did so much damage, suppose they treat you twice. Stay still, sit there and rest" — he added sympathetically, then he yawned and began to smoke.

*

Quiet. I stood in the corner and looked at the wall. I swallowed hard and was afraid of falling. I lightly rested my elbow on the chest and it helped. I was only afraid of failing asleep on my feet. The desire to sleep, to sleep swept over me and what would be the results! I knew that this bolshevik beast would wake me again as yesterday or by a worse method that would put me to sleep forever, instead of waking me. I caught myself but I wanted to sleep, a second, a minute and I slept, slept, I swayed, and if it had not been for the chest, I would have fallen. God, what is happening to me? Lord, help me!..

After the prayer, I felt better as always. I glanced to the side and saw the examiner at the table, smoking and nodding. The priest was sitting on the floor, holding his head in his hands.

A sleepy, long, oppressive quiet kept on. A thin, high pitched sound suddenly broke the stillness.

"Save me, save me" — some one was crying — "what are you doing to me?"

The priest dropped his hands from his head and listened, but it was not a surprise to me.

Again came the voice with more emotion:

"Save me, save me" — a woman was calling in the room of some examiner. It was very startling to hear a call for help in the NKVD. Who could help there?

Now the voice dropped into an alto and there were no words. It was a colorless cry, dark without any expression.

"A.. a...a...", it went on monotonously. There was a certain falseness in it as if an untalented actor in a theatre was playing badly in a tragedy.

O, I knew well what the change meant. Only when the sufferings under torture reach their peak, do people cry not in their natural voice, but without an expression of the terrible pain, monotonously and even falsely. I cannot explain this — that is for the physicians.

The voice again became screaming and the cry: "Save me, save me" was repeated several times but ever weaker and dying away.

In the next room, something heavy fell, the doors slammed and some one ran from the room, shouting:

"Natalka, Natalochka!"

Then the doors of other rooms slammed; there came the trampling of many feet and shouts:

"Stop, stop". The cry of Natalochka was mixed with a bell and a burst of revolver fire from the men of the NKVD.

Our examiner also ran out into the corridor and through the open door I saw a group of soldiers dragging along the floor some unfortunates — perhaps some dead.

It grew still. Only the strong odor of gunpowder seeped from the corridor to us and told of the recent tragedy. And the strained, anxious, hesitant quiet filled the room. It was broken by a whisper. The priest was praying and asking the help of the heavenly powers.

"Priest, sit up here at this table and confess. Write down who enrolled you and whom you enrolled" — the examiner began. "Tell me, you long-tailed devil" and he struck the table with his huge fist. "Talk, tell me of the revolt, when it is to be and where. Stop muttering your prayers, to the "lamp,"⁵ you're in the NKVD not in church.

"I don't know, I don't know nothing. What revolt!" — the priest's words were scarcely audible.

With quick steps the torturer walked over to his victims and put the muzzle of his Nagan⁶ to the head of the man being examined.

"Stop, you old idiotic mug, one shot and you'll fly into your grave. You understand! Confess, I tell you, I'll write it down and you'll only have to sign the statement. Fine! Now answer quickly!"

⁵ "To the lamp", i. e. to nothing.

⁶ The revolver used by the NKVD.

I looked at the old man. His face was impossibly swollen and twisted to one side, great tears flowed from one eye, the other was closed, and his hair was strangely pink.

"Stop crying, parasite. Moscow does not believe tears — you know the proverb. Come here and dictate."

The strong hand of the NKVD man dragged his victim by the hair and put him near himself. The revolver disappeared and the man began to smoke and prepared to write.

There was again quiet and silence and then an involuntary cry of the priest. It was hard to see at once what had happened. I only saw that the examiner put his arm around him and then threw a cigarette on the floor. Now I understood. The torturer had put out his cigarette on the bare neck of the old man. He had a good reason to scream and clasp his hand to his neck. This little wound was very painful. In prison language it was called a "prank". It was too bad there were so many of these "pranks".

The clock struck four.

"Sit down, priest, and we'll finish" — the torturer called out cheerfully. The victim slouched helplessly on a chair near the table.

"Well, brother, you're awfully frightened. You're a fine fellow. Ha, ha, ha, you're a cavalry man. The girls are for you, now they'll look at you, and don't yawn. You've got a nice soft, goat's beard, and you're the father of a lot of kids, but you're a one-eyed goat. Now write, you goat, write... what are you muttering? Praying to God?"

"I am praying to my Lord."

"You're talking to God. There's no one in this room except us and that snake in the corner."

"God is a spirit and He is everywhere."

"And you pray to Him."

"I do."

"For yourself..."

"For myself and others, for all."

"And for me."

"Yes, for you."

"You're lying, parasite. You'd eat me up, if you could."

"As a Christian, I pray for those who torture me... I sorrow for sinners."

"And for me as a sinner."

"Yes."

The stool with the old man flew away from the table and fell on the floor. The back of the head of the old man hit the ground. His hands began to twitch convulsively as if they were grabbing at some-

thing or were digging into the floor. Apparently the torturer had kicked his victim under the table; it was a severe, well aimed blow and the impact of the soldier's boot was powerful.

"Get up, dog, fake, devil. Or I'll dig you out like a crab with tongs." And then the examiner let loose a true Muscovite tirade. From his throat there poured out a torrent of black filth and it flooded the room. The tirade abused the parents of his victim and their parents, their souls, blood and faith. The filth continued for a long time, very long, and only stopped after a blasphemous outburst against God, Christ and the Mother of God.

I made a move to help the priest but a threatening shout stopped me.

"Stand there with your snout to the wall — I'll take care of you in a moment."

Then I heard a telephone conversation.

"Command post. Send guards to room 116 to pick up a prisoner."

The guards came quickly, caught hold of the priest by the arms and dragged him into the corridor.

"To the hospital?" asked one.

"Throw the carrion into the corridor of the doghouses," answered the examiner and he turned to me:

"Hey, you in the corner! Are you ready to sign the statement or shall we go to the 'hall of pleasures' for some fun?"

I did not sign and although I did not go that night to the "hall of pleasures," the examiner amused himself so well that I only came to in my cell in the prison.

*

I actually recovered consciousness in my cell under the table where my friends had laid me. The guards had brought me back unconscious in the early morning. I lay under the table until dinner for this was the most quiet and suitable place for resting.

"Get up, you musn't lie too long, get control of yourself, or you'll be lost. Remember you're in the prison of the NKVD, it will soon be dinner and you must eat" — the commandant of the cell warned me.

I absolutely did not feel like eating. My body ached from the blows and especially my wrist, which the examiner had hit with the leg of a stool. A physician, likewise a prisoner, decided that no bones were broken but he bound my wrist very tightly with a shirt torn into a strip.

We were brought for dinner the horrible balanda — warm salty water with traces of barley which stank of rotten fish. By great effort I ate this for I knew that in prison you had to eat to live.

When I told the chief of the events of the night before he told me that many of those examined had witnessed the torturing of other prisoners.

"What is this novelty for?"

"They are trying a new way of influencing those who are being examined. Apparently the tortures do not bring a sufficient number of persons to accuse themselves and sign the statements the torturers want. The NKVD knows — and it has great experience — that no torture can inflict more pain than the victim can endure. Then he loses consciousness. This does not suit the NKVD. Now they are forcing one victim to watch the torture of another. This is supposed to exert a psychological influence on the first victim, to terrify him and take away his will. It is sad to think that this was not invented by the NKVD but by some scholar, probably the Communist physicians of the NKVD. In a word the NKVD is working on a scientific basis. Yet to-day no one signed the statements. Did you?"

"I didn't sign."

"Then no one signed" — added a new participant in the conversation.

"It's not strange. The person who watches the torturing of another victim feels sorry for him. He will not become weaker but will hate the NKVD more strongly. His hate will give him more desire for revenge and this will give him more strength for the struggle," added the chief.

"If I got hold of that scholar, the author of this combined method, I would thank him with my own hand," added another.

Then I told of the priest, to whom the examiner gave an overdose and as a result interrupted the torturing... or death.

I then asked the prisoners, if any one had seen in the corridor of the doghouse of the NKVD the old priest.

One told me:

"Yesterday I sat in the doghouse almost the whole night, but I was not called for examination. I heard tramping, some one with a rattling in his throat or dying. I guessed that they had brought some one from the examination or perhaps we were going in the Black Crow⁷ to the prison and I tried to find out. But time passed and there was no Black Crow. Then the man they brought began to mutter something that I could not understand. A guard flew at him — 'Shut up, you long-haired counter, this isn't a hospital but a doghouse and there must be quiet' but he kept

⁷ The Black Crow is a truck which takes prisoners from the prison to the NKVD doghouses and back to prison. It has an iron top and walls and no windows.

on muttering as if he were out of his head or something. The guard "quieted" him quickly, perhaps with blows. He grew still. But when they called me to go to the prison, and I was going along the corridor, I saw near the steps a man lying on the cement floor. From his hair he was obviously old and from his cassock a priest. He was a small man, humped up, and lying by the wall. I thought he was dead, but he was breathing and croaking. I don't know how long he lay there. We were piled into the Black Crow but that poor devil was left," — and the narrator lit another cigarette.

I could not get out of my mind the fate of the priest. What happened to him? Did they take him to the prison hospital, and perhaps free him after all he had gone through? Unfortunately there was no one to ask about him. Many people were taken for examination and never returned.

The next two nights I was not called for examination and this gave me the opportunity to recover a little by sleeping soundly.. But when the NKVD next took me and brought me into the doghouse, I saw there was no one in the corridor but as I passed the steps to the back court, I noticed a foot in an old slipper and a rag of a cassock sticking out from the darkness under the steps. Then something stirred in the darkness. Two arms in torn sleeves began to rise up. A bowed head appeared in the light of the corridor, its long matted hair covered with dirt and blood, and the face was so swollen that it had lost its shape. No eyes were visible — they were lost in the swelling. The color of the face was blue with bloody and dirty spots. I cried out in terror. It was the priest whom the torturer had worked on in my presence.

"Look at the beast" — shouted my convoy. He took a step back into the dark corner under the steps and added:

"That damned priest, he won't die." As I sat on the bench of the doghouse, I could not sleep, although I was looking forward to a sleepless night of examination. The sad picture which I had seen gave me no rest. I explained to myself why it affected me so — there was nothing extraordinary about it — the NKVD had killed thousands of people by different methods. They died by individual and mass shootings, at examinations, in prison hospitals, or in prison cells, in exile in Siberia, during the inhuman work in the mines, while strengthening the economy of the USSR. They died at home a few days after they were released from prison. I did not know what would happen to me that night, whether the torturer would break the wrist of my sprained hand... or think of something worse.

Against this background what was the significance of the death of this priest? But there, so near, his twisted little body, his torn body, under the steps in the dark, cold and dirt, was writhing and twisting,

suffering, and seeking the only possible way out from this hopeless situation. That way out was **d e a t h**, but it did not come to him, and they cursed him because he did not die..

And I prayed in the doghouse:

“O Lord, my God. Give this unfortunate victim of our terrible time a speedy and easy death, if there is no other way out. Do not let the foe mock of him. He has drunk to the last drop an overfilled cup of sufferings. End this life, my God. Let it leave the body and let his soul come to Thee. God of all the suffering and the oppressed look on the people of our once delightful Ukraine, now tortured by the Communist beast. This beast has been committing unheard of crimes in our country for decades with the indifference of the other powers or even with their full acquiescence. The blood of our people flows like rivers, millions have perished. God permit one more victim. Take life from the priest, Thy servant, more unhappy than any of us prisoners, give him death, O Lord, only death as the last way out..

My night went off quietly with the examiner. It was hard to spend the night without sleep but there was no torture. The examiner went over old questions. In the morning I went back to the doghouse to wait for the Black Crow and go to the prison.

In the corridor two guards were pulling a body in a torn cassock. I stopped. The convoy hit me in the back and shouted:

“Go on! Boys, what sort of filth are you moving?”

“The priest finally died. We were told to throw him out in the back court,” was the answer. My soul felt better. So he had died.

*

By a miracle I was released from prison. It was my dream to tell people about the examination of the priest in a bolshevik prison, on the basis of scientific materialism, dialectic and Marxism, in a word on the basis of the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, “those great sons” of humanity. My dream is now fulfilled.

God have mercy on all who suffer in the NKVD.



DID THE TREATY OF PEREYASLAV INCLUDE A PROTECTORATE

By DR. SOKRAT IVANYTSKY

The Treaty of Pereyaslav between Ukraine and Moscow in 1654, which inaugurated the domination of Moscow over Ukraine has served as the occasion for great celebrations and manifestations of the adamant determination of Moscow not to allow the Ukrainian people to free themselves from its control. Our readers can find in the first number of the Ukrainian Quarterly for this year material on the catastrophic results of this Treaty for Ukraine.

Russian and Ukrainian scholars have produced an enormous historical literature on the legal aspects of the Treaty of Pereyslav. Their views as to its nature cover at least 180 degrees. They range from those who see in the Treaty an international alliance of two completely independent states to those who regard it as the ordinary annexation of Ukraine by the Moscow state, the later views are represented by some Russian historians. Between these extremes there are countless other views, that the Treaty of Pereyaslav gave the Moscow tsar a protectorate over Ukraine, that Ukraine became a vassal state, or that it entered into a real or a personal union. This article from the pen of a representative of the younger generation of Ukrainian lawyers sees in the Treaty of Pereyaslav still another type of the relations of Ukraine and the Moscow tsarism — a military alliance. S. Ivanytsky rejects the idea that by the Treaty of Pereyaslav Ukraine became a protectorate of Moscow. — (Editor).

An international protectorate¹ is a material and formally juridical relationship between two or more states. The material side of this relationship lies on the one hand in the constant need of defence of the weaker state by the stronger or by several such states, and on the other in the constant obligation of the stronger state or several such states to protect the weaker state. The formally juridical side of this relationship depends again upon the legal dependence of the guarded or protected state on the guarding or protecting state or states. The basic sign of an international protectorate is that the protecting state, which gives the protection, limits significantly the field of action of the protected state. The protected state does not have a free hand in carrying on its foreign

¹ We must distinguish from international protectorate a colonial protectorate. The latter is often called an overseas protectorate.

affairs. This makes it markedly dependent upon the protecting state. This limitation of the protected state in carrying on its foreign affairs is justified by the fact that the protecting state could not assume the obligation of protecting the weaker state, if it gave it a free hand in foreign affairs, wherein lies the greatest danger of becoming involved in international quarrels and exposing its existence to danger.

Sovereign states create an international protectorate by treaty. In opposition to the position of vassalage, under a protectorate the citizens of the protecting and protected state are mutually aliens. In other words we have to deal with the international relations of two states and not legal relations in one state (international-legal relations as opposed to state-legal relations).

Therefore those scholars, who wish to see in the Treaty of Pereyaslav a protectorate, base their theory on the supplemental articles which the tsar proposed through the envoys of the Hetman in March, 1654, although these proposals of the tsar were not accepted by the Hetman. The tsar's representatives in Moscow, in cleverly editing these proposed articles as the propositions of Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, gave immediately to every such proposal an already prepared answer of the tsar in the form of "resolutions." They assumed that the government of the Hetman would not notice the changes and would accept the proposition. In Article Five, we find this resolution: "To accept envoys with good purposes and to dismiss them and to write to his Tsarist Majesty truly and quickly, why they came and with what they were dismissed. And those envoys who have come with proposals hostile to his Tsarist Majesty to hold and keep in the Host and to write about them at once to his Tsarist Majesty and not to dismiss them without the permission of the tsar. And to have no relations with the Turkish sultan and the Polish king without the will of his Tsarist Majesty." It is on this resolution that previous scholars have based their conception of a protectorate, overlooking the fact that the articles with the resolutions did not come into force, as Moscow wished, but remained only a plan of the tsar in answer to the proposition of the Hetman.²

The reason for the Treaty of Pereyaslav was, as we know, the need of help for Ukraine in its defence against the threat of Poland. This support was at the same time the subject of this agreement. So it cannot be doubted that both in January in Pereyaslav and in March, 1654 in Moscow the parties to the treaty had to agree definitely not only how the support of the tsar would be shown practically but also how the two contracting parties together and separately would act outside of the

² The text of the resolutions is quoted from the translation of Hrushevsky.

military actions against Poland.³ As we have emphasized in the introduction, an alliance with a military object contains provisions not only for the military but the diplomatic actions of the allies. In making a treaty with such a purpose, the contracting parties usually mutually bind themselves not only not to enter on their own account and without the knowledge of the other side into treaty relations with the hostile states or some third states but mutually to inform each other about these hostile and third states. Such limitations in foreign affairs are not for the contracting state limitations in the sense of an international protectorate. It concerns only certain definite sections of the foreign affairs of the given state in its relations to certain other states. On the other hand in a protectorate this limitation concerns all its foreign affairs in its relation to all states.

The limitation of a state in the field of only some foreign affairs in relation only to some third powers in treaties with a military purpose is bilateral. So in the same degree in which the Ukrainian State was limited by the Treaty of Pereyaslav in the field of foreign affairs, Tsar Aleksey had to be bound by the treaty in the same field. On the basis of such a contactual limitation of the tsar, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, the successor of Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, demanded that all agreements of the government of Moscow with third states, in which the Ukrainian state was interested, should be made only in the presence of representatives of the Hetman.⁴ So in accordance with the Treaty of Pereyaslav the Ukrainian State enjoyed full freedom in foreign affairs. Hetman B. Khmelnytsky carried on his policy toward White Ruthenian areas with absolute independence, independently carried on diplomatic relations with Sweden, Brandenburg, Hungary, England, Moldavia, with the emperor of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German People," etc.⁵ He even made agreements with states with which the tsar was not on friendly terms.

³ In accordance with the "resolution" of Art. 5, it seems that Tsar Aleksey thought of it as a means of separating Ukraine and Turkey. So the tsar asked that the limitations on foreign affairs should be extended also to Turkey, with which Hetman B. Khmelnytsky had had a treaty since April 12, 1653. The Hetman did not break his relations with the Sultan (Hrushevsky, *History*, Vol. XI, p. 109).

⁴ M. Hrushevsky: *Treaty of Pereyaslav*, p. 23. Yakovliv: *Ukrainian-Moscow Treaties*, p. 48.

⁵ We must emphasize that the tsarist regime dealt with the government of the Ukrainian state under B. Khmelnytsky and for many years after only through the Posolsky Prikaz, i.e. that department of foreign affairs through which the tsar dealt with other independent states. See: Lev Okinshevych — *The Prikaz of "Little Russia" of the Moscow State in the XVII Cent.* (Works of the Commission for the study of Western Rus' and Ukrainian Law, UAN, Kiev, 1925, p. 109).

Hetman B. Khmelnytsky after the Treaty of Pereyaslav had no need to hide and did not hide from the tsar his independent conduct of his own foreign policy. On May 2, 1655 the Hetman wrote to the tsar: "For four years we have been carrying on negotiations with the Swedes for an alliance to help us against the Poles."⁶ In 1657 Hetman B. Khmelnytsky declared to Okolnichy Buturlin that the income of the Hetman was used on payments to envoys and the army needs.⁷

Not only did B. Khmelnytsky carry on his foreign policy after the Treaty of Pereyaslav with complete independence but so did his successor, Hetman Vyhovsky. Tsar Aleksey not only had no treaty basis to object to the independent carrying on of foreign policy by the Ukrainian state but he did not even complain of this right of Ukraine. In the fifth point of the Moscow draft, which Boyar Khitrov presented to Hetman Vyhovsky in 1658, the tsar asked the Ukrainian State to send envoys to the King of Sweden and urge him to make peace with Muscovy. After the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the tsar appealed to the government of the Ukrainian State to intervene between Muscovy and Sweden, i.e. he recognized the statute of the sovereignty of Ukraine in international policy.

As we see, there can be no word of the position that the Treaty of Pereyaslav extended a protectorate over the Ukrainian State. In the relation of Ukraine to tsar Aleksey, there is no basic sign of a protectorate. This could be seen when Peter I appointed to Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky his resident Andrey Izmaylov, who was to supervise also the foreign policy of Ukraine. This was not done on the basis of the Treaty of Pereyaslav but contrary to it. This fact was not a legal relationship but an illegal act of violence.

WAS UKRAINE IN A QUASI-PROTECTORATE OF MOSCOW?

We have already considered the basic conception of a protectorate and have shown that the Treaty of Pereyaslav could not fulfill that conception. Now we can the more easily consider whether this treaty did not create the conditions of a quasi-protectorate.

If the limitation of the freedom of a state in carrying on its foreign policy is the basic mark of a protectorate and one of the basic marks of vassalage, the basic sign of a quasi-protectorate is the limitation of the freedom of a state in carrying on its internal affairs. In a quasi-protectorate the protector allows the protected state to carry on independently its foreign affairs but secures to itself by treaty its influence in the internal

⁶ M. Hrushevsky: *History*, Vol. IX, p. 107.

⁷ Yakovliv: *The Moscow plans of the Treaty Points with Hetman I. Vyhovsky*, p. 120.

affairs of the protected state. It is of course to be understood that although formally the protecting state in a quasi-protectorate has the treaty right to influence only the internal affairs of the protected state, yet by virtue of this fact it has also actually a great influence on the conduct of the foreign policy of the protected state, even though this is barred by the treaty. If the protecting state does not like the foreign policy of the protected state, it can find a "reason" for noticing an internal lack of harmony in the protected state and by military force restore "order" in the protected state in accordance with its own wishes and thus change the direction of the foreign policy of the protected state. We know cases where states make a loan from other states and in this connection give to the creditor states some state monopolies, customs, etc., which the creditor states collect also on the territory of the debtor states and even with their own state organs, i. e. their own officials. Yet this does not in its result create a legal dependence of the debtor state upon the creditor state.⁸

When Hetman B. Khmelnytsky negotiated with Tsar Aleksey for help against Poland, among other things he asked through his envoy Kapusta that a voyevoda be sent to Kiev with 3,000 soldiers. At the moment, the Hetman wanted obviously to demonstrate to Poland that Tsar Aleksey was the ally of Ukraine and that with his military power he was taking a stand against Poland. In the negotiations at Pereyaslav in January, 1654, the tsar's envoy Buturlin raised this question and asked the Hetman to grant passage to the voyevoda who was to go to Kiev with the tsar's army. When Buturlin informed the tsar from Pereyaslav of his agreement in this question with the Hetman, the tsar appointed to Kiev the voyevoda Kurakin. In his order to Kurakin of January 30, 1654, the tsar gave explicit orders to the voyevoda that he was being sent to protect Kiev from the attack "of the Poles and all military people."⁹

In making military treaties, the states often bind themselves in case of need to send to the territory of the allied state even whole armies in aid and to give garrisons for fortresses in the allied state. In such an act international law does not see a legal subordination of the allied state, which has received help, to the other allied state which has sent the help. We know such situations not only in the past but in the present, before our eyes. We need only mention the presence of British forces on the

⁸ Examples of this are the international commission for control of the state debt of Turkey which was active in 1879; the international finance commission in Egypt after, 1880; the international commission for the control of the financial economy of Greece which was set up in 1898 after the Greco-Turkish war, to protect the interests of the European creditors.

⁹ Yakovliv: *Ukr.-Moscow Treaties*, p. 41.

territory of France and Belgium in both World Wars and now the presence of American forces in bases in Britain.

From the Moscow documents it appears that later during the negotiations in Moscow in March, 1654, the tsar expressed through his representatives his desire to have his voyevodas not only in Kiev but also in Chernihiv, Pereyaslav and Nizhen, and at least in Chernihiv. From these documents it also appears that the tsar was planning through these voyevodas to collect taxes which were to cover, logically, the sum of Polish zloty which it was to give to the Ukrainian State as a loan. But the Hetman through his envoys agreed only on the sending of a voyevoda to Kiev and definitely only as a warning to Poland; and, according to the plan of the Hetman the taxes could not be collected in any way by the foreign officials of the creditor state. The tsarist side had to agree to this, for the articles, which the tsar wished to submit to the Hetman in March, 1654, say nothing of the collection of taxes by the tsarist voyevodas. Despite this, the tsar tried in the spring of 1657 to raise this question again. With this in view he sent his envoy Boyar Buturlin to the Hetman, so as to tell the Hetman through him that on the basis of the agreement there were to be tsarist voyevodas not only in Kiev itself but also in other cities of Ukraine. The Hetman replied to the envoy that he considered the March articles of 1654 binding only in so far as they were in agreement with the Treaty of Pereyaslav.¹⁰ As regards the admission of voyevodas to other cities of Ukraine (except Kiev), the Hetman declared that he "had given no instructions to Judge Samijlo Zarudny and Colonel Teterya and he had made no allusion to the idea that his Tsarist Majesty would order his voyevodas to be in the great cities — Chernihiv, Pereyaslav and Nizhen, and assign the collection of taxes to the voyevodas of his Tsarist Majesty." As we know, nothing of the loan to the Ukrainian State went to the tsar and so the Ukrainian State made no payments to the tsar.

From this declaration of Hetman B. Khmelnytsky, which was taken down by the tsarist contracting party, we see again that the Hetman never considered for the Ukrainian State the articles sent from Moscow to be the treaty; that he very definitely opposed to these articles the treaty which he made with the tsar in Pereyaslav and that finally he did not in general recognize the articles sent to him from Moscow. The declaration of the Hetman that he respected the Moscow articles "in so far as they were in agreement with the Treaty of Pereyaslav" was a declaration of the Hetman couched in diplomatic language that the Hetman did not recognize as a whole the March articles sent from Moscow as a binding

¹⁰ M. Hrushevsky: *Pereyaslav Treaty*, p. 6.

supplemental treaty. The contracting parties cannot recognize a treaty in parts. If one of the contracting parties does not agree with even one section of the outline of a treaty, the whole treaty rejected in part by one side must be again approved and again a treaty document with an agreed text must be written out and signed by both parties. As we know, the Hetman did not approve the text of these articles and did not sign them. So they remained only a plan of the tsar for an eventual supplementary treaty to the binding Treaty of Pereyaslav.

The tsar again tried to secure the collection of taxes from Ukraine by this voyevodas, but under a distant successor in the post of Hetman, "the slave of his Tsarist Majesty" Bryukhovetsky. The whole of Ukraine answered the tsar by a general national uprising against this Hetman and liquidated him. After this the tsars made no further attempts in this direction until the time of Empress Catherine. II.

So it is clear that the Treaty of Pereyaslav did not give the tsar the right to perform with his state organs in Ukraine any administrative functions and in general to interfere in any manner whatsoever in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian State. As is seen from the outline of the treaty which the Ukrainian government prepared "on the principles of the Treaty of Pereyaslav" during the time of Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky, the Treaty of Pereyaslav did not even permit Moscow without the knowledge of the Hetman in general the right to have relations with any one in the Ukrainian State.

In this legal relationship which was created by the Treaty of Pereyaslav between the Ukrainian State and Tsar Aleksey, there is not the basic mark of even a quasi-protectorate. Thus the assertion of certain scholars that this treaty created the conditions of a protectorate of Moscow over Ukraine is in our opinion incorrect.

O. LATURYNSKA

(Translated from Ukrainian by MIRA HORDYNSKA)

*

Peace abide here.
 Here will I lie,
 With me — my true pal.
 My horse and the feather-grass
 The honor guard will keep.
 The wormwood will be ever bitter,
 And cornflower ever blue.

DAILY LIFE IN THE KOLYMA CAMPS OF DEATH

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

(This article is a continuation of the memoirs of Petro Kolymsky published in the previous issues. *Editor.*)

THE PRISONERS HAVE TO SERVE THEMSELVES

In the application of the extraordinarily severe regime in the camps there were variations in the different sections in one direction or another. Though in Nyzhny Khatynakh we were forbidden to bring wood to the barracks, in the section "March 8" the prisoners fully provided the camp with fuel. There were four horses in the camp, nevertheless the prisoners were forced to carry the wood from the mountains on their shoulders for the barracks, the mess hall and the kitchen. After 15½ hours of heavy work, at 11 o'clock in the night, the prisoners were sent into the woods in the steep cold mountains. We had to cut down the trees, let them down from the mountains and then carry them on our shoulders to the camp some 1½ to 2 miles. We got back to the camp at 2 A.M. These nightly walks took place twice a week. In spite of the night's work in preparing the fuel, all the prisoners were roused at 5 A.M. and sent to work in the mine. Besides these two days when the wood was prepared in the night, each camp had a certain stretch of the automobile road which during the winter had to be cleared of snow. This was in addition to the 15½ hours of work in the mine. This regime of limitless exploitation of the strength of the prisoners helped to increase the number of sick prisoners in the camp.

Being in a land far removed from equilibrium, and feeling themselves helpless slaves, who sooner or later could not endure such treatment, many prisoners committed suicide. In the winter of 1938-39, in the section "March 8" two prisoners hung themselves in the woods. Two others cut off their fingers in the mines. My acquaintance, Dmytro Altshuler, during this winter twice tried to hang himself but his friends took him down and brought him back to life. In March, 1939 he put his hand on the rim of a narrow wheel. It cut off the palm of his hand along with his fingers.

SANITARY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TYPHUS

In camp "March 8" there were no baths. For more than a month the prisoners did not wash and no one spoke of baths for the feared blows. All wore dirty and torn underwear for 2-3 months and under such conditions the prisoners were ridden with lice. In some camps of Kolyma cases of typhus appeared. For this reason a physician came to the camp from the chief administration and made an investigation to see if the prisoners had lice.

At 10:30 P.M. all prisoners were placed in their underwear in a room and were told to take off their shirts, which were filled with lice. At 11 P.M., we were taken to a neighboring camp about two miles. All clothing was taken for disinfection and we were sent to wash. In the building, where we washed, it was very cold. The entire walls were covered with a thick layer of ice. There were two stoves in the place but their warmth served only to melt snow to secure water for bathing. Each of us received one quart of water with which we were required to wash our entire body.

After finishing the "dry" wash, we received our things from the disinfecting station and were taken back to our camp. We went to sleep at 3 A.M. and at 5 A.M. were roused for work. When we came back to camp in the evening at 10:30, there was another check for lice. They were found on almost all the prisoners and we were again sent to spend the night in the bath. This time the bath was occupied and we had to wait and so we got back at 4 A.M. In spite of the fact that the prisoners slept 1 to 2 hours, they were roused for work at 5 A.M. On the third evening there was another inspection and lice were found again. We were inspected five nights in a row and five nights we spent in the bath, and slept only 1 to 2 hours a night.

THE CLOSING OF THE SECTION "MARCH 8"

Hunger, severe cold and hard work without a single day of rest destroyed the entire working capacity of the small camp. More than half of the prisoners were swollen and their skin peeled. They could not work and rotted away in the barracks. Yet the regime, in general, remained as severe as before and each day saw an increase in the number of the swollen and the dead.

On February 26, 1939, at 10:30 P.M. all who were considered able to work were ordered to collect their things and go out into the courtyard. 94 prisoners out of the total number were picked out and more than a hundred severely swollen were left in their bunks. We noticed 6 armed

men of the NKVD approaching us with dogs. We were formed in a column of fours and marched back to the camp. None of us knew where we were going and all thought that it was to a punitive camp. At 2 A.M. we passed the chief administration and were driven on further down the valley of the little river Khatynakh.

Four miles below Nyzhny Khatynakh we saw a small hut in which there was a crew of carpenters, who had arrived the previous day. We were told that we would build here a new camp section to be named Ledyana. Conditions here were very bad. We had no housing whatsoever. So, in order to have some sort of sleeping facilities, we had to build first such a building. Under the guidance of one of the carpenters, we were sent to a wooded hill to bring out on our shoulders the necessary building materials. The trees were let down from the hill into the valley, and then two or three men carried them on their shoulders, about one mile to the site of the new camp.

At 3 P. M. the frame of the building to house 120 men was raised and strengthened. After two hours the cloth was put on and at 5 P.M. iron stoves were connected to supply some heat in the structure. The floor and the bunks were yet to be built so that that night and the next we slept on thin branches with fresh needles.

THE LAYING OUT OF A NEW MINE AT CAMP LEDYANA

On the eve of the third day of our stay in this camp, 150 new prisoners arrived. Few were left to build the camp and more than three-quarters were sent to begin work on a new mine. The first step was to dig a pit down to the gold-bearing stratum after which it was possible to proceed to a primitive mechanization of the work.

In March, 1939, with the forming of the new Ledyana camp, prisoners were driven to it from the various camps of the Khatynakh area. All prisoners confirmed that in the month of March they had received more and better food, regardless of their fulfillment of norms. This was true of the Ledyana, where the prisoners were also given more and better food.

Although at the beginning of the winter the swollen prisoners were forced to work until the skin peeled on their legs, now they were left in the camp. The length of the working day at the mine was reduced to 12 hours. The "brigadiers" and foremen of the mines only saw to it that the prisoners worked the entire time, and took no account of the intensity of their work. The let up in the exploitation of the prisoners and the improvement of the food improved the physical condition of the prisoners. No

further cases of swollen prisoners occurred. The swelling soon began to leave those who were swollen but whose legs showed no peeling.

It is hard to give any explanation of this change during the stay of the prisoners in Kolyma then and 14 years later. Joseph Stalin saw the results of his crimes. He destroyed N. Yezhov and laid the blame for the terror upon him. On the other hand, Kolyma produced over 60% of all gold and this was due to the strength of the prisoners. If the food had not been increased and the hours of labor reduced to 12, 65-70% of the prisoners would have been lost. Their muscular energy was the basis for the securing of gold in Kolyma. Probably this was the main reason for the change in the regime and the betterment of the food allotted the prisoners in the spring of 1939.

EDUCATION AND THE CAMP REGIME IN KOLYMA

Even under the conditions of the arctic cold, the rising of the sun above the horizon and the increase in its light quickly increased the warmth. In the second half of April there were days so sunny that the glare of the sun upon the surface of the snow often blinded people forever. At this time all the prisoners were given dark glasses and sternly ordered to wear them.

At 2 P.M. in the open, the sun was quite warm, although in the shade the thermometer showed 12° — 6° . At night the cold went down to 22° — 13° . In the first half of May the streams flowed from the mountains and flooded the mines.

The surface of the river valleys in the Kolyma mountains was formed of sheets of rock and mold mixed with earth. The melting of the upper layer of the mineral soil made it porous for the filtration of water.

In the whole of the Khatynakh area along with the free and hired workmen there was only one chief engineer, who had completed the course of the Geological Faculty of Moscow University. The rest of the personnel in charge were either semi-literate party members who had been assigned here or criminals who had completed their term and were working as free labor. When the floods came, they were hopeless.

I was working on the night shift in pumping water from the mine. A large tractor worked a huge centrifugal pump and after 8 days the level of the water in the mine had been reduced less than 5 cm. The water that was pumped out flowed by the flooded mine, quickly sank into the unfrozen soil, and flowed back into the mine through the frozen subsoil.

In the camp "March 8," some one had told the chief engineer that I was by profession a student of soils. He looked me up in the mine and for 10-15 minutes asked me whether I knew the soil experts in Moscow

University, Professors Vilensky, Kachinsky, Gernerling and Yarirov. Later he met me at the pump which was pumping the water from the mine. He could not fathom why the level of water in the mine remained constant. He asked me about it as a professional and a workman constantly employed at the pump. I explained to him that the water pumped out nearby flowed beside the mine into the stony soil and upon contact with the shallow frozen base it ran back into the mine. To avoid this it was necessary to take pumped out water from the mine to a place with a noticeable slope so that the water would quickly flow off. By lengthening the slant the level of the water in the mine began to fall rapidly and in four days the mine was dry.

When the mine was dry, the chief engineer came again and told me that he would ask the third section to make me the hydrogeologist of the area. Two days later he came again and told me that the third section would not permit him to use me as a professional. In my case there was a special note that I was to be used only for hard physical work. It was not without meaning that the prosecutor Kosachenko had said to me: "Don't be stubborn and give the information the prosecution needs; it will lighten your lot in exile." As I recalled those words, I did not regret losing the "favors" through self-incrimination to lighten my lot. What had happened to me, had happened to hundreds of thousands of prisoners in Kolyma, with a higher professional education, prisoners who before death or liberation had had to deal with a wheelbarrow, pick and shovel, while the technical and economic parts of the camp were managed by the uneducated and the criminals.

THE KOLYMA SUMMER

Kolyma covers quite a large area and extends from the river Indigirka to Bering Strait some 2200 miles, and from the sea of Okhotsk in the south to the Arctic Ocean, a distance of 800 miles. Kolyma includes the tundra, forest-tundra and the forest belt but gold mining is only in the forest tundra and the southern part of the tundra.

On the shores of the Arctic Ocean during the day the sun is quite warm in summer. Where I was interned, there was no intervening period between winter and summer or summer and winter.

The transition period was marked by heavy freezes at night with quite warm days. This period was short and did not exceed 25-30 days. In the second half of May it was warm enough to begin the washing of gold. The opened gold-bearing stratum was frozen at 15-29 cm. in depth. It was taken out and brought to a state where it could be washed.

The beginning of the washing season opened a new period of exploitation of the prisoners. The system of feeding the prisoners according to the productive norm was again introduced. The long hours of work were renewed and the working day was increased to 16 hours. However, the heavy 16 hour day in summer in the mines could not be compared with the sufferings of the prisoners in the winter cold. Prisoners who were in the punishment cell looked better than those who, in winter were fed in the first category.

During the summer the weather could quickly change. There were very often years when snow fell in July and lay on the ground for 2—3 days. In 1939 there was no snow but there were heavy rains which were accompanied by a quite low temperature. Despite the heaviness of the rain, the prisoners in their usual summer clothes worked 16 hours a day though soaked to the skin. In 1939 there were 18 days of rain in a row which flooded a majority of the mines. To stop and pump out the water, the prisoners for days worked in the cold water up to their waist.

In the brigade in which I worked, there was one prisoner named Bukhvalter. His father was a German and his mother was a Jew. During World War I he had belonged to the German Social-Democratic party and in 1916 had been sentenced to 15 years in prison. The revolution of 1918 in Germany had liberated him from prison but in 1923 as a Communist he again was imprisoned and in 1925 was exchanged by Moscow. Until 1936 he worked in various institutions in Moscow and in 1936 he was arrested and proclaimed a spy of Hitler. Since this occurred during the time of Yagoda, he was given 10 years in a concentration camp in Kolyma.

Learning that I had been connected with agronomy, Bukhvalter asked me if I knew the Professor of Botany in Kharkiv University, Yanata. I told him that I did not know him personally but I was familiar with his scientific works. Then he told me that Prof. Yanata had died May 17, 1938 in his (Bukhvalter's) arms from inflammation of the lungs.

30 miles from Magadan, Bukhvalter and Prof. Yanata were working in a lumber camp. During the spring thaw, which warmed the valley, in which the camp was located, the prisoners were forced to go from the camp to the place of work by a ford, often in water up to their chest. The water was almost freezing and in one day in the camp 17 men came down with inflammation of the lungs. Among them was Prof. Yanata, who, as millions of others was guilty without a crime. He had committed no crime against the people and the state, but was only a prominent scholar and a Ukrainian patriot.

With the coming of warm, dry weather, in spite of the heavy 16 hour working day in the mine, without a single day of rest, the physical

condition of the prisoners markedly improved and illness and mortality decreased. The short and changeable Kolyma summer is the most delightful part of the year, which saves and prolongs the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent prisoners who are sentenced to death. The life-giving force of the rays of the sun gives them strength and endurance to oppose death in the next winter.

ILLNESS AND MORTALITY IN THE KHATYNAKH AREA IN THE WINTER OF 1938-1939

The best indication of the living conditions of the prisoners in the camps is the number of sick and dead. The heavy work, cold, hunger and the absence of any rest were the basic causes of the high percentage of mortality in the camps of the NKVD in the Khatynakh area. In all the section of this area during 1938-1939 there was not a single day of rest. For two years the prisoners worked 15-16 hours a day plus the supplementary labor of furnishing the camps with fuel, warming the shelters, cleaning and drying the area around the camps and cleaning away the snow on the roads. Even on the state holidays, the October and May days — the prisoners worked 12 hours. On November 7 all the camps prepared fuel for the winter, and on May 1, they dried and cleaned up the camps. When the prisoners brought to despair asked for rest, the organizers of this demand were taken to the famous prison of Kolyma in the Khatynakh area called Serpentinka and from there no one returned. The less active were put in jail and most of them were shot in broad daylight by the guard on the charge of trying to escape. The rest of the prisoners, like an obedient flock of sheep, went where the armed guard drove them.

The endurance for 16-18 hours in winter in the severe cold which went to — 88° and the performance of heavy work exacted from the prisoners an extraordinary loss of energy for the performance of the work and the warming of their own bodies. The indigenous population of the polar regions during the winter eats 2-3 lbs of seal, bear and deer fat. This amount keeps them in strength and supports their ability to live on a certain level.

The ration of the prisoners who performed 100% of the norm included at most 1500-1700 calories. This included $\frac{1}{8}$ ounce of fat. Butter, as the most tasty thing, on the road and in the camps was stolen by the criminals in charge of the camps. Thus, the prisoners received not more than $\frac{1}{20}$ ounce of fat. With this quantity of food, the prisoners during the first days of winter swelled up and died.

In the winter of 1938-1939 in all the camps of the Khatynakh area there were too few physicians and almost half of the buildings of the camps were regarded as hospitals. The swelling of the prisoners from hunger and the scurvy sores which covered their bodies took out of work more than half of the prisoners of the area.

In December, 1938, while in the camp "March 8," my legs swelled up and became covered with scurvy sores. Despite this, like the others, I was not relieved of work, for the skin had not fallen off my legs and my temperature had not reached 100°. I received from my family packages with sugar, salt and onions. It was almost impossible to get rid of the swelling and the sores of my legs while in constant hunger and doing 16 hours of heavy daily work. This shows that the chief cause of the swelling of the prisoners was the lack of sufficient food in the winter. All the letters and telegrams which I sent to my family had one message — send food packages, no money. Under the conditions in the camps of the NKVD, the prisoners would not receive the money and if they did, there was nothing to buy with it. If it had not been for the food packages which I received in the winter of 1938-1939, I would never have lived to the summer of 1939. I would have taken my place among the hundreds of thousands of the dead in Kolyma during that terrible winter.

The prisoners' bodies were wasting away not only outdoors but in the dwellings, especially in the huts. The walls of the huts had an icy coating 3"—5" thick. This chilled the air and as a result it circulated throughout the entire hut. Despite the fact that two stoves burned constantly, the temperature in the huts never went above 45°—48°. The bedding of the prisoners, moss mattresses and summer clothing did not furnish enough insulation and the heat of the body of the prisoners was used up uselessly. This completed the harmful influence of the arctic winter cold upon the prisoners.

THE SHADOW OF DEATH HUNG OVER THE PRISONERS

In January and the beginning of February, 1939 the camps of the Khatynakh area offered a terrible sight. The hundreds of the swollen and the dead, even in the small camps of less than 1,000 men, had a depressing effect upon those who were still well. As in the other camps of Siberia, very many prisoners wrote protest letters against their unfounded conviction and asked for a review of their cases. They did the same at Kolyma when they lost the hope of enduring the sentence. The spectre of inevitable death wound itself around the souls of all the prisoners in Kolyma. Men who were working in the mines for 16 hours

a day were dying. To get out of the mine meant the possibility of salvation from death and many prisoners resorted to self-mutilation. Cases where the prisoners cut off their fingers were reported in almost every camp in the area.

To explain these acts of voluntary mutilation and the psychosis of death which dominated the prisoners, I will give the mortality in certain camps of the Khatynakh area for the winter of 1938-1939.

At the post "March 8" from the beginning of December, 1938 to February 26, 1939 out of a total number of 283 prisoners, 81 died, i. e. 28.3% of the total number of prisoners. The prisoners died in the camp, therefore, every prisoner knew the number of dead. According to the statements of Dr. Koali (who before his transfer to the mine had been the head physician of the area) at the camp Central Khatynakh, of a total number of 1390 prisoners, 216 died, i. e. 16%. At the camp Nyzhny Khatynakh of 1240 prisoners, 402 died, i. e. 32.4%. The same phenomenon was observed in all the sections and camps of Kolyma.

These figures show what suffering went on during the regime of Yezhov until May, 1939, to kill 65-70% of the prisoners. And if we take into account that 97-98% of the prisoners had committed no crimes against the state and were innocent victims of the bloody Communist terror, the diabolical savagery of Joseph Stalin, who drove millions of innocent people to certain death, becomes frightening.

The question involuntarily rises: why and in the name of what ideals were these millions of innocent people sacrificed? Did the man who ascribed to himself basely and shamelessly all virtues and the finest human feelings for the sorrow of others and the most talented mind not know about this? When we were taken from Kolyma for a review of our cases, a Ukrainian named Bublik, who lived in Central Asia and had been arrested, was with me in the same compartment of a Stolypin prison car. He said: "If Stalin knows of this and approves it, he is the greatest monster in the history of humanity; if he does not know about it, he is a fool, who has no right to be a dictator. We cannot lay all blame on N. Yezhov".

THE GRAVES OF THE DEAD WERE LEVELLED AND COVERED WITH MOSS

The catastrophic mortality of the prisoners in the winter of 1938-39 made it impossible to bury them in the winter and the bodies were left until spring. Because of the constant freeze it was hard to dig a pit even in summer, because the ground was frozen at a depth of 20"—30". In winter the ground froze to the very surface and this made the digging of pits more difficult, although both winter and summer explosives were

used. The general weakness of the prisoners and the great mortality forced the bodies of the dead to be kept in sheds. In camps of my detention the dead lay in tiers until April or May. During these months broad pits were dug 3'—5' deep and 25 corpses were put in each. They put a metal tag on the foot of each corpse and thus registered death.

The dead bodies were buried about 3' deep, and were frozen even in the summer and therefore did not decay. Because of the eternal frost it might be possible 100 or 1000 years hence to find the remains of these great martyrs. If conditions change, the families might find their dead and take them back to their own lands.

Every precaution was taken, so that no one could find the place of burial. The brigades which buried the dead in Nyzhny Khatynakh, were given special instructions: to cover the graves so that in filling them the surface of the ground would be level; then to cover the place of burial with moss and plant trees on it. This shows that the NKVD very deliberately dug the graves for the dead prisoners in Kolyma, for these victims of Bolshevik brutality.



B. I. ANTONYCH

P O L A R I A

(Translated from Ukrainian by MIRA HORDYNSKA)

The sea congeals in a sculptured cup of ice.
The goldlipped moon — a mystic in the blue,
And polar angels sway God's waters,
And beasts howl hungrily and dully.

Human vermin has not yet crept thus far,
Foxes with their backs the scarlet sky support,
Whales spray the stars, and white fowl hang
Motionless, like arrows fallen from the Zodiac.

When the Virgin of the firmament black tresses combs,
And lame Aquarius the shadows from their lairs calls forth,
The earth becomes a shell that cracks and groans,
And mammoth's ghosts go wandering through crimson snow.

BOOK REVIEWS

UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS. By Clarence A. Manning. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953. Pp. 223. \$3.50.

Dr. Manning's latest book is a brief historical account of the significant political, economic, cultural, and religious changes in Ukraine since 1917. He discusses the effects of the NEP in Ukraine, the literary and scholarly developments of the "Ukrainization" period, the great famine, the trials of the 'thirties, the intensive re-russification, and finally, the events during and after World War II with special emphasis on the resistance of the Ukrainian population. His book is a very provocative one and it is well-written, but it has perhaps one limitation as far as methodology is concerned: it is not clear to what extent Dr. Manning used the information apparently supplied to him by the fifteen Ukrainian professors that he names in the Acknowledgements, since he does not cite any of them in footnotes.

He described the variety of methods that the Russian Communists have developed in their attempts to control every facet of the social life of an entire nationality. No social practise, however trivial, is left untouched, and not only are the important citizens controlled, but even the obscure and mediocre are under the constant scrutiny of secret cells of informers. In tsarist times, the Russians openly administered Ukraine, and did not even pay lip-service to the distinct Ukrainian nationality. To them it was "South Russia" and that was that. But when the last tsar relinquished the reins of government, Ukrainian political groups immediately established a democratically-oriented government which eventually declared its independence. However, this democratic state was defeated in war, and the Russian Communists emerged as the final victors of that struggle. They set up a "Ukrainian" Communist government and asserted that it was independent; as a matter of fact, in its earliest days, it did exercise a good deal of local initiative — but it was not independent. Only one party was legal in Ukraine: the Russian Communist party, and the Russians tightly controlled its membership. This party, however, was not made up of Russians alone; it also contained, besides other peoples, a small number of Ukrainians. But even besides these Ukrainians, there were a couple of groups who called themselves "Communists," but who were by no means united with the Russians in a singleness of purpose in political, economic, and cultural affairs as they applied to Ukraine; these were the "Borotbists" and the "Ukapists." They were interested in retaining a distinct Ukrainian identity in cultural, economic, and political affairs, and they constantly sought the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Communist party equal with those of the Russians and the other nationality groups in the Communist International. But the Leninists, and later the Stalinists, insisted that the Ukrainians could be no more than a branch of the monolithic Russian Communist party. Eventually, these dissident Ukrainian "Communist" groups were dissolved, and their leaders were either killed or imprisoned.

Though a Soviet government was established in Ukraine, many of the Ukrainian social organizations and governmental units that predated it were retained. However, the Russians and their sympathizers, even in the early twenties, began the process of infiltrating these Ukrainian organizations. These infiltrated agents of the Russians then proceeded to act within the Ukrainian organizations to bring Ukrainian scholarship, education, literature, music, and so on, into conformity with the particularistic Russian views and aims. They began to control the composition of the membership, to oust opponents, and to channel the activities of these organizations in the Russian interest. As they succeeded in gaining control over the Ukrainian political organs, many of the functions of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic were ceded to the RSFSR. This in itself was a phenomenon without precedent in the history of the world: an "independent" national state deliberately giving up its powers to another national state, and subordinating itself to it. Thus, Ukraine became nothing more than an administrative subdivision of the central government at Moscow. Still the organs remained, and the Russians continued to insist, and do even to the present day, that Ukraine was (and is) "independent", and that it was (and is) administered by Ukrainians. Soon they began to intensify measures to convert the country into an area which would have the basic function of supplying raw materials to the industrialized areas of ethnographic Russia. The natural resources and the labor force of Ukraine were thus being made artificially dependent on the factories and the skills of the Russian labor force. Lenin himself once called such an arrangement "colonialism"; today the Russians call it "economic integration".

However, there was a good deal of literary, artistic, and scholarly activity during the so-called "ukrainization" period of the 'twenties. Dr. Manning correctly characterizes this movement as not so much a Communist or an anti-Communist movement, as it was an extra-Communist movement, although, of course, it was conducted under the auspices of many Ukrainians who were avowedly Communists. It should not be overlooked, however, that only one party was legal and if Ukrainians were to write, study, or administer at all, they would have to do it through the only legal party in the land. After all, the Russians are not the only ones who know something about infiltration and "boring from within". We might say that the Ukrainians began infiltrating the infiltrators. The Russian Communists looked upon all this activity with growing disfavor, and soon put a stop to it. Soon Ukrainian world famous scholars as historian M. Hrushevsky, were being "tried" before howling mobs whipped to a frenzy by the People's Courts. Incredible "confessions" were uttered by men of established scholarship. Thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals — famous and mediocre — were killed, imprisoned, and deported for "nationalism". No Russian intellectual, incidentally, has ever been killed for nationalism; the charge applies only to non-Russians in the federation. These trials, suicides, tortures, executions, and imprisonments ushered in the renewed policy of the re-russification of Ukraine, taking up where the tsars had left off a short while before. Russian Communism had shown itself to be basically a continuation of the Russian imperialism of the tsars. The Ukrainian language, music, art, architecture, and literary styles and themes were then required to conform to Russian models. Centuries-old Ukrainian churches were levelled; all monuments of the Ukrainian past were destroyed in a systematic way. Ukrainian history was rewritten and reinterpreted. At the same time the Russian language, literary styles, music, art, and architectural styles were being intensively diffused into Ukraine.

The collectivization of agriculture, which best suited the Russian mentality, with its traditions of the *mir* and the *obshchina*, was imposed on Ukraine with its traditions of private enterprise in farm land. The Ukrainian peasants rebelled furiously, but were quelled by a deliberately perpetrated famine in which five to seven million Ukrainian farmers and their families died.

The coming of World War II saw the Ukrainian population generally ready to accept the invader. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the Red Army surrendered without a fight. However, since the Ukrainian hopes for independence were chronically ignored, and since they were dealt further repressions, they turned to fighting both the Nazis and the Communists. This guerilla warfare continued even after the war, although today the insurgents are engaged more in anti-Russian propaganda, in keeping up the spirit of resistance among the people, and in killing Communist Russian officials. That is Ukraine today: a restless land, fiercely proud of its national identity, and still rebellious against the foreign Russian occupant.

The book stimulates the question as to why any government would be so vicious against a people under its jurisdiction. Why have Russian officials — whether tsarist or Communist — practised measures that have been so repressive? That they are extremely proud of their culture, and that they seek the greatest economic benefits for their own nationality is understandable enough, but does that justify their lack of inhibitions toward the non-Russians? In the judgement of this reviewer, the proper interpretation of these arbitrary and brutal methods is to be made in terms of the Russian political traditions, which have been built on the idea of an absolutist hierarchy of power. They do not contain even the germ of the democratic idea. Even the *zemstvos* and the *dumas* which are often touted as “lessons in democracy” were not based on a democratic philosophy of government. At no time in Russian history was political power thought to reside in the people as their inherent right. The powers that local units had were privileges arbitrarily extended to them from above, and they could be arbitrarily revoked. Also, the contemporary Russians look upon the historical process as basically one of constant conflict in which one side must necessarily subdue the other, and arbitrarily dominate it to its own advantage. They see no middle road. Since they are impelled to dominate arbitrarily for fear of being dominated by others, they do not conceive of the possibility of all the nationalities in a federation, or in the whole world for that matter, living together as political, economic, or cultural equals, where none of them would have arbitrary control over the others. The economic unity of the world to them means that the world economic structure must necessarily be arbitrarily controlled from Moscow, or Washington, or London, or some one place, by an authoritarian clique for the specific advantage of their own nationality. World federation, or the “world community” to them means a political organization arbitrarily dominated by one people for the exclusive benefit of that people — whether they be Russians, or Americans, or Chinese — at the expense of all other subservient peoples. As one reads of their methods in Ukraine, one has the feeling that they are trying to establish themselves as the unequivocally dominant people in the Soviet Union. To achieve that, they seek to reduce the number of nationally-conscious non-Russians, as well as to thwart their cultural development by developing a “Russian” or “Soviet” consciousness among them.

THE END OF A REVOLUTION, Soviet Russia — from Revolution to Reaction, by Fritz Sternberg. The John Day Company. New York, 1953. Transl. from German by Edward Fitzgerald. Printed in Great Britain. 191 pp., \$3.00.

This rather small and unpretentious book is a most interesting exposé of the figures and facts of the Soviet State. It is also the most daring condemnation of the Red rulers in recent years. They have claimed for many decades that they are the real heirs of the November Revolution and that their ideas are the genuine reflections of the first organized Communist uprising of thirty five years or so ago. This is the core of the Soviet fallacy which F. Sternberg tries to analyze.

Quoting all known Soviet facts, the author points out that in spite of an excessive exploitation of their workers and peasants, the Soviet productivity, industrial output and standard of living not only have not improved but in many aspects have fallen below the standards of the Tsarist regime.

Again, at the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan about 75% of all the factory workers in the USSR had less than six square meters of housing space per capita and 20% of them had less than three square meters per capita. At the conclusion of the census of January 1939 the housing space per capita was less than 4.5 square meters, a reduction of over 25% from the already low figure of 1926. In the city of Moscow the percentage was slightly over five square meters in 1926 and a little more than 4.2 square meters in 1939 of housing space per capita. It is important to note that in 1912 Moscow had a per capita average of 7.4 square meters!

The industrialization of *some* areas is the only considerable progress that USSR has made in thirty-five years, and that, it should be remembered, has been done only by regimented labor without an increase of real wages, by deported and enslaved prisoners and by the increased exploitation of the peasants. In spite of that, the Soviet Union entered the Five-Year Plan with the same percentage of world industrial production as Tsarist Russia had when she entered the first World War (4%). In twelve years (1929-1941) the Soviet Union increased her total world industrial production from about 4 per cent to between 10 and 12 per cent. The forced collectivization, the great famine of 1928-1929, the destruction of the trade unions, the deceit concerning the social content of the Soviet dictatorship clearly show that the dictatorship in Kremlin is directed against the Soviet workers and peasants.

The Soviet foreign policy is not different from its domestic policy. At first the Soviets hoped that they would be able to exploit the severe economic, social and political crises which Europe suffered as an aftermath of the war in order to incorporate it into the Soviet Empire. Their aim was not to bring about a progressive social transformation of Europe but to turn her into a satellite in order to strengthen the power of the USSR. When the Soviets drive forward in Asia, F. Sternberg explains, they represent a country which is technically and industrially more advanced and which also has a considerably higher standard of living than the countries into which they are expanding. In Europe, on the other hand, some workers still identify the present-day USSR with the Soviet Union of the November Revolution, because they believe that the red dictatorship is a dictatorship of the workers and peasants directed to improving the conditions of "the toilers." The basic fact is that the Soviets are not greatly hampered in their Asiatic activities because the Asiatic peoples are ignorant of the fact that the USSR is a terrorist police State.

The End of a Revolution is an excellent book. It is a compact and well rounded political treatise *sui generis*. The most important feature of this study is its good documentation together with a well organized historical background for each divisional and subdivisional chapter. It is clear and concise in its comparative argumentation and free from superfluous words and meaningless digressions. But in spite of its scholastic decorum, the book is also full of unpardonable sins committed against other Soviet nationalities and some historical facts. In the first place, the author, who happens to be an internationally known expert on Soviet affairs, in referring to USSR constantly uses the word Russia, Russian State, Russian Empire, while the average intellectual knows that Russia and the Russian State today is only a part of the Soviet Union; this last official term is practically nonexistent in the vocabulary of Sternberg. It is also very strange to read all about the Russians and the Soviets as though he were allergic to or had never heard of the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians and other nationalities that are forced to live under the same roof. It looks as if F. Sternberg's knowledge of the nationality problems of the Soviet Union is extremely poor. In reference to the forced collectivization and the great famine of 1928-1929 the author makes the same careful omission of facts. He says that the over-hasty and ruthlessly enforced collectivization of agriculture caused in "some parts of the country... actual famine conditions" (p. 53). What these "some parts of the country" were F. Sternberg does not attempt to elaborate. It is simply unbelievable that Sternberg, who has written so many books on the USSR, never heard of the almost seven million Ukrainians who were victims of the Moscow sponsored famine while the ethnographic Russian SFSR enjoyed an abundance of food.

In spite of these shortcomings *The End of a Revolution* should be a *must* on the list of every loyally minded citizen and read particularly by every student of history and political science. But it should be read with the reservations listed above.

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OUR SECRET ALLIES, THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA by Eugene Lyons, New York. Duell Sloane and Pearce, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1954, pp. 376.

According to Mr. Lyons, there are four basic misconceptions in the appraisal of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union which concern the shaping of the American policy towards Moscow. These appear in the illusion that Bolshevism was created by the Soviet peoples themselves, that those peoples accepted it meekly and without resistance that we should not interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet empire and that we act as if the regime and the people were one and indivisible (pp. 45-54). This author's statement must be clarified in the beginning. No writer in the United States asserts that the Soviet peoples also the non-Russian people of the USSR, created Bolshevism but that it was created by the Russian people alone and it is only the truth or falsity of this statement that is open to discussion. A disillusioned admirer of the "great experiment" of Bolshevism himself, Mr. Lyons is very emphatic in his denunciation of all "hazy Soviet sympathizers" and "hazy anti-Communists" who identify the Russian people with their government or speak of the enthusiastic devotion of the Soviet masses to the present regime and consider the *status quo* of the Soviet Union permanent. His analysis of the various stages of Communist policy from 1917 to the present try to show the internal weakness of the Soviet regime which has as its main

problem its own internal security and its defence against its own subjects. Yet in successfully attacking the "myth of Soviet unity", Mr. Lyons, turns out to be an ardent advocate of that "unity" when he speaks of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.

It is useless to argue with Mr. Lyons. He attempts to impose on the American public opinion his own version of the history and the present situation in the Soviet Union for his remarks are like the most extravagant pronouncement of the rabid Great Russian chauvinists, who like the old French Bourbons have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Whom does he have in mind, when speaking of the "peoples of Russia"? Does he mean the peoples of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic? This contains 74 per cent of Russians, 8 per cent of Ukrainians and 17 non-Slavic some primitive ethnic groups.¹ No. He is speaking of Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Georgians, Armenians and the other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, who have kept their spirit of national independence alive for centuries and whose independent states were overrun by Moscow only after a long and ruthless struggle. While even the masters of the Kremlin are forced to recognize the existence of 16 constituent and formally independent republics, Mr. Lyons, an American newspaper man, posing as a friend of these peoples, uses the term "Russian peoples", a term which as Prof. Hans Kohn says in his review of this book² is "of most doubtful validity". "Nor is the problem of the non-Russian nationalities and of the past of Russian imperialism so simple as Mr. Lyons believes."

Mr. Lyons dismisses as "racist drivel" (p. 314) any indication of Russian imperialism and its common elements with the drive for world domination by Moscow communism. He says: "Russian imperialism... was not sparked by any flaming imperial idea or theory of race superiority."³

The Kremlin's distortions of history and its falsifications have the primary goal of destroying the national traditions of the non-Russian peoples in order to keep them in their present bondage. What can be the aim of a Western newspaper man in befuddling American public opinion? Why does he deny the undeniable

¹ The Columbia Encyclopedia, New York, 1950, p. 1722.

² *The New York Times Book Review*, November 22, 1953.

³ The full baselessness of Mr. Lyons' assertion can be easily proved by the noted works of the more important ideologists of Russian imperialism for they all assume the racial superiority of the Russian people. Passing over the Russian Slavophiles of the early XIX century, we need only mention the views of Katkov in the *Russian Herald*, of Danilevsky (*Russia and Europe*, 1858), of Dostoyevsky (*The Possessed*), Leontyev (*The Orient, Russia and Slavdom*, 1885) and many others. All these Russian authors, often of differing political views, agree that the Russian people is the leading people, with a natural hegemony over the Slav world and all humanity, and a people chosen by God to reform mankind, after creating a Pan-Slav empire and organizing a world empire under the leadership of Moscow. That Russian Orthodoxy is the only Christian Church which truly interprets the true teaching of Christ was declared as recently as 1948 by the spokesman of the Patriarch of Moscow on the 500th anniversary of the autocephalism of the Moscow Church. The same ideology was expressed by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Jan. 12, 1954, on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty, when they assert that the Russian proletariat is the leading body of the proletariats of all nations. Mr. Lyons needs only consult a standard handbook of Russian literature to be convinced that he is writing the exact opposite of the truth. The German Nazis were not the first political racists in human history. They learned much from the Russians in various ways. (*The Editor*).

truth of the fact that the Politburo, now the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has been carrying on the imperialistic tradition of the tsars with new vigor and new tactics, or as the *Washington Post* of August 8, 1953 wrote: "From the days of Peter the Great born in 1672 to Malenkov, Russian imperialism has had the same dangerous and acquisitive objective, an objective which remains the same whether it continues under the tsars or the communists."

This dominant bias of the author shown in his appraisal of Russian imperialism and of the non-Russian peoples comes also to the fore in his suggestions on psychological warfare by the West against Soviet aggression. Here there are some contradictions. Mr. Lyons says that the free world should not "champion sovereign statehood for the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Turkestan", because "it would risk alienation of 1) Great Russians believing in the unity of the empire, 2) non-Russians who prefer a federated system. . . 3) ethnic groups omitted from the list of future independent countries" (p. 320).

It is well known that the only people interested in "the unity of the empire" are the Russian imperialists and their American fellow-travelers, both red and white, and not the impoverished Russian masses. Or does Mr. Lyons suppose that a Russian peasant or worker or a truly liberal Russian intellectual believes in the necessity of the preservation of the empire by the bloody terror and genocide practice on the territories of the non-Russian peoples? But history shows that they can be kept down only in this way. Do the Russian people really need for their existence and happiness foreign territories, when they have their own huge republic, the RSFSR with 6,553,600 sq. mi. (i.e. more than twice the territory of the United States) today strongly industrialized with developed agriculture? Is perhaps not the only thing they need freedom and the ability to live peacefully with all their neighbors in a democratic way of life? Does not their future lie in shaking off all imperialistic Russian cliques who exploit their own people pressing them to live in misery and subjugate others?

Mr. Lyons as former chairman of the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia would do better not to mention publicly the non-Russian federalists, if he regards the good name of the American democracy. It is obvious that some Quisling groups were formed among the non-Russian emigres by American money and this shabby enterprise was doomed in advance to a complete failure, and so it happened.⁴ Mr. Lyons should ascribe the bankruptcy of these attempts to the fact that, as he says, only non-Russian emigres are interested in the national independence of their respective countries; while in the USSR "not once did I hear any one argue fervently for sovereign statehood for the Ukraine of Azerbaidjan" (p. 323). To expect a Soviet citizen to discuss publicly that question with a foreign correspondent, is to achieve the highest grade of naivete. Besides, basing his opinion of the alleged lack of interest among the Ukrainian

⁴ The practices to falsify the democratically expressed will of the masses by an organization of pseudo-political groups with use of money, unknown in this country, are very well known to the students of national and social emancipation of the peoples of former Russia and Austro-Hungary. In order to fight national liberation movements, as well as the social exploitation of peasants and workers by feudal landlords pseudo-political groups of mercenaries were organized to be "spokesmen of the masses" for the advantage of oppressors. These shameful practices of the darkest times of reaction in latter part of the 19th century pressed millions idealistically minded East and Central Europeans to emigrate to this country of the free. They are familiar with such bought political action. (*Editor*).

people for national independence on his own observations, how can he explain what he writes on p. 232? An American journalist was talking to a prominent member of the former German general staff after the war. "Do you know where we lost the war in Russia?" — the German asked. "In Stalingrad," — the journalist answered promptly. "No, we lost it long before that — in Kiev, when we hoisted the swastika instead of the Ukrainian flag!" And Mr. Lyons adds: "Independence leaders fled to the forests to avoid arrest, and effective Ukrainian contingents were soon fighting against both Reds and Browns". We hope, Mr. Lyons does not suspect that those Ukrainian contingents fought for an indivisible Russian empire, because — to quote Prof. Kohn once more, "The pre-Soviet Russian flag would have been as unwelcome in Kiev or Riga, Samarkand or Tiflis as the hammer and sickle."

Finally no one should fear that the championing of national independence for non-Russian peoples as well as the Russians, that is the dismemberment of the Russian slave empire (not of the Russian state, as the advocates of the Russia First movement always charge) would alienate other ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. This pertains primarily to the groups of the RSFSR. No one can predict the course of their future development. If one day they should become able to have an independent existence, this should not be hindered by a democratic Russia. The XX century has seen all empires undergo a complete disintegration and "the trend toward national liberty in the free world is as inexorable as an incoming tide" (*The New York Times*, December 16, 1953). The proponents of Russian imperialism will not be able to stop that tide in Eastern Europe and Asia or save the last slave empire of the world from its ultimate collapse.

DR. MYROSLAV PROKOP

FROM LENIN TO MALENKOV, *The History of World Communism*. By Hugh Seton-Watson. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. Second Edition VII, 377 pp.

In his former works: *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914*; *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941*; *The European Revolution*, Prof. Seton-Watson has shown himself a foremost authority on East European problems and an objective and careful student of the history of Communism.

In his latest work he has broadened the scope of his studies and has given us an unusually valuable comparative study of the development of the Communist movements in the entire world. We must marvel at the erudition of the author, who has been able to use such a wealth of material and produce a multitude of problems in a clear exposition giving historical analysis and valuable sociological conclusions.

Prof. Seton-Watson in his comparative analysis of the Communist movements accepts — as he says, — the "approach to look from outside, not from within" and he emphasizes that the power and the successes of Communist expansion at present in the world do not come from its theory and ideology but from its coldly reasoned and logical strategy adapted to its goal and from its changing and adaptable tactics, which depend upon local conditions and the momentary possibilities of international politics. The author has gained the power to explain the basis on which the Communist movements have arisen in the various countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and to make clear the factors which have aided this development or have checked it.

In the first section — Europe before 1914 — the author considers and compares the social, economic, political, religious and cultural conditions, the labor movements and the problems of nationalities in the various countries of Europe, so as to show why Communism first took over Russia which was not one of those developed lands, which according to the theories of Marx, were the most ready for the Communist revolution.

Then in chronological and geographical order down to the present time, the author gives the 7 main phases in the history of the international Communist movement, pointing out how each of these phases were closely connected with the course of events in the USSR and how each of them in turn reacted on the Communist movements of the other countries of Europe, Africa and Asia, among the colonial peoples. He devotes the greatest space to the history of the present triumph of Communism in China.

The coalition of non-Communist parties with the Communists against a common enemy is known in Western writings by the name of popular front in Spain since 1934, and in France, Italy the resistance during the last war and the post war period. It has its analogies everywhere and the author has been able to emphasize that the pattern of these successful tactics was worked out by the Bolsheviks during the revolution in the years 1917-20.

Thus, during the revolution the Bolsheviks profited by the patriotic feelings and national antagonisms and in the same way they destroyed them wherever the people had no knowledge of the national Communist aspirations of the "older brother." The author correctly treats the national policy of the Bolsheviks within and without their own boundaries. He very intelligently discusses the potential powers of the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR which hang as a double edged sword over the Bolshevik tactics, "cultures national in form and socialist in essence."

In evaluating the powers of the non-Russian peoples, the author has emphasized the factor of the movements for the liberation of the non-Russian peoples in 1918-22 and he especially condemns the attitude towards them of the western victors in World War I. The author correctly evaluates in the negative the position of the Entente toward the reactionary opponents of the Bolsheviks, the defenders of the restoration of the undivided Russia and he shows that this aided the Bolsheviks. Prof. Seton-Watson shows in his book that at the same time the weakened movements of liberation of the non-Russian peoples were fighting against the reds and also the whites, for they saw the danger not only from the left but also from the right.

On the basis of these reflections, we permit ourselves to turn attention to a misunderstanding in the book (pp. 61 and 67), where the author, in discussing the threatening situation permitting a breakthrough of the Bolsheviks to the aid of the Communist revolution in Hungary and Germany in the spring of 1919, asserts the "mutiny of Hryhoriev" hindered this. Hryhoriev, the leader of an insurgent band, an unreliable political figure, was no threat to the Bolsheviks and was not on the main road of the advance of the Bolsheviks into Central Europe. That was stopped by the Ukrainian national army and they bore the brunt of the Bolshevik attack in March, 1919. The author mentions the later entrance of Pilsudski into Kiev in the summer of 1920 but he does not mention the entrance of the Ukrainian army into Kiev.

Since the chief object of the author has been the relations of the Communist movements to the social classes and the question of the internal equilibrium of the

political governments in the various countries, and how these have aided in the successes or the failures of Communism, he proceeds on the basis of an historical and comparative analysis to the assertions that:

1. A favorable soil for Communism is offered by retarded societies in which the state government imposed from above and rejected by society, in which the people do not feel themselves an organic part, as it was in pre-revolutionary Russia, China, the colonial lands.

2. There is greater resistance in the state machines of political alert societies which allow the direct participation in the functions of their own government and they value their own traditions.

3. The Communist movement succeeds where there is no balanced equilibrium of the social classes and cannot where there is a social balance (e.g. Finland). We believe that a special factor is the clearness of the knowledge of Russia or the absence of the knowledge because of geographical distance in which case we can have a definite Russophilism (France, Czechia, and some Balkan countries).

4. A favorable soil is also offered by the lack of a general education of the broad masses and where there is a great difference in the education of the upper and lower classes.

5. An unorganized laboring class which does not draw from its own class consciousness its obligation to resist the Communist ideology is favorable. For that reason Communism succeeds not in developed industrial countries where an organized labor class does not need to struggle for its rights in the revolutionary underground but demands them lawfully in parliaments.

6 Communism has been usually successful in retarded peasant countries, to which capital has paid little attention but where, as the author says, "the peasant mind is a clean slate, on which communists may write their message."

7. Most frequently Communism recruits its leaders from the unsuccessful and confused intellectuals who cannot be or have no desire to be included in the organic life of their nation and form a separate social group.

8. The author maintains that Communism is not a class labor movement but a caste of professional revolutionists, a category which chooses its leaders and partisans from various classes and stands outside of social classes.

In an objective analysis of his historical comparisons the author shows the truth of his remarks at the beginning of his work; he successfully proves that "Communism is a theory which professes to explain philosophy, religion, history and society. Communism is a vocation, whose devotees accept its discipline in every part of their private and professional lives. Communism is a science of conspiracy, a technique of wrecking and subversion. Communism is a revolutionary movement, a political force which operates in a social environment, which recruits its members from various classes of society and marshals its armies against various political opponents."

This clearly organized and well documented study of Prof. Seton-Watson is very informative and thought-provoking and deserves the attention not only of specialists, practical politicians, lecturers in universities but also of every one who is interested in this most important question in the world — to be or not to be free.

THE THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM, edited by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, pp. 402.

This self-betraying work is composed of elegantly worded papers, style diplomatique, that were delivered in the summer of 1954 at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D. C. Although the given title conveys the formal subject of the numerous papers submitted and of the apparently sterile discussions that followed, a critical reader cannot escape the pressing thought that a more accurate title for the works is "The Problems of Kennanism" or "The Alpha and Omega of Containment."

If one is seeking some concrete observations on the threat of so-called Soviet imperialism, this volume, for the most part, is the least capable of satisfying this want of understanding. He could employ his time and effort, by far more profitably, with works on the order of Nicolas Berdyaev's "The Origin of Russian Communism." The papers abound with verbally graced speculations and ambiguities which by this confused set are consistently rationalized as considered observations heavily conditioned by the baffling complexities of the Soviet Union.

It is by no means difficult to determine the overt consequence of these modes of intellectual confusion and arid moralizing. In large measure the instructive work by James Burnham on "Containment or Liberation?", a brilliant and unanswered critique of Kennanism, presents them in most lucid terms. They contribute to our strategic disadvantage, a sense of timidity and atrophy of imaginative initiative, a really exclusive dependence upon indefinite superior quantitative power, and, in substance, an immoral insouciance toward the captive peoples and nations.

The critical reader would receive as much concrete knowledge from reading Mr. Kennan's paper as from listening to a physician diagnosing a particular disease in terms of the whole evolution of mankind. "Soviet imperialism," he is told, "means a thousand things." If this were so, it should be obvious that within the physical limits of his paper, not to mention the book itself, Mr. Kennan could scarcely establish what Soviet imperialism is. This is the typical Kennan flux, without rhyme and reason. He is supposed to cast "The Soviet Union and the Non-communist World in Historical Perspective," but all that the reader receives is a mass of disconnected observations, uncertain speculations and some institutional absurdities. The historical discontinuity that Mr. Kennan ventures to establish between Communist Russia and its Tsarist predecessor is almost intellectually puerile, but perhaps this is excusable since this expert has confined to many that he is least familiar with historical scholarship pertaining to Eastern Europe. He demonstrates this fact here by his total unacquaintance with the non-Russian liberational revolution of 1917-20 which poses a far greater "If" for the real alternative possibilities of history than those superficially chosen by him.

The following successive discussion on this unilluminating paper by Frank Altschul is truly a model of face-saving tergiversation. To him "Liberation" is little more than a "translation into new and misleading terms of the hopes originally voiced by Mr. Kennan." His glaring lack of understanding the liberation thesis is well evidenced by the feeble remark that "unless we are prepared to back the notion of liberation with armed intervention, it is not a policy at all."

George A. Morgan's paper on "The Motivation of Soviet Policy Toward the Non-Soviet World" is much more intelligible and enlightening. It sets forth the real, historical phenomenon of Russian imperialism, and very likely, if the paper wasn't prepared for publication, the author would doubtlessly have enjoyed the

liberty of treating this matter more thoroughly. The presentation by Mose L. Harvey on "The Basic Tactical and Strategical Concepts of Soviet Expansionism" can easily be punctured by any close student of theoretic Marxism, especially its specious thesis that the Russian Communist rulers are absolutely orthodox interpreters of Marxism. Where presumed experts display their failure to command real, objective distinctions, as in the cases of John Hightower, chief diplomatic correspondent of AP in Washington, Willis C. Armstrong, a State Department official, and Professor Conway Zirkle, for whom the USSR is merely "Russia," we have good reason to let pass their super-structural observations with little attachment of significance.

The papers of Professor Batghorns and Jules Mencken, dealing with the factors of ideology and force respectively, are on the whole profitable reading. The somewhat strange participation of Dr. Harry Schwartz, the brilliant analyst of the *New York Times*, in this stacked gathering can be explained on the grounds described earlier. His socio-economic analysis of the Soviet Bloc is, in striking contrast to most of the other papers, concretist, informative and balanced. However, a systematic development of the pervasive phenomenon of Russian economic imperialism would have magnified the singularly outstanding character of this rendition. Comparable in quality and content with Schwartz's paper is the one delivered by T. Cuyler Young on "The Eastern Mediterranean in the East-West Conflict" in which, regarding Marxism, he soundly maintains that "most Near Easterners should know it as a Western ideology that has been transplanted to Russian soil, now serving basic Russian imperialism."

The competence of Vice Admiral L. C. Stevens to deal with historico-political matter in a paper entitled, "Present and Potential Military Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc," can well be placed in grave question when the informed reader comes across factually juggled passages of this sort. Concerning German political unpreparedness in the Soviet Union during World War II, the Admiral states, "There were two schools of thought; one of which believed in dividing and conquering, which could well have set the nationalities against the Great Russians, and the other which advocated turning both Great Russians and the non-Russian peoples against the regime. If the latter school of thought had prevailed, the outcome of the war might well have been different." This is patent nonsense on the basis of both evidence and testimony. First, the reader should ask the fact-dogging Admiral, "What if the first school of thought had prevailed?" When sheer circumstances accommodated it in the early months of the German invasion into the Soviet Union, close to 2 million non-Russian soldiers willingly surrendered to take up arms again in a war against the Russian imperialist yoke. German archives, the founded testimonies of German military men and correspondents, and the best analysis of men in our own Department of Defense overwhelmingly establish the fact that because this first school of thought was overruled by the arrogant Nazi Party command, the Germans committed political suicide in Ukraine and the Caucasus. If the Admiral were in contact with the Defense Department rather than State and the C. I. A., he would learn these essentials of fact.

Also, it is grossly untrue that German policy "served to unite both Russians and nationalities in support of the state." The records are abundant on Ukrainian and non-Russian insurgence toward both German and Russian imperialism.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"WAR or PEACE: SOME BASIC ISSUES," by Hanson W. Baldwin. The New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1954, New York.

The writings of Mr. Baldwin are always thought-provoking, essentialist in character and factually founded. In this plainly written article the author, an eminent military analyst, succeeds in furnishing the reader a working perspective on some basic issues contributing to war or peace. It would be most extraordinary, of course, to expect complete agreement with the many observations and conclusions of his analysis. The prediction that we shall soon have to reappraise our policies in Europe and Asia, seems to be close to realization. His characterization of the enemy as two-headed, really Russian imperialism and communism, is beyond argument.

The political policy advocated by the author is a markedly limited one, namely the restoration of a balance of power by the "creation of a system of collective security and the re-emergence as great powers (including the rearmament) of Germany and Japan." No one given to a dynamic foreign policy on the part of the United States can disagree with this. The pressing question is whether this is sufficient to deter the enemy and, as the writer wishes, to win the minds of men everywhere. His warning against a political policy keyed to an ideological crusade against communism is also subject to question. Minds are attracted to ideas and principles, and only political warfare, as urged by a policy of liberation, can intensify this attraction.

True, as he says, "We must carefully differentiate between the Russian people — particularly the minorities in the USSR, and the satellite peoples — and the Moscow Government," but this differentiation, if it is to be functional and significant, must rest on political objectives consonant with principle and the historical aspirations of those — really the majority non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union and the occupied countries — given emphasis to above. The concept of peripheral action is uniquely amenable to the vast Russian Communist Empire, and Mr. Baldwin is perfectly correct in stating that such actions "would have to be accompanied by other major offensives — a psychological and political offensive in the Ukraine and satellite states for instance, and a very strong air offensive against selected targets." Many elements of Baldwin's analysis find their ordered place in the context of a liberation policy with a more clear and coherent coordination between the psycho-political and military factors which he presents in various forms both as problems and operational assets. Nevertheless, his article is a substantial contribution to orderly popular thinking on these basic issues.

"FOR EVER WITH MOSCOW, FOR EVER WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE", 1654-1954," by M. Khmelko. Soviet Union, January 1954, Moscow.

That Ukraine is vitally important to American strategy, as indicated by Mr. Baldwin above, is obversely confirmed by this issue of the obvious propaganda

magazine, *Soviet Union*. For over thirty years massive evidence in this respect has been piling up, and now Moscow, the source of all tyranny and genocide in Ukraine, wages for foreign consumption a conciliatory policy in this captive non-Russian state. This issue is punctuated with slogans of brotherhood and friendship between Russia and Ukraine, to the extent that the latter is represented as a partner-in-arms in the designs of imperialist Moscow for world conquest.

In this brief article a crass re-writing of Ukrainian history, commencing with the fictitious reunion of the two states in the Treaty of Pereyaslav, is undertaken to establish this propaganda point. Beneath it is a colorful picture of Khmelnytsky before an assembly of Ukrainian warriors outside the Cathedral of the Assumption. Despite the length to which they may stretch their fallacious propaganda, the Russian Communists can never succeed in concealing their greatest weakness, namely the undying hostility of the captive non-Russian nations for Moscow. Nor can imperialist Russian emigres who employ substantially the same arguments in order to maintain the illusion of a cohesive Russian Empire, succeed in this either. In both cases, the principle of friendship between peoples is cynically exploited to serve the common end of empire. This principle can only be genuinely realized once Ukraine attains to real national independence. Its people will then manifest it fully not only toward the Russian people, but toward all others in a common endeavor of European reconstruction.

"RUSSIANS SEEK TO BUILD UNITY WITH UKRAINIANS," comment. Freedom's Facts Against Communism, The All-American Conference to Combat Communism, April 1954.

This publication of the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, which consists of over sixty national organizations dedicated to the mortal struggle against communism, presents in each of its nationally distributed issues an overall factual report of the activities of communists both here and abroad. It provides the preoccupied American reader with an arsenal of essential facts in order to better understand the threat to our country and its free institutions. In this issue the editors bear on the Russian-sponsored 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty, and soundly observe that "It is obvious the Russians fear Ukrainian nationalism and are attempting to woo the Ukrainians whom they for many years have subjugated as a nation but still have not been able to conquer as a people. The Ukrainian spirit of freedom and its desire for independence has been the cause of great concern to the Russians."

"STUDENTS LOOK INTO EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES," a report. The Ukrainian-American Student News, Spring 1954, Cleveland, Ohio.

Published by the Ukrainian-American Student Association of Cleveland, this first issue of a quarterly organ contains many interesting items, notably the results of the research project undertaken by the group on the current condition of East European studies at 47 universities and colleges in the state of Ohio itself. It was found, first, that "an undue influence of Russian concepts which disappeared a long time ago from the minds of the East European peoples" exists in these studies, and, secondly, that assigned works on Eastern Europe are grossly deficient in regard to the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly these results would apply to most of the other states. This particular association has taken steps to rectify this situation to some degree in the state

of Ohio. With the formation of similar associations in other states this valuable endeavor can be wholesomely generalized.

"SLAV MENACE IN A MUSCOVITE MYTH." *Catholic Herald*, January 8, 1954, London.

The conclusion reached in this article is that the term "Slav Menace" is a stratagem of Moscow production designed to frighten the West with a solid front of Slav nations under the leadership of the Soviet Union. This is a real myth because no Slav solidarity exists in the interest of Moscow. On the contrary, the evidence shows that a solidarity of the Slav peoples exists in opposition to the Muscovite tyranny. The fantastic Slav Menace is in reality a Great Russian Menace to the freedom-loving world of which the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union are an integral part. "The non-Muscovite nations... made heroic and literally epic efforts to keep alive their own languages and preserve their national culture and identification," writes the author.

"PROFESSOR SHARP'S BOOK AIDS THE ENEMY AND UPHOLDS SOVIET CONQUEST OF POLAND," a review by Jan Karski. *Congressional Record*, April 14, 1954, Washington.

"Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field," written by Samuel L. Sharp of Harvard University, is critically reviewed by a competent Polish scholar with a most devastating report. Professor Sharp could scarcely have done better than had he written his poorly documented work behind the Iron Curtain. To write off a nation's independence and the current struggle for its restoration in the cynical manner that he does, causes one to wonder where freedom of thought ceases and license begins in a democratic environment such as ours. Dr. Karski's review is long but hard hitting and to the point. In many respects its argumentation could be easily employed against the works of other "experts" in this country who likewise aid the enemy with their distortions of the histories of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union and the silly belief circulated by them that these nations do not desire their independence from the bloody bosom of Holy Mother Russia.

"SMUGGLED FILMS EMBARRASS VISHINSKY WITH HIS PAST SINS," commentary. *Life Magazine*, December 21, 1953, New York.

In concise photographic form the tragic story of the conquest and forcible annexation of the three formerly independent Baltic states is vividly portrayed in this issue of *Life* magazine. The disclosures were made in the hearings staged by a congressional committee under the chairmanship of Representative Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin. Much of the testimony on Soviet genocide is not new to students familiar with the subject, but the committee performs a most valuable service in accomodating all the information it can obtain on this score. It is historically erroneous to believe, as the editors of this magazine do, that the pattern for subsequent Soviet Russian crimes in Central Europe was formed by what occurred in the Baltic states. Indeed, the skillful pattern observed in the Baltic states was tested and tried years ago in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and elsewhere. With the expansion of its hearings into these areas of Soviet Russian aggression the committee should soon establish this fundamental fact, and thus perform a double service by filling in the gaping holes of historical understanding so frequently found among those who refuse to take pains in informing themselves.

"RUSSIA UNCENSORED," by Marshall MacDuffie. *Collier's*, March 5, 1954. New York.

Based on notes and photographs taken during a two month trip through the Soviet Union, this article is an edited compilation of facts, figures and impressions assembled by the author who travelled as far as Minsk and as far east as Alma-Ata in Turkestan. Much of what he reports is very interesting and enlightening to the average American reader. "Most Russians are surprisingly short... I am an even six feet and I felt a giant in most parts of the Soviet Union. Only among the Ukrainians did I see men as tall as I," he writes. As perhaps to be expected, there is much confusion of names and terms in this popular article that even a year's travel in the Soviet Union wouldn't resolve. For instance, we read, "The Soviet Union is a nation of aging political leaders..." This characterization of the Soviet Union as a nation is, of course, elementary nonsense. Along with other nonsensical features, this hardly contributes to a proper understanding of the Soviet Union, over and above the informational tidbits meted out.

"FIRST INTERVIEW WITH RUSSIA'S No 2 MAN," by Marshall MacDuffie. *Collier's*, March 19, 1954, New York.

Mr. MacDuffie, an American lawyer who served with UNRRA in Ukraine, relates here his unusual meeting with Niketa S. Khrushchev, now the number two man in the Soviet Union. The details of their conversations are most absorbing and well described. Close students and observers of the Soviet Union know that Khrushchev is a Russian who was delegated to rule over Ukraine, and the writer establishes this fact for the American reader. Concerning his birth, he writes, "I know now, from Khrushchev himself, that it was near the town Kursk, just outside the Ukraine." Shortly thereafter, the author points out that "When 'bourgeois nationalism' erupted in the Ukraine before World War II, it was Khrushchev who was sent to eradicate it." Significant, too, in this article is the vehemence that Khrushchev demonstrated in his attack upon John Fischer for having written the book "Why They Behave Like Russians" which, except for the unfortunate use of the title, disclosed the non-Russian behavior and temperament of the Ukrainians whom he had an opportunity to observe during his stay with UNRRA. The second man in the Kremlin accuses Fischer of intelligence activity!

"THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES AND THE QUESTION OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE," by Reuben Darbinian. *The Armenian Review*, Winter, 1953.

The author deals with the problem of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union as it is treated by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. The Committee's policy has run into a dead-end street. It has insularly refused to accept as the only workable basis of policy the independence of all the nations in the USSR, out of deference, no doubt, to the imperialist and empire-minded Russian emigres that the Committee has had to negotiate with. The writer soundly observes that "No matter how unpleasant our words are to the Russian leaders, it is an irrefutable historical fact that the land of the Russians is the citadel of Bolshevism. It was from this beachhead that Bolshevism started to conquer the non-Russians." The ludicrous position of the American Committee on this whole issue will receive more and more attention on the part of responsible American officials who are intent upon fixing the ultimate responsibility on the official backers of this costly venture.

L. E. D.

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