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## RED RUSSIANS AT SUEZ

### *Editorial*

When the Kremlin, after communizing the satellite states, tried also to communize Greece by force and demanded from Turkey joint control of the Dardanelles, so as to secure for itself a free path into the Mediterranean Sea, America spent billions of dollars to help Greece and Turkey and for the Marshall Plan, so as not to allow the red Russians outside the Black Sea and to keep them at a distance from the Suez Canal, the chief artery of communications for the Western World.

Britain organized the Bagdad Union of Mohammedan states south of the USSR to create a northern barrier to protect the Arab countries with their enormous supplies of oil, the industrial blood of free Europe. The Mohammedan world with its still living faith in Allah was a sure pledge that Bolshevism would not succeed in this part of the world. The American containment policy in this part of the world made its chief goal the keeping of the red Russians as far as possible from Suez. After 8 years of this policy the red Russians are now at Suez.

It is true that they have not forced the Dardanelles, they have not broken through the northern barrier made by Great Britain with the aid of Uncle Sam. They have not reached Suez by armed force with tanks and atomic weapons, but Soviet instructors at Suez are now teaching the Egyptians how to use the arms which they have purchased from the Soviets. Russian pilots are now sailing on the Suez Canal and they are not only piloting ships through the Canal but also, we must suppose, carrying on the other task to which every Soviet citizen is bound — to work everywhere for the strengthening of the power of the Soviet fatherland. All is going well and if the Western world continues its present "Suez policy," there will soon appear at Suez red volunteers and the Suez Canal, the chief artery of communications for the life of the Western world, will be lost forever. The policy of the West is helping the Communist world to penetrate the basin of the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea despite the firm hand of Marshal Harding in Cyprus and the stationing of French troops on the island of Archbishop Makarios, the ethnarch of the Cypriote Greeks.

What is the reason for this? Can the Arab Mohammedan world of the Near East replace Allah with Marx and become an ally of the

atheistic world? Even now there are not many adherents of Marx among the Arabs except those indoctrinated by the French Communists in Syria during the period of the French protectorate over that country. The Arabs are still praying to Allah. The Mohammedan scholars of the Islamic University of el-Azhar in Cairo, and not the Cominform, are proclaiming a holy war against the expected invaders of the Egyptian land; they are not only proclaiming a holy war against the unbelievers from the West but even the old gray-haired professors of the Islamic academy are now for the first time in their lives taking arms into their hands, so as to die with their students in defence of Egypt in case of a British-French attack upon their country. (*New York Times*, August 19, 1956).

Yet if the Soviets have not forced the Dardanelles or crashed the northern barrier, how have they reached the Suez Canal? The northern barrier, created by the Bagdad Pact, is dissolving of itself, just as the southern flank of the Atlantic front dissolved itself because of Cyprus. The policy of the Big Three of the West has brought the Bolsheviks to the Suez Canal, because for some reason they do not understand and do not want to understand that "in the Middle East the old order is changing and that we must get ready for it," as the wise American journalist Walter Lippman is telling us without much success. (*New York Herald-Tribune*, September 13, 1956).

Soviet arms came to Egypt when Egypt along with the other neighbors of Palestine was defeated by Israel and was left without arms to face the victorious enemy. Who under those circumstances would not take arms even from the devil? The solution of the question of the Jewish Home in Palestine promised by Balfour and carefully fostered by him, did not take account of the existence in Palestine of a majority of an Arab population then inflamed by Arab nationalism. No fair minded person could forbid the talented and persecuted Jewish nation to have their own home, their own place of refuge in case of an outbreak of anti-Semitism in one or another country of the world. But the solution of this question did not proceed along the path proposed by one of the first Jewish pioneers in Palestine, the Jewish patriot and authority on the Palestine problem, Dr. Magnes, for many years the Rector of the University of Jerusalem. He proposed to set up in all Palestine as an Arab-Jewish country cantons like Switzerland and not to divide it with the consequent driving of some 800,000 Arabs from their homes.

There is no doubt this solution of the problem would have met with the opposition of the fanatical Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and his adherents, but it would not have made the gaping sore that now has existed for years. The increased influence of the enlarged Jewish population with

their capital and technical training would after a few years have convinced the Palestinian Arabs and their Arab neighbors that the Jews were a constructive element and the Palestinian population would have benefited by the industrialization of the country.

But the Western world chose another solution for the Palestinian question and took no account of the spiritual force which is now dominating the entire world — the existing growth of Arab patriotism which is now called in the West by the less popular name of nationalism.

When this happened and when Israel became the master of only part of Palestine as an established fact, it was the time, soon after the ending of military operations, for making strenuous efforts for as just a peace as possible, but the Palestinian question was allowed to drag on for eight years and still more corrode the situation in the Near East.

The history of the growth of nationalisms teaches us that they grow most rapidly amid a struggle with neighbors for existence. The struggle against such an unexpected neighbor as Israel quickened the growth of a dynamic Arab nationalism at a constantly accelerating rate and now there is no power in the world to stop it.

The question of Palestine and the problem of the Suez Canal have become the firm cement which has united into a monolithic structure all the Arab states which had previously been quarreling and suspicious of one another. Nasser alone could not have done this. It was done by the Western states by their ignoring of the fact that the Arab world is at present very similar to Italy a century ago and is now on the way to its national *Risorgimento* and national unification. As a century ago Italy was divided into several small kingdoms and principalities and the Papal State, so in the same way now Arabia not by its own fault is divided into several kingdoms and republics and is clearly striving to secure a national unification, and this no power can check. That is the trend of modern history.

Besides this the Arab world has behind it a national tradition of which any nation could be proud. The Turkish rule prevented the further development of the splendid Arab culture of the IX-XIII centuries. A short colonial period broke Arabia into pieces. Now the natural reaction against this is the moving force of Arab rebirth, a fact which the West does not want to understand, to its own injury.

On the other hand the Soviets definitely understand the dynamics of the modern nationalisms for they have their own troubles with "bourgeois nationalisms." They definitely understand the value of conflict in the Near East for spreading their own influence and they are trying to utilize the troubles of the great powers in the best way. It is the



object of Soviet policy in this part of the world not to help in the solution of sharp conflicts but to inflame them and to fan in the Near East the flames of struggle. When eight years ago the United Nations created the state of Israel, Moscow supported the Jews by voting against the Arabs for the formation of an Israeli state. What is more, Israel secured from the Soviets their first arms for fighting against the Arabs.

When Israel grew strong and, what was more important, adopted a policy of solidarity with the West, the Soviets came to the conclusion that it would be useful to the Communist cause, if they stirred up trouble in the Near East and supported for a while the Arabs against the Jews by arming Egypt against them. It is obvious that if it had been necessary, the Soviets would also have armed Israel so that there would be trouble in the Near East and it would be better for them if war broke out in that region. Rosy perspectives then would lie open before red Moscow. The Arabian oil, which is the life blood of its industry for half of Europe, would stop flowing. If there were no oil, half of Europe's industry would stop; there would be millions of unemployed and it would be the best opportunity for capturing Europe by parliamentary methods.

Unfortunately the Western world does not understand the reality of the national movements of the recently enslaved peoples and is now pushing the Arab world into the arms of red Moscow.

The Suez policy is the best proof of this. There is no doubt that from the standpoint of international law, Egypt is now the owner of the Suez Canal and as its owner has the full right to operate it and receive the income for the benefit of the large and extremely impoverished population of Egypt. Because of the tremendous international importance of the Suez Canal which is closely connected with the economy of a great number of states, Egypt is bound by the Constantinople International Agreement of 1888 to guarantee free passage through the Canal for all countries of the world. That must be kept in force and firmly secured under the supervision of the United Nations. The situation is clear and there would be scarcely any tribunal which would take any other position. But the question is now something else. It is decided to liquidate Nasser personally as the creator of all the troubles in all Arab countries. It is here again that we meet the lack of understanding of the dynamics of the aroused Arab nationalism.

Nasser may disappear but Arab nationalism will not until it achieves its national ideal — a united Arabia or at least a union of its Eastern section. There have been threats of war and of occupation of the Canal and threats of imposing by force an international administration etc.

When the conflict flared up, the Soviets appeared as defenders of the independence of the Arabs and ready to take vengeance for the "economic exploitation of the Egyptian people."

But who is the defender of the oppressed and enslaved peoples? Red Moscow, the oppressor of 15 clearly crystalized and nationally conscious nations and the economic exploiter of the wealth of these nations. It is the owner of the largest colonial empire in the world.

Bourgeois nationalism, the own brother of Arab nationalism, is now in the Soviets the greatest crime both before and after Stalin. The last official publication of the Committee of the All-Union Communist Party dated July 2 (*New York Times*, July 3, 1956) with great respect gives the condemned Stalin credit because he fought the bourgeois nationalists who in the opinion of this Sanhedrin of the USSR are the worst foes of socialism and the USSR.

If any one passes to the practical consideration of Ukraine, every one is a bourgeois nationalist if he speaks about a Ukrainian spirit separate from that of Moscow, who speaks of a separate current of Ukrainian history independent of that of Moscow. Every one is a bourgeois nationalist who even believes that Ukrainian literature is the independent creation of the Ukrainian people, independent of Muscovite influences. Every one in the post-Stalin Soviet Union is a bourgeois nationalist, if he wishes the Ukrainian people to be the masters of the wealth of the Ukrainian land. Every one is a bourgeois nationalist if he even wishes to use his own language rather than Russian. So the higher schools in Ukraine have at least half of their courses in the Russian language for there have been persons who have dared to teach definitely in the Ukrainian universities in Ukrainian only to land in the shortest possible time in concentration camps. Even the poet in the USSR is a bourgeois nationalist, when he writes a poem, "*Love Ukraine.*"

The first Soviet agents appear in Suez as the defenders of the Arab world and the independence of Egypt, at a time when the Soviet concentration camps are full of Ukrainians, a well organized opposition that we believe, will finally blow up the USSR. We read in this publication two messages from the Ukrainian prisoners in Mordovia and we see what a sham is being played at Suez and what mistakes the Western democratic world is making by smoothing with its ambitions of the past years the way for the Bolsheviks to get control of the Near East.

*The greatest weakness of the West is its failure to understand that at the present time the entire world is dominated by a noble and democratic movement — the love of every people for their native land and their readiness to make every sacrifice even to the sacrifice of their*

*own blood for the independence of their own land, the right to be the full master in their own land, for their national value as a nation and for the equality of all nations.*

This spirit in the USSR is not less dynamic than in the Arab world, but silenced only by brutal force. The movements for the liberation of the non-Russian peoples are now the chief headaches of the Collective Dictatorship in the Kremlin. But the West does not wish to see this, although it is the Achilles' heel of the Kremlin. Why this is so, God knows. Recently the two great political parties in the USA held conventions to choose their candidates for President but both platforms passed over in silence the fact that there are in the USSR oppressed nations, fully ripe for independence, although they called for the natural end of Western colonialism carried on by their Western allies.

When America will have a better understanding of the questions of the contemporary nationalism, or to use a better word, the patriotism of the reborn nations, America and the Western world will secure true friends, a mighty weapon against the Kremlin. The reborn nations are ideologically close to the ideas of the American Revolution. They desire nothing more than to be the masters of their own land. The newly reborn nations are especially sensitive about their independence and there is no reason for forcing them into that hopeless situation from which there is no way out except to turn to the Kremlin.

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**Note:** This article does not represent the opinion of all the members of the Editorial Board. The following members of the Board did not agree with some important views expressed in this article: Antin Dragan, Dmytro Halychyn, Matthew Stachiw, Roman Smal-Stocki.

## THE SARNOFF MEMORANDUM: A YEAR LATER

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

A year ago last May, General David Sarnoff, who is chairman of the board of the Radio Corporation of America, released for public consumption an exceptionally well written memorandum on a "Program For A Political Offensive Against World Communism" which he had submitted to President Eisenhower. The memorandum received wide publicity in our newspaper organs. It was reported that the President had turned it over to certain unidentified experts in the Government for intensive study. In addition, the full text of the project was introduced into the *Congressional Record* by Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas with complimentary and fitting remarks.<sup>1</sup> After this flurry of attention and wide-spread interest on the eve of the Geneva Summit talks, the memo seemed to be buried and forgotten as we plunged into the so-called period of "peaceful coexistence."

It may appear to many that the general political climate at the present time is scarcely conducive to any renewed interest in, far less serious consideration of, this detailed blueprint for victory in the cold war. Some are under the illusion that the cold war is at an end, or at least approaching it. Others, under the guise of supposed realism with its dominant strain of expediency, view the course advocated in the memo as impractical and perhaps dangerous from the angle of live-and-let-live.

However, it can be strongly and convincingly argued that the contents and ideas incorporated in this meaningful memo are more applicable and urgently needed today than they were a year ago. This writer is in complete agreement with General Sarnoff's recent observation that "There is a spreading opinion that this struggle — the Cold War, so-called — is tapering off. I believe, on the contrary, that it has entered a critical stage."<sup>2</sup> It is most revealing that in its incessant cold war activity Moscow continues to regard the bold ideas, expressed by Sarnoff, George Meany and many others, with the gravest concern, as witness *Pravda's* attack on July 9, 1956 under the caption of "Nefarious Deeds of American Cold War Proponents."

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<sup>1</sup> May 11, 1955, pp. 5125-5131.

<sup>2</sup> "The New Look In the Cold War," address, Phila., Pa., July 21, 1956.

## RECONSIDERATION OF THE SARNOFF MEMORANDUM

There are, thus, a number of reasons why we should at this time give careful consideration to the numerous ideas proposed in the Sarnoff memorandum. For one, the cold war is far from being over. On the contrary, we are indeed in the most critical stage of it, with Moscow, despite its internal troubles, reaping successes in its empire consolidation, nuclear advancements and skilful psychological warfare, feeding the opiate of peaceful coexistence abroad. Moreover, the current ideas of General Sarnoff are striking and persuasive, providing much food for thought to the countless citizens before whom he appears. Based on the sound empirical premises of his memorandum, these ideas significantly repudiate expediency and the seeming finality of the captivity of the enslaved nations. In his cogent remarks, "The great temptation today, as in all times of crisis, is to compromise on ideals in the name of expediency. We are counseled, by some who fly the banners of so-called 'realism,' to recognize the 'finality' of a world half-free half-slave and make the best of it."<sup>3</sup> His implied rejection of the fashionable doctrine of evolution, by which ostensibly the free and slave halves will in time happily blend, and his firm disapprobation of the needless respect shown the "blood-stained Kremlin dictators" are derived from the same premises underlying his remarkable memorandum. The continuity of thought in Sarnoff's position is securely maintained. It deserves the unabated support of all who find themselves in agreement with the essentials of his original project.

The support that could be offered by men like General Sarnoff and George Meany in public forum, would contribute immensely in offsetting the despair and discouragement that have engulfed the minds of those who have favored a strong American liberation policy. In compact form, the Sarnoff memorandum furnishes almost all the essentials necessary for a successful implementation of such a policy. Most of its ideas must be kept in the forefront of public discussion, attuned to the theme that the time for waging the cold war in an organized manner and winning it is now, while Moscow grapples with many diverse problems within its empire. Our passiveness, nurtured by despair and growing hopelessness, will only serve the enemy with the time necessary for the solution of his present difficulties and, in effect, really help to seal the 'finality' of the captivity containment that must be fought and defeated in order to preserve our own national security and the very light of freedom in the world. It is for these reasons, and the oft-repeated additional one marked by the empty query — "What can we possibly do to help the captive nations?" — that the Sarnoff memorandum should be studied anew and advanced with increasing fervor.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

## ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE MEMORANDUM

An analysis of the memorandum into its essential parts and features reveals the striking fact that all of these basic points bear poignant currency in the area of present world conditions. Again, more so than in yesteryear. The memo strongly urges a coordination of cold war activities in a comprehensive and systematically organized program rather than on a piecemeal, sporadic basis. In contrast to Moscow, we have no such program and in the operational field, our actions are almost entirely responsive and in the nature of reactions. Paraphrasing one of Father Walsh's classic statements, Sarnoff declares, "Our best and surest way to prevent a hot war is to win the cold war." But, to adequately contend with Moscow's apparatus, this requires initiative, organization, imagination and courage. The regrettable fact is that we have produced no such combination of factors. This indubitably is a primary objective to be realized.

It is emphasized, too, that the cold war is not a new phenomenon, but actually has been in existence against our civilization since Russian Communism entrenched itself in 1917. This perspective is a sound and necessary one in order for us to understand that the present phase, which has its precedents, is only a continuation of this fixed cold war. The tactical zigzags in Moscow's strategy toward world domination are ably noted so that one could not possibly misconstrue the present "liberalization" trend in the Soviet Union as representing a secular break with past performances. In a concise way, the memorandum shows the puny nature of our propaganda uses in comparison with the USSR, where Soviet broadcasting to foreign areas entails about 1,675 hours as against 716 hours a week by the Voice of America. The Kremlin spends more for jamming than we on all operations of VOA. In the case of printed matter, Moscow's subsidies are so heavy and incalculable that ours hardly qualify for comparison.

Further fundamental points that receive able treatment in the memorandum and should be constantly borne in mind for the present and future, cover communist infiltration and subversion, fifth columns, sabotage and terror, civil strife, the preparation of cadres and reserves, and treacherous diplomacy. In the deceptive sweetness of "peaceful coexistence," too many persons are already losing sight of these techniques which are being employed with undiminished fervor and skill by Moscow and all of which were confirmed and approved at the recent 20th Congress of the Communist Party. One need only read carefully the text of Khrushchev's address for verification of this. It remains as no mere espionage but the subversive corruption of foreign institutions in favor of Moscow that communists, fellow travelers and others continue to sow

seeds of disunity in realizing their undermining objectives. The fifth column technique, openly endorsed by the 20th Congress, is at work in the formation of front organisations and parliamentary infiltration. Strikes, kidnaping and assassination are still in order, and the incitement of civil strife, notably now in the Middle East and Africa, with Moscow exploiting local and native issues, ranks high today in Russian Communist cold war activity.

The training and preparation of cadres and reserves in the name of world communism have by no means been reduced. On the contrary, the present emphasis placed by Moscow on Leninist principles points to an intensification of such activity. And in the area of treacherous diplomacy, which Sarnoff summarizes superbly, Moscow continues to operate on two levels, the conventional state and the conspiratorial. The former draws the necessary respectability for the Kremlin criminals and inspires "peaceful coexistence" programs in the form of cultural visits and the like which, as he aptly puts it, make "grist for the cold war mills." On the conspiratorial level, all this is cleverly exploited without any show of contest by the free nations which blindly seek worthless agreements and pacts on the conventional state plane. There is an obvious void here working to the certain disadvantage of the West and to the defeat of freedom itself. This is the critical area. It is to fill in this void and thereby gain necessary leverage to win the cold war that the Sarnoff memorandum, the works of James Burnham, the findings of the famous Kersten Committee, the proposals and addresses of such far-sighted national leaders as George Meany, Congressman Feighan and Senators Knowland and Douglas have been conceived to guide the American people in this period of mortal crisis.

The keen insights of General Sarnoff into the contemporary situation may be gleaned from many of his pointed statements. "The cold war," he states, "is not a temporary or holding operation, nor a prelude to a hot war. It is the main bout, the decisive offensive, conducted on an unlimited scale, with total victory as its goal." With only the qualification that it is not *necessarily* a prelude to a hot war, this observation rests on an overwhelming mass of solid historical evidence. The cruel fact is that unless we meet this threat, it can eventuate in a situation where the United States "will be cornered, isolated, subjected to the kind of paralyzing fears that have already weakened the fiber of some technically free nations." Another significant point stressed by the General is that in an effective way we used political psychological offensives in wartime and with forceful report he continues, "... it has become incumbent upon our leadership to make the country aware that non-military or cold war is also terribly 'real' — that the penalty for losing it will be enslavement." As applicable today as it was last year is his reflection that "Because

there is no immediate sense of overwhelming menace, no thunder of falling bombs, and no daily casualty figures, we are apt to think of this period as peace. But it is nothing of the sort."

These insights and points are exceedingly valuable and should be pressed on every occasion in the public forum. The author's acknowledgment last year that we are losing on the political and psychological front applies even more today. His urging that we carry political warfare to the terrain of the Russian Communist empire, seeking out its vulnerabilities and weaknesses, is even more pertinent now. It calls for a program on "a scale for victory" and the essence of the whole issue, really the entire message of the memorandum itself, is that the United States, with resolute expression of will and conviction, must decide irrevocably to win the cold war and to cancel out the destructive power of Russian Communist imperialism. With regard to our relations with the Soviet Union, Sarnoff wisely observes that the "hope of a real compromise is a dangerous self-delusion. It assumes that Soviet Russia is a conventional country interested in stabilizing the world, when in fact it is the powerhouse of a dynamic world movement which thrives on instability and chaos."

Unless we are naive to believe in such a compromise, in the Kennanist doctrine of evolution, or plainly drifting with our only hope staked on nuclear weapons, our only recourse is to wage this political warfare on the terrain of the Russian Communist empire. With initiative and bold imagination, our prime objective would be to keep the enemy off balance and to weld our natural bonds with our many allies in the empire. In his guidelines for the political offensive, Sarnoff strikes the main chords: "To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the spirit of resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and sovereignty"; "To provide moral and material aid, including trained leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resistance movements in satellite nations and China and Russia proper" (? — author's); "Our philosophy of freedom must embrace the whole of mankind; it must not stop short at the frontiers of the Soviet sphere."

#### CONCRETE MEASURES PROPOSED IN THE MEMORANDUM

If anyone wishes to know in a concrete way what can be done to engage in political warfare in order to prevent a hot war or to preclude our psychological isolation in the world, to the knowledge of this writer the Sarnoff memorandum presents in compact and succinct form the best outline for bold and principled action. This is one of the prominent values of the memorandum. For people who won't take the trouble of reading books on the subject or even the recommendations of the Kersten



Committee, no less numerous addresses outlining specifically the channels of operation in such activity, this memorandum serves the purpose of quick reading for such individuals who, more often than not, are quick to form their own unfounded conclusions.

The measures proposed are as concrete as one could reasonably expect them to be. The need for organization led by "A Strategy Board for Political Defense" is underscored first. It is estimated that the cost for this vital activity in both organizational and operational form would be somewhere about 5-7½% of the military defense appropriations. Considering the nature and significance of the program, this would indeed be a stroke of economical utilization of our resources, with doubtless maximum return. The personnel, as Sarnoff rightly recommends, would entail the "mobilization of hard, knowledgeable anti-Communists who understand the issues and for whom it is not merely a job but a dedication." The propaganda, as he puts it, "should appeal to universal emotions, to love of family, of country, of God, of humanity." The host of his recommendations includes planned defection, the use of emigres and escapees, campaigns by special groups, such as unions, nationality groups and the like, economic leverages and measures of reciprocity, the employment of newspapers, magazines, radio, TV stations, mobile film units, phonograph and radio devices, and the necessary expansion of our United States Information Service.

In the face of these proposals and more, the usual question that is raised — "What can we do to help the captive peoples?" — is simply a ludicrous one, and invariably born of stubborn ignorance. Even a fifty cent phonograph, developed by Sarnoff's corporation and air-dropped or funneled through existing underground passages with messages for each of the captive peoples, would produce more tangible results than the expenditure of millions of dollars on questionable military equipment. Even the incurrence of passive resistance would benefit us more, things which, as Sarnoff puts it, "in their millionfold totality will affect the national economy and the self-confidence of the rulers. It is the method that comes naturally to captive peoples, especially in countries with a long historical experience in opposing tyrants." Even on the level of diplomacy we miss the mark set up by present requirements. Diplomacy could be forged into an effective weapon. Sarnoff is perfectly correct when he states that "Even when nothing practical can be immediately accomplished, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggressions, violations of Yalta, etc. must be kept continually before the world." The facts unfortunately show that this is not the case, especially in what is regarded as the world's forum, the United Nations.

SEVERAL CONCLUDING CRITICISMS OF THE MEMORANDUM

In his work, General Sarnoff himself admits that his outline is not exhaustive and can be substantially supplemented. Actually, of course, much of the material is not new, and this writer is certain that the General, who is commendably modest in his claims, would be the first to admit this. Many of the basic ideas in the memorandum can be found in the measures proposed by Mr. Kersten of Wisconsin, in the work on *Containment or Liberation?* by James Burnham, in the resolutions that emanated from the several Liberation Conferences held in Washington, in the broad findings and recommendations of the famous Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, and in the numerous addresses and articles by such public leaders as Senators Knowland and Douglas and Congressmen Feighan, Dodd, Smith, Judd, Madden and others. In short, these ideas form the policy of liberation which, at least verbally, has been adopted as the foreign policy of this Administration.

The Joint Resolution, H. J. Res. 433, submitted by Congressman Feighan and aimed at the establishment of a Joint Committee on United States International Information Program, would, if it were brought into reality, accomplish a major portion of the things proposed in the Sarnoff memorandum. The measure pressed by Senator Douglas for the official creation of a Freedom Administration is entirely in line with the objectives of the memorandum. However, despite all this, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that because of its compact presentation, its clarity and piercing content, the Sarnoff memorandum bears outstanding merit and has earned the status of prime reference for the countless who consume ideas in capsule form.

It has been rumored that the memorandum was prepared for General Sarnoff by a person highly versatile in writing and intimately conversant with Soviet affairs. This may or may not be. This writer has received word from the office of General Sarnoff that he authored the memorandum. What has apparently prompted this rumor, whether founded or not, are the peculiar views expressed by the General in relation to the nature of the Soviet Union, communism, and certain events associated with these phenomena. They are peculiar because of the gross inaccuracies involved. One is that Russia itself fell helplessly to the Bolsheviks. Objective scholarship shows that the Russian environment was ripe for Bolshevism and that Lenin gained the broad support of the masses, regardless of the coup that was staged.

The second glaring mistake in the memorandum is his reference to the peoples in the Soviet Union as "Russians." Contrary to his construction of it, the fact is that Hitler's psychological blunders largely took the form of insulting and alienating the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet

Union, particularly the Ukrainians. Evidence for this is massive. Further, his unfortunate identification of the Soviet Union and Russia indicates a lack of awareness regarding the essential facts governing this area and scarcely any appreciation of the greatest weakness of the USSR, namely the invincible and still fighting nationalism of several politically mature non-Russian nations of the USSR against Moscow colonialism. Moreover, when reference is made to existing organized resistance, the Ukrainian underground hardly fits into the false context established on this point. Also, Sarnoff is on unusually weak grounds when he pictures Russia as a tool of world communism rather than the reverse; Russia proper (Mos-covia) is still a stronghold of world Communism. The course of the history of the Soviet Union can be more easily and factually explained in terms of Russian imperialist expansionism than in terms of ideological communism. Communism at present is just a tool of Russian imperialism as before the October Revolution (1917) Orthodoxy and Pan Slavism were.

Yet, despite these fundamental errors, the operational ideas in the Sarnoff memorandum are sound and worthy of advancement. He hopes that once these ideas are put into effect, the basic errors of history and interpretation will be corrected by sheer reality itself, especially the peoples involved. However, before this occurs, it would strengthen the General's position in the public forum to avoid these fading fallacies by his own understanding and volition.

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## **ELEMENTS OF WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH OF THE USSR**

*By* **NICHOLAS L. F. CHIROVSKY**

What are the sources of weakness and strength of the USSR? The most important among the weaknesses are the rule of terror, the problem of the non-Russian nations, the economic deficiencies of the Communist system, and the doctrinal insincerity of Soviet Communism as a whole. Among the elements of strength, on the other hand, the most important are Russian nationalism and imperialistic messianism, the traditional Russian diplomatic skill, the Russian-Communist propaganda techniques, and the opportunism and fear of the West. Let us briefly analyze these aspects of the power and deficiency of Soviet Russia. The emphasis will be given to the deficiencies because they are more real and less thoroughly explored and discussed in the West, than the elements of the Soviet strength.

### **THE RULE OF TERROR**

Terror and violence are a dreadful abuse of the divine law of the dignity of man. As such, they represent a very dangerous double-edged sword of rule. The traditionally deficient Russian techniques of organization and administration certainly would never have been able to build the Russian empire. Terror applied against their own Russian people, and conquest and violence used as means of political growth and expansion for more than six hundred years, made possible the creation of great Russia. So, looking from that point upon the entire political history of Muscovy-Russia, terror and violence may be considered as a source of strength of the Russian nation. But this would be rather a one-sided and deceiving approach and analysis.

Russian history has given numerous evidences of a fundamental weakness of the terror regime. Russia has always been troubled by never ceasing revolutionary turmoils. National revolutions of the subjugated nations, peasant revolts, the rebellions of Stenka Ryazin, Emilian Pugachov, Bolotnikov, and other Cossacks, the revolutionary plots of the Decembrists and Nihilists, and finally the two revolutions after the First World War can very well serve as an evidence of a basic weakness of the terror rule. The official Tsarist terror of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the

Great, and Nicholas I, always produced a violent reaction, resulting in bloodshed and weakening the empire under construction. These revolutionary movements, as a reaction to the official rule of violence, very often paralyzed the large-scale political plans of the Tsars; to cite only the Japanese War of 1905-06, and the First World War of 1914-1918, both of which were interrupted by revolutionary plots and turmoils.

Then the Soviet regime came, which as a modern exponent of the Russian imperialist messianism also has preferred the system of a terror regime. With the Communist revolution things did not improve; they became even worse. Force continued to be a major tool of government as a make-up for organizational and administrative deficiencies, and at the same time as a major source of weakness of the Communist state. The monstrous Soviet terror practices produced suspicion, distrust, dissatisfaction, and the need for continuous purges. Practically no Soviet citizen knows what will happen to him tomorrow or in the next future in this atmosphere of general uncertainty. It results in lowering enthusiasm for work, initiative, progress, and growth. Prisons and concentration camps have been overfilled and become a real "social" dynamite, ready to explode any time and to bury the whole Red Empire in its ruins, if only conditions turn to be a little more favorable through some external factor inducing some disorganization in the Russian terror system. The revolt of the East Berlin workers in the summer of 1954 and in Poznan 1956 and the revolts in the Russian concentration camps after the death of Stalin and the collapse of Beria have proved the very state of affairs behind the Iron Curtain. The revolts in the concentration camps were reported by John Noble and other witnesses of the Bolshevik practices, who recently were released from Russia. That the Red Russian rulers have not yet started a major war to crush Western Europe and America is largely due to the internal insecurity of a regime founded and maintained by ruthless terror. The anti-Communist underground activities throughout the entire USSR, and in Ukraine and the Baltic countries especially, only intensify the problem of the internal security of the Soviet government.

The fact, that the USSR survived the Second World War and did not collapse, is no evidence of the vital power of the Soviet system, as some American politicians and economists believe. In reality, the Soviet Empire was saved at that time by three factors, which had nothing in common with and no relation to any vitality or efficiency of the Communist system and Communist doctrine. Actually, the insane cruelty of the Fuehrer toward the peoples of Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe, the American Lend-Lease and other forms of the American material support to the fighting USSR, and the Soviet resort to Russian nationalism and Russian imperialistic messianism saved the Empire of the Muscovite-Russian people.

During the three first months of the German-Russian war Hitler succeeded in taking more than two a half million war prisoners. This was undoubted evidence that the peoples of the USSR did not want to fight for Communism and Russia. When, however, the German Nazi authorities let those prisoners starve in the P.W. camps, and introduced in the countries of Eastern Europe a not less cruel terror than that of the Kremlin, then the East European nations did not see any solution of their national problems in a simple disintegration of the Soviet Empire, and eventually becoming victims of another terror regime. National undergrounds started to fight against both Russian Communism and German Nazism without having any prospects for success in either case. The active and passive opposition to Communism on the part of large segments of the East European population was weakened by the German terror and changed it into a kind of defeatism. So, prospects for the Kremlin considerably improved.

Underestimating the role of the American subsidies and support in helping the USSR to overcome the German menace and to survive, would be an entirely unrealistic approach to the studies and evaluation of the war capacity of the Communist economic system. Food, clothing, and weapons used by the Russian armies in the later phase of World War II, were all of American origin and production. In order to hide this incredible fact from their own population and their own Soviet soldiers, the Russian authorities repainted, repacked, and changed the trade marks of the American goods, for the Soviet citizen was not supposed to know the truth.

The cruel rule of the Germans weakened the resistance of the subjugated peoples against Russian Communism, while the full-scale resorting to Russian nationalism and messianism strengthened the willingness of the Great Russians to fight for the cause of the USSR, as the personification of "Mother Russia." For their Soviet-Russian patriotism the Russian people were especially praised by Stalin and other Soviet leaders.

#### THE PROBLEM OF NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS

Yet the emphasis put by the Kremlin rulers on Russian nationalism and messianism as the source of the greatness of the USSR had also its bad consequences by making the question of the non-Russian nations a very acute and dangerous issue in the Soviet Union. Russians were officially praised and recognized as the leading and superior nation. Russian nationalism was identified with Soviet patriotism. This, of course, produced an almost automatic and violent reaction in the form of an outburst of nationalism of the other peoples of the USSR, who opposed the glorification and the supremacy of the Great Russians. This is the second

weakness of Russia which can easily lead to an accelerated downfall of the Communist empire.

Russia always has been a conglomeration of various races and nationalities, and this has always been a problem for her imperial growth. The centralizing and separatist tendencies of the subjugated nations have been continuously an element of the political weakness of the Tsarist empire. Only measures of an extreme terror preserved the Empire for a few centuries. In 1917 the Empire crumbled and disintegrated. But the Communist doctrine and the slogan of an international brotherhood of the working people were successfully used by the Russians to deceive other nationalities, to weaken their national separatism, to force them to join the Soviet Union, and rebuild the Russian Empire in the form of the USSR. The dominant position of the Russians has always existed in the USSR, but the doctrine of internationalism was, at least, theoretically maintained in it. Since the Second World War, however, internationalism has been entirely forgotten and fully replaced by the Soviet-Russian nationalism, and consequently the drawing power of Communism declined in the domestic market. In order to appease the growing separatism of the non-Russian people, the Kremlin used various deceptive tricks, as, for example, presenting the Ukrainian Union Republic with the Crimean peninsula. But the artificial conglomeration of nations within the USSR exists by the simple principles of inertia as long as no major event disturbs the operation of the elaborated system of terror. A major war, however, or any other external factor can easily distort the "smooth" operation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The separatist tendencies of various nationalities would then bring about the liquidation of the Empire.

The Communist rulers and the so-called democratic White Russians in Europe and America are greatly afraid of the national problem of the USSR. So, *pro foro externo* they use the demagogic propaganda trick of the Russians, which implies the existence of "a Soviet people." It is unrealistic to talk about one Soviet people, when the Soviet Union comprises various differentiated races and nationalities. But the concept can easily confuse the American public, and the more, when the pseudo-experts on East European matters attempt to identify the meaning of the terms "American people" and "Soviet people." That kind of talk reveals either an absolute ignorance of the real facts about the nationalities and national problems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or a political, pro-Russian and pro-Communist tendency of these "experts."

The American people is a new, voluntary, national creation of various immigrant elements, which freely developed in virtually unpopulated territories into a new nation with a balanced civilization. This national process has developed as a separate historical entity of a new

country in a new world. But the national communities in the so-called USSR, on the other hand, have lived as compact ethnographical masses for many centuries on their traditional territories and have developed for centuries their own separate languages, national cultures, and individual political life.

In order to integrate these traditional differences among these separate national communities, and to create first the still not existent concept of a Soviet people, the Red rulers apply *pro foro interno* a large-scale, forced internal colonization by means of consecutive deportation programs. Ukrainians and Balts are deported to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while Kazakhs and Turkmens are forced to settle in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries. The Russians settle throughout the whole Union as the ruling and controlling element. Mixed marriages are encouraged and even forced; children are taken from their parents and educated in the public orphanages according to the party line and the idea and plan of creating one Soviet people.

As yet, there is no such thing as a "people of Russia" or "a Soviet people." There are still many peoples in the USSR, who desire to separate themselves from the ruling superman caste of the Great Russians. The Western politicians and leaders, deceived by the Russian propaganda, reveal sometimes a horrifying ignorance in this respect. And to compare, for example, the individual states of the United States to the individual countries or Union republics of the USSR is a direct absurdity. A lack of a basic knowledge of geography, history, and political circumstances is quite evident in this. A little objective study of the history of the national, political, and social past of Eastern Europe and Central Asia would at once enlighten the confused minds. But the true facts are not in favor of the Russian political-imperialist interests. So Russian propaganda and diplomacy has made all possible efforts to twist the truth.

#### THE ECONOMIC DEFICIENCY

The Communist economic system has proved very deficient. The collective national economy of the USSR is in spite of all achievements internally unbalanced. Some fields, like heavy industry and war production, have progressed considerably. But other fields, as agriculture, mining, transportation, and the production of the necessities of life, are far from developing satisfactorily, or are even regressing. The standard of living, including housing and food, is horrifyingly low. Destruction of private initiative and private ownership has retarded the progress. Five-year programs have never justified the expectancies and goals. The catastrophic economic state of the USSR was officially admitted in 1953 by the Soviet leaders, and recently, in December 1955, by the Supreme



Council of the USSR. The main economic deficiencies of the system are the poor quality and unsatisfactory quantity of production in all branches of the economy and poor planning. No wonder, therefore, that the major propaganda slogan of the Communists to-day, is as it was in the past: "To catch up with the level of production of the capitalist countries and to surpass it by collectivist measures." It is, however, scarcely possible and probable.

The Soviet rulers are, of course, fully aware of the deplorable state of their national economy. They do not like it either, because it is an unsurmountable hindrance to their plans for a Communist world domination. They cannot help it, however. If they should give up collectivism and dictatorship and try to apply individualism and democracy, it would absolutely mean the collapse of the USSR, and a rapid disintegration of the Russian empire, exactly as it had happened after the First World War, when the Tsarist state turned to democracy and quickly disintegrated. We face a world tension and a threat of another war. Is, however, the Communist block really such a menace, looking from the economic point of view? A modern war does not need to-day only men to fight. It needs steel, iron, oil, electric power, and atomic energy. And according to the *New York Times* Military Strategist the United States and the United Kingdom surpass the Communist block in the most of these cases. The Soviet block can dispose of about 700 million people more than the US and the UK. But, it has fifty per cent less steel and iron, eighty per cent less oil, sixty per cent less electric power, and is ten times weaker with respect to the availability of atomic energy and atomic weapons, than America and Great Britain. And what the Soviets have in minerals and manufactured product is to a great extent available on the territories of the satellites and non-Russian nations, the loyalty of which would be highly questionable and problematical in a case of war or any major trouble for the USSR.

#### THE DOCTRINAL INSINCERITY

The doctrinal insincerity of the Soviet system is still another soft spot, which can contribute to the self-confidence of the West. Despite the theoretical Marxist philosophy of the Red Russian constitution and government, actually very few of the Marxian ideals have been realized. There the ideal of a classless and stateless, anarchistic society of the Communists is still far away from any reality, exactly as forty years ago, despite long years of sacrifice, bloody revolutionary turmoils, and the death of millions of human beings. There is in the USSR no equality, no welfare, and no happiness. Human dignity has been crushed, and men have become slaves of the state, instead of being citizens of an earthly paradise. The dictatorship of the proletariat which was initially

intended to be only a short transitional period to perfect Communism, seems at the present to be the chronic governmental system of the Russian Communistic Bolshevism. And there is no sign of any improvement or true liberalization. Recently, not quite two years ago, Russian philosophers and sociologists frankly stated that it is still not the proper time to think about an introduction of full Communism in Russia. Moreover, Molotov said in the Winter of 1955, that the USSR is in the first stage of laying the foundations for a socialist society. It means, therefore, that the realization of the perfect Communism of the Marxian type is still a very far distant mirage deceiving the Soviet society. Millions of human beings (perhaps more than fifty million) have been sacrificed, murdered, and tortured to death in the name of Communist ideals, and Communism is still far off. Instead of general social progress, actually a regress has been achieved, while the Communist propaganda is continuously trying to convince the world of the enormous collectivist advances.

A big lie can succeed but only to a certain extent. A disillusionment must come sooner or later. A lie must be exposed sooner or later, too, and must produce a violent reaction on the part of those who were fooled so long and so shamefully. In fact, this partially happened during and after the Second World War through the contacts of the Soviet peoples with the West. The young Soviet writers, now living in the Free World, describe very impressively the psychological processes of the Soviet youth, who had been nourished so long with the deceiving Communist propaganda, and were suddenly brought face to face with the so-called Capitalist reality, and learned in this way that they had been fooled their whole life long by their Communist idols and masters. A violent psychological reaction was going on in the souls of those young Communists, and culminated in hatred for Communism, in a desire for revenge for being deceived, and an internal demand to destroy the mendacious system.

Hitler's cruel practices in East Europe did not permit that psychological process to develop to its full extent. But what may happen if the peoples of the USSR learn the true democracy and freedom of the Western man and realize their own misery? Certainly, this would not help the Communist cause but would rather produce a most sudden collapse of the Soviet empire, if once initiated by some powerful factors, the much more, because the Soviet constitution provides each Union republic with the right to secede from the USSR upon its own discretion. Of course, so long as terror is omnipotent in the Soviet Union, this constitutional right is rather meaningless. However, in the case of a collapse of the USSR this right easily becomes the death sentence for the Soviet Russian Empire.

## THE ELEMENTS OF STRENGTH

Such are the most important elements of weakness of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. But there are also some mighty allies of Russia. The sources of strength of the Soviet Union are not so materially founded as her weaknesses, but they are of an enormous emotional tension and capacity. *Russian nationalism and messianism have always inspired Russian imperialist expansion and growth.* Russian poets and writers praise Russia and the Russian people as the God-chosen to conquer, dominate, and rule other nations and peoples. The Russian official Orthodox church intensified this nationalistic messianism by inventing and propagating the irrational idea of Moscow being the "Third Rome," appointed by God to rule the world. A mystical element was added in this way to the Russian nationalistic messianism.

Imperialistic messianism has always been the source of political aggressiveness and produced the self-sacrifice and political success of the Russians. Nationalism saved Russia during the Northern War and the Napoleonic Wars. Russian nationalism greatly contributed, as pointed out above, to the Russian success in overcoming the German menace during the World War II. The mystical messianism of Mother Russia created the self-confidence of the Russian people and their will to dominate and rule. An argument that the Russian government and not the Russian people is imperialistic is not very convincing. A government and its political features result from the national psychology of the people. A despotic and imperialistic government of Russia has prevailed for seven hundred years, and this is the proof that its nature was not incidental but was originated by and deeply rooted in the national psychology of the Russians.

*The Russian imperialistic messianism has been supported throughout the centuries by unusual diplomatic skill of the Russian leaders, rulers, and statesmen, able to succeed where force could not.* What the USSR achieved through the clever diplomacy and propaganda in the course of and after the Second World War is the best evidence of those unusual diplomatic skills. "Be afraid of the Russians even when they are bringing gifts;" so we can paraphrase the ancient poet. The whole Russian Empire was built half by conquest and half by skilful diplomacy toward its weak and strong rivals. The West has grasped already the Soviet diplomatic tricks, but only a little and not far enough. This is a real danger for the Free World.

As skilful diplomats, the Russians know very well how to use any possible ways and means to help their own cause. So, a source of strength of the USSR and at the same time an element of weakness of the Free World, are hidden in the Western opportunism and fear of

war. The Red leaders are real masters in utilizing the psychological dispositions of the West. They again and again arrange for sudden world tensions to scare the world with the ghost of a new world war, and then suddenly produce unexpected relaxations, demobilizing in that way the Western leaders psychologically, and facilitating the growth of Western opportunism. Meanwhile new lands and new countries come under the Communist rule one by one, and the West is deceiving itself that co-existence is still possible, because the Soviets have not yet started the war.

*Also a perfectly developed Communist propaganda technique and the Communist fifth column in the still free countries are first class factors for the Russian-Communist success.* The propaganda and the fifth column silence to a great extent any stronger anti-Communist and anti-Russian move in the Free World. Any sound and resolute anti-Communist reaction is frequently suppressed in a demagogic and deceiving way by the Communists and the Communist fellow travellers by the use of such slogans as individual freedom, respect for individual human rights, respect for human dignity, and democracy, eventually appealing to the freedom and justice loving American mind.

#### CONCLUSION

In order to resist successfully the menace of the Russian Communism, the Free World should develop such material and moral weapons, which would be able to persuade the Russians what a weak position they have, objectively speaking, and that the Western world is determined to defend its freedom. Here, however, not words but deeds should be the major tools of political action. The Western leaders should understand, first of all, that the core of the evil is the Russian nationalism and imperialist messianism, and that Communism is only the political tactics of the Russians to realize their traditional dreams of a world domination. In order to defeat that pathological Russian imperialistic messianism, the West should support the nationalist and separatist movements of the subjugated nations of the USSR. The Western leaders should make the most extensive use of the nationalities problem of the Soviet Union. Instead of adopting an opportunistic attitude and showing a fear of war, a strong, courageous, firm, and resolute position should be taken. A large-scale propaganda campaign would be advisable. But it should be a propaganda of truth, and not that of a half truth, talking about "bad Communists" and "good Russians," adequately evaluating the political situation, and not overrating or underestimating the strength of Russia and Communism. Anglo-Saxons tend rather to overrate the enemy.

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## GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SATELLITES

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Each of the two World Wars which menaced the very existence of the British Empire and which caused the United States to participate, originated not from imperial questions, but as a result of political tensions in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe — the “Iron Curtain” area (the characterization of Winston Churchill). Specifically, the murder of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo in Southern Slav territory, and the attack on Poland by Hitler, were the direct causes of the opening of the global wars. These historical facts testify that this region was, and is even today, the key to world-wide war and peace.

This Central-Eastern-Balkan region, for which there is no common name (but which has been most aptly characterized by Churchill, and then by the German Geopoliticians as “Zwischen - Europa”), with its more than 100,000,000 inhabitants, and more than 30 nationalities — some small, some large, but none absolutely predominant — is the real weather vane of the world, as shown by recent momentous historical decisions arising out of it and then influencing the whole course of world history — Munich, Yalta, the abandonment of the plan to invade Europe by way of Salonica (as in World War I) and the substitution of Normandy, the recall of General Patton from the suburbs of Prague in order to permit the Russians to enter Prague as “liberators,” the abandonment of Mihailovich, the Truman plan, the Berlin blockade, etc. While in both World Wars the strategy of German aggression was to lead from Germany proper to Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe and from there to Europe as a whole, with the world influences as the final destination, today the same area is being assigned the same role in reverse by Soviet Russia: to achieve world domination by using it as the springboard for a potential conquest of Western Europe and then of the rest of the globe.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Roucek, Ed., *Central-Eastern Europe* (New York; Prentice-Hall, 1946); Roucek, Ed., “A Challenge to Peacemakers,” *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXII (March, 1944), and “Moscow’s European Satellites,” *Ibid.*, CCLXXI (September, 1950); C. E. Black, Ed., *Challenge in Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954).

The ignorance of the geopolitical importance of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe was aptly illustrated by Prime Minister Chamberlain's statement on the crisis of 1938: "How terrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." Even as late as October, 1939, Winston Churchill said about Soviet Russia: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

One cause of Anglo-American indifference has been the influence exerted in the United States and in Anglo-Saxon historiography by the concepts of "Western Civilization" and related tendencies derived from German scholarship. Most of the founders of the graduate departments of history in American universities either received their training in Germany or eventually came under the spell of its tradition. Ranke's earlier views that the Germanic and Romance nations form a distinct cultural unit with a common history to be identified with the history of Europe has been accepted by the entire historiography of Germany — and then of Western Europe. For a long time, even if not today, America and Western Europe have been thinking of Western civilization as being somehow identical with universal history. This conception has been bolstered by innumerable textbooks on "The Development of Western Civilization," with the result that the graduates of America's institutions of higher learning have been raised under the impression that all important history has been made in Western Europe and by the Western countries. Thus Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe as well as South-Eastern Europe has been lost in the shuffle of academic curricula.

When World War II broke out, to use Chamberlain's words, "In a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing," the "enigma" of Russia shocked the Western statesmen, for not only did the Soviets join Hitler in the division of Poland but their pact with Berlin enabled Hitler to conquer western continental Europe. In 1945, in the vastness of the Allied victory and Germany's tremendous defeat, one curious fact was, at first, overlooked. Never before in history had Western Europe and Eurasia faced each other — except across a buffer of German and Austrian power. For some 500 years most of the history of Europe and Eurasia had been a series of variations, mostly tragic, on this geopolitical fact. The Allies' victory had finally destroyed this historic pattern and created a new previously unknown conception of a curtailed Europe. Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe was simply renamed Eastern Europe, while the traditional Eastern Europe was ceded to the Eurasian Soviet Continent. Henceforth Western Europe and Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe had to live face to face. What was even more paradoxical was the fact that the victory of the Western Allies was also

the victory of Soviet Russia — thanks to the direct attack of Hitler on the Soviet Union after the defeat of France.

#### GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Between 1945 — the defeat of Hitler — and 1949, a period of “undeclared war,” a remarkable transformation took place in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe. Only four years after May, 1945, when Hitler’s armies were defeated under the joint blows of the three major allies, Soviet Russia, continuing its war-time carefully planned strategy, had conquered by the “extended civil war strategy” tactics all of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean — with the exception of Greece — thus extending its domination over the territory which was evaluated by Sir Halford MacKinder as:

Who Rules East Europe commands the Heartland;  
 Who Rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;  
 Who Rules the World-Island commands the World.”<sup>2</sup>

Today, the post-World War II Europe, shaped in war and councils, strangely approaches the pattern of the “real Europe, east and west,” prophetically outlined by Sir Halford. This trend of history, in turn, helped to make Western Europe lose the politically central position which it had until the dawn of the present century, and this has led to the power constellation in the world in which the struggle for power is determined by the strategies of Soviet Russia and the United States, with a minor influence on the balance of power by the second — or third-rate powers (such as Great Britain and France). At any rate, the ability of Soviet Russia to control most of Central-Eastern Europe is one of the most important props supporting the power of Soviet Russia.

The warnings of Sir Halford are worth recalling. We might remember that he was an Englishman; hence we can understand that he was insistent that naval power could rule the world only on condition that no larger continental power would be able to carry on a large-scale maritime development. If this should happen, the continental power could attack the naval power on the high seas without being reached at its heart through any naval action. In concrete terms, he was talking about the old rivalry of Russia and Britain, the former trying to reach the open sea, while Britain was trying to keep Russia from access to the oceans. The basic problem was, therefore, felt Sir Halford, the control of the ter-

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<sup>2</sup> Sir Halford MacKinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Henry Holt, 1942), p. 150. For a good evaluation on how the Allies handed Stalin his goals even during World War II, see: Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper, 1952); William L. Neumann, *Making the Peace 1941-1945* (Washington, D. C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1950).

ritory between Russia and the Atlantic European shores by a power not too friendly to Russia; inversely, domination of Russian continental areas by Germany would be an equivalent threat to the power ruling the seas, particularly to Britain. Hence the control of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe meant world control, a situation which is at the very core of all "East and West" differences today. It can be argued against MacKinder's theories that the ability of the modern jet-plane to reach any part of the world (without expectation of returning) nullifies the importance of such theories. But it must be noted that the ability to destroy and the ability to control the base are quite different things. Specifically, any area of the Eurasian Axis can be reached today from the American bases in Africa. But this ability to reach it is not sufficient, since the destruction of the military or economic centers of the region will not solve, at the same time, the control of the area for productive purposes, as a base for either military or peaceful purposes. Furthermore, Soviet Russia controls nearly all this area and should, according to MacKinder, be able now to control the world. But Soviet Russia's plans have stalled because air power, since the end of World War II, has rewritten the probable course of international geopolitics. Since the range of aircraft has become almost limitless, air power has become a major factor in preventing the Politburo from using Eurasia as the jumping-off base for its world conquest; Soviet Russia does not want to have its cities and factories and population centers destroyed.<sup>3</sup> A second factor, almost non-existent previously is the high tide of nationalistic movements among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union which paralyzes Russia's impetus to world conquest.

#### U.S. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE CENTRAL-EASTERN-BALKAN AREA

The interests of the U.S. in this area are identical with the geopolitical interests of Great Britain. The United States cannot afford to have this region dominated by a single, hostile power; conversely it is of benefit to the national interests of the American people to have here a bloc of small, independent states (the principle of the "self-determination of small nations"), acting as a bulwark against either Germany or Russia ("cordon sanitaire") and fighting against their potential uses as an outpost of Berlin or the Kremlin for the eventual conquest of the world.

In this respect, up to the opening phases of World War I, the United States had no interest in the region, except when, occasionally, it was urged by the descendants of the numerous immigrant organizations from that area to do "something" for their oppressed countrymen

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<sup>3</sup> Joseph S. Roucek, "Geopolitical and Air Power," U.S. Air Force, *Air University Quarterly Review*, V, 3 (Fall, 1952), pp. 52-73.



there, especially the Jews. Yet, geopolitically, the United States joined World War I in order to stop Germany from controlling the area — although, morally, the battlecry was “to make the world safe for democracy,” and to promote “self-determination of small nations.” In other words, Wilson’s policies induced the United States to join the Allies and to make right decisions, but for wrong or pretended reasons.<sup>4</sup>

After 1918, the United States recognized the official existence of the “divided” Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe; but the moral arguments, rather than the geopolitical reasoning, gave rise to the accusations of “the Balkanization of Europe.” When Hitler started his crusade for world domination by way of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe, American diplomacy tried to check his aggression by numerous appeals to international law, treaties, and moral obligations. But the course of events forced Washington to make again the right geopolitical decision, and in the fighting the American armies reached the Danube and the Elbe rivers. But, as soon as the fighting stopped, the United States, as in 1918, “let the world go by,” with the results that Soviet Russia was allowed to continue its march for its bloodless conquest of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe.

A rude awakening took place in 1947, when President Truman proclaimed his plan in regard to Greece and Turkey — this was nothing but a geopolitical decision to draw a line against Soviet Russia’s expansion toward the Mediterranean. What Britain and France were doing in 1938, when straining to hold back the Nazi aggression, the United States was forced to do alone because without American help the chances of restraining Soviet communism were sinking to the vanishing point by 1947. Back of Washington’s decision were irremovable geographic realities. Soviet Russia’s advance into Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe meant, sooner or later, the conquest of Western Europe, and thus the complete execution of the blue-print for conquering all of Eurasia.

#### SATELLITE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STRENGTH OF THE USSR

The extension of the domination by Soviet Russia into the Central-Eastern-Balkan area has added tremendously to the strength of the Soviet Union, in terms of: population, natural resources (agriculture, primary industry, mining and quarrying), industry (manpower and experts), and armaments industry and armed forces.

The territorial and population contributions of these acquisitions can be realized from the following table:

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<sup>4</sup> This thesis has been brilliantly developed in Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of National Interests* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

	Area	Population
Estonia	18,357 sq. miles	1,126,415 (1940)
Latvia	25,395 " "	1,994,506 (1940)
Lithuania	22,958 " "	2,879,070 (1940)
Poland	119,703 " "	26,200,000 (1953)
Romania	91,654 " "	16,300,000 (1952)
Czechoslovakia	49,330 " "	12,339,647 (1950)
Austria	32,388 " "	7,090,122 (1949)
Germany (German Democratic Republic)	41,700 " "	17,313,700 (1946)
Albania	10,629 " "	1,186,000 (1949)
Bulgaria	42,741 " "	7,390,000 (1947)

The Baltic countries were incorporated as the 14th, 15th and 16th Republics of the USSR in 1940.

By the August 16, 1945, agreement with the USSR, Poland lost 69,860 sq. miles with 10,772,000 people, but gained 38,986 sq. miles of the German territory with a pre-war population of 8,621,000.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 confirmed the cession of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the USSR, the return to Romania from Hungary of northern Transylvania and the cession of southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

Carpatho-Ukraine was ceded to the USSR in 1945.

Austria was divided into 4 national zones, as was the city of Vienna. The Soviet zone was to be evacuated according to the agreement of 1955.

Southern Dobrudja was added to Bulgaria from Romania by the Peace Treaty of 1947.

*Population.* Although all of Central - Eastern - Balkan Europe — except probably Czechoslovakia — is confronted with the same major social problems of rural overpopulation, from the Soviet point of view the added millions of the satellite peoples mean manpower which serves as the backbone of the satellite countries and as the labor force which will be channelized into the industrialization plans of Moscow.

All evidence shows that the population of northwestern and western Europe will decline within the next generation. But the population of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe will continue to increase; that of the Soviet Union will experience an enormous growth within its pre-war boundaries, and in spite of large war losses will gain perhaps 50,000,000 between 1950-1970.<sup>5</sup> Fundamentally, these different rates of growth are

<sup>5</sup> See such studies as: Office of Population Research, Princeton University, *The Future Population Trends of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Princeton University Press, 1944); Feliks Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), and bibliography, pp. 139-153; Gordon Skilling,

related to the age structure of the populations. The Western European countries have populations centering in age groups higher than those of satellite Europe and Soviet Russia. The most numerous age group in Germany in 1940 was that of 30 to 35 years; but the Soviet Union had more children under 5 than in any other 5-year age span, and these children almost guarantee rapid growth during the next few decades. Hence the Western European countries are facing the necessity of adapting their institutions to an older population with fewer dependent children and more dependent old people. Persons over 65 years of age in that area are now only a little over one-third as numerous as those under 15; but by 1970 there will be almost as many over 65 as under 15 years of age.

In Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe the existing pressure of population upon a largely agrarian economy will be accompanied by rapid increases in the labor force. (A complicating factor, however, has been the policy of the Soviet Union of enforced deportations and transfers.)\*

National power depends mainly on manpower and industrial potential. The Soviet government has proved that a nation which is willing to become industrialized at the expense of current consumption and has access to the sources of raw materials meets only one limitation — its available manpower. This has been fully realized in the Politburo. Although the USSR is still in the full tide of its demographic development, the Soviets have adopted all sorts of measures to encourage a high birth-rate. The leaders know that a decline in numbers menaces industrial expansion, just as the lack of industry reduces even an immense manpower to impotence.

From this point of view, in spite of the present pressure of population in Central-Eastern Europe, the demographic prospects present several astounding implications. This area which lost more than twice as many lives and suffered terrible damages during World War II, is passing through the stage of lowered mortality and high birth-rate and the resulting quick growth of population. By the end of the present century, the area will be able to draw numbers whose production of wealth and soldiery will be far greater than that of Western Europe. Furthermore, even with foreign aid, the West has been hardly able to support the standards of the numbers it already possesses. The East, on the other

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*Eastern Europe in Flux* (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1949); League of Nations, *European Conference on Rural Life 1939, Population and Agriculture, With Special Reference to Agricultural Overpopulation* (Geneva, 1939).

\* Eugene M. Kulischer, "Population Changes Behind the Iron Curtain," 100-111, in "Moscow's European Satellites," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLXXI (September, 1950).

hand, can take care easily of an increasing population with its resources which are being rapidly developed. Western Europe "has attained its present density of population at the end of a long industrial expansion. Without very drastic recapitalization and a widespread introduction of new techniques, western Europe has very little economic slack left to provide for greater numbers."<sup>7</sup> Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe, on the other hand, has reached its present population before doing much more than "scrape the surface of its resources. There is infinite room for industrial expansion."<sup>8</sup>

*Markets and Industrialization.* Before World War II, Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe was a market for Western manufactured consumer goods; now these countries import mostly only capital goods which assist in the process of industrialization. But while Western European markets are distinctly narrowing, Central-Eastern-Balkan markets, in the near future, are apparently unlimited. Under the Soviet heavy hand, the national boundary (within the USSR) is no more an economic barrier. Further, labor has no established standards to protect. Indeed, the whole of Eurasia is a virgin market — all the way from the Chinese shores of the Pacific to the German Elbe.<sup>9</sup> In short, "in some 25 years Central Europe will be, by its population numbers and by its economic structure, nearer to Western European standards than one could expect on the basis of the present situation viewed from a static point of view. The Soviet Union favors such a development on the realistic calculation that an economically strong Central Europe would be a valuable addition to the Soviet potential."<sup>10</sup>

World War II broke Germany's economic hold on the region, which had depended on imports of German manufactured goods and on exports of agricultural products to Germany. Today, the USSR is obviously unable to export industrial goods and hence cannot take the place of pre-war Germany in these markets. This void is being filled by having each of these countries build their own industries, according to the master-plan provided by the USSR. Poland and Czechoslovakia have been singled out to replace German industries in the Central-Eastern-Balkan markets. Plans are under way to build a second Ruhr in the large basin of Czech Silesia, Polish Silesia, and ex-German Silesia annexed by Poland. Here are some of the richest coalfields in Europe and an important

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<sup>7</sup> Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 283-284.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>9</sup> For an over-optimistic evaluation of this bright future of Central-Eastern Europe, see: Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-295.

<sup>10</sup> W. W. Kulski, "Central Europe in Transition," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, VIII (January, 1949), pp. 345-365, p. 356.

network of industries. The plan covers the building of a power plant at Oswiecim (Poland) to be used by Czechoslovak and Polish industries, and a canal linking the Oder with the Danube, anchored at Bratislava. In turn, the canal is to facilitate the exchange of goods with the Danubian and Balkan countries.

In general, the satellites, having, in many cases, ample natural resources and limited access to supplies of Soviet raw materials, have been following the Soviet example of industrialization at the expense of home consumption; this has been expressed in the various Two, Four, and Five Year Plans, all of them calling for economic reconstruction on a more industrial basis. Another interesting aspect of these plans is the coordination of various blueprints. The Poles and Czechoslovaks are cooperating in developing their industries, especially in the Silesian basin, in order to replace Germany on the market. Yugoslavs and Bulgars intended (until the quarrel of Tito with the Cominform) to dovetail their plans of electrification.

*Natural Endowments.* The industrial potentialities are backed by the natural endowments. The region is fairly poor in iron ore and most of the deposits are of low iron content. But there is a wide-range of non-ferrous metals in the area: important reserves are known to exist: spelter (Yugoslavia, Poland), lead (Yugoslavia), magnesite (Greece), chromite (Greece, Yugoslavia); there is a well-developed zinc smelting and rolling industry in Poland, and copper-smelting in Yugoslavia. The whole area is well endowed with coal, mineral oil and water power, although these are unevenly distributed among the several countries. Big deposits of coal exist in southwestern Poland and the adjacent districts of Czechoslovakia; the coal seams in Poland are exceptionally rich. The mines in other parts of the area are only of local importance. Brown coal and lignite of varying qualities are mined extensively in many parts of the area, their main use being for generating electric power, but also directly for low-grade industrial fuel. No reliable estimates of oil reserves are available. The known reserves in Romania were put before World War II at 50 million tons, which was possibly an under-estimate; the Russians have been interested in Austria's oil fields. Uranium from Jachymov (Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia) is extremely important for the development of Russia's atomic power. Only in Austria is water power developed to any major extent, and a more intense development of the available mineral resources is dependent on better transport facilities and on the supply of cheap electric power; special mention may be made in this connection of the bauxite deposits in Hungary and Transylvania. The timber resources provide another important source of potential industrial development. The forests contain trees of all non-tropical varieties; coniferous trees predominate in the northern and western areas, while de-

ciduous trees are more common in the other places. Wood is used extensively as fuel, especially for domestic consumption, but not infrequently also in small industries in the more backward areas.

*Expanding Communications.* The satellite empire, once famed for its intense separatistic nationalistic rivalries, is being rapidly fused by rigid Soviet control and an expanding communications network. Moscow has nearly completed a railroad program which includes construction of new lines and the conversion of old ones from the standard European gauge to the broad-gauge which is used in Russia. Moscow now has broad-gauge lines running directly from Byelorussia and Ukraine across Poland, into Czechoslovakia and Hungary, across most of northern Romania, and across southeastern Romania toward Bulgaria. The key to the Kremlin's momentous communications offensive is Carpatho-Ukraine — the area lying between Lviv and Csap. Three railroad lines pass through the Transcarpathian region, and all have been shifted to the Russian broad-gauge. A line running southward into Hungary from Csap is in process of conversion. This means that the Soviets will be able, soon, to deliver arms and troops, on Russian trains, from the interior of the USSR almost to the Yugoslav border. The lines across Poland have been transformed, including the one that goes directly into Berlin. Another line of great importance crosses the top of the Danube delta and soon will reach Bulgaria. Romania's Ploesti oil is now delivered directly to Russia by broad-gauge rail. Coupled with this network is a great military highway building program and full utilization of canals and navigable streams.<sup>11</sup> Closely allied with the Danube-Black Sea project is the "Slav Suez" plan for a Danube-Oder Canal, which would facilitate Polish-Czechoslovak industrial integration and link the Baltic to the Black Sea via Stettin and Bratislava.

#### HERDING THE SATELLITES

There is nothing secret or new about the ways and means whereby the Politburo has been directing the integration of the satellite empire into the large framework of the Soviet framework. The control of all these processes by the communists, receiving their instructions from Moscow, has been the key to the execution of these grand designs by the head men of the system. Of special interest to us is, however, the supplementary machinery for the economic imperialism in the European satellites.

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<sup>11</sup> Leland Stowe, "Satellites in Arms." *Life*, XXXI, 25 (December 17, 1951), pp. 98ff.; see an excellent map on pp. 98-99; Joseph S. Roucek, "Geopolitic Trends in Central-Eastern Europe," pp. 11-19, in "Moscow's European Satellites," *The Annals*, op. cit., September, 1950.

On January 25, 1949, the Soviets started the "Council of Mutual Economic Aid" (KOMEKON, Communist Economic International), to counter Marshall aid, to coordinate the exchange of goods between the countries of the Soviet orbit, and to exchange their experience of various methods of production.<sup>12</sup> Gradually, the KOMEKON has become the centre which works out the economic policy by which the Soviet Union dominates its satellites — Eastern Germany included. The organization has 2,000 employees, 70% of whom are Russians, the rest nationals of the various satellites. Its offices are partly in the Kremlin, partly in Kitaigorod, the old part of Moscow. The Council is also a clearing centre for all payments resulting from trade between the USSR and the members of its orbit. Planning for investment in industry, including the armament industry, is concentrated in KOMEKON. The governments of the People's Democracies are allowed to make suggestions, but to act only after the Council has agreed that any given plan can be realized. The foreign trade and the production of the satellites are completely dependent on the decisions of KOMEKON; all members of KOMEKON are obliged to help each other in the delivery of raw materials, industrial equipment, food, and in exchanging experiences. (Eastern Germany was admitted on September 29, 1950, and has to "cooperate" with the rest of the region).

#### THE FUTURE OF THE WEST AND THE SATELLITES

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe is to create an integrated region here, directed on all fronts — political, economic, cultural, and military — from Moscow. If the West allows the communists to consolidate the region, it will probably prove a more valuable gain to Moscow than the Sovietization of China with its 400 millions. The Soviet masters control all the important geopolitical points of Eurasia. The West will be safe only when these key points have been returned to their original masters, the small nations of Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe, as well as to the subjugated nations of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>12</sup> Hans Jaeger, "Council for Mutual Economic Aid," *East Europe and Soviet Russia*, No. 367 (Feb. 21, 1952) pp. 3-5.

## VOICE OF FREEDOM FROM THE SOVIET PRISON

### UKRAINIAN PRISONERS IN MORDOVIA

In the present troubled times when the whole world lives under tension and in fear of the results of the struggle of the Arabian world for its own position and when Mr. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, the Prison of Nations, comes to London to play the false role of the great defender of oppressed nations, there is transmitted to the West an unusual voice — the voice of oppressed Ukrainians in the prison camps of Mordovia in Soviet Union.

Where and what is Mordovia? It is a small region situated south east of Moscow, a region inhabited by a stubborn, decent, Ugro-Finnish people differing from Russians in language and culture who during the last eight hundred years since the beginning of the existence of the Moscow Suzdal principality until the present day not fully have been Russianized. From these Mordovian concentration camps through underground channels came two pieces of old white linen with two messages written thereon from imprisoned, but still spiritually free Ukraine. On these two pieces of linen were carefully lettered writings addressed to the free world.

The first message addressed to the United Nations, Division of Human Rights, and to the whole civilized world is signed by eight representatives of the men's labor columns and five of the women's columns in initials and pseudonyms. The other letter is addressed to all Ukrainians in the free world and is signed by the imprisoned Ukrainian women in Mordovia.

At a time when some American "experts on Russia" who lack any understanding of the problems of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union, try to reduce the nationalities problem in the USSR to the fight for personal rights, Ukrainian prisoners in Mordovia teach these experts that even after long years of imprisonment and after hundreds of thousands of their kinsmen have died, their only demands are: Freedom for the Ukrainian Nation, freedom for the Ukrainian State now under Moscow occupation.

In the other message the Ukrainian women prisoners encourage and urge the Ukrainians living in freedom not to dismiss from their minds their foremost duty — to fight for the liberation of Ukraine, for unity and solidarity in action and to prepare themselves for their return to a liberated Ukraine.



We quote these letters to show the patriotism and the noble courage of modern enlightened Ukrainian nationalism, an idealism poorly understood in this country. (*Editor's remark*).

**AN OPEN LETTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION  
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND TO THE ENTIRE CIVILIZED WORLD  
FROM THE PRISONERS IN CAMPS IN THE U.S.S.R.**

We, the prisoners in Mordovian special camps, wish to bring the following statement to the attention of the entire civilized world. We, Ukrainians, are in favor of any movement whose aims are freedom and truth; we advocate cultural progress in all walks of life, and we stand behind self-determination for all nations, including the United Ukrainian State.

We have no desire to exaggerate the facts of the situation that has existed in Ukraine for a long time. We do not ask for mercy or for pardon. We demand our right to live under laws that should be recognized by the entire civilized world — the world of twentieth-century civilization. This century has been spearheaded by a number of humanitarian organizations, from small groups on up through national leaders. They include the great world-wide organization, the United Nations. Our Ukrainian nation, like a number of other nations, has come under the conquering heel of Red Russia. We have been deprived of the basic rights of existence. We have been driven into camps, with severe sentences from ten to twenty-five years — not for criminal acts, as the Bolsheviks maintain before the rest of the world; not for arson, treason, or murder; but because we, like every freedom-loving people, demand our lawful rights in our own land.

The question therefore arises. Does the civilized world know about the conditions prevailing not only among us prisoners, but throughout our country? Does the civilized world know that, when we have served our sentences, we are exiled to the so-called virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Krasnoyarsk, and the Far North — while they proclaim that it is volunteers and members of the Komsomol who go out to those areas.

Can the civilized world conceive of Ukrainian sovereignty without a Ukrainian government, without a Ukrainian army, and without the Ukrainian people? If Ukraine is sovereign — and she should be — why is there no army composed exclusively of Ukrainians? Why do Ukrainians serve their terms in the army beyond the borders of their country? Why are military units, composed of Russians and other nationalities to whom the interests of the Ukrainian people are alien, if not directly hostile, stationed in our country? If we are traitors and if our punishment is just, why were we tried by "peoples'" or "military" courts, whose composition is certainly not Ukrainian? Why do we not serve our terms on Uk-

rainian territory, which was ravaged by the last war and is in need of reconstruction? Why do we have to work at the cultivation of wild, remote lands and forests, when there is such a need for our forces at home?

Does the civilized world know that, over the mass burial sites of the prison camps, new camps and cities are built, canals are dug, and stadiums are erected, in order to obliterate the traces of these crimes? In Abez' (Komi ASSR), Camps 1, 4 and 5 stand on former cemeteries. At Zavod 5 in Leplya (Mordovskaya ASSR), the first and second polishing shops, the technical laboratory, and the forge were erected on human bones. Does the world know about the mass executions of prisoners who only demanded their rights as political internees (at Mine 29 in Vorkuta, Attorney-General Rudenko was in charge of the firing squads). Is it known that in Kingir (Post Office Box 392, Colonies 1 and 3, Kazakhstan), men and women demanding their lawful rights were charged by four tanks and crushed by them?

Does the civilized world know that Ukraine has suffered starvation for thirty-eight years, in addition to the artificial famine of 1933; that Western Ukraine has been inundated by floods, and that the people have been condemned to death by starvation, with no hope of aid from "humanitarian, peace-loving" Communist Russia. This, at a time when millions of tons of grain are exported abroad for propaganda purposes, when all sorts of foreign delegations visit model collective farms (special display models) and factories in the USSR.

In the postwar period (1945-55), Russia has raised the level of light and heavy industry beyond the prewar level. This was accomplished by the toll of millions of prisoners. Those prisoners raised the issue of improved living conditions — an improvement essential for any creature that breathes air (after between nine and eleven hours of work in the mines, the prisoners were shut up like cattle in close, smelly barracks furnished with the well-known "slop buckets"). Some of these prisoners were shot, others were crushed by tanks. Many of them received additional sentences of from ten to twenty-five years and were put in jail, where they are to this day.

This is addressed to the civilized world of the 20th Century — a century of education and progress. We feel certain that anyone who reads these lines will experience revolt and contempt for the "just and humanitarian" Communist Party of Russia and the crimes committed against the nations she has enslaved.

We are not discouraged, because we know that our will for freedom is founded on natural law, and we believe that the entire civilized world will uphold us in our course.

Bearing in mind the foregoing points, we — the prisoners in Mordovian special camps — have adopted the following resolution:

**RESOLUTION****I**

1. A commission is to be appointed for precise verification of the facts as we have stated them: That Attorney-General Rudenko and Deputy Minister of the MVD, Maslennikov, were distinguished by the cruelty of their conduct in Vorkuta and Noril'sk in 1953, and in Karaganda in 1954.

2. The fact that Camps 1, 4 and 5 in Abez' (Komi ASSR) and Zavod 5 (Mordovskaya ASSR) were built on cemetery grounds is to be verified. Similar cases are not hard to find — there are forty-four such camps in this area.

3. We demand that the cemeteries be put in order, that the buildings and plants on them be razed, and that memorials be erected to the dead, as a symbol of perpetual shame to the Red slaveholders. Since members of all nationalities of the world are numbered among the dead, a special international organization is to be established for the purpose of erecting these memorials.

4. We demand comprehensive social security for the orphans, widows, and parents (if they are not fit for work) of these victims of cruel injustice; also for those persons and their families who incurred complete physical disability in camps and are unable to provide for themselves and their families.

5. Since an entire family is held responsible for an offense committed by one member (they are all subject to exile, deportation, confiscation of property) and a man's grandson as well as his son may suffer because of an act he himself has committed, there have appeared cases of "reliables" and "unreliables." The "unreliables" live under constant oppression, persecution and misery. We therefore demand that these people be given back their rights as human beings, that they receive social security, and that they be permitted to return to their countries.

6. We demand that all persons who have served out their sentences be permitted to return to their native lands. We protest the passing of sentences to twenty-five years on a mass basis, because such a sentence is a sentence for life.

7. All persons who underwent a second trial and were then transferred from camp to jail because of their participation in camp strikes or in any other form of mass or individual protest against the violation of their rights as political prisoners are to be released from jail and to have their sentences annulled.

8. All desert lands, pits, mines, and forests that became part of the USSR after their discovery or cultivation are to belong to the na-

tions whose sons and daughters worked on them and strewed them with their bones.

## II

1. We demand the establishment of an international control commission charged with the fair distribution of aid earmarked for underdeveloped countries and for disaster areas including the USSR.

2. We are wholeheartedly in favor of extending aid to all those who need it — regardless of their nationality, religion, race, or political convictions. But we cannot agree that bread should be torn from the mouths of the starving and sent abroad as aid, when it is really for purposes of propaganda. This is done in the Soviet Union, at a time when millions of people are starving.

## III

1. Whereas every criminal act against the enslaved nations is perpetrated with the knowledge of the Politburo and of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we demand that the entire ruling class of the Soviet Union be brought before international justice.

2. Yezhov, Beria, Abakumov and others, whose execution was ordered by the security organs in order to deceive people at home and abroad, cannot be made to hold full responsibility for everything, because crimes against the enslaved nations continue to be perpetrated.

## IV

We, Ukrainians, make the following demands on purely nationalist grounds:

1. All Russian nationals shall be required to leave Ukrainian territory. They will not be permitted to return until such time as Russia abandons her dream of denationalization, assimilation, and of eventually devouring Ukraine—until she ceases to regard herself as the Big Brother. It is a distortion of reality and of historical fact to speak of "the union of Ukraine with Russia." Ukraine has always been cruelly enslaved by Russia.

2. We concede the right of other nationals — unless they have been sent by the Russian government for aggressive purposes — to live on Ukrainian territory, enjoying equal rights with the Ukrainian people. Russians may live there only when they begin to be governed by general standards of morality.

3. As long as there are armed forces in the world, the only units stationed in Ukraine are to be composed exclusively of Ukrainians and under the command of Ukrainians; all soldiers and commanders not of Ukrainian extraction are to be withdrawn beyond the borders of our coun-

try. This also applies to the administrative and security organs of the MVD.

4. Anyone who violates the laws of Ukraine is to be tried before a Ukrainian people's or military court; if convicted, his sentence will be served within the national borders.

*Note:* We request that the citizens of the world be informed of this letter by the United Nations, Division on Human Rights.

We have signed with initials and pseudonyms, so as to forestall any possible consequences.

30/IX-55

**MESSAGE OF UKRAINIAN WOMEN IN THE MORDOVIAN CAMPS  
TO UKRAINIANS IN THE FREE WORLD**

Dear Friends:

We want to take advantage of this opportunity to tell you in brief what the Bolsheviks say about you — our political emigres of the last decade — in their so-called lectures and in recent articles in the press. We would also like to give the Ukrainians abroad who are not indifferent to our fate some idea of the conditions prevailing among political prisoners in special Soviet camps since the war.

Lectures on Ukrainian affairs are delivered by important officials in the Mordovian Party, and not by members of the administration of local special camps. The main point in what they have been saying about you is roughly as follows: Although the number of Ukrainian political emigres in the last decade has been small, the group is torn by dissension and split into many parties. They are politically short-sighted, and they no longer enjoy popularity among their people, whose support they have lost. They are not fighting for anything real — just for the capital letter "U." The Bolsheviks cite the names of our most prominent political leaders abroad, calling them "the most despicable betrayers of the Ukrainian people."

Lectures on Ukrainian affairs were discontinued recently. The reason may lie in the prisoners' dignified reaction to the Bolsheviks' tendentious distortion of historical facts. These lectures, held at unexpected times, caused us spiritual anguish. But at the same time, they were a welcome event, because they allowed us to think (correctly, we hope) that our position in international politics had improved and that the Bolsheviks were therefore intensifying their propaganda efforts in the pertinent direction. Political prisoners of other nationalities in the Soviet Union envy us without rancor, and they hope that we did not rejoice in vain.

Among recent printed works attacking us, first place is occupied in the libraries of Mordovian special camps by the brochures of Halan (*Selected Work*, 1954), of Belyalev, and of M. Rudnitskiy (*Under Alien Banners*). They are permeated with monstrous, unparalleled venom, bigotry, and hatred for everything Ukrainian and non-Communist.

Entire chapters in these libelous sheets are devoted to you, our political emigres of today. Emphasis is placed on internal disorder, dissensions, the struggle for power, the lust for gain, and political immaturity. Our attitude toward all forms of Bolshevik propaganda is the same. We are convinced that the written and the spoken word in the Soviet "prison of nations" is hopelessly slanted. We firmly believe that, with the benefit of past experience, you will do your duty with honor — a moral duty imposed by the nation upon its political emigres; that your years in the emigration will not prove to be time lost; that you are using this time to good advantage; and that you will return to Ukraine with your forces undiminished and with an awareness of all important theories successfully practiced in Europe and the rest of the world, so that our nation may benefit from them. We believe that your long sojourn abroad will not diminish your longing for your country and that it will not make you want to live abroad for the rest of your lives.

And now a few words about living conditions among political prisoners in Soviet special camps during the postwar years. The basic features of the Bolshevik prison-camp system have not changed. Almost all of the special camps are located in areas where the climate is severe (Kolyma, Taymyr, Siberia, Komi, Kazakhstan). Sentences for political crimes vary in length from five years (for a single attempt, as they say in jest, at "suspect" thought) to twenty-five years in so-called corrective labor camps, and from fifteen to twenty years of penal servitude. In the immediate postwar period, famine, unendurably hard labor, and appalling sanitary conditions took a toll of thousands of political prisoners. Again in 1948, a so-called strict regime was introduced in the special camps; the iron-barred barracks were locked at night, correspondence was restricted to two letters per year, one was not permitted to keep cash, there were penal barracks, prisoners were not allowed to wear their own clothes and had to wear prison uniforms with numbers on the back, they were not allowed to make notes from books, to engage in handicraft, to assemble in large groups, and so forth. This was coupled with twelve hours at hard labor and a deliberate increase in the work norms. The unbearable living conditions brought about uprisings in certain camp centers — Vorkuta in 1953, Noril'sk in the spring and summer of 1953, and Kengir (Kazakhstan) in 1954. Over forty thousand prisoners of different nationalities took part in the uprisings. The enemy used all kinds of weapons, including tanks, in suppressing the uprisings. At the cost

of several thousand comrades killed or wounded, we brought about the abolition of the stricter regime and the introduction of an eight-hour day.

In the last few years the Bolsheviks have paraded their humanitarianism before the world. They issued decrees that also pertained to political prisoners, but most of them were not put into effect on a comprehensive scale (the decree releasing invalids from special camps, the "probationary" release of political prisoners who had served two-thirds of their terms). Following their release from special camps, prisoners can usually expect to be exiled to Siberia for an indefinite period. In September of this year, an amnesty was declared for political prisoners who had collaborated with the Germans during the war. The official Bolshevik term for our nationalist prisoners is "Banderivtsi" or "Ukraino-German Nationalists," and the amnesty does not apply to us. Another proof of the perfidy of the Bolshevik system.

For the sake of the truth, we want to say in conclusion that we hold the name of Ukrainian political prisoners in deep respect and that we have, generally speaking, gained favor and recognition from political prisoners of other nationalities.

God bless you, dear friends. Do not forget us, and keep in mind your return to Ukraine.

Ukrainian Women  
Political Prisoners in Mordovian Special Camps

Mordovia  
5 October 1955

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# PHYSICAL EXTERMINATION OF THE POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

by Prof. N. N. RUSKIN

(This attempt to give an account of the victims of a Communist Russian experiment is based on the statistical data prepared by Col. F. Houdyma in his Ukrainian publication).

It can be proved by the statistical data for the natural growth of the people in Russia during the years prior to World War I that the present regime of the Soviet Union is responsible for destroying between October, 1917 and January, 1941 some 70 million people by various methods.

This record of the Communist Moscow tyranny is such that even persons who were there and witnessed all the horrors and shared the dreadful fears of the "black crow" (the black prisoner's bus operated by the NKVD), which came at night and took suspected persons to prison, concentration camps, or special places of execution, refuse to believe that the Communist tyrants could have killed so many human beings during their relatively short domination.

We must therefore substantiate our statements with statistical data and historical proof, if we would show that this number of persons liquidated, chiefly between the ages of twenty and fifty, is neither exaggerated nor untrue.

During the early part of the nineteenth century (about every 15 years) a census was taken of the village population, chiefly serfs, the so-called *revizky skazky*. The numbers of the other classes, the nobles, clergy, and the middle class, were recorded in special records kept by the government, the treasury or the police, to determine taxes or military manpower or liability to conscription. This system prevailed until the reforms of Tsar Alexander II in 1861. According to these data, the population of the Russian Empire in 1801, the coronation year of Tsar Alexander I, was 25 million and at the end of the reign of Tsar Nicholas I, it was 50 million. Of course, these figures were not entirely up to date and they may have underestimated the actual population of the country. Yet all methods of computation show that during this period the population of the Russian Empire increased on the average by 2% a year. If we make allowances for deaths by disease, migrations and



other causes, we can reduce this rate to 1.7%. In other words the yearly increase of the population was 17-22 per thousand yearly. In Ukraine the natural increase was still higher and never below 2%. We can say then that the population of Russia doubled in 40 years and that of Ukraine in some 38 years.

The only complete census of the entire Russian Empire in the XIX cent. was taken in 1896. It showed that the population of Russia on January 1, 1897 was almost three million more than had been anticipated on the 2% rate of increase. It was 129,200,000 instead of the expected 126,235,000 with an accuracy of 1:100,000. At that time there were 27 million Ukrainians in the Russian Empire and 4 million in Austria-Hungary (Galicia, Bukovyna and Carpatho-Ukraine) so that the total number of Ukrainians was not less than 31 million.

Thus the population of the Russian Empire had doubled in 36 years, despite wars, epidemics (typhoid and cholera) and sometimes local famines (especially in Central Russia and the Volga area). Later statistics assumed on this basis that the population of the Russian Empire would double in the next 40 years and that in 1936 it would exceed 260 million if the rate of 2% was kept. The Office of Statistics announced on the basis of its calculations that the population would be 190 million on January 1, 1914, the eve of World War I, despite the Russo-Japanese War, and that theoretically on the 2% basis, the population should not have been more than 180 million (See Table I).

The year 1917 was a turning point in the life of the Empire. The tsarist regime of Nicholas II was overthrown and replaced by the Red dictatorship of Lenin. This put an end to the favorable conditions for the natural increase of the population. During the years of persecution and the Red Terror under Lenin and Stalin, the rate of natural increase dropped to zero and the population of Russia did not change for some years. In addition, through the Revolution, Russia lost Finland with 4.5 million population; the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with 5 million; Poland with 12.5 million and Bessarabia with 2 million—a total of 24 million. If we add another 6 million lost throughout the rest of the Empire because of World War I, we can account for a drop of 30 million in 1917, so that the population on Jan. 1, 1918 was only 165 million instead of the anticipated 195 million (Table I).

As a result when the Moscow Bolsheviks seized power in the autumn of 1917, Russia, including Ukraine, the Caucasus, Siberia and Central Asia, had a population of 165 million. The Ukrainians including those in Austria-Hungary and excluding some 2.4 million who perished in the war, numbered on Jan. 1, 1918 44.5 million (Table III).

If conditions had remained in Russia favorable to the natural increase as under Tsar Nicholas II, the population in 1941 would have increased to 260 million (Table I) after deducting the lost territories and with the reannexation of the lands formerly in Poland, the Baltic States, and Bukovyna and Bessarabia (taken from Romania), with a population of 21 million, it would have 281 million (260+21). The total population of Ukrainians would have been on Jan. 1, 1941, more than 70 million (Table III) and by Jan. 1, 1949 they would have increased to somewhat more than 80 million.

Even if we assumed that after 1897, the rate of increase in the Russian Empire had dropped to 1.7%, the figure for 1941 would have been more than 227 million (Table II) and with the territories annexed in the West, it would have been 248 million (227+21).

But under the Soviets and the Red Terror of Lenin and Stalin there came the annual deportation of millions of "enemies of the people" (mostly from Ukraine and the Cossack area) to the concentration camps of the Far North and Siberia and to hard labor, cold and hunger; there was the artificial famine in Ukraine and the continuous shootings and tortures in the underground cells of the many Russian prisons maintained by the CHEKA and the NKVD; there were mass murders like those in Katyn and Vynnytsya in Podolia; there were mass cremations in Lviv, Dubno and other parts of Ukraine because the prisons were overcrowded. As a result the total population of the totalitarian Soviet Empire in 1941 was neither 260 nor 227 million but only 172 million; and if we include the territories annexed in the West, it was only 193 million (172+21).

The changes in the population of Ukraine have been so great that we can hardly view them in their entirety. Physical extermination in some districts and areas has been widespread, there have been fantastically great migrations due to collectivization and industrialization; the replacement of Ukrainians by Russians has been sometimes on such a huge scale that we cannot say with any accuracy how they have changed the ethnographic picture of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. We can, however, assume safely that the changes have been great.

We need only to compare the figures for the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union and those for the Great Russians to see how the political manipulations of the Kremlin has been to the disadvantage of the former. According to the *Voelkerkarte der Sowjetunion* (Berlin 1941) the Great Russians in the Soviet Empire numbered 77,732,000 and the Ukrainians numbered 31,189,000 in 1926. In 1939 the proportions had completely changed. At this period there were 99,019,000 Great Russians and the number of Ukrainians had decreased to 28,070,000. This shows that the

Soviet regime had applied its policy of extermination with special rigor and cruelty to the Ukrainian population. (Franz Pauser, *Die Ukraine*, Wien, 1943, p. 84).

The natural increase of the Ukrainians placed them in the lead in natural increase among the peoples of Europe for its percentage was 2.3%. At the beginning of 1933 the number of Ukrainians reached 32.6 million and this promised to be true for the future. Then came the artificial famine in Ukraine so that in 1939 we find the figure 30.9 million in spite of the extremely high natural increase in Ukraine.

Other sources, both German and Russian, confirm these general figures. We can estimate that there were 31 million Ukrainians in 1926 and 78 million Great Russians or a proportion of 1:2.2. In 1940 S. Sulkevich, a Russian authority, stated that by the Russian census of January 17, 1939, the Ukrainians numbered 28,070,404 (16.56% of the total population) and the Great Russians 99,019,929 (58.41%). This indicates that between 1926 and 1939, despite their superior rate of natural increase the proportion of Ukrainians to Great Russians had dropped from 1:2.2 to 2:7 on account of the continuous physical extermination of the Ukrainian population in the Soviet Union.

When we take these figures into consideration and add the data published in the Berlin edition by a well known German, *Globus- Jahrbuch des deutschen Verlags. — Sowjetunion.* (p. 206). we find that on Jan. 1, 1941 the Soviet Union contained in all 39.5 million Ukrainians including those in the annexed lands and other territories. When we compare this figure of 39.5 million Ukrainians with the 30 million in the Soviet Union on Jan. 1, 1949, we see that during these 8 years (1941-1949) the number of Ukrainians decreased by almost 10 million. This means not only that during these years there was no natural increase at all but that one out of every four Ukrainians had perished in one way or another.

This is not the total loss of Ukrainians. If there had been no World War II and Soviet domination of Ukraine, the Ukrainian population of 39.5 million in 1939 would have increased to more than 46 million (Table IV) in 1949, assuming the natural increase of 2%. Thus World War II and the terroristic domination by the Soviets, reduced the number of Ukrainians to 30 million. Thus the World War and these eight years (1941-1949) cost the Ukrainians some 16 million lives. Of these Hitler's Germany and the Gauleiter Erich Koch destroyed some 5 million and 2 million perished in the military operations. Thus the War and the Germans destroyed 7 million and the Bolsheviki can be credited with the destruction of the other 9 million.

If we combine these various sets of statistics which cover various periods between 1917 and 1949 we find that the Soviet leaders have contributed in one way or another to the terrible destruction of 39 millions of the Ukrainian population in this period of their domination. In other words one out of every two Ukrainians has perished in one way or another.

If we extend our calculations to all the people destroyed in the Soviet Empire for the period from 1917 to 1941, we find that in these 23 years the Bolsheviks have exterminated from 55 to 88 millions of their own population ( $227-172 = 55$ ;  $260-172 = 88$ ) or an average of 70 million people (71.5 million). This is so terrible in a country where the death penalty has been officially abolished that the Western world finds it almost impossible to believe.

These 70 million dead were destroyed for no other reason than that they wished to be free and independent and so they were declared by the Russian tyrants to be the "enemies of the people." It should be a shocking reminder to all the nations outside the Iron Curtain of the fate that awaits them, if they lose their independence and their love of freedom, truth and happiness are extinguished forever.

The assumed annual increase of the population:

TABLE I. Russian Empire 2% basis		TABLE II. Russian Empire 1.7% basis		TABLE III. Ukraine 2% basis	
Year	Population	Year	Population	Year	Population
1850	— 50,000,000	1897	— 129,200,000	1897	— 31,000,000
1860	— 60,920,000	1900	— 135,895,000	1900	— 32,890,000
1870	— 74,160,000	1910	— 160,840,000	1910	— 40,050,000
1880	— 90,320,000	1914	— 172,035,000	1917	— 45,980,000
1890	— 109,960,000	1917	— 180,960,000	1918	— 46,900,000
1897	— 126,235,000	1918	— 184,045,000	loss	— 2,400,000
plus	— 2,965,000	loss	— 30,000,000		
1897	— 129,200,000			1918	— 44,500,000
1900	— 137,080,000	1918	— 154,045,000	1920	— 46,290,000
1910	— 166,700,000	1920	— 159,380,000	1930	— 56,390,000
1914	— 180,400,000	1930	— 188,620,000	1940	— 68,790,000
1917	— 191,420,000	1940	— 223,480,000	1941	— 70,140,000
1918	— 195,250,000	1941	— 227,270,000		
loss	— 30,000,000				
1918	— 165,250,000				
1920	— 171,920,000				
1930	— 209,620,000				
1940	— 255,620,000				
1941	— 260,720,000				

## THE PEACE OF RIGA—THE END OF ANTI-BOLSHEVIK FRONT

By BOHDAN HALAYCHUK

The Peace Treaty of Riga which was signed 35 years ago inspires more than one interesting thought. We are considering it here in only one aspect — as the last of a long series of peace treaties by which Soviet diplomacy gradually liquidated its front with the new states torn away from Russia and which had served the Entente as bases for their anti-Bolshevik intervention. Soviet Russia by making peace on March 18, 1921 in Riga with the last of the new states, Poland, and hiding behind its straight, rigid iron curtain extending from Murmansk to Odessa, moved with its first satellites to “build socialism in one country,” i.e. to the systematic creation of a base for the conquest of the rest of the world. 18 years later independent Poland disappeared from the map of the world and on June 18, 1940 the Soviet banners flew over Riga. The Sovietization of Central Europe, China and part of Korea and Viet Nam was an inevitable result of this series of peace treaties, thanks to which the Bolsheviks successfully stood the desperate years of intervention and blockade by the all-powerful Entente.

The young East European states torn away from Russia concluded peace treaties with the RSFSR in this order:

12.6.1918 in Kiev — Ukraine

2.2.1920 in Tartu — Estonia

7.5.1920 — Georgia

12.7.1920 in Moscow — Lithuania

11.8.1920 in Riga — Latvia

4.10.1920 in Tartu — Finland

18.3.1921 in Riga — Poland.

As we see, the Ukrainian treaty (in fact it was only a preliminary peace treaty, for the final treaty was never signed) was chronologically the first. But it was concluded during World War I in an international situation which changed basically a few months later, with the triumph of the Entente. The Kiev peace treaty, as it were, completed the triangle of which the two other legs were the two treaties signed at Brest. This triangle formed the juridical skeleton for the *Pax Germanica*, the system dominating in Eastern Europe in 1918 and this, despite a few bitter mistakes, kept Soviet Russia in its proper place and succeeded in saving Europe from the Bolshevik menace. The later peace treaties were only

progressive steps in the gradual disintegration of the anti-Bolshevik front which had been created and supported by the Entente. They form a single logically connected whole. As regards content three others largely depend upon the Estonian peace treaty.

When we look seriously at this series of treaties, we see that the first states to make peace treaties with Soviet Russia were those to which the victorious Western Great Powers had refused recognition *de jure* — the three Baltic Republics and one Trans-Caucasian Republic, Georgia. Two new states recognized *de jure*, Finland and Poland, signed later. We involuntarily ask the question whether there is any connection between the refusal of recognition and the conclusion of peace by the new states with Soviet Russia, i.e. with the disintegration of the anti-Bolshevik front. But to understand and evaluate the situation of that time, we must explain why the Western Great Powers refused these four young republics full recognition, *de jure* and limited themselves to provisional recognition *de facto*.

The so-called *Russian Political Conference*, an organ formed by three prominent Russian diplomats, which represented Russian interests in 1919 before the Entente, agreed to the independence of Poland in its ethnic boundaries and wanted the fate of Finland to be decided by a future All-Russian Constituent Assembly and the Finnish Diet. When it was a question of the other non-Russian peoples, the Conference proposed to the Great Powers of the Entente this resolution: "The Great Powers recognize that all questions relative to the territory of the Russian Empire in the boundaries of 1914 (with the exception of ethnic Poland) and questions of the future status of the peoples living within these boundaries cannot be solved without the consent of the Russian people." Taking into account that until the Russian people emerged from chaos and created representative organs which could give or refuse this agreement, the peoples who had declared their independence could exist without a state organization, the Russian Political Conference proposed — in a second version of this resolution — this resolution: "On the other hand, desiring to support these peoples in the organization of their national life and to protect them against dissolution and anarchy, the Great Powers decide to aid them without deciding in advance their final fate, under a provisional regime which corresponds to their present conditions, especially in questions of the economic, financial and military needs of the population concerned." i.e. the Russians agreed to tolerate to some degree the existing condition — yet carefully providing that the existence of the new states should not be recognized and so they used such concepts as "peoples" and "population," concepts hardly practicable in this case.

How did the Great Powers of the Entente react to this request?

During World War I France alone recognized Finland by a note of 4.1.1918. The accrediting to the Ukrainian government of "a commissar of the French Republic" 29.12.1917 must be considered recognition but it is hard to give a definite answer as to whether this was recognition *de jure* or *de facto*.<sup>1</sup> When both young states signed peace treaties with the Central Powers, France broke diplomatic relations with them; it later restored them with Finland but not with Ukraine. Also Great Britain had accredited its representative in Kiev at the same time.

Thus the Entente states followed the line of the Russian desires which the Russian Political Conference had formulated. The American government — in accordance with the statement of Lansing of 15.1.1918 — "did not think of recognizing any independent government until the Russian people shows its final will on this general question." Lansing did not mention in what form this will was to be expressed. His British colleague spoke more clearly. On 18.1.1918 Balfour declared to the Finnish delegation that the British government, allied with Russia — cannot recognize an independent Finland until the future Russian Constituent Assembly makes an agreement on this question. Yet 5 days later he informed a Finnish delegate that the question of the recognition of their state had been postponed to an undefined time, for the Bolsheviks had dispersed the Russian Constituent Assembly. The British representatives accredited to the Ukrainian government did not make any analogous statement; there were no Ukrainian leaders at that time in London.

After the conclusion of World War I the Entente powers took the same attitude toward the new states which had emancipated themselves in the meantime, i.e. the Caucasian states (except Armenia) and the Baltic. Now France took a position along with her allies. The Commission on the Baltic States of the Versailles Peace Conference composed of representatives of the five Great Powers declared on 15.7.1919 the provisional position of the three lands, emphasized that the Allies "cannot now accept any position which would bind them to a final solution before the restoration of a recognized government in Russia." As we see the difference between 1918 and 1919 was in the fact that they formerly spoke of a Constituent Assembly, now about a Russian government that was recognized (naturally — by the Allies).

Finally the Supreme Council of the Allies decided to recognize *de facto* the Baltic governments, without mentioning in it the recognition of the Baltic States. That they did this deliberately and intentionally, we see from the protocols of the Commission on Baltic Questions, which at a session of 4.7.1919, discussed the outline of a resolution which it was

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<sup>1</sup> Arguments for each probability are given in the author's work *El Estado del siglo 20*, Buenos Aires, 1933, pp. 56-63.

to present to the Supreme Council. The British representative, Sir Esme Howard, expressed himself very clearly: The Entente states agreed "to recognize now as independent governments *de facto* the governments of Estonia and Latvia. At the same time the Allied governments once again were bound to express their opinion that it was impossible to come to a final solution without the approval of a recognized Russian government; reserving to themselves the right to work out, either directly or through the mediation of the League of Nations a solution satisfactory to both sides, they can do nothing that would bind them to a final solution until there should be again a recognized Russian government."

Although such a formula, as it might seem, bound no one, it called forth remarks from all the other members of the Commission. It was not satisfactory to the French representative (Kammerer) that his British colleague spoke about a government, when France recognized only an "independent body." The Italian Marquis della Torretta, calling for an exchange of telegrams with the head of the Provisional Russian Government, Admiral Kolchak, supported the French representative who had already spoken, but he insisted on speaking exclusively of a *de facto* government. The Japanese Ochiai laid stress on the recognition of a *de facto* independent body. Still greater reserve was expressed by Major Tyler, the American representative: "The government of the USA — he stated — "would never join in any recognition of the Estonian and Latvian governments and was not thinking of doing so." A long discussion followed, in the course of which it was proposed to call the Baltic Republics "free states" or again "autonomous states united to Russia" or "forming a part of Russia," "autonomous units within Russia" or "annexed to Russia," "under Russian protection," etc. The American scholar Malborne W. Graham,<sup>2</sup> remarks in irony that this "exhibited so completely the Byzantine spirit in logomachy."

After long discussions the Commission on Baltic Questions prepared at its 16th Session (15.7.1919) a final form of the resolution. Carefully avoiding such words as "states" and "independence," the plan speaks only about Baltic "territories" and their governments without explaining whether the governments are *de jure* or *de facto* and gave to the Baltic governments a definite knowledge of the parts of the note of the Supreme Council to Admiral Kolchak that concerned the Baltic lands: "in the meantime Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be treated as autonomous and able to have diplomatic relations with the Allies; without acknowledging the independence of these states, the Entente states could accept representatives of the existing governments in the character of diplomatic or consular officials." In accordance with the plan, the Allies "can do noth-

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<sup>2</sup> *The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States*, Vol. 2, Estonia, pp. 361-2.



ing which would bind them in regard to a final solution until a recognized government is brought back in Russia, but, when that Russian government is again functioning, they intend to protect the 'liberties' of the Baltic governments and in the meantime will help these governments in their defence and the stabilization of order."

On 25.7.1919 the Supreme Council rejected this draft. Without solving the basic question, it called the Baltic republics sometimes states, sometimes territories, provinces, regions. The position of Allied diplomacy which can be deduced from these — very confused — instructions, was best formulated by the Italians: "The Royal Government is ready to recognize the provisional Estonian National Council as an independent organization *de facto*, but cannot give any assurance toward the future independence of the Estonian state." As we see, this position was entirely in harmony with the demands of the Russian Political Conference.

In analyzing this attitude of the Western Great Powers to the young states, Prof. Malborne W. Graham<sup>3</sup> states: there was in it "a compromise between independence and non-independence by according *de facto* recognition to the Baltic governments while denying status as legally constituted states to the nascent republics. Practically, the proposals were designed to involve Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the far-reaching interventionist schemes of the moment, while promising them in return only an illusory status, dependent upon the caprices of Kolchak, the Conference Politique Russe or even the League of Nations. Thus did the British propose to themselves and their allies militarily for purely verbal generosity. Small wonder that the Baltic delegations, so far as they knew of the matter, suspected a plot against their independence."

In this opinion of the impartial and competent American author we find a full evaluation, legal, moral and political, of the East European policy of the Western Great Powers after World War I. He confirms that the recognition *de facto* of the Baltic governments had no validity in international law, that at this price the Allies wanted to buy in the Baltic cannon fodder (a tendency indifferent to a moral point of view) and that they did not succeed in this manoeuvre, i.e. it ended in a political defeat. The juridical evaluation emerges clearly from the quotations made in our article — but it is worth while to note two other points.

It was not only in the Baltic that the Allies showed so little sense of responsibility in their efforts to involve the Eastern nations in the war. We may cite the fact that at the end of 1917 and early in 1918 Gen. Tabouis tried to convince the Ukrainian government not to sign the Brest Peace Treaty but to continue the war against the Central Powers, al-

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<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.* 3. Latvia, pp. 430-1.

though this war would have been an obvious absurdity, when we take into account the relative strength of the forces after Russia had made a separate peace. In the summer of 1918 the British General Dunsterville involved the Armenians living in the city of Baku in a war against the Turkish and Azerbaijanian armies and at a critical moment sailed off with his small expeditionary force and left the Armenian minority to bloody reprisals by the Mahommedans.

The Baltic statesmen — like the then Ukrainian government — showed more sense than the Armenians and so the Entente policy did not meet with success.

However the Allied conception (which can be called non-pre-determination) was unrealistic; a state by its nature is a lasting creation and it cannot exist as a temporary body. That a "postponement" (of the recognition of independence) is harmful for internal construction, hostile to the strengthening of these states and for their external defence — was asserted by the heads of the delegations of the interested states (Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and Georgia, in a note handed to the President of the Peace Conference 19.4.1919. This argument was developed in a note of the Latvian Government of 24.3.1919. In analyzing it, we find in it these points:

1. The postponement to an indefinite moment of the decision of the fate of the young states is leading them to anarchy, for: a) The Latvian armies will not fight to be returned to Russian rule; b) The Latvian Government will lose prestige in the country; c) The most necessary reforms cannot be introduced but they are necessary to remove those causes of anarchy which the young Republic had inherited from Russia.

2. The continuation of anarchy is ruining the country definitely so that later it will be impossible to restore order and normal conditions of life.

The Allied conception was unacceptable to the new states. Also the Entente states did not know how to protect them from the Russian anti-Bolshevik armies and could not assure the young states their present "independence before the decision." The head of the Russian government recognized by the Allies, Admiral Kolchak, refused any obligations in this connection. General Denikin, the leader of the armed forces of the "South of Russia," armed and equipped by England, enslaved the northern Caucasus, attacked Georgia, and gave a dangerous blow to the right wing of the Ukrainian army during its successful anti-Bolshevik offensive. Gen. Yudenich, leader of the Russian Northwestern Army which had its base of operations in Estonia and enjoyed the aid of the Estonian army in an offensive against Petrograd, appointed in October 1919 a Russian Governor General of Estonia!

Taking all this into account, we cannot be surprised that the Estonian government left the anti-Bolshevik front supported by the Supreme Council and sought peace with Soviet Russia. The latter proposed, 31.8.1919 what the West had refused: full and definite recognition of Estonian independence. In September, 1919 when the strong offensive of Denikin against Moscow was reaching its culmination Russian-Estonian conversations began the break. The young but dynamic Bolshevik diplomacy found a way to broaden this first breach in the enemy front. On 11.9.1919 it turned to the other new states with a proposition similar to that to Estonia and found a response. One after the other the young states turned away from the Western Great Powers who were fossilized in their antiquated Russophilism and concluded peace treaties with Soviet Russia which recognized their independence *de jure*.

"If all these young states had moved against us — and they obtained hundreds of millions of dollars, the best weapons, the finest arms and trained British instructors in the art of war — if they had moved against us, without doubt we would have been doomed to defeat. That is clear to every one. But they did not move against us, for they knew that the Bolsheviks had good intentions. We have information on that point not from Latvian or Polish Communists but from the bourgeoisie of Poland, Latvia, Ukraine and elsewhere."

These were the words of Lenin and they are right.<sup>4</sup> The Western Great Powers made a great mistake by resting upon the cause of Russian indivisibility. But despite Lenin's statement, the new states had no illusion as to Bolshevik loyalty. On the basis of the example of Ukraine (the first aggression after the recognition in the note of 17.12.1917, the second after the preliminary peace treaty of 12.6.1918) and of Finland (the aggression after the recognition of 18.12.1917) they already knew the value of Bolshevik international obligations. But they had no other course. The decision was forced upon them not by the good will of the Bolsheviks but the ill will and the failures of Western diplomacy.

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<sup>4</sup> *Works* Vol. XXV, on the *History of Diplomacy of Potemkin*, Vol. 3, p. 81.

## UNMARRIED MOTHERS—A SPECIAL PHENOMENON OF SOVIET LIFE

*By MYKHAYLO PAVLYUK*

Before the Communists seized power in Russia, they carried on an extensive propaganda as to the necessity for freeing women from the hardships of rearing children and of domestic housekeeping and also from their material dependence upon their husbands. Along with this they intensified their propaganda for the weakening of family ties in general and they promised to place at the foundation of a socialist society not a compact family but the free cohabitation of a man and woman — free love. When they came into power the Communists did not even try to realize many of these propagandistic ideas but by their law for the free dissolution of a marriage merely by the declaration of one party, it was easy for a woman or man to throw off the marital obligations, if there were no children. With children the question was not so simple. To protect the interests of the mother, a law was passed calling for the payment of support by the man to the mother for care for the children until the age of 18 by the decision of a special court; the payment was not to be more than one half of the husband's income.

This law on support also protected the interests of the mother who had a child born out of wedlock. The judges were always women and the decisions of the court were almost always in the woman's favor. So the law on support was an important factor in checking divorces of families with children. The law gave actually complete protection for the woman but at the same time it was an important factor in reducing the number of births both in and out of wedlock, for, if a wife was aiming to keep her husband, she only needed to have one child by him. On the other hand the having of 3-4 children placed the woman after divorce in a difficult position for she could receive only half of his income, even if she had 3-4 children. As a result many men under the pressure of the law were not inclined to have any children and they were still more averse to large families.

We can say that married families with children were not so frequently divorced. On the other hand, young marriages, where the husband and wife did not desire to have children, were usually of short duration. Also, by taking advantage of the law on support, some women occupied themselves with catching men with large incomes and lived

on these payments. This condition continued a long while. Soviet propaganda boasted of the accomplishments of its legislation for regulating family relationships.

In the 30's the Soviets introduced a charge for divorce amounting to 300 rubles, so as to reduce their number. They also began a propaganda campaign against divorce and especial pressure was applied to members of the Communist Party, who were supposed to be a model in this connection. There was then noticeable in the Kremlin a tendency to strengthen the existing families but the law on support was not changed.

The censuses of 1937 and 1939 were disappointing to the Kremlin. They showed that the population of the USSR was not growing but diminishing and that they could not count upon the good will of the population to increase the number of births, even if this would raise the material security of the masses. The planned figures as to the increase of the population by the methods of the Derzhplan, on which the Soviets had based their estimate of the population during the period from 1926 to 1937, had led to the self-deception of the governing organs of the USSR. The catastrophic lack of population as compared with its planned estimate as shown by the censuses of 1937 and 1939 compelled the Kremlin to adopt more concrete methods for planning the birth of children and making cardinal changes in the legislation governing family relationships. The war with Germany served to hasten the introduction of more concrete methods for planning an increase in births and for an appropriate change of legislation.

The first law of this character was issued in 1941, when it might seem that the Kremlin had other difficulties. Obviously this law had been previously prepared and the war only hastened its adoption. Unfortunately we do not have the text of this law of 1941, but we can judge its basic provisions by the law of July 8, 1944 which was issued as a development and supplement to the law of 1941 and is basically still in force. The most important provisions of this law of July 8, 1944 "to strengthen the principles of the family," were: to give state aid to mothers who have two children on the birth of a third . . .

	Single Payment	Monthly
Third	400 rub.	—
Fourth	1700 "	120 rub.
Sixth	2500 "	200 "
Eighth	3500 "	250 "
Tenth	5000 "	300 "

To unmarried mothers on the birth of the first child 100 rubles; of a second 150 rubles; of a third and more 200 rubles.

Par. 16. To provide that men between the ages of 20 and 50 and women between 20 and 45, who have no children, pay a tax in the following amounts: a) Citizens who pay an income tax, 6% of their income; b) Members of kolhosps, private proprietors and other citizens who pay the agricultural tax, 150 rubles a year; c) Other city dwellers, 90 rubles a year.

Par. 19. To decree that only registered marriages give to husband and wife the rights and obligations contained in the code of laws on marriage, family and guardianship.

Par. 20. To annul the existing right of the mother to appeal to the court to establish paternity and to receive support for a child born from a person with whom she is not in registered marriage.

Par. 23. To provide that divorce is secured through a court.

Par. 24. In the delivery of certificates of divorce the payment from one or both partners is established by order of the court as from 500 to 2000 rubles.<sup>1</sup> In 1947 a special decree cut the one time grants on the birth of the third and later children by one half of the amount scheduled in the law of 1944.

The first impression of the law of 1944 is that the Soviets are giving large one time premiums, trying to stop the large number of divorces and laying a tax on the childless. It is also that the law has a character that approaches it to the similar legislation of the democratic countries. But a deeper analysis of it with a knowledge of Soviet reality shows without any difficulty its real essence, which is very unlike the similar legislation in other countries.

We will treat especially that part of the law, which deals with unmarried mothers. This term is used, as we have seen, in the law. This term does not include women who have lost their husbands either from death or divorce, widows or those divorced with children. In the exact sense of the law the term refers only to women who have one or more children out of wedlock. We might think that the Soviets did not forget these unfortunate women and gave them by law a monthly payment from the state as was indicated in paragraph 3 of the law of July 8, 1944. But when we take into consideration paragraph 16 of the law which provides for the taxation of all women from 20 to 45 and including all the unmarried, it becomes clear that the Soviets want by financial and fiscal pressure to compel the unmarried women to have at least one child out of wedlock. How all-embracing and strong this financial pressure is can be seen from paragraph 16, section 3, where it is briefly said: "The rest of the citizens pay a tax of 90 rubles a year." To see the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. S. N. Prokopovich, *People's Economy of the USSR*, New York, Chekhov Publishing Co., 1952, Vol. I pp. 90, 91, 92.

great importance of this minor point of paragraph 16 we must remember that:

1. The income tax in the Soviets is paid by persons who have an income of more than 150 rubles a month.<sup>2</sup> This tax is paid almost exclusively by workers and officials.

2. The agricultural tax is paid by the head of the family of a member of a kolhosp or a private proprietor.

Thus paragraph 16, section 3 applies to these persons:

1. Wives of workers or officials, if they do not have two children and do not work.

2. The daughters of a worker or official if they do not have a child in or out of wedlock and do not work.

3. Wives or daughters of a member of a kolhosp, if they have no children, for the agricultural tax as we have seen is paid by the head of the family.

4. The wife or daughter of a private proprietor, if she has no children, for the agricultural tax is paid by the head of the family of the private proprietor.

In summing up, we can say that this section of the law has the object of burdening exclusively with financial pressure the least materially secure persons without work, supporting fathers or husbands and it applies especially to women, for as a rule, the women earn less than men. It is also a sign that the measure does not serve a financial purpose but is intended to compel the birth of children in or out of wedlock. This is shown by the exact terminology used in defining the persons to whom it applies.

Passing to the amount of the tax, we must notice the following. There is no doubt that before the currency reform of 1947 the amounts of the tax on the childless and those with few children together with the possession by the people of an important amount of depreciated Soviet currency made the tax no noticeable burden for those subject to it. Thus a kolhosp woman, by selling at the bazaar at free prices a kilo of grain for 100 rubles, could pay the whole yearly tax with that one kilo. There are also reasons to think that the Kremlin, in view of the war and post-war time, allowed not a little delay in paying this tax. That is the only way that we can explain its small yield in the budgetary receipts, i.e.<sup>3</sup>

Years	41	42	43	44	45	Total
Budgetary yield in millions	0.1	1.1	1.3	2.2	3.4	8.1

<sup>2</sup> Cf. V. I. Aleksandrov, *The Income Tax on the Population*, Gosfinizdat, 1946, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S. N. Prokopovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 90,91,92.

After 1945 the Soviets ceased to give details in the budget on the yield from this tax on the childless and those with few children. Obviously the yield from the tax had grown so much that the Soviets did not consider it advantageous to inform the Free World of it. The devaluation of the Soviet ruble in 1947 which took from the population 9/10 of the money in their possession, increased the weight of the tax on the childless and those with few children more than 10 times. The financial reform of 1950 and the lowering of the prices of the state stores which took place before and after it, increased the pressure of the tax still more. We can thus assume that after 1947, i.e. 6 years after the promulgation of this law in its first reduction, the tax pressure acquired new force and still has it. Now this fiscal pressure on the childless and those with few children is a very serious and keenly felt burden on the payer and especially on the materially most insecure men and women. This can be easily seen when we remember that for persons who receive less than 1000 rubles a month this tax is larger than the income tax. The income tax is only 5.2% of the salary while the tax on the childless and those with few children, as we have seen, is 6%. Also the income tax in the Soviets is progressive but the tax on the childless and those with few children is the same for all. Thus an official who receives 4,000 rubles a month pays the same tax of 6% as the worker who receives 300 rubles a month. This shows that the Kremlin has established for the higher strata of the Soviet bureaucracy a tax that is much less felt than it is by the materially insecure workers, villagers and lower officials. It also shows again that the tax on the childless and those with few children does not have a financial purpose.

From the text of the law of July 8, 1944 and our preceding remarks, we can see that the object of this law with its financial pressure and premiums is:

1. To compel all men from 20 to 50 to marry, if they are not married already.
2. To compel married couples to have not less than 2-3 children.
3. To reduce divorces to a minimum. Paragraphs 23-24 of the law show that it is at present much harder to obtain a divorce from a registered marriage than in other countries of the West.
4. Also to compel by financial pressure and premiums women between 20 and 45, who have no husband, to have at least one child out of wedlock. i.e. financial pressure, premiums, and usually propaganda are developing a mass phenomenon in the Soviet social life, called in their terminology Unmarried Mothers.
5. There is now in the USSR the normal married family with divorce almost impossible and also the family of an unmarried mother, as can be seen from our further consideration of the number of such cases.



Usually there is in every society a small number of women who have a child out of wedlock. No state or society encourages it but tries to reduce its occurrence. To have an idea of the number of women between 20 and 45 who under the Soviet plan have to produce a child out of wedlock, we must consider the number of the women who cannot find men to marry.

The censuses of the population of Russia and the USSR give this ratio of the numerical superiority of women over men:

Census	1897	1926	1939
Men	1000	1000	1000
Women	1011	1070	1087

The figures of these censuses show the definite numerical preponderance of women over men as a result of the losses of World War I, the Civil War, the mass emigration primarily of men, the mass shootings also primarily of men, and the death in prisons of a larger number of men than of women. Also the mortality from the famines of 1921 and 1932-3 were greater for men than for women.<sup>4</sup>

The figures of the Soviet census of 1939 which show a preponderance of 87 women were rather reduced than magnified by the Soviets. Yet it shows that in 1939 each tenth or eleventh woman could not marry, for there were no men available for her. According to our calculations these women must have numbered 6-7 million.

World War II inflicted on the Soviets colossal losses, especially of men between 17 and 50 years of age. To have an idea of the extent of these losses we give the estimates of the irreplaceable losses to the soldiers and the civil population, without taking account of the decrease in births, as estimated by students of this problem in millions:

V. Pavlovich,	S. Timashov,	V. P. Marchenko,	A. Zaytsov
32.5 <sup>5</sup>	26.6 <sup>6</sup>	14.8 <sup>7</sup>	11.6 <sup>8</sup>

As we have seen, the number of irreplaceable losses among the soldiers of the Red Army and the civilian population were around 11.6

<sup>4</sup> A sufficient proof of this are the secret Soviet documents listing the famine deaths in 1932-3 in the Chernusky region of the Poltava district. According to these 2163 men died and 1401 women. Observations show that these proportions can be accepted for all localities where there was a famine mortality. *Ukrainian Collection*, Inst. for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, Munich, 1955. Book 2, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, New York, 26. 6. 1952.

<sup>6</sup> Timasheff, "The Post-war Population of the Soviet Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LIV, 1948-9, p. 148.

<sup>7</sup> *Journal of the Institute for the study of the history and culture of the USSR*, Munich, 1955 L/14, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> Prof. A. A. Zaytsov, *The Dynamics of the Population of the USSR for 1952*.

millions. So in 1947 the number of women who could not find men to marry can be reckoned as 16-17 million as a minimum for we must not forget that after the war the Communists imprisoned an important number of men as traitors. This all shows that at that period each sixth or seventh woman between 20 and 45 could not marry because of the lack of men and bear a child in wedlock. Of course this number included a certain number of widows with children to whom the law of 1944 did not apply, but more than 10 million women who according to the plan of the Kremlin were left to increase the number of the unmarried mothers by bearing a child out of wedlock.

Undoubtedly the fiscal pressure reduced to a minimum the number of unmarried men between 20 and 50; so we must assume that between 1947 and 1955 these 10-12 million women had no chance to marry and have a child in wedlock. Usually these unfortunate women tried in every way not to be bound by a child out of wedlock, and especially the younger ones between 22 and 25, but it is also clear that the Soviets have succeeded in the last 7-8 years in increasing the number of unmarried mothers by 5-6 million, especially from the poorest classes of the population. This has been done by strong fiscal pressure as well as by intensive propaganda.

As we have seen, the law of 1944 compels men to marry and have not less than 2 children but at the same time the law encourages the men in their desires to have a considerable number of children out of wedlock without any moral responsibility and further financial charges for the support of these children, since now the state pays for these men the support of the children through premiums to unmarried mothers.

It is almost 40 years since the Communists promised the women to free them from domestic troubles, enslavement in the married family and even the troubles of raising children. Many Soviet citizens have even forgotten these promises of the Communists, for Soviet propaganda does not mention them. The Soviet slogan "Make way for the woman" which the Communists constantly repeat, has in practice brought the Soviet woman to unendurable work in the coal mines and in heavy metallurgy and left them all their domestic troubles while they are living as beggars in a married family with the trial of raising children while it is impossible to secure a divorce from a registered marriage. It is a hard fate. But still harder is the fate of an unfortunate woman who cannot find a man to marry. She must work hard, live in a dormitory and rear her child born out of wedlock until it reaches the age of 12, when the child is taken from her and put in a trade school. That is the lot of every sixth or seventh Soviet woman.

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## THE FLOATING PRISON

by MYKHAYLO MLAKOWY AND OLENA ZWYCHAYNA

(Excerpt from the unprinted story "In the Golden Shackles of Kolyma")

Do you know what a "floating prison" is? Have you ever seen one? If not, then . . . leave your daily tasks for a few moments and come with me! I will lead you over the paths of my memory far, far away . . . there where the "floating prison" is a common sight, there where the political prisoner is the cheapest article in the world . . .

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On a hot summer's day, awkwardly tossing on the waves of the Sea of Japan, the Soviet cargo ship *Dalstroy* was sailing north from Vladivostok. Like the dishevelled gray hair of a witch, smoke curled from its smokestack and the ship moved with the steady tempo of a sure tread upon the bed of the sea . . . Everything seemed normal as on other ships . . . But beware of this superficial serenity of the *Dalstroy*! Come with me into its hold! I know it well! I was there! I will show you the interior of this fish! . . .

Soviet cargo ships in the Far East are specially fitted out for the transportation of prisoners. The hold of the ship *Dalstroy* is a good pattern of this mode of transportation. It had several rows of many-tiered plank bunks which resembled huge bookcases with many narrow shelves. The space between the tiers was so small that a person could only lie down in it. The aisles between the rows were not more than a yard wide.

Upon orders from the NKVD, the *Dalstroy* was to swallow up eight thousand prisoners, and although the bookcases could not accommodate even half that number, the belly of the *Dalstroy* continued to take them in. No matter how closely the prisoners pressed one against the other, the crowding went right on. Those less fortunate in grabbing places on the plank bunks had to find lodging in the aisles and under the bunks. The lot of the latter was the worst. They were shoved around, trampled in the darkness and had no rest day or night.

The doors of the hold were kept locked and though we were "travellers" on the sea, we never saw it. Through small grated openings in the deck, we saw only patches of sky and this stubbornly showered down upon us the hot rays of the sun and these raised the temperature

of the stifling air of our "quarters." We lay crowded, side by side, naked or half-naked, and we suffered from the heat and the foul odor of perspiration.

We had already become acquainted with the pangs of thirst, while we were being transported in stifling freight cars with 50 persons in each. But we felt the need of water still more here on the water. During the hot, sunny days we needed more and more of it. Not having the strength to stand the high temperature of the air, the inmates of the higher shelves crawled to the bottom, seeking for relief. There they stood in throngs in the aisles, dressed only in their underwear or entirely naked, pressing their hot and sweaty bodies against one another. All around hung the thick, unbearable odor of human perspiration. The open barrels for the human excreta added their contribution to the stifling atmosphere and they sent out their specific sharp odor which caused nausea and gagging. These barrels had to be left open, because the throngs of prisoners never vanished from around them! And there were eight thousand of us! Under these conditions, even the Sahara Desert seemed like a pleasant dream!

Our tortures from thirst were enhanced in no small measure by a meal of raw, salty, red fish, which we received daily along with 100 grams of dry bread and several tablespoons of balanda (a thin soup given to the prisoners). Once a day, we received a small portion of stale water.

To get our food and drink, naturally in a bucket or bowl, we were divided into groups of thirty. With what anxious, sharp eyes we followed the prisoner who carried the water, so that he (God forbid!) would not have a chance to drink some, while he was carrying it. The monitor of the group portioned out the water, a small cupful to each of us. If after he had served it around, some water was left, the monitor very carefully measured one tablespoon for each man's dish and he repeated this operation as many times as was necessary, until the balance was used up. The monitor performed his task diligently and conscientiously, for he fully realized his responsibility for the task delegated to him and he saw the twenty nine pairs of eyes follow fixedly his every move and the other prisoners.

With what greed in his eyes each man looked at this daily, pitiful dose of the most treasured drink in the world! With what eagerness and trembling, each sipped his portion and, if he had the endurance, saved some for his own use later in the day! But it was not easy to keep this most precious nectar; the plates were not adapted for storing water and not all had plates, not by any means! In addition the saver had to have unusual ingenuity. He had to hide the water in such a way that

it would not be noticed, because if the owner of the "reserve" left it for even a few moments one of his neighbors would quickly drink up the treasure. Ordinarily the prisoner hid the dish somewhere in his bed. The place was so crowded that the dish was often overturned in its hiding place. The precious nectar was spilled and refreshed the heated bodies of the occupants of a lower tier, while the owner of the lost water could only lick his parched lips in despair.

Through the grated openings in the deck of our floating prison, we gazed at the sky, for it was only from there that we could hope for relief and justice. With our eyes we searched for clouds, the forerunners of rain. Somehow we believed that the NKVD guards would be unable to stop some drops of rain falling through the deck and the grated openings to us in the hold below. Then . . . ah, then we would set out our plates and mugs to gather these drops and — drink! . . . Yes, we would be able to drink fresh cold water. At the mere thought of this we lost our equilibrium and then the pangs of thirst still more sharply swept over us. The hot and dry feeling went from the mouth to the throat and the esophagus. Oh, the pangs of thirst! Whoever has once felt them, knows how much worse they are than the pangs of hunger!

But the sky did not relent! Bright, limpid blue, indifferent to our sufferings, it sent us only the hot rays of the burning sun.

So day followed day. Some of us were already seriously ill. They lay motionless on and under the plank bunks and moaned in a low voice. Some died in our midst!

On the seventh or eighth day, when it seemed as if our sufferings would never end, dark, threatening clouds appeared unexpectedly in the sky. We had not yet come back completely to our senses, when a few drops of rain hit the deck. Oh, joy! To us this was the most beautiful symphony in the world, a symphony that brought relief and stirred our parched bodies and souls to their depths. It promised us life itself!

All the inmates of the huge bookcases became excited. They stirred and muttered like a hive of disturbed bees, — except those who were already dying and those too seriously ill. All staggered to their feet and with plates, mugs, even spoons in their hands, they surged toward the grated openings, toward cracks and holes in the deck.

Here it was — our long awaited nectar! It washed off the deck and then began to run down to us in small, dark streamlets. Thousands of hands were raised toward it. They held plates, mugs, spoons. Others bent their hands to serve as impromptu cups. Around every crack, around every opening in the deck were clustered people with raised and trembling hands. Each crevice was an individual spring through which the heavens sent us relief, sent us good fortune!

I will never forget those moments of immeasurable joy! . . . My mug was full of water and I gulped it down quickly, eagerly; I swallowed the dirty water. I felt it rinse my parched and thirsty throat; it flowed in a cooling stream down my parched esophagus and filled my exhausted body with tender delight. The second mug I drank more slowly, unhurried and I held the water in my mouth and swallowed it with pleasure. While taking my pleasure in my portion of water, I got another cup for a sick neighbor, for he had no strength to get one for himself.

Everywhere, at every crevice was a crowd of naked and half-naked men. They quarreled, jostled one another and even fought in their efforts to swallow even one more spoonful of this dirty rain water. Oh, woe to us! for we knew that the rain would stop and then we would have again that horrible lack of water.

All too soon the heavens took away our pleasure. Our disturbed bee-hive grew still for we were frightened by a new danger. An epidemic of diseases of the stomach broke out; people died in horrible tortures from a bloody diarrhea. The prisoners perished under the plank bunks, in the aisles, because once a man became ill, he no longer had the strength to crawl to his place on the eighth or ninth tier. The upper tiers were soon emptied, but this made it only more difficult to move through the aisles. It was difficult to keep from stepping upon either a corpse or a near corpse. The upper tiers emptied; the groups of thirty shrank. I recall that our group of thirty dropped down to nineteen!

Soon it became hard to know who on the floor was a corpse and who was in his last agonies. We were not interested. For us, who were still alive, it was hard to crawl down from our plank bunks and we tried to get from bunk to bunk — like monkeys. It was stifling hot, the dead bodies quickly rotted and added their nauseating odor to the general stink and filth. They spoke in a horrible wordless language to the hearts and consciences of those who were still alive. We knocked on the locked doors, we pleaded, begged the men of the NKVD to take away the dead — but all our begging was in vain.

Finally one NKVD man, angry at our pleading, snarled at us: “You fools don’t understand! What sort of an accounting could we give if we threw out the corpses? Have ourselves arrested because of them?”

We understood. The guards had to deliver at our destination the same number of prisoners that they had received in Vladivostok, dead or alive. Even the dead were not released from the floating prison but they were transported to penal servitude by the orders of the NKVD. We stopped knocking.

A few more days passed and a curious thing happened: we who were alive and not ill, finally ceased to pay attention to the corpses. We ceased to worry about them. We became indifferent to everything. We were in a sort of semi-savage state, on the brink of complete insanity, with our human emotions stunned . . .

We were in this condition when on the sixteenth day of our sea journey we received the order: "Come out!"

We, the living, summoned up the rest of our strength, we hurriedly dressed, gathered up our possessions and ran headlong toward the entrance — to the deck.

"The port of Nohayevo" — we heard on every side.

The fresh air intoxicated our senses. The ship *Dalstroy* rhythmically lessened its speed and slowly approached the steep shore of the unknown land — Kolyma! . .

The Floating Prison had landed!

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# QUARTERLY CHRONICLE OF UKRAINIAN LIFE

## I. IN UKRAINE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

### UKRAINIAN DISTURBANCES IN KIEV AND CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

The London *Times* on June 3 reported on demonstrations in Kiev by students and workmen on the anniversary of the death of Symon Petlyura on May 25. The demonstrations had a character opposed to Moscow and for independence.

Now the *Path of Victory*, the organ of the Ukrainian nationalists which is published in Munich and has contacts with the Ukrainian underground, prints some further details on the disturbances. They took place in April at the same time when the American press reported the derailment of a Soviet military train near Shepetivka east of Kiev. Then battles flared up between the Ukrainian insurgents and the regular army. At the news three regiments of the Red Army in Kiev revolted. In the battle between the rebel and loyal units about 600 red officers perished. The remains of the defeated troops escaped into the forests and joined the Ukrainian insurgents. In Carpathian Ukraine there has been since spring a state of military siege. In Uzhorod there are tanks around the station and all aspects of life are under military control.

### NEW REPORTS ON VORKUTA

The *Path of Victory*, a weekly appearing in Munich, had an interview with Victor L., a journalist of Swiss birth, who had been in the concentration camp of Vorkuta along with German prisoners. There he met the Ukrainian prisoners who formed about 70% of the camp. The Ukrainians had a specially trained organization which successfully liquidated informers.

In the years 1950-1951 many Kievan students were brought to Vorkuta because they tried to form a "socialist" party. When they reached the camp, the Ukrainians tested them for a long time and later took them into their group.

There were at that time 32 Ukrainian Catholic priests, all monks from Lviv itself. The Ukrainian prisoners were 99% political and only 1% were criminals; of the Russians about 1% were political prisoners and 99% criminals.

### BISHOP MYKOLA CHARNETSKY STILL IN EXILE

The report that Bishop Mykola Charnetsky who was arrested in Lviv in 1945 with the entire episcopate of the Ukrainian Catholic Church had been released was incorrect. Bishop Mykola Charnetsky is still in exile in the Mordvin Autonomous Republic.

In the well known concentration camps in Karaganda there are also imprisoned the following Ukrainian Catholic priests: Fathers Sulyatytsky, Zoretsky, Verhun, Babynuk and Bukovytsky.



**BISHOP IVAN LATYSHEVSKY IN STANYSLAVIV**

Word has reached America that the Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Stanyslaviv, Ivan Latyshevsky, who was arrested with the entire Ukrainian Catholic episcopate in 1945, had returned sick to Stanyslaviv and is living there privately. The Ukrainian Catholics of Stanyslaviv are waiting until the Soviet government orders to remove of the episcopal palace and see the renegade Bishop Pelvetzky installed by the Soviets and restores it to the legal bishop, Ivan Latyshevsky. His bishop in ordinary Hryhori Khomyshyn died in prison in 1946.

**A THIRD UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOP HAS DIED IN A SOVIET PRISON**

The French priest, Father Jean Nicola of the Order of the Assumptionist Fathers, who recently returned from exile in Siberia, has confirmed the news of the death of Bishop Hryhori Lakota, Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Pere-myshl. He died in a concentration camp near Vorkuta in the beginning of 1953. This report has been confirmed also by an Italian priest, Father Leoni, a Jesuit who has also returned from exile in Siberia. Thus of the 10 bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western and Carpathian Ukraine which was liquidated by the Communist government, one third have died in Soviet prisons; one was crushed by a Soviet tank in Carpathian Ukraine and six were imprisoned: four in the USSR and two in Czechoslovakia.

**THE VICE PRESIDENT OF INDIA IN KIEV**

Almost directly after visit of Marshal Tito (June 25), the Vice-President of India Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan visited Kiev. The guest examined the historical monuments of Kiev. At a banquet give by the Premier of Ukraine Korotchenko, the Indian guest said: "We must say that the great civilizations have always taken their rise along great rivers: the Ganges, Yangtse, Nile and Dnieper. The achievements of your people have been great." Then he added incautiously: "We also had to renew the independence of our country and liquidate the injury caused to our cities and villages by the colonizers." If he had been not an Indian guest but a Ukrainian, he might have been charged with "bourgeois nationalism."

**THE SHAH OF IRAN AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN KIEV**

On the same day, July 6, there arrived in Kiev the Shah of Iran with his wife and the General Secretary of the United Nations. The agency TASS reports as follows on the stay of the General Secretary in Kiev. "The General Secretary of the Organization of the United Nations Dag Hammerskjold visited the capital of Ukraine from Moscow at the invitation of the government of the Ukrainian SSR." Hammerskjold was met by the members of the Moscow regency in Kiev headed by L. Palamarchuk in the role of "Minister of Foreign Affairs" and also the members of "the delegation of the UkSSR to the 10th session of the UN, I. A. Tolkukhov and V. I. Sapozhnikov." During the visit with Senin there was a "conversation which turned into a friendly chat." Questions were discussed as to the state form of the UkSSR and the economic and cultural construction in the republic.

## THE BUILDING OF STRATEGIC ROADS IN UKRAINE

In connection with the tension in the Near East the news is not without interest that at the present time there is being built a network of roads aggregating 2400 km. The roads being built connect Moscow and Kiev, Kiev and Odessa and Dnipropetrovske, Kharkiv and Kupyanske, Chernihiv and Novhorod Siversky. The paved road joining the Black Sea cities of Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson and Beryslav is being completed.

## THE MOVEMENT TO THE COAL MINES OF THE DONBAS

The Ukrainian Comsomol journal, *The Youth of Ukraine*, reports that 25,000 young men and women of Ukraine have been mobilized and sent to the Donbas so as to check the decline in production of coal in the Donbas in Ukraine.

THE OPPOSITION OF LENIN TO THE RUSSIFICATION OF UKRAINE  
IS CITED

In connection with the new policy of the USSR in de-Stalinizing the whole of life, there has been published in Moscow a work *Lenin on Culture and Art*. In commenting on the appearance of this work I. Turbay in *Soviet Ukraine* cites the view of Lenin on the de-russification of Ukraine: "In view of the fact that Ukrainian culture (the language, schools etc.) for centuries has been stifled by Russian tsarism and the exploiting classes, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party establishes the obligation for all members of the Party to support by every means the removal of all barriers to the free development of Ukrainian culture. The members of the RKP on the territory of Ukraine must in fact support the right of the toiling masses to learn and speak in all institutions their native language, working in every way against the efforts of the Russifiers to place the Ukrainian language in a second class position... Steps must be taken quickly to bring it about that in all Soviet institutions, all the officials will be able to speak the Ukrainian language." This was in theory for in reality the Russian language supported by the Central Committee of the Party still is flooding Ukraine.

## THE POOR CONDITION OF THE SCHOOLS IN UKRAINE

The journal *Soviet Ukraine* on May 23, 1956, reported on the great deficiencies in the educational construction in Ukraine. The plans for school building had not been even 20% carried out; in the district of Zhytomyr instead of 240 buildings, only 29 had been constructed; in the district of Suma only 52 instead of 306; in the district of Vinnytsya only 36 instead of 316. It appears that the plan was not fulfilled because of the lack of cement, again of wood or some other lack, even at the time when the Soviet government was furnishing shiploads of cement to Burma more than was needed and which would harden there in the monsoon rains.

## THE COMPOSERS OF UKRAINE HONOR IVAN FRANKO

*Soviet Ukraine* reports that the music for the film *Ivan Franko* which is now being shot has been written by the composer Mykola Kolessa. V. Kozak is writing the music for the drama of Ivan Franko, *The Teacher*. Kos-Anatolsky is working on the creation of a ballet for the story of Ivan Franko, *The Jay's Nest*.

SHAKESPEARE'S *HAMLET* ON THE UKRAINIAN STAGE

The Ukrainian State Academic Theatre in Kharkiv has produced Shakespeare's drama *Hamlet*. This is the first performance of this play on the Ukrainian stage. In mentioning the artists of this performance, *Soviet Ukraine* has omitted the name of the translator Yuri Klen, a Ukrainian writer who was repressed by the Bolsheviks and died in exile in the West.

## THE UNIONS IN SOVIET UKRAINE CALL FOR MORE WORK

There was held on July 27 in Kiev the Second Plenum of the Soviet of Unions of the Ukrainian Republic. The assembly adopted a resolution to appeal to the local unions to endeavor constantly to increase production and to make special efforts to raise production as high as possible.

## THE BOLSHEVIK PRESS IN UKRAINE

The Soviet press reports that there are now being issued under the Soviets in Ukraine 1,090 newspapers with editions of 6,000,000 copies. There are 74 journals with an edition of 1,300,000. In comparison there are in the whole USSR 7,246 newspapers with an edition of 48,700,000. Yet we must note that the press being issued in Ukraine is not entirely in the Ukrainian language. The catalogues which reach the USA show that all the important journals of the exact sciences appear in the Russian language, while in the Ukrainian language there is printed only the cheap agitational press.

EXAMINATIONS ON THE STALIN PERIOD HAVE BEEN CANCELLED  
IN UKRAINE

*Soviet Ukraine* (No. 103, 1956) reports that according to instructions issued by the Soviet Ministry of Education, examinations on the history of the USSR are to be abolished for the time being. The Ministry states that this measure has proved necessary since the history of the USSR is being rewritten.

## "BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM" AGAIN

Ukrainian writers are being accused of having conceived "dangerous" conceptions of Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism." The newspaper *Literary Journal* (No. 14, 1956) declares that they are accused of disseminating the nationalist theory of the double origin of Marxism and proletarian culture. Numerous works of the Association of Ukrainian Writers have been confiscated by the ideological censorship.

## PURGES IN THE UKRAINIAN KOMSOMOL

*The Youth of Ukraine* (No. 95, 1956), publishes that at the beginning of this year, purges were carried out in the Komsomol in Ukraine as well as in the entire USSR. Every Komsomol member is obliged to go to the Komsomol headquarters for his new membership card. This year, however, many members failed to appear and were accordingly excluded from the Komsomol ranks.

## II. OUTSIDE UKRAINE

### AN AGREEMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN AND CHINESE ANTI-COMMUNISTS

On October 24, 1955, in Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa), Jaroslaw Stetzko, President of the Central Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) and Ku Cheng-kang, President of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, Republic of China (APACLROC) signed an agreement to coordinate the work of the two organizations. Both declare their common objective to be to crush the international Communist Bloc, annihilate Russian imperialism and support those nations enslaved by the Russian imperialists in Europe and Asia to restore their independence in their original ethnographical boundaries. Both organizations will also work for the return of Free China to the Chinese mainland and to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime. They also accepted the ABN slogan: "Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!" The resolutions were duly ratified by the official bodies of the two organizations and came into force on April 30, 1956 in Rome.

### GEORGE DREW FOR RAISING THE QUESTION OF UKRAINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

George Drew, the leader of the Canadian Conservative Party, declared at a Ukrainian convention in Toronto at the end of June 1956 that the time had come for the free nations to take an interest in what was happening in the USSR and discuss the question of Ukraine and the other non-Russian peoples of the USSR at the United Nations. The Soviets have accepted international obligations which they are constantly breaking.

### THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE UKRAINIANS IN CANADA IN WINNIPEG

The Fifth Congress of the Ukrainians of Canada, called by the Committee of Ukrainians of Canada, met on July 6-8. The Congress was larger than any of the preceding four congresses. More than 500 delegates and hundreds of guests came from all parts of Canada from Halifax to Vancouver.

The Congress which meets every three years aims to promote the cooperation of the leading Ukrainian groups of all-Canadian importance.

The Congress welcomed the Ukrainian Catholic Bishop of Winnipeg, Maksym Hermanyuk, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitan, Ilarion Ohiyenko.

Among the distinguished speakers were well known persons from Canada and the United States. Among them were the leaders of the three Canadian parties; George Drew, represented by John Diefenbaker for the Conservatives, M. J. Coldwell for the SSF and Solon Low for the Social Credit Party. Speakers from the United States included Prof. Clarence A. Manning and Miss Maria Beck, a Councilwoman from Detroit. The Congress also greeted Dr. Robertson, the representative of Minister Paul Martin.

### IHOR GUZENKO DECLARES HIMSELF A BELIEVER IN UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

The well-known official of the Soviet Embassy in Canada, Ihor Guzenko, who left the Soviet service and chose freedom by unmasking the espionage work of the Soviet embassies is living incognito for his personal protection.

He has previously for the same reasons not expressed his national Credo. For the first time this year he sent a written greeting to the Congress of the Ukrainians of Canada. In it he unmasked Khrushchev and accused him personally of genocide in Ukraine. He ended his greeting with these words: "I am certain that the time will come when I shall have the possibility and honor to greet in person a Ukrainian Congress which will contain representatives of a free Ukraine and representatives of the Ukrainians scattered throughout the entire world."

#### THE DEDICATION OF A HOUSE FOR THE UKRAINIAN MUSEUM IN CHICAGO

On June 17, 1956 there took place in Chicago the dedication of a House for the Ukrainian Museum and Archives. This house was established by a local American physician of Ukrainian origin, Dr. Myroslav Simens-Simenovych, a protector and patron of Ukrainian culture. Prof. Yuri Kamenetsky is the Director of the Museum.

#### AN EXHIBITION OF UKRAINIAN BOOKS IN THE CONGRESSIONAL LIBRARY IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

On June 22 the Congressional Library in Washington opened an exhibition of Ukrainian books marking the beginning of systematic work to arrange a previously non-existent Ukrainian section of the Library. The Director of the Library, Dr. Clapp, opened it. The importance of this step was stressed by the Director of the Slavic Department, Dr. S. Jacobson. Prof. Jaroslav Rudnytsky of Winnipeg, who served as adviser in the organization of this section, spoke of the rare books and the treasures of the Ukrainian Section.

#### AN EXHIBITION OF THE WORKS OF IVAN FRANKO IN THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

To mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of the great Ukrainian poet, writer and scholar, Ivan Franko, the New York Public Library opened in the beginning of September an exhibition of his works in the hall of the Slavic Division.

#### THE CONVENTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN MUNICH

In Munich, Germany, there was held in July the first Regular Convention of the Ukrainian Christian Movement with delegates from Germany, France and England. The Ukrainian Christian Movement is an ideological and non-political organization with purposes similar to those of the Western Christian Democracies. Its chief aim is to realize Christian principles and Christian ethics in the entire life of the Ukrainians outside of Ukraine. The organization includes both Ukrainian Catholics and Orthodox. It has therefore two sections, the Catholic headed by Prof. Hnat Martynets and the Orthodox under Prof. V. Glovinsky.

#### THE CONGRESS OF ORTHODOX UKRAINIANS IN BRAZIL

In Curitiba, Brazil there has been a congress of representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in communion with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox

Church outside of Ukraine. The Congress recognized the need for a congress of Ukrainian Orthodox parishes in the emigration to develop their consolidation.

#### THE FOUNDER OF THE UKRAINIAN SCOUTS CELEBRATES HIS 10th BIRTHDAY IN EXILE

In the emigration in Vienna Dr. Aleksander Tysovsky, founder of the Ukrainian Scouts and author of the book *Life in the Scouts*, celebrated his 70th birthday.

The Scouts for 35 years have been a very popular organization among the Ukrainian youth and have played an unusually positive role in training the Ukrainian patriotic youth.

#### THE DEATH OF A GERMAN FRIEND OF UKRAINE

In Dangenberg at the age of 86 the German historian Paul Rohrbach has passed away. He maintained that the greatest danger to Germany was a strong Russia or its successor, the USSR. Therefore for the good of Germany and Western civilization the division of Russia into national states and the creation of a strong Ukraine as a counterweight to a strong Russia are necessary.

#### A UKRAINIAN EMIGRANT A PROFESSOR IN ARGENTINA

Dr. Bohdan Halaychuk, a student of international law who had some years ago gone from Germany to Argentina as a political emigre, has been called to be Professor of International Law in the Catholic Institute in Buenos Aires.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

George F. Kennan. *RUSSIA LEAVES THE WAR*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1956, pp. XIII+544.

This is an extraordinary book and one that is absorbing for any one who has even caught a glimpse of the tangled situation that was created by the Russian Revolution, the disintegration of the old Russian Empire and the rise of Bolshevism. It far surpasses any previous history of Russian-American relations and it leaves the reader quite uncertain whether to bestow more praise on Mr. Kennan for his skillful picturing of events or to wonder how the author of this book with his ideas could ever hope to represent the United States in the field of foreign relations.

In almost every chapter, Mr. Kennan touches upon his great thought, that diplomats are accredited to governments and not to peoples. This is perfectly true but he does not make clear what is to happen when a recognized government ceases to exist as it did after the downfall of the tsar, for by his own showing the Provisional Government was merely allowed to represent Russia in foreign relations while the soviets, especially that of Petrograd, was able to hamstring all of its domestic efforts (p. 11). The situation became even worse after the Bolsheviks seized the power and opposition began in the interior.

To face this and to guide the American policy, we had an ambassador, Mr. David R. Francis, in Petrograd. He was not a career diplomat and not too cordial to his professional staff. There was also the American Red Cross Mission, led by William Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins, which took almost a malicious joy in countering the efforts of the Ambassador, even when they were on the right track. Still later Arthur Bullard and Edgar Sisson appeared to represent still other American agencies each with his own policies, while Gen. Judson, the Military Attache on the staff of the Ambassador, was independent of him as head of the American Military Mission.

All these complications lead back to the truly enigmatic figure of Woodrow Wilson, "a man who had never had any particular interest in, or knowledge of, Russian affairs" (p. 28). He was "largely his own Secretary of State insofar as the formulation of policy in major questions was concerned," but "he shared with many other American statesmen a disinclination to use the network of America's foreign diplomatic missions as a vital and intimate agency of policy" (p. 28). Let us add to this that he was already "showing the first signs of the fatigue and strain that were to affect him increasingly in the remaining years of his presidency" (p. 29).

There is here one omission. The author frequently mentions the interposition of the Russian ambassador in Washington, Boris Bakhmeteff, but he does not endeavor to go one step further and trace the influence of other Americans and Russians who by personal relationships, if not by writing, were able to reach and influence some of the leading Americans of the government. He does not even mention George Bakhmeteff, the last imperial Ambassador, and his friends

who exerted more underground influence on the American leaders than appears in the record. Wilson succeeded in avoiding Congressional influence to a large part but not all members of Congress, especially Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, were utterly negligible or helpless. There were men in the Army and Navy who were not as ignorant as might be thought and they too quietly but definitely added their mite to increase or diminish the confusion.

Yet this book is primarily a criticism of the policy of the President and the American public. That is the definite impression that the volume leaves for the author clearly and honestly describes the confusion and the weakness of all the actors in the almost comic tragedy that was being staged.

As regards the Russian participants, Mr. Kennan treats the Russian participants fairly, especially if they do not represent those "separatist tendencies inflamed by the unhappiness of the time and now greatly stimulated by the disappearance of the dynastic center that had been at least the symbol, and the only symbol of political unity" (p. 9).

This attitude covers all of his references to Ukraine. To him the Ukrainians like the peoples of the Caucasus are purely Russian. So he describes the Ukrainian movement in words that suit his ideas, even if they contradict the facts and the terminology of the "separatists" themselves. He says "The February Revolution had unleashed strong separatist tendencies, particularly among the nationalist-minded Ukrainian intelligentsia. A regional authority called the Ukrainian Central Rada had been set up at Kiev during the period of the Provisional Government, had badgered the Provisional Government mercilessly to make concessions to its demands for a semi-independent status, and had by late autumn succeeded in extorting the assurance, on paper, of a high degree of local autonomy. Actually, however, the Rada lacked many of the powers requisite to even a federal status. It was composed of a relatively small circle of intellectuals and had no effective administrative apparatus. The borders of its authority were vague. Its political appeal was diluted by a great variety of factors, including — again — the presence of large non-Ukrainian elements in the population and the tug of all-Russian as distinct from Ukrainian political tendencies. Its authority, at best, was tenuous and feeble" (p. 166). After the failure of an attempt to work out some sort of collaboration (?) between the Bolshevik organization in Ukraine and the Rada, "The Rada proclaimed itself, if only provisionally, the sole repository of power in several of the southern governments. While the Soviet Government was prepared to recognize the theoretical sight of the Ukraine to call itself independent, actual defiance was another thing" (p. 166). To what does he refer? The Third Universal, which still hoped for a loose federation with Russia? Or the Fourth Universal which definitely proclaimed the complete independence of Ukraine? This is an arbitrary misstatement of the situation, which he could easily have corrected by a reference to another Princeton University Press book: *The Ukrainian Revolution* by John S. Reshetar, which book we do not find among the copious literature he consulted.

Mr. Kennan never asks himself the question why separatist movements developed, for he speaks of the Transcaucasian peoples in the same way and says "After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, this administrative body (the Zakavkazskii Komissariat) was reinforced by a legislative diet, in which representation was based on the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly."

He is honest enough not to call these separatist movements the result of German and Austrian propaganda and to realize that under the military situation, England and France could not offer the struggling Ukrainians as much as could



the Germans. Yet with a weird stretch of the honesty that has marked his other references, he calls the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk "A full-flung delegation from the Ukrainian Rada, empowered to negotiate independently with the Central Powers on behalf of the Ukraine" (p. 366). He declines to state that the delegation was a delegation of the Ukrainian National Republic which the Rada with popular approval had declared at Kiev on January 22, 1918. He adds that the appearance of the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk "threatened to deprive the Bolsheviki of much of what little bargaining power they possessed. They reacted by bringing to Brest Ukrainian puppets of their own, ostensibly representing the rival Kharkov Bolshevik regime... and by pressing frantically ahead with the military offensive against Kiev" (p. 366).

Another example that is important in Kennan's attitude is shown in his citation of Francis' dispatch on January 9, 1918 — " 'Beginning to think separate peace improbable perhaps impossible and inclined to recommend simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossacks Province and Soviet as *de facto* government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity. Understand another government organizing at Archangel.' It is clear that what Francis had in mind was the idea which gained considerable currency in Allied (particularly British) circles throughout January, of a simultaneous *de facto* recognition of all the various authorities commanding sizeable portions of Russian territory — a proposal to which the United States government never warmed" (p. 397). Again there is no appreciation of any different national structure anywhere.

We could go on indefinitely in this vein, for to George F. Kennan as to Woodrow Wilson there was no national problem in Russia, except possibly in the case of the Poles. He dismisses the entire subject in one paragraph dealing with the Fourteen Points, when he merely touches on the fact that the phrase, "the evacuation of all Russian territory" might involve an estimation of what "Russia's territory" was in view of the separatist movements (p. 258). For both men there was the one democratic Russian people hoping for a government of their own choosing, the Constituent Assembly, so ably supported by Boris Bakhmeteff and Kerensky and debarred from such actions by the crude and ruthless Bolsheviks and even they, if they would change their manners, might represent the Russian people.

Apart from this there was a curious confusion for the American diplomats were in reality accredited to the Russian government and not to the Russian people but whom could they meet? That was and is the question. In this volume, interesting as it is and full of honest detail, lively narration and excellent characterization, there is no real appreciation of the situation where a government, a civilization and a code were at one time dissolved in ruin with only chaos left. With rare honesty the author notes the failures of all participants but he leaves the reader with an impression that there is the same chaos in his own mind as there was in the minds of Wilson, Francis and Robins, not to speak of the lesser men. The reviewer is amazed how such an excellent book can be so lacking in any idea other than the advantages of the limiting and standardizing of official and unofficial contacts and the restoration of diplomacy to an eighteenth century pattern in a twentieth century world. Yet for its picture of the chaos in the mind of President Wilson, official Washington and the Americans in Petrograd, we can only be grateful.

COMMANDO EXTRAORDINARY, The Remarkable Exploits of Otto Skorzeny  
By Charles Foley. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955, 241 pp.

This book is an extraordinary work about the courage, daring and power of imagination of a leader and one of the comparatively few men specifically charged with doing the unexpected in World War II. It is especially well written and vividly describes the remarkable exploits of Otto Skorzeny, an Austrian military adventurer, in behalf of the German cause during the most trying days of the last war. The rescue of Benito Mussolini on the highest peak of the Apennines is brilliantly portrayed in romantic detail. The kidnapping of the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, from his own heavily guarded palace in Budapest and the frenzy created by Skorzeny and his men in the headquarters of General Eisenhower in Paris are unquestionably fascinating episodes in this amazing record of the wartime adventure of these German commandos.

For those given to think today largely in terms of massive retaliation and the like, without regard for the tremendous costs involved, this work stands as a powerful antidote to such insular thinking. This book demonstrates on the bases of the achievements of Skorzeny's unit and also of the British Special Air Service, which was decisively responsible for the German debacle in Africa, that with infinitesimal cost in material and men, inordinate damage can be inflicted upon the enemy and virtually bring to ruin his massive plans for any campaign. The foreword written by Brigadier General Telford Taylor emphasizes this point in an imagined version of future events. "In Kharkov and Odessa," as Taylor visualizes it, "terrible explosions were reported by Tass, but the Germans denounced the story as a 'plant' to furnish the excuse for aggressive Soviet moves, and both cities had been closed to foreigners since the Ukrainian separatist riots a few years earlier." The wreckage of a Soviet troop train near Shepetivka, between Lviv and Kiev, by Ukrainian nationalists last May 20th lends adequate credence to this imagined version and shows that with adequate backing in this period of the cold war, commando tactics fashioned and pursued by fighters for freedom behind the Iron Curtain would accomplish more than the expenditure annually of billions of dollars.

On pages 196-7 in the book, Skorzeny's theory of warfare adapted to our times is presented with cogent force. It summarizes in essential form the entire narration of the events packed into this work and furnishes an excellent clue to the decisive type of warfare in the future, indeed, for the cold war of the present. As he puts it, "strategic operations with limited forces will be able to play a foremost role; it may even be a decisive one. . . I am thinking rather of the one instrument which will always be incalculable — the secret weapon, Man." The author is on solid ground when he supplements this theory with the observation, "A new technique would make brain and nerve win victories over guns and concrete; it might even forestall the nuclear explosion, if occasion offered."

The most valuable aspect of this contribution is the manner in which it conveys to the thought of a truly implemented policy of liberation. The techniques described here are easily adaptable to the field of political warfare which, unfortunately, Moscow is exploiting to its almost complete advantage. This work is highly recommended to those who have waxed skeptic as to our ability to implement such a policy, and peaceably at that. Its material provides an excellent insight into the best means of starving off a third world war and at the same time making strides toward the defeat of Russian Communist imperialism.

A GERMAN OFFICER. By Serge Groussard. Translated by Antonia White. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955, 218 pp.

The plight of an officer in the defeated German army receives a most colorful and descriptive treatment in this stirring novel. The work is deeply moving and steadily absorbing from cover to cover. The author develops insights which are penetrating and human throughout. The valor of the past, the bearing of a Russian type of officer, the decisions that had to be made on the Eastern front, the material deprivations that followed the war and the climactic ending are all so skillfully painted and portrayed that the reader virtually lives the life of this warrior, discredited, hardly adaptable, and defeated. The principal character is Karl Brucken, once a colonel of the Wehrmacht and a bearer of the Iron Cross.

The reader is taken in a most interesting way into Brucken's very soul during and after the Second World War. His hopes, fears and anxieties on the various fronts to which he was assigned, are revealed with a great human touch. Much human understanding surrounds his refusal to accept unemployment relief until sheer exhaustion compels him to apply for it. His appearance and general military composure before the denazification court are impressively described. The proceedings in this court occasion a recounting of his activities on the Eastern front, especially his involvement with Wila Kasprovicz whom, despite his love for her, he is compelled to hang. This episode sets the ground for the climax of the book where after considerable personal rehabilitation and final achievement, Brucken meets death at the hands of Wila's brother Jacek in rather unusual circumstances.

Those who are familiar with the historical facts of this turbulent period, cannot but appreciate greatly the deep feeling with which the author presents and develops his several typical characters. What is known in the abstract and in general takes on flesh, blood and warm animation. The work undoubtedly contributes to a compassionate understanding of the souls caught in a welter of chaos, confusion and misery.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE CHANGING WORLD OF SOVIET RUSSIA by David J. Dallin, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956, pp. 422.

David J. Dallin in his latest work undertakes to indicate the changes which have taken place and are taking place in the USSR and he rightly declares that a prerequisite for understanding these is an understanding of the true nature of Soviet Communism. He finds the real force of this in the Communist Party. He compares it to the structure of a typical army. Just as in an army the decisive and guiding element is the higher officers' corps so the few thousands of the high command of the Communist Party of the USSR control the entire life of the Soviet Union. The eight million of the lower members of the Party and the one hundred ninety million non-party individuals either agree with and profit by the regime or they hate it, but they have no power to change it. They all are striving to keep the positive results of the revolution. When it is a question of a change of the present regime, it will be necessary only to change the high command and the millions of bureaucrats will obey and support the new chiefs. The nature of this change will then differ from that in 1917. The author hopes for changes and the growth of anti-regime sentiments because 1) the old and formerly militant slogans of "world revolution" and "class struggle" are diminishing and 2) there is ceasing to exist in the USSR a "socialist youth" who could believe in the Communist ideals and would be ready to die for them. These points urge the author to believe in the "better Russia" of the future.

Dallin sees no other possible forces that can oppose Moscow. He does not consider, for example, the liberation struggle of the non-Russian peoples for independence from the Moscow colonial centre even worthy of further analysis. What is more, for him there do not even exist separate peoples in the USSR as a rule, outside of Russians. Even Dallin's use of terminology is absolutely confused and tendentious. He uses the term "Russia" and "Russians" not only for the Russians but for the other peoples of the USSR. By this terminology the uninitiated reader will not understand when he is speaking of the true Russians and when about the non-Russian peoples. Thus for him such Ukrainian cities as Dnipropetrovsk and Uman or the Georgian Tiflis or the Azerbaijanian Baku are "southern and southeastern regions of Russia in Europe" and Tashkent capital of Turkestan is "Russia in Asia." At the present time even a ten year old pupil in the USSR knows that Dnipropetrovsk is in the Ukrainian SSR and Tashkent has existed for 7 centuries when there was not yet a Russia and has belonged to Russia scarcely one hundred years. It is true that Dallin sometimes abandons his identification of Russia with the USSR but it is only when he is speaking of the crimes of Moscow against the peoples of the USSR. Then he uses the adjectives "Soviet" or "Communist."

Dallin's book contains a great deal of inaccurate information on the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, especially the Ukrainians. He says that "some Ukrainian intellectuals" were disappointed when Hitler did not allow them to "establish an autonomous Ukraine under German protection," although he cannot be ignorant of the fact that during World War II the Ukrainian people started a widespread struggle against both the Germans and the Bolsheviks for their independence as a separate state. He certainly knows that 24 years before the Ukrainians carried on the same kind of a struggle for independence and established the Ukrainian National Republic which fell only because of the military aggression of Moscow. The author is not free from the same tendency even when he speaks of the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine in 1945 which heroically opposed and still opposes Moscow. Dallin calls the Ukrainian bishops "Ruthenian" and Western Ukraine "the Carpathian area."

Dallin treats in the same way the question of concentration camps. He is rightly disturbed at the fact that when in 1945 Wendell Wilkie wrote a book on his journey around the USSR and mentioned concentration camps in Yakutsk, some "influential people" in Washington persuaded Wilkie to eliminate this reference, and he accepted their advice. But what was bad for Wilkie is completely admissible for Dallin. Obviously he cannot deny that there are in general Ukrainians in concentration camps. There has been published too much testimony by foreigners on this in the free world. But these Ukrainians he limits in the majority of cases to "Western Ukrainians," who in his words, so "hate Russia and the Russians and draw little difference between the Russian government and their Russian prisoner comrades." He cites the evidence of Dr. Joseph Scholmer in his book *Vorkuta* (New York, Henry Holt, 1955). At the same time there are many mentions in that book of the fact that in general all non-Russians do not love the Russians and often identify them with the regime. Scholmer writes:

"All the national resistance groups other than those of the Russians are characterized by two features: first, their uncompromising opposition to the whole Communist system, and secondly, their dislike of Russians as Russians. Ukrainian hatred of the Russians had its roots in a three-hundred-year-old tradition. In Poland the memories of the risings of the nineteenth century are as vivid as if they had taken place yesterday... Nor have the Baltic peoples forgotten the day when they had to defend their language and their literature against the tsars. The

system that threatens them with annihilation today is also controlled mainly by Russians" (p. 194). The author, himself a German, speaks of this from his own point of view: "In the meantime I tended to identify the Russians with the regime that held us all prisoners and to keep away from them. Several made no secret of the fact that imprisonment had not shaken their Communist faith. Several more were known to be working as informers for the NKWD (NKVD)" (p. 154).

This does not mean that all Russians were like that. Scholmer confirms that there were other Russians who joined sometimes with non-Russians in the common struggle against the regime. But these were the ones who acknowledged the right of the non-Russian peoples to independence from Moscow. This applied especially to some groups of Russian intellectuals in the concentration camps (p. 195, 221).

In connection with the statements of Dallin, we must cite those of the well-known Austrian socialist Karl Fischer, who had the opportunity to meet the Ukrainian insurgents in the concentration camp in Aleksandrovska, USSR. He declared that the Ukrainians "displayed persistent hostility toward the Great Russians. But this hostility was subordinated to their chief purpose, which was to create solidarity among all the prisoners, whoever they might be. They themselves set an example" (Cf. "International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices," *Monthly Information Bulletin*, No. 4, 1955, France).

Thus Dallin's book which should show to the American reader the chief centrifugal forces in the USSR, omits the greatest weakness of the USSR, the struggle for liberation of the non-Russian peoples. It is worthy of mention that Russian publicists hushed up the efforts of the non-Russian people for independence on the eve of and during World War I. Nevertheless in 1917 and 1918 almost all the non-Russian peoples broke away from the Russian colonial empire and formed their own independent states. Only the Bolsheviks understood this great power of the non-Russian peoples. And they in the first period of Soviet domination, at least in word, condemned the old empire. On the other hand the Russian anti-Bolsheviks worked out in the same years the conception that they could resist the Bolsheviks with the program of a single, indivisible Russian Empire. It is not strange that the enslaved peoples of the old tsarist Russia turned away from that conception and the Communists triumphed. Dallin's book shows that the Russian political emigrant publicists who were reared in the old Russian imperial school, wish now a second time to repeat their unlucky experiment which was rejected by all the peoples of the USSR.

MYROSLAW PROKOP

**INTEGRATED EUROPE** by Michael T. Florinsky. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955, pp. x 182. \$3.50.

This book is the result of a special study carried on by the author here and in Europe. He appraises the European conditions and especially the question of European integration which is vital at the present time. He considers this from various aspects. The introduction gives us some facts on the Communist menace and later the author discusses the relations between Russia and the West.

In his preliminary remarks the author passes over a few very important events of the first decade of Bolshevik rule. The International Intervention and the Civil War paved the road for the Bolsheviks, since the Allies supported the wrong parties, the White Russians.

The Tsarist regime had worked for three hundred years in building the Empire by conquering new lands, new states, etc. The Revolution commenced the disintegration of the Empire. The new nations as Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan,

Armenia and Byelorussia as well as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, did not receive help but in many cases definitely suffered from the blows of the White Russian leaders as Denikin, Kolchak (who destroyed the democratic Siberian state), Bermond-Avalov, Wrangel, etc. who were supported by the Allies. These men fought both the separatists and the Bolsheviks.

The author on pp. 10-11 writes that "the Communist doctrine remained unchanged." This is only a half truth because since the thirties and down to the present time the Communist doctrine has been interwoven with the Russian nationalistic and imperialistic ideas. This is easily seen from the Party pressure applied to all the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and their steady russification.

On p. 13, he writes: "By the spring of 1942, the number of Russian war prisoners rose to 5.5 or 6 million, an unprecedented record in the history of any war." This is a very important fact but the author fails to explain that the larger part of these war prisoners were members of the oppressed non-Russian peoples and that the largest part of them were Ukrainians. After the Soviet Army had lost a large part of its non-Russian soldiers, the Kremlin gained the possibility of building up Russian patriotism by all the media of propaganda. The army received new slogans for fighting the enemy, of course with the help of the supplies furnished by the American lend-lease. It is also important that the appeal to Russian instead of Soviet patriotism was started eight years earlier on June 19, 1934, when *Pravda* and *Izvestia* printed articles on the Chelyuskin celebration and for the first time used the words — "Rodina" — Motherland — and "We Russians."

The various aspects of the problem of European integration are handled in four detailed and well documented chapters and are treated soundly.

On p. 157, Note 12, the author mentions in an unimpressive manner J. M. Keynes. Keynes' book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, New York, London, 1920 has become a classic and deals often with the future of Europe. Keynes wrote for example (p. 216) that "German democracy is annihilated at the very moment" when the Treaty imposed excessive and burdensome reparations. Keynes here and elsewhere saw with clarity the political consequences of the Treaty.

The integration, security and stability of Europe can be achieved, if the dynamic Communist Russian Imperialism can be stopped and its sources dried up. This can only be done by the Free World in one way. That is by giving freedom and independence to the millions of peoples enslaved by the Communists. The winning of their independence will free Europe from its present difficulties. Yet we find no hint of this in "reflection on recent experience."

JOHN V. SWEET

ISTORIYA RUSIV, edited by Olexander Ohloblyn, New York, 1956, pp. 346 (in Ukrainian).

No book with the exception of Shevchenko's *Kobzar* has had so much influence in crystalizing the political thought of the Ukrainians looking for independence as the *History of the Rus (Istoriya Rusiv)* written by an unknown author at the end of the XVIII century at a time when Russia had completely destroyed the autonomous state of Ukraine. The book circulated in many manuscript copies throughout Ukraine but no one ventured to print it. It was 50 years later in 1846 when the Ukrainian scholar Osyp Bodyansky, a professor of the University of Moscow, printed it through the Imperial Society for History and Antiquities.

It is true that the bold professor during the reign of the absolutist Tsar Nicholas I paid for his patriotic act by the loss of his university chair, but this

argument for Ukrainian independence had appeared in the world and did its work until it was destroyed by the tsarist censor and police and became a literary rarity.

Who was the author of this revolutionary history of Ukraine-Rus entitled by the author the *History of the Rus* from the name of the oldest Ukrainian state, Kievan Rus'? The editor, Prof. O. Bodyansky, identified as the author the Ukrainian patriot Heorhy Kony's'ky, Archbishop of Mohylev and at one time Rector of the Kiev Mohylyanska Academy. It is now certain that Kony's'ky was not the author of the *History*, and perhaps Bodyansky used his name deliberately so as to deceive the Russian censor by the use of the name of an Orthodox archbishop. The question as to the authorship of this history of Ukraine in the independent spirit has not yet been solved despite the basic studies of several Ukrainian historians who have come to no conclusion among themselves.

Prof. Olexander Ohloblyn, an authority on this period of Ukrainian history, has undertaken to solve this question of the authorship of the *Istoriya Rusiv* by historical analysis. He has succeeded in localizing the place of origin and the group of persons who were possible authors. He believes that the work took its rise in the highly cultured circle of Ukrainian patriots who were grouped at the end of the XVIII century in Novhorod-Siversky, i.e. the northeastern part of Ukraine. This was that group of Ukrainians who recognized their helplessness against the Petersburg of Empress Catherine II and who before the final destruction of all traces of the autonomous statute of Ukraine sent Vasyl Kapnist to King Friedrich II of Prussia to seek aid abroad for Ukraine.<sup>1</sup> Prof. Ohloblyn mentions certain individuals as possible authors of this political work.

The *Istoriya Rusiv* takes the position that Ukraine has the God-given right to be an independent nation; its consecrated and heroic struggle for centuries against barbarous Poland and Russia was always based on high morality and justice. In his quotations and ideas the author included so many conceptions which were to be found in the works of West European thinkers of the time of the American Revolution that we have the involuntary thought that the author of the *Istoriya* and the Founders of the United States drew their inspiration from the same source.<sup>2</sup>

This new edition of the *Istoriya Rusiv* is a translation of the Ukrainianized Church Slavic language of that time into the present Ukrainian literary language. The editor, Prof. O. Ohloblyn, has given in the introduction a review of the studies as to the authorship of the work, which is a source for studies of the old Ukrainian thought on the independence of Ukraine.

New York

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

THE DOCTRINE OF ANARCHISM OF MICHAEL A. BAKUNIN. By Eugene Pyziur, Marquette University Press, Marquette Slavic Studies I, Milwaukee, 1955, pp. X, 158.

The study of Eugene Pyziur deals with the social philosophy of Michael Bakunin, one of the most famous revolutionaries of the 19th century, a founder of the Russian and world anarchist movements. Because of its pragmatic essentiality and analytical insight this book is a real contribution to Russian studies in the U.S. Its first advantage lies in the strict limitation of the theme by the author.

<sup>1</sup> "The Ukrainian Independence Movement at the Time of American Revolution," by Nicholas Chubaty, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. V, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> American Revolution and Ukrainian Liberation Ideas During the Late 18th Century," by Olexander Ohloblyn, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XI, p. 203.

This is not a work about Bakunin in general, since that would require many volumes. It is only a detailed, careful, and subtle analysis of Bakunin's doctrine of anarchism and revolution. The author fully conquered the temptation of going into other aspects of Bakunin's gigantic personality, no matter how inviting. But on the other hand, we can feel that he has carefully taken into account all the other elements in his laboratory, not, however, to increase the number of the pages of the book, but to give the reader a full awareness of their invisible presence.

It is well known that the Soviet system considers Bakunin its ideological enemy, as Bakunin had thought everything that preceded the Soviet system in his own time to be his mortal enemy. The conflict between Bakunin and Marx is well documented. Bakunin destroyed Marx's First International and he objected to communism and Marxism, because they would bring enslavement of the worst sort. On the other hand Bakunin's influence on the practical revolutionary movement, on the organization of the revolutionary forces, was rather small, and his own organizational achievements were almost imperceptible in comparison with his popularity and his noisy revolutionary propaganda.

Nonetheless, as Eugene Pyziur proves convincingly and documents in a pedantic way, Bakunin is the predecessor of Bolshevism to a greater degree than Marx and the Russian Marxists themselves. Marx, Plekhanov, and Lenin attempted with great pains and in a scholastic, rational manner to define the course of the future and to classify the forces of its realization. In spite of all this, the ideas of Bakunin, an anarchist in thought and in organization, so absurd to Marxists, were realized. This conclusion we draw from Pyziur's book, although the author himself does not pay any special attention to this problem and mentions Lenin only a few times in passing, for he focusses his attention on Bakunin and his concept of revolution and anarchism.

Is this a paradox? Perhaps, but not unique in the annals of human social thought and strivings. Take for example Saint-Simon. Here, too, we have a dreamer and an unsystematic thinker who did not leave us any well-formed system. But (as in the case of Bakunin) in his jungle of ideas some are extremely profound. Saint-Simon is the precursor of socialism. But to an even greater extent we may consider him as an anticipator of our managerial age. Strange as it may be, the visionary fantasy of Saint-Simon depicted our captains of industry more profoundly than the scholarly analyses of the Classical economists. On the other hand Bakunin's fancy thoughts defined more exactly the essence and the course of the Bolshevik Revolution and its commissars than all the Russian Marxists including Lenin, and also not excluding Marx himself. But nobody imitated Saint-Simon or Bakunin directly. The ideas of both were realized in a somewhat automatic fashion, because both anticipated the trends of the development of the future. Therefore the interest of the young author in Bakunin is fully justified. The technique and the psychology of revolution, the apocalyptic total destruction of the previous social order, the utilization of the potential energies of the masses, the role of the secret revolutionary society, built on the principle of the elite and finally the necessity for the preservation of the achievements of the revolution within the new "ideal order" — all this was very precise in Bakunin, and carried out by Lenin, although he thought he was carrying out the ideas of Marx. Eugene Pyziur's study will stimulate interest in Bakunin along the right path.

Some fragmentary news has reached the West that there allegedly exist in the USSR today syndicalist circles, which consider Bakunin as their spiritual father for his opposition to Marx and communism. If this is true it might certainly be considered as a trend toward freedom. But what a paradox, since Bakunin's idea of absolute freedom led to absolute slavery. This was due to its utopian pre-



sumptions. Utopia is not necessarily an obstacle for a political movement in its strivings toward power. But once this power is achieved and the movement insists on the realization of utopia, then a totalitarian terror over society is the only avenue left. In this case Bakunin, too, teaches us an important lesson, and once again he is only an anticipator of Russian Communist reality.

The book of Eugene Pyziur turns our attention toward this important problem and for this deserves wide consideration.

JURIJ LAWRYNENKO

THE MEANING OF YALTA. By Charles F. Delzell, George F. Lensen, and Forrest Pogue; edited by John L. Snell. Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1956. Pp. xvi+239. \$3.75.

Three young historians used mainly the *Yalta Papers* which were published by the U.S. State Department, to give in condensed form the events which transpired at Yalta in February, 1945. Four major problems were discussed there: (1) Germany, (2) Eastern Europe, (3) the Far East, and (4) the United Nations.

The theme of the whole book was that the concessions which were made to the Russians at Yalta can best be explained by the political and military circumstances which existed at the time of the discussions. That is the meaning the authors see in the Yalta conference: it was tragic only because it did not happen to work out favorably for the Free World.

This orientation is seriously deficient. The Yalta conference was tragic to the Free World not so much because of the *consequences* but because of the wide-eyed, trusting anxiousness with which American leaders went into the conference. Many competent Americans and Europeans had repeatedly warned of the international irresponsibility of the Russians for a long time before Yalta; these warnings were ridiculed by many Americans, in and out of government, as "red-baiting," or dismissed as "bias." The conference was doomed to failure from the start; the only people surprised by its failure were those gullible enough to think that we could bargain with the Russians.

The tragedy of Yalta was the belief that the Russians would allow free elections and self-government in the occupied territories in the first place. The tragedy of Yalta stemmed from the *willingness* to give so much territory to the Russians in the Far East, prior to their participation in the war. The tragedy stemmed from the confident *conviction*, not merely the hope, that the Russians would cooperate with the West in maintaining peace after the war. The tragedy and betrayal, in short, was the complete error with which the Russians were approached at Yalta.

The authors avoid any mention of the work of the Soviet spy rings, which has been documented in other works. For example, in explaining why Japan attacked a non-belligerent half the world away, when the Russians were running like scared rabbits in December, 1941, George Lensen merely mentions his judgment that the Japanese felt closer to the Russians than to the Americans; he added that the Japanese also "profoundly respected" (p. 132) the running Russian Army. It is well known that the aim of Russian espionage in Japan was to divert the Japanese toward British and American holdings in southern Asia and the Pacific, instead of chancing an invasion of Siberia. The role of Harry Dexter White is hardly touched on; no taint of subversion is even suggested. Alger Hiss' influence, declared Forrest Pogue, was inconsequential, because his role at the conference was confined to questions dealing with the U.N. Pogue seems to be little troubled that there were Russian agents in American ranks; he dismisses it by saying that

they did not do much anyway. He read Hiss' sketchy notes, and decided that Hiss was not really effective as a Russian agent, as though a spy would keep notes on his own treachery and turn them over to the State Department for scrutiny.

The chapter on Eastern Europe was written by Charles F. Delzell who gave an account of events dealing with this area on the diplomatic level. He does not show evidence of being familiar with the history of the people in the region under discussion. I doubt that Delzell fully realizes the existence of the Ukrainian nationality. In a number of places, he uses "Russian" and "Soviet" interchangeably, and erroneously. The boundary dispute is portrayed as a discussion about a line dividing a Polish area from a "Russian" area; he does not point out that the nearest *Russian* area was over 500 miles away, and that the people directly involved in the dispute were the Poles, and the *Ukrainians*, neither of whom were represented at Yalta.

My general impression is that the authors are honest historians, but that they are too prone to favorably portray the bald gullibility of the American political leadership in 1945, with regard to the Russians and their intentions.

*University of Wisconsin*

JOHN ZADROZNY

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## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S TOAST," editorial. *The New York Times*, May 21, 1956, New York.

This is one of the most significant and important editorials that has as yet appeared in any newspaper organ in this country. Appearing in the *New York Times*, it assumes even greater significance and firmly indicates the solid progress that has been achieved these past few years in our knowledge and understanding of the foremost problems of Eastern Europe. The editors seize upon a toast ironically offered by the Kremlin criminal, Khrushchev, "to the Arabs and all others who are struggling for national independence."

The sheer hypocrisy of this toast couldn't possibly be brought into the open more expertly and pungently than it is done here. All the basic and telling elements of the situation find keen expression in this apt retort to the personality charmer of Moscow. It quickly and bluntly drives home the point that "If Mr. Khrushchev is so concerned about peoples struggling for national liberation, he has a great opportunity to show that solicitude right at home. Why should not the Ukraine be independent, or Byelorussia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or Estonia, or Uzbekistan, or Kazakhstan, or Tadzhikistan, or Turkmenistan, or Kirgizia, or Armenia, or Georgia, or Azerbaijan?" Indeed, why not? This is the great opportunity that many American groups and individuals are fighting for with will and certitude poised on the knowledge that the non-Russian complex in the Soviet Union is the greatest weakness of the present Russian Communist empire. This weakness is made to order for American use and leverage in realizing our gains in the cold war.

"THEY SPEAK FOR THE SILENT," special supplement. *National Review*, August 1, 1956, New York.

In many respects it was very appropriate for the editors of this new conservative journal to feature in this issue the two Ukrainian documents that emanated from the Soviet slave labor complex in Mordovia, RSFSR. For one, the journal is rapidly achieving national reputation and esteem, and this fact in itself stands to insure a broad, intelligent reception of these exceedingly important documents. Moreover, in doubtless contrast to the editors of some so-called liberal organs, those of *National Review* possess a keen awareness of the evils of communism and collectivism in general so that the unique contents of these remarkable letters must have met with spontaneous and critical interest. The warm sense with which they were received, is reflected in the very first sentence: "In order that they may become part of the historical record of our time, *National Review* here makes public two documents as remarkable in their origin as in their content."

These documents were written by Ukrainian political prisoners on cloth, and funneled over long distances through the Iron Curtain until they reached the hands of the "Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council" (UHVR) which represents the Ukrainian underground in the free world. Mr. Mikola Lebed, Secretary General for Foreign Affairs of the Council, made them available here. One of them is addressed to the United Nations, the other to Ukrainian refugees and supporters of these prisoners and of the struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Communist colonialism and imperialism.

This is the first time that any documents conceived in the Russian forced labor camps have been smuggled out into the free world. It goes almost without saying that they are of considerable historical value. In Congress, Senator Smith of New Jersey and Congressmen Dodd of Connecticut and Smith of Wisconsin brought them to public attention in the *Congressional Record*. Ambassador Lodge was informed of their importance, and we should look forward to their effective use soon in the United Nations. Joining in this effort, the editors of *Nationai Review* have performed a great public service, and are deserving of the highest praise.

"WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT RUSSIA?" — by William C. Bullitt. *U.S. News & World Report*, June 29, 1956, Washington, D. C.

Two former ambassadors to the Soviet Union are pitted against each other in this issue on the question of what we should do about the USSR. The article by George F. Kennan is of little novel content to the readers of this journal. His strange and sometimes pitiful notions have been the subject of many an article in this periodical. Here one finds the usual array of "containment," supposed rationality parading for political expediency, a naive doctrine of evolution, the admission of Red China to the U. N., and his characteristic verbal makeshifts by which any significant change in events is credited to his foresight. However, one statement of his which he will probably regret for some time to come—that is, if he is capable of this feeling—relates to the captivity of the enslaved nations: "But there is a finality, for better or for worse, about what has now occurred in Eastern Europe..." This morbid outlook, passing for realism, is the natural consequence of the Kennanist containment mentality.

The article by Mr. Bullitt is direct and incisive, and almost unmercifully tears to shreds the "queer" suggestions of Kennan. It very properly states at the outset that "Mr. George F. Kennan played a part in our descent from safety to danger..." immediately after World War II. It characterizes as blatant defeatism the four chief Kennan proposals of trusting the Kremlin criminals, admitting Red China into the U. N., permanently abandoning the captive nations, and neutralizing Germany and Japan. But above all, it provides an excellent insight into the emotional thinking of Kennan whom the writer knows very well, since he selected him as a junior member of his staff in Moscow in 1933.

Kennan's "emotional involvement in Russia," as the author puts it, has been a fact long stressed by many students of the Soviet Union, including those of this journal. This involvement has sharply biased his ideas and judgment to the extent that his opinions, no matter how garnished verbally, are regarded as unreliable in many informed quarters. Many have discerned in his slanted opinions a distinct Russia First proclivity. Now it is refreshing to observe the same being expressed by Mr. Bullitt who remarks about Kennan as follows: "He was, to be sure, inclined to give the Russians the benefit of every doubt — not because

they were Communists, but because they were Russians — and he was apt to flee from harsh reality." The unfortunate circumstance exists today that there are still too many entrenched in the State Department with much the same bent and Kennanist feelings.

"THE SOVIETS' 'HOMELAND' SIREN SONG," commentary. *Freedom's Facts Against Communism*, July, 1956, Washington, D. C.

Redefection and communist appeals even to old immigrants in many nations of the West to return to their homeland are more serious than most people think. In the words of this commentary, they "are using every emotional appeal in the book..." and the media cover radio, chain letters, newspaper advertising and direct letter or personal contact. In the Argentine the communists seem to be reaping huge successes, although the realized numbers of returnees might be considerably less than the 30,000 listed due to the awakened efforts of the Argentine government to curb this sinister campaign.

Among the many reasons underlying this campaign, there is, as the writer stresses, "a larger reason involving the security of Red rule over the peoples now in the Communist Empire. The existence of emigre groups and governments in exile are a direct threat to Communist rule." As a cold war technique used under the convenient cover of "peaceful coexistence," this program aims to weaken and smash such groups, with the further effect of discrediting the West.

"BAIT FOR THE HOMESICK," by Walter Dushnyck. *National Review*, August 18, 1956, New York.

On this basically important subject of redefection, a piercing analysis buttressed by a wealth of essential material and some direct experience, not to mention sound political interpretation, is ably provided in this excellent article by a man equipped with an extensive knowledge of East European movements. While directing the South American mission of the Catholic Relief Services, the writer came into possession of much significant data on the subtle operations of the Soviet embassies which are playing a fundamental role in the redefection program. These data, along with well founded analytical explanations are clearly set forth in this extremely interesting and highly informative piece.

The chief value of this presentation lies in its coherent integration of these data in the larger framework of redefection as an effective weapon of Russian cold war activity. The author's observation that "The scale and intensity of the 'redefection' campaign betrays the deadly fear in which the Kremlin holds all refugees from Communism" cannot be too strongly emphasized. If, after reading this well-rounded article, one is not convinced of the gravity of this problem and the utter necessity for solid counter-measures, then surely it is time for one to re-examine his state of mind, afflicted either by lack of understanding or pure and self-defeating indifference.

SOVIET CRIMES AND KHRUSHCHEV'S CONFESSION, by Chester S. Williams.  
Ed. by Public Affairs Committee of Freedom House — *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 7, 1956.

For a long time the free world has needed a publication which would list the most horrible crimes of the Russian Communist regime during its existence

(1917-1956). Such a publication was released by the Public Affairs Committee of The Freedom House in New York, Sept. 4, 1956 and reprinted in the *U. S. News & World Report*. The list of crimes was elaborated by Chester S. Williams and its publication approved by the Committee composed of such persons as: Whitney North Seymour, Herbert Bayard Swope, Dr. Harry D. Gideonse, president of Brooklyn College, Leo Cherne, Father George B. Ford, Rex Stout, Mrs. Henry Gale, George Field, Norman Cousins, Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt and William L. White.

We expected that such prominent intellectuals would furnish the American public with the martyrology of the Russian Communist revolution. But this has not happened.

We have only a very superficial list of victims on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic and a listing of the victims in both capitals, Leningrad and Moscow. But it is a known fact that the overwhelming majority of the crimes committed by the Kremlin were not in Russia proper, but on non-Russian territories: in Ukraine, Georgia, Turkestan, etc.

The released list of crimes mentions only once the massacre in Georgia, but nothing more. It is obvious that at least 50% of all crimes against humanity committed by the Soviet regime, took place in Ukraine which is not once mentioned in the Freedom House publication.

We can mention only the most important Red Russian crimes in Ukraine:

January 1918 — First Red Russian invasion of Ukraine, occupation of Kiev; massacre of 10,000 people; massacre of Ukrainian high school youth at Bazar.

January 1919 — Second invasion of Ukraine;

1927 — Imprisonment of the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Vasyl Lypkivsky.

1928-1929 — Liquidation of the Shumskists (Ukrainian Titoists).

1930 — Pogrom of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev; liquidation of over 30 Ukrainian scholars.

1930 — Forcible dissolution of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

1932-1933 — Artificially made famine in Ukraine in order to force collectivisation; about 6 million farmers were condemned to starvation.

1934 — Forced suicide of the Ukrainian Commissar of Education, the communist Mykola Skrypnyk.

1934 — Execution of 28 Ukrainian poets and writers;

1934 — Forced suicide of the Ukrainian communist writer Mykola Khvylovy.

1937 — Forced suicide of the Ukrainian Premier Lubchenko.

This is only a partial list of the many Ukrainian victims.

One other crime must be mentioned, which should have been included by Father Ford. This is:

1945 — Forcible liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, connected with the imprisonment of the whole hierarchy (seven bishops) including Metropolitan Joseph Slipy; the execution and imprisonment of ca. 500 priests.

1947 — Murder of the Greek Catholic bishop Theodore Romza of Uzhorod and liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church in Carpatho-Ukraine. In 1945-1947, 4 1/2 million Ukrainians were forced formally to repudiate Catholicism and join Russian Orthodoxy.

It is evident that the Public Affairs Committee assembled only the materials for the martyrology of the Russian people and neglected to expose also crimes committed upon non-Russian peoples. The list neglected also to mention the Russian Communist crimes in Byelorussia and especially in Turkestan, where

the years long Basmachi uprising was paid for by hundreds of thousands of Moslem victims.

We hope that the next edition of the List of Communist Crimes, published by Freedom House will include also the victims in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union.

**"KHRUSHCHEV'S CRIMES AGAINST THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE,"** a feature.  
*International Free Trade Union News*, October, 1956, New York.

This widely read publication is published by the Free Trade Union Committee which is affiliated with the AFL-CIO. It reaches countless readers in the ranks of labor here and abroad. In this issue, the *News* features an article which appeared in the July 1-15, 1956 issue of the *Ukrainian Bulletin*, one of the two official publications of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. The article is packed with specific facts on Khrushchev's crimes against the Ukrainian nation.

There can be no doubt that the editors of this important organ had the primary end in mind of providing their multitude of readers with indisputable facts showing the nature and type of man that Khrushchev really is, something that cannot be ordinarily gleaned from our newspapers. In this, they serve their readers admirably and with the utmost journalistic responsibility.

The reproduced article covers the dreadful period of the 30's in minute detail, a time when the basically vicious and ruthless Khrushchev made his name in unsurpassed political crime and started his ascent in the Russian Communist hierarchy. Against the lurid background of these crimes, ranging from the man-made famine to individual murder, the behavior of this criminal today cannot but be viewed as a spectacular display of diplomatic clownery demanded by the opportunistic requirements of the Russian Communist manipulation of "peaceful coexistence." As the engineer of the vast purge in Ukraine in the 30's, the two-faced Khrushchev reveals his true nature with the vow that "We will smash their heads in once and for all!" An exponent of the Russification policy in Ukraine, this present advocate of the independence of nations inveighed against the "enemies of the people, the bourgeois nationalists," at the 14th Congress of the C. P. of Ukraine, blasting away on the theme that their obstructionism was predicated on their fear of "the strength and influences of the Russian language and Russian culture."

**"CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION OR 'AUTONOMIZATION' "**, —  
Lenin's notes. *The New York Times*, July 1, 1956, New York.

The reality of Russian chauvinism and racism, whether white or red, has long been pointed to as a paramount and oftentimes all-ruling force in the thinking and actions of both Russian Communist and anti-Communist politicians. In fact, it has been and continues to be the common denominator between them. Perhaps no groups of people know this better, from harsh experience and direct contact, than the non-Russians in the Soviet Union and those who have fled to the four corners of the earth. That there is something to this, the skeptical American mind, unexposed to such experiences, has been only too reluctant to admit. Now, although the objective works of numerous Russian scholars and intellectuals describe this reality well, we have the notes of Lenin providing further substantiation.

These notes should be memorized by everyone seeking to understand the forces at work in the Soviet Union. Referring to the brutality of conditions in Georgia, one of the many non-Russian states, Lenin writes: "Under such conditions it is an entirely natural thing that the point about the 'freedom to withdraw from the union,' with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be but a scrap of paper insufficient for the defense of foreign races in Russia against the inroads of that *very generically Russian man, the Great Russian*, the chauvinist, and actually a villain and a ravager, which is what the typical Russian bureaucrat is. It cannot be doubted but that the insignificant percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will drown in this chauvinistic sea of Great Russian rascality like a fly in the milk." The history of the Soviet Union and the experiences of many organizations with Russian political emigres are to a marked degree shaped by the truth of this one note.

Another very pertinent note written on the question of the degree of autonomy raises doubts as to "whether we have applied measures with proper care for the purpose of defending foreign races against the generically, the typically, Russian Derzhimorda (a Gogol character noted for his brutal arrogance). In my judgment we have not taken such measures although we could and should have done so." The brutal facts of Russian Communist genocide, slave labor, purges, Russification and a host of other outrages and crimes against humanity plainly demonstrate that this was never done, in any volitional sense. The present dictatorship is tinkering with such measures, but all eyes are fixed on the lengths to which it considers it safe to go.

The deceptive Russian political habit of pointing to Stalin, Mikoyan and others of non-Russian birth as alleged proof of their spurious thesis that communism is not Russian-centered is fully brought to light by this additional Lenin note: "... (it is a common knowledge that Russified members of other nationalities always like to exaggerate when it comes to typically Russian attitudes)." In this respect, particular birth is an accident; the consciousness and fundamental loyalties are all-determining. Quislings, properly rejected and spurned by the patriotism of their former people, are thus prone to exaggerate their adopted attitudes, even the most heinous and brutal ones.

In his note on the Russians, which gains credence from many authoritative sources, both Russian and non-Russian, both in this century and in past centuries, Lenin confessedly observes: "...we, the nationals of a great nation, show ourselves almost always in historical practice guilty of untold numbers of outrages and, what is more — we do not even observe that we are perpetrating untold numbers of acts of violence and abuse; it should suffice for me to cite my own Volga recollections to show with what contempt we treated non-Russians; 'a Pole is always referred to as 'Polak', a Tatar is sarcastically called a 'Count', a Ukrainian — a 'Khokhol', a Georgian and other members of the Caucasian nations — a 'Caspasian man.' These racist expressions have persisted to the present day. They form an arsenal of ammunition for us in a propaganda warfare against racist Russian discrimination heaped on the non-Russian colonials in the vast Russian Communist empire. But, insularly we choose to remain on the defensive — targets for their contrived attacks on us."



"RUSSIAN COMMUNISM VERSUS HUMAN FREEDOM," comments by the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, Md. C. "*The Lithuanian Situation*, July-August, 1956, Washington, D. C.

One of the most outstanding experts in the United States Congress on communism, and certainly the most conversant with the plight of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union is Congressman Feighan of Ohio. The leadership and members of his own party, as well as numerous Republicans, hold his opinions in the highest esteem and often seek his advice and judgment on diverse matters pertaining to Russian Communism and the Soviet Union. In these striking comments on the Kremlin's downgrading of Stalin, Mr. Feighan emphasizes the fact that the "evidence as to whether or not the Russian Communists have undergone any fundamental changes following the death of the Dictator is overwhelmingly conclusive that no change whatever has taken place as to policy or world-wide objectives."

Another illuminating comment, for which not too much evidence is required, is that through "the Geneva Conference the blood of millions of martyrs was wiped from the guilty hands of Khrushchev, Bulganin and Co." Few can doubt that we contributed in cloaking these criminals with respectability which they are exploiting to the hilt in their concentration of criminal responsibility upon Stalin. With an adroit eye to the possibility that the naive suggestion of inviting General Zhukov might soon be acted upon, this fighting Congressman warns that "The Red Army and its commanders are as integral a part of the international Communist conspiracy as is the MVD, the MGB, the Russian diplomatic corps, and the Communist Party in the United States." The American electorate is indeed fortunate in having in Congress people of Mr. Feighan's intellectual stature. One often wonders what would happen without them, their critical judgments and insights, their moral opposition to the easy course of compromise and expediency.

"CRIMINAL OPTIMISM AND THE FOUR SUMMITS," by N. Henry Josephs. New York, August, 1956.

This specially distributed article, written by a former Lt. Colonel of the United States Air Force who is also a member of the New York bar and a former special consultant to the Under-Secretary of War, has run into a third printing as a result of public demand. The title is in itself an intriguing one. The contents are even more so in their skillful organization about the four summits which the world in the past seventeen years has toppled off — "The Munich Summit," "The Moscow Summit," "The Washington Summit," and now the recent "Geneva Summit." The writer treats each with a professional hand and hammers away on the point that "Russia's 'coexistence' policies have been used at all times as diversionary movements and for just one and always the same purpose, the purpose first announced by Stalin, to secure 'a period of accumulation of strength (for the Communists) . . . for future revolutionary initiatives.'" The article is very much worth reading and can be secured by writing to the author at 90 Broad Street, New York 4, New York.

L. E. D.

