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September, 1958

THE VOICE OF — AMERICA?

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PICTURE ON THE COVER: *City Hall in Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine, where the Ukrainian national flag was hoisted on November 1, 1918 announcing the rebirth of Ukrainian independence. In the background are the historical buildings of the PROSVITA Society and the Ukrainian Catholic Assumption Church. Lviv was a center of Ukrainian cultural and political life for many generations.*

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THE VOICE OF — AMERICA?

Editorial

Is the "Voice of America" really the Voice of—America? This is no play on words, believe us. Nor does the question, as posed, imply in any way that the "Voice" or the United States Information Agency is riddled with sabotaging communists and subversives. This thought is, in a sense, passé and rather superficial at this time. In fact, to clarify the question more, we can go a step further. The writer of this editorial, the leadership of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and many organizations and individuals who follow closely the activities of the U.S.I.A. and now seriously raise this question, have consistently supported the Agency in its needs for expansion and improvement. To be sure, we've criticized it on many occasions but always with constructive intent.¹ In the past few months, however, the Agency had decided upon certain policy directions for the "Voice" which cause us to raise the question in the form we have. These directions are dangerous, ill-advised, and even a bit absurd.

We do not at all believe that the decisions arrived at by Mr. George V. Allen, the Director of U.S.I.A., and also by the Department of State are the results, in some degree, of any subversive communist or pro-Russian influence operating within these areas. Nevertheless we are convinced that these decisions are the products of ignorance and total misunderstanding as regards the nature of our mortal enemy, the aspirations and requirements of the captive nations both within and outside the Soviet Union, and the modes of effective appeal to the subjugated non-Russian peoples in the USSR. After all, to any informed person the broad non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union is the solar plexis of the Russian Communist Empire. Its sons and daughters make up about 50 per cent of the armed forces of the USSR. In over three decades of Russian Communist domination, the non-Russian colonies within the USSR consistently and steadfastly resisted Russian imperial power and rule.

¹ e.g., "The Voice of America and Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter, 1955, pp. 35-45.

From these facts alone it should be obvious that, in terms of U.S. security interests, the non-Russian nations in the USSR constitute a high priority target for U.S. information and propaganda. A broadened and skillful aim at this vital target would successfully turn the tables on spurious Russian propaganda concerning colonialism, nationalism, and independence in Asia and Africa. Unfortunately, this is not evident to Mr. Allen and the U.S.I.A.

THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SOUND POLICY

The reason why we lag far behind Moscow in effective propaganda appeal and commit blunder after blunder is explained in basic terms from a significant passage in one of Vice President Nixon's latest addresses. Speaking to the Harvard Business School Association, Mr. Nixon stated in effect that the way to combat Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism is to revitalize the American Revolution. He urged that we should be standing for, not against, the nationalist movements in foreign countries. As he put it, "It is ironic in the extreme that the United States should ever be cast in the role of opposing legitimate nationalist movements. Many of the ideas which motivate today's nationalists stem from American history and have been taught in American universities at home and abroad . . . We, rather than the Soviet Union, should be the natural champion of legitimate nationalist movements." How true and yet how thoroughly negated this American view is by what is going on in the "Voice" today.

To a marked degree the decisions made by the U.S.I.A. work to Moscow's advantage. Due to ignorance and lack of American revolutionary dedication, they can only do serious damage to U.S. and Free World interests. The steps now being taken by the U.S.I.A. will actually work in behalf of Mr. Khrushchev's aims as conveyed to Mr. Adlai Stevenson on his recent visit to the Soviet Union. "Mr. Khrushchev was saying," Stevenson reports, "that whatever goes on in the Communist world is a family affair and doesn't concern outsiders, that Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 was not interference, and that Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia to conform to Moscow is not a case of meddling in another country's affairs. But Khrushchev also made it clear that what went on in the free world is a proper concern of the Soviet Union."² Whether the U.S.I.A. is aware of it or not, its impending actions will be serving these aims. These are the same aims that Khrushchev has endeavored to realize through a summit meeting. By its present

² *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., August 27, 1958.

shortsighted policy in the "Voice," the U.S.I.A. is helping him to achieve this in some degree.

THE ISSUE AND ITS BACKGROUND

In discussing this issue and its background it must be emphasized at the outset that this has absolutely nothing to do with official talk and programming leading to "premature revolt" and the like. It has to do with policy wisdom and propagandistic efficacy. The "Voice" is not only a technical instrument for the transmission of factual information. It is also—or should be—a psychological weapon employed for the prime purpose of influencing minds and hearts to the justice and political integrity and intentions of our side in the global struggle. Anyone listening to Mr. Allen and his associates explain the purposes of the "Voice" leaves with the distinct impression that the "Voice" is simply an innocuous medium set up to inform the rest of the world about what Americans are doing in their everyday existence and living. They just don't seem to evidence a propagandistic skill and acumen aimed at progressively weakening the enemy by carefully designed programs and words. In a real sense, the enemy isn't even looked upon as one. There isn't that ardor or fervor in the Agency that qualifies the leadership to undertake those things implied by Vice President Nixon. The revolutionary spirit is lacking and the goal of defeating the enemy by word and thought is virtually non-existent. Indeed, one person reports that at a meeting with Mr. Allen last spring, the U.S.I.A. director seemed to be more concerned about the unfavored prospect of "splinterizing" the Soviet Union than anything else. A strange bias for the head of our propagandistic agency, but true.

Now let's look at the issue. It was recently decided by the U.S.I.A. and the Department of State that certain changes in connection with "VOA" broadcasts to the Soviet Union take place at the beginning of October. The changes are: (1) the elimination of the regular 15 minute daily program in the Moslem Uzbek language beamed from Munich to Central Asia, (2) the reduction of one hour each in the daily Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian programs, and (3) an increase in English-language programs beamed to the USSR as well as a half-hour increase in the Russian-language program.

As explained below, these changes will have some unfavorable bearing on U.S. relations with the Moslemic peoples, not only in the USSR but also with those knowledgeable in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and, more directly, on our relations, such as they are, with the other non-Russian nations which are held captive in

the USSR. These changes, which we believe the Secretary of State is unaware of, lack adequate justification. In fact, they possess all the earmarks of the first step in a policy of psychological disengagement with regard to the entire Russian Communist Empire. Today, these areas; and with this success, tomorrow, the "external satellites" in Central Europe. Adding to a six months' background of private discussions on the subject, the announcement of these changes was timed immediately after Congress made its appropriations to the U.S.I.A., thus for the moment at least precluding any public airing of this vital issue.

Now, according to Mr. Allen, what are the reasons for these changes? Concerning (1) the Uzbek program, they are allegedly: (a) to maximize our use of available transmitters, (b) "insufficient evidence" as to whether this program was "being heard to an appreciable extent," and (c) scarcity of "available funds, or transmitters or of qualified personnel." On close examination these reasons for eliminating the Uzbek program are weak, to say the least. This change is further evidence of our gross ineptitude in the propaganda field. The height of this ineptitude is revealed by the fact that while Moscow today is building tremendous radio facilities in Tashkent to influence the free Moslem world to its ways of thinking, we propose to abolish the only meager program in "VOA" aimed at the unfree Moslems in Central Asia.³ *The New York Times* editorial of July 22 on "Khrushchev and the Moslems" indicated further the absurdity of this change. Instead of displaying greater interest in the enslaved brethren of the free Moslem world, by this step we propose to ignore them.

Thus, it is evident that if transmitters are to be usefully maximized, they certainly should be in the direction of the Moslems in Central Asia. There is considerably more evidence demonstrating Turkestanian opposition to Russian Communism and its imperialist colonialism over the past forty years than can be shown in favor of the Russians, to whom we devote a disproportionate amount of "VOA" time and facilities. By political analysis, the 35 million Moslems in the USSR have a higher target priority over most of the areas in the free world to which we beam "VOA" broadcasts. Second, the reason of "insufficient evidence" on the reception of this program raises the question as to what kind of evidence the U.S.-I.A. is seeking on the basis of an admittedly puny operation directed at these peoples? And third, Mr. Allen relies heavily on lack of re-

³ See "Soviet Steps Up Radio Campaign in Mideast to Five Hours a Day," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1958, p. 10.

sources, thus no effective program. Clearly, if he understood this problem, he would recognize that the cause-and-effect sequence is really the other way around: this is a vitally important target area; thus we must have an effective program; therefore, resources must be made available to it, even at the cost of less important areas. The resources, both human and physical, can be made available.

Let us look now at the U.S.I.A.'s reasons for cutting down the Baltic and Ukrainian-language programs. It contends: (a) that such reductions will permit a more concentrated use of transmitters in order to overcome the *heavy jamming* of these programs and (b) that "the concentration of transmitters on particular programs necessarily decreases the number of programs which these transmitters can carry." The extra time, however—again according to Mr. Allen—will be devoted to English-language programs beamed to the USSR and, by way of a half-hour increase, to the Russian-language program, both of which, quite significantly, are not subjected by Moscow to such heavy jamming. As in the preceding case, these reductions are equally unjustified and unwise for our interests.

First, a point which should be of keen interest to any legislator voting on the U.S.I.A. appropriations is "Why does Moscow jam these particular non-Russian broadcasts most heavily, whereas our English and Russian-language broadcasts are less or not jammed at all?" One can only reasonably infer that Moscow fears these latter broadcasts less. This striking fact of disproportionate jamming, supported by Mr. Allen's own written admissions, is indeed a sound point of departure for an inquiry into these cases and also the relative contents of these programs. Common sense would dictate steps of concentration and expansion of the non-Russian broadcasts because of the excessive jamming. Our authorities prefer not to follow such dictates. Instead, on the flimsy pretext of transmitter shortage, they have decided to reduce these sensitive programs and, of all things, allocate the extra time to the far less sensitive English and Russian-language broadcasts. In the case of the Ukrainian broadcast, this is being done at the very time when "Radio Kiev" in Ukraine is expanding its facilities to reach the millions of Ukrainian background everywhere in the free world.

Mr. Allen makes the plausible point that these changes, by virtue of transmitter concentration, will enable us to overcome the heavy jamming. This is all to the good. But it does not in itself justify the allocation of the extra time to the English and Russian-language broadcasts. Indeed, with concentration of transmitters for the non-Russian language broadcasts, this time and more should be devoted to these evidently more sensitive programs. As in the

Moslem case above, there is again much more evidence to show that we have considerably more to gain by concentrating on these Baltic, Ukrainian, and other non-Russian broadcasts to the USSR than on either the English or Russian-language programs. That is, unless our self-defeating goal is eventually to imitate the B.B.C. and have these captive non-Russian nations in the USSR listen in the language of their captor. The changes now decided upon are certainly in this direction, one of psychological disengagement. While from Moscow Ukrainians are told to like the Russians, it now appears that from Washington they are told to listen like Russians.⁴

The second reason offered by Mr. Allen is not without a certain logical flaw. For the moment let's agree that transmitter concentration necessarily decreases the number of programs. Still, why more time and programs for Russian and English-language broadcasts? For, applying his own formula, this presumably means more programs on fewer transmitters per program. Or, are more transmitters per more programs the rule for them and not for the particular non-Russian programs? Here, too, one runs into a priority valuation. Very simply, if it is conceded that the USSR has top priority for our broadcasts, then why can't more transmitters be made available at this time to our broadcasts to the Soviet Union at the expense of less sensitive programs to areas with lower priority? This is another sensible alternative and in accord with the view of every legislator who believes "that the purpose of this Agency was to combat the propaganda of the Soviet Union."⁵

In Mr. Allen's view the languages of the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Turkestanians are "minority languages" of "minority groups." This, perhaps more than any other fact, explains these unthought changes. The recent study of the Senate Judiciary Committee on "The Soviet Empire: Prison House of Nations and Races" and many other studies, particularly those of the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, show that the non-Russian nations have striven desperately to preserve their distinctive languages and other cultural identities against the Russification programs of Moscow. Ironically enough, and regardless of its alleged reasons, the "Voice" in effect abets Moscow's Russification program by emphasizing communication in Russian to the subjugated non-Russian peoples. This seems to be the best way to alienate your natural friends and aid your enemy.

⁴ "Ukrainians Are Told to Like the Russians," *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, March 14, 1958.

⁵ *The Congressional Record*, August 20, 1958, p. 17253.

The recourse to expanded English broadcasts to the USSR appears almost as ludicrous in terms of the global psychological conflict. Are we perchance attempting to Anglicize the peoples behind the Iron Curtain? The present movement in American education is to have people learn the languages of other peoples primarily in order to understand them better, to make warm contact with them. Evidently the tendency in the "Voice" is contrary to this movement and its objective. The U.S.I.A.'s fantastic formula is: reduce the programs in the language of the masses, have them listen more in the language of their captor, and the relative few who wish to perfect their English, very likely for political ends against our own interests, let's accommodate them, too.

On the basis of these facts and more, is it little wonder that we pitifully lag behind the Russians in the propaganda field? Need one be startled by the irony mentioned in the Vice President's Harvard address? Bearing on this subject, Senator Paul H. Douglas recently stated: "On the occasion of meeting with Secretary Dulles, he expressed agreement with the proposals made in the memorandum, one of which was the strengthening and expansion of the foreign language broadcasts—particularly in the non-Russian language programs—of the 'Voice of America' . . . It is, therefore, shocking to learn that the 'Voice of America' is now engaged in a series of actions which do violence to one of the major proposals with which Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement."⁶ Really, have we a Voice—of America?

⁶ *The Congressional Record*, August 22, 1958, p. A7898.

THE 25th ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT FAMINE IN UKRAINE

By MYKOLA HALIY

This year the Ukrainian emigration in the free world marks one of the most tragic events ever recorded in the annals of the Ukrainian people.

Twenty-five years ago Communist Russia committed a crime in Ukraine which has no equal in the history of mankind. With the official silence of the Western world the Russian Bolshevik government murdered millions of Ukrainians through a planned and artificially-engineered famine, and destroyed cultural treasures of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras and liquidated the spiritual achievements of several generations. Twenty-five years ago the Ukrainian people—their peasantry, workers and intellectual classes—without support or even sympathy from the West—paid the supreme sacrifice not only in their own defense but in that of the Western world itself. This heinous crime of genocide and the untold suffering of so many human beings, which the Kremlin despots sought to conceal, will remain an indelible scar in the hearts of countless future Ukrainian generations. The Russian Bolshevik onslaught on the live organism of the Ukrainian nation resulting in the destruction of six million Ukrainians, a crime accomplished with the tacit acknowledgment of the civilized world, easily constitutes one of the greatest tragedies of modern times.

RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIK ATTACK UPON UKRAINE

In analyzing the Russian Bolshevik bestial attack on Ukraine twenty-five years ago, we must concentrate on two problems which constantly troubled the Russian Communist Party and the ideologists of the new Russian empire. The crime in Ukraine was interwoven with two factors: the economic and the national-political, both of which were intermittently connected on the non-Russian territories and whose potentialities threatened not only the Soviet regime, but the unity of the empire as well.

These two problems, the economic and the national-political, especially sharply manifested themselves at the beginning of the 30's at the time of the collectivization of agriculture by the Bolsheviks. The fact itself that the character and the forms of the Bolshevik attack on the village were not uniform in the entire Soviet Union shows that collectivization was used by the party apparatus as an instrument directed against the liberation process of the enslaved nation. Having connected these processes with political trends, such as Trotskyism, Petluraism, "bourgeois nationalism" and Khvylovyism, Moscow directed its blade in the first place against Ukraine, because it was in Ukraine that the resistance of the peasantry against collectivization was the most violent and *per se* the most dangerous for the regime. This came about through a series of causes which could not have been avoided:

(1) The small cadres of the Communists in Ukraine who according to official estimates numbered only 12,900 in Ukraine in 1922, and of that number 6,900 were Russians. (In 1927, out of a total of 53,000, 25,000 were Russians, cf. *Proletarska Pravda*, No. 288, 1927);

(2) The revolution in Russia had an economic and social character, while in Ukraine the two phases of the revolution, economic-social and national-political, merged into one;

(3) Deceitful slogans of Leninism in the matter of nationality policy which Moscow applied in the national republics, especially in Ukraine;

(4) Perfidious tactics of the Bolsheviks in the matter of land policy. The slogans announced at the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution, "Stick the bayonet in the dirt—the power and the land in the hands of the peasants"—comprised only deceitful demagogy serving to enhance the Bolshevik power.

We have to recognize the fact that the peasant masses gave eager credence to the Bolshevik demagogy, inasmuch as they visualized new perspectives of welfare and peace. But the sentiments of the peasantry soon changed. After the NEP came their first disillusionment: they saw reality as something quite different from the things the Bolsheviks had promised them. The peasantry came to understand well that it was impossible for them to attain an economic welfare and a free national development in the Soviet state. Thus a struggle for the individual well-being and the national culture was transformed into a struggle for the Ukrainian land for the Ukrainian peasant, as an economic foundation of the nation and state.

The Bolshevik tactics contained another curious phenomenon—"the self-exclusiveness of theory and practice." These contrasts of

Bolshevik ideology, which initially were disguised and officially denied, erupted with unusual force in the era of collectivization and resulted in a tragic conflict of the Ukrainians as a whole with the Bolshevik system and its spirituality.

On November 2, 1917, the Communist Party, under the signatures of Lenin and Stalin, issued a "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which among other things, stated:

There exists equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia. All and any national privileges and restrictions are abolished.

With respect to the problem of nationalities which in Russia has always been an Achilles' heel, V. Lenin, after the assumption of power, wrote:

The victorious socialism must inevitably realize full democracy, which means to realize not only a complete equality of nations, but also to realize the right of self-determination of the oppressed nations, that is, the right of free separation. The socialist parties which will be unable to prove with their determination now, during and after the revolution that they will liberate the oppressed nations and will establish relations with them on the basis of a free union—and a free union is a mendacious phrase without the freedom of separation—such parties would be committing treason against socialism (V. I. Lenin: *Natsyonalny vopros—The Nationality Problem*).

But regardless of the "Declaration" and the statement of Lenin, on November 7, 1918, that is, a year later, we have other pronouncements by outstanding members of the Communist Party which wholly contradict the former. For instance:

We never regarded the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as a national republic, but exclusively as a republic on the territory of Ukraine (V. Antonov-Ovsienko: *Zapisky*, Vol. II, p. 23).

"To create a Ukraine, even a Soviet one, is reactionary," stated Artem, Russian chauvinist, a member of the Communist Party and even a member of the so-called Soviet government of Ukraine (*Litopys revolutsiyi*, Vol. 4, p. 168, 1929).

Not the least typical of the Russian communist tactics are the so-called "Instructions" of L. Trotsky, which he sent to the Bolshevik agitators in Ukraine:

- (1) Not to impose communism upon the Ukrainian peasantry until such time as our power over them is solidified;
- (2) To assure them that there is no communism in Russia;
- (3) To propagate that Russia also recognizes the independence of Ukraine, but with a Soviet government;
- (4) In cases of robberies in the Red Army, they should be ascribed to insurgents and Petlurites.

Taking into consideration the Bolshevik contrast between theory and practice and the aggressive policy of Moscow toward U-

kraine as a whole, one could not but expect that a final settlement between these two nations would occur at any time, which in fact did happen.

In the early 30's the growing spark of rebellion burst into a roaring fire, and a defenseless nation rose in defense of its ancestral land, its glorious past and its right to an independent life and human decency.

FORMS OF COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS RESULTS

In order to provide a full and lucid answer to the question of why there was a mass famine in Ukraine, we shall try to analyze the reasons for this great tragedy of the Ukrainian people and to single out the criminals who caused it.

We shall not discuss the question whether collectivization was an inevitable necessity of the accomplishment of the socialist order, but will limit ourselves to the query whether there were in the USSR at that time concrete and spiritual possibilities for the execution of such a grandiose plan as collectivization. Let us quote a few specific examples:

In Ukraine a few thousand tractors are not in use. They do not operate because repairs have not been made and because spare parts are not available in sufficient quantities (*Visti*, October 9, 1932);

The failure of wheat plans by state farms came about as a result of insufficient preparedness of the state farms with respect to the harvest campaign and as a result of underestimating by a number of leaders the problem of the preparedness of qualified cadres, the belated service of machine-tractor parks, and also the failure to utilize machines, the long delays and the accidents (from the address of Postyshev at the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, July 29, 1932).

The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine recognizes the state of the sowing campaign as catastrophic. Over one-third of the plan has yet to be fulfilled in the sowing campaign in Ukraine (*ibid.*).

Let us recall the opinions on collectivization of N. Bukharin, author of *Historical Materialism*, who remarked of Stalin's collectivization:

We consider the form of the collectivization which is now being implemented as a medieval military-feudal form of exploitation of peasants.

But the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow, instead of undertaking appropriate measures to prevent full catastrophe, did the contrary. It sent into Ukraine a number of "strong men," such as Postyshev, Zaitsev, Khatayevich, Akulov and GPU chief Balitsky. Moreover, the Politburo designated Molotov, Andreev, Kaganovich and Mikoyan for the task of the control and strengthen-

ing of the party authority in the country. Speaking at a meeting of "shock activists," Molotov stated:

The work had to be done regardless of how many lives it may cost. There is no room either for softness or sentimentality.

Even more eloquent in the matter was another emissary of Stalin, Khatayevich, who stated:

Comrades, the Party and Comrade Stalin have ordered us to terminate the process of collectivization by spring. The local village authority needs injections of Bolshevik iron. You have to begin your work without any manifestation of rotten liberalism. Throw out all your bourgeois humanitarianisms on the garbage pile and act as Bolsheviks. Destroy *kulak* agents wherever they raise their heads. The *kulaks*, as well as the middle-class peasants and paupers, do not give up their wheat. Your task is to get it by any and all means. You must squeeze it out of them. Do not be afraid to employ the most extreme methods.

The attitude of Moscow toward the Ukrainians was revealed afresh by Postyshev, when he addressed the plenum of the Kharkiv *oblast* committee:

The Bolsheviks always fought and are continuing to wage an implacable struggle against Ukrainian nationalism, burning out with a heated iron all chauvinist Petlurite elements, no matter under what false national banner they might be found . . . Today, we cannot lose a single day or a single minute. We must with all energy and determination fulfill the wheat campaign. We will be able to do this only when we correct the errors of the past years. These errors are by no means of an objective nature, but stem from so-called sentimentality, by which the local organs were guided at the surrendering of wheat by producers.

"CRIMES" OF LOCAL ORGANS, OR THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM OF LAWS?

Light upon the question whether the crime of the mass starvation of Ukrainians can be attributed to the "local organs" or to the whole system of the Soviet Russian government is thrown by the following examples:

The Odessa *oblast* committee has decided that the wheat of the first hectare should be used for the needs of the local, or rather public alimentation. Do we need to prove the incorrectness of such a decision? It is incorrect and false because the decision puts at a second remove the yielding of bread to the state, and puts the problem of public alimentation in the first place. It proves that some of our *oblast* committees have been under the influence of the interests of the collective farmers and therefore have served the interests of the enemies of our proletarian state. Can we tolerate such softness? No, such softness can have nothing in common with the Bolshevik struggle . . .

And further:

On the road to sabotage of the unbreakable law on the surrender of wheat to the state was Kisilev, head of the administration of the "January 9

Collective" in the village of Obukhiv. Three times did he send wheat to the mill directly from the threshing machine. On his instruction bread was baked for the community and was distributed to all farmers in equal portions. For this Kiselev was sent to court.

On the road of overt sabotage also went S. Tymoshenko, head of the village council. He distributed 10 *oods* of wheat among collective farmers. For this crime Tymoshenko was expelled from the party and was put on trial.

The Soviet court has condemned *kurkul* Osypov to 8 years in prison for sabotage. On Osypov's premises four *oods* of potatoes were found buried in the ground.

The alert eye of the GPU has uncovered and sent to trial the fascist saboteurs who hid bread in a hole under a pile of clover.

A special commission has uncovered manipulations with bread in the Tarashcha *rayon*. Bread, which was designated for the state, has been stolen by the collective farmers for their own use.

The mobile session of Bershad peoples' court, in the district of Vynnytsya, sentenced the miser, Olena Ivasyn, to five years' loss of liberty and confiscation of property, for the crime of clipping off the unripened heads of the winter crops (*Visti*, June 11, 1933).

DRACONIC DECREES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

In the meantime the Central Committee issued the following draconic decree:

It is forbidden in the time of ripening of the wheat and during harvest to walk or travel on field roads and paths. Every day after the termination of work the guards will see to it that no one remains in the field. Every night patrols will be sent into the fields to watch the roads and fields for wheat thieves.

The Central Executive Committee of the Council of People's Commissars decrees: To apply as a means of judicial repression for the stealing of collective property the higher degree of social defense—execution by shooting and confiscation of all possessions.

GUILTY OF DEATH OF MILLIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN POPULATION

Testimonies of Ukrainian Peasants

Here are eye-witness reports of Ukrainian peasants who survived the great famine:

"They have taken everything from us, and now we have no bread, we have a famine."

"They are taking everything from us without leaving us anything for nourishment. They tell our delegates in the *rayon* committees: 'Let all *kulaks* die from hunger!'"

"We are facing a famine catastrophe as they are taking every grain of wheat from us; they don't even pay us for our work."

"We sow the wheat, then reap and thresh it, but we have no bread. 'You ought to die from hunger!', the partymen keep telling us."

"People are dying like flies. They are swollen and are too weak to move. Young children present a ghastly sight: their legs are like match sticks, while their stomachs are inflated. People look like skeletons."

"What have we lived to see in our Ukraine! If anybody has a piece of bread, he eats out of sight of his neighbors."

"The people are dying in the mass hunger and typhus. Cannibalism is spreading. Will we ever see the end of this, or will we die with our children?"

"Hundreds of people are swollen from hunger. Every day a cart comes to the village to collect the corpses. We have eaten everything: dogs, cats and even field mice."

"Our villagers are afflicted by blood, tears, death and deportation. And for what?"

Testimonies of Foreign Correspondents

"Even if immunized against a nervous shock, the world would be shaken if it heard about the famine in Ukraine. This was not a famine induced by natural causes, such as drought or floods. No, it was a famine brought about by people, a planned famine. I had to dip my pen in the blood of my heart in order to write articles for *Forward* about what I saw in Russia. I saw the harvest of hunger, the harvest of death. I saw people swollen from hunger as they fell in the streets. In Ukraine I found out that six million people died from hunger" (G. Lange: *New York Daily Forward*, 1933).

"The Soviet government deliberately created the disastrous famine in 1933 in order to break the resistance of peasants. It is the first government in history which used famine as an instrument of national policy. Cold-bloodedly it murdered about two million people without a hearing" (W. H. Chamberlin: *Russia's Iron Age; The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation*).

"The present-day state in Ukraine: ruin, hunger and a grave-yard silence. Entire villages are dying out. In a village which had 800 people, 150 have died since the spring. The famine in Ukraine was created by Moscow artificially from political considerations. In order to completely destroy all aspirations toward independence, the Soviet government organized a man-made famine with the purpose of destroying the entire people whose only sin is the longing for freedom" (Suzanne Bertillon: *Le Matin*, Paris).

"Ukraine—is a country which always swam in welfare; now it is a destitute desert. The peasant, terrorized, persecuted and famished, longs only for a voluntary death. In the Ukrainian village a stillness rules as in a grave-yard. Once the Ukrainian was master of his own land; today, when you travel through Ukraine you will see great crowds of peasants who throw themselves on trains and beg from the travellers. The famine which plunders Ukraine this year is undoubtedly bigger than in the years 1921-1923. The misery of the oppressed and decimated peoples surpasses all imagination" (Gerritt Johns, former secretary of Lloyd George: *The Daily Express*, London, 1933; *The New York American*, June, 1933).

"The catastrophe in the southern countries of the Soviet Union (Ukraine and Northern Caucasus) during 1933 must be considered the most terrible misfortune that has ever afflicted our globe. Many millions of people died from starvation and help for them came from nowhere" (E. Ammende: Extracts from his correspondence).

"Collectivization cost as much in human sacrifices as the Great World War" (Nicholas Basseches: *Die Freie Presse*, 1933).

"In Ukraine alone some six million people died from hunger" (Walter Eidlitz: *Die Neue Zuericher Zeitung*).

"Since the fall of 1932 the food problem has deteriorated in a catastrophic manner. In some localities 20-30 persons are dying daily. Entire houses are deserted. The population is overtaken by apathy and despair. No one comes to them with help. The government officials are not at all interested in the hunger misfortune. The population could be eventually saved if it could obtain the wheat, which the government is selling abroad. The present crisis cannot be solved other than by the death of a majority of the population" (Dr. Otto Schiller, economic expert of the German Legation in Moscow, *Ost-Europa*).

"In Southern Ukraine and Northern Caucasus there is a famine. In Berdyansk about 10 persons die from starvation every day. In two localities not far from the Dniprelstan, 4,000 persons have died from hunger" (Anagen, Director of the Eastern European Institute in Breslau).

"The country is in the grip of a catastrophe which could be seen even by one blind. The silence of the Russian press about the catastrophe is one of the most outstanding phenomena of present-day Russia. Today the peasant is fleeing to the city in order to secure a piece of bread—a produce of his own work—which the state took away from him" (Pierre Berlan: *Le Temps*, Paris).

"You go in Ukraine or Northern Caucasus—the most fertile provinces of Russia. Today they look like deserts: the fields are covered with weeds and the people, swollen from hunger, are awaiting inevitable death. In talking to these miserable people you will find out how many people have died from hunger and how many have been executed by the Soviet government or deported because they have hidden a little wheat in order to satisfy their hunger" (Malcolm Maggeridge: *The Manchester Guardian*, March, 1933).

"An important role in the hunger problem is played by the national problem, which is not solved to this day. In the USSR, as in Czarist Russia, there exist the state people (Russians), who wage a struggle against the other nationalities, above all the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The purpose of this struggle is to impede their independence aspirations. I must say with all determination, clearly and openly, that on the basis of present great differences and antagonisms with respect to the Ukrainian people, Russia aspires directly toward the extermination of a great part of the present generation in Ukraine" (E. Ammende: *Muss Russland hungern?*).

"So Ukraine is dying. The Ukrainians are dying of hunger. This is a great calamity not only for Ukraine and the Ukrainians, but for the culture of Russia, Europe, and even the whole world. For this dying land was once a great production center of agriculture. There, where today people are dying exhausted by famine, lush harvests supplied not only the people of Ukraine with enough bread, but also all the inhabitants of Central Europe. The soil is not changed only the people. This is where we have to look for the causes of the great drama, in which a whole nation has become a sacrificial victim" (The Belgian daily *La Flandre Libérale*, September 2, 1933).

"Pilate took water and washed his hands . . . Is this the attitude the British people are to take, when they are told about things they find hard to believe in the year 1933? The famine started when the authorities took all the grain away from the people. Children under 14 were first to feel the pangs of hunger. Only the strongest are managing to exist, the majority are dying. It is a long time since there have been dogs, cats, not to mention poultry in

the villages. When a cow dies it is consumed immediately" (*The Daily Telegraph*, September 9, 1933.)

COMMENTS OF OFFICIAL COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES
ON HUNGER AGONY OF UKRAINIAN PEASANTRY

Mykola Skrypnyk, the leading Ukrainian Communist, declared:

In talking about the state in which Ukraine is now, we cannot admit even the slightest underestimation of what we have. We must acknowledge that we have a great, shameless failure. We must state openly that the state is very hard. The reasons which I have heard from the population are: The hunger was caused by the fact that they took everything away from us, not even leaving anything for our daily food.

V. Chubar:

I cannot keep silent about the fact that some of the proletarian students, including even members of the Comsomol, having spent some time in the country and having seen that the farmers have difficulties with food stuffs, explain that such a state exists only because Moscow has demanded from the peasant more wheat that could be given.

P. Postyshev:

In the villages agitation against the Soviet government is going on. The peasants complain about giving wheat to the Communists, as they export it abroad, while we are dying from hunger!

M. Kalinin's speech:

The masses of collectives went through a good schooling this year. The school was quite cruel to some (*Pravda*, June 24, 1933).

V. Molotov:

In a number of regions (of Ukraine), as a result of mistakes made during the campaign of grain collection, difficulties in food supplies have arisen. In many collective farms great difficulties in food supplies exist to this day (*Pravda*, July 14, 1933).

Litvinov to Congressman Koppelman, on January, 1934:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and thank you for drawing my attention to the Ukrainian pamphlet. There are a great number of similar pamphlets, full of lies, circulated by counter-revolutionary organizations abroad, which specialize in work of this kind. There is nothing left for them to do but to spread false information or to forge documents . . . Yours truly, M. Litvinov.

Stalin (from his address at the XVIIth congress of the Communist Party, January, 1934):

The important thing lies in that an atmosphere of disease of exceptional distrust is spreading . . . The cattle branch of agriculture was most deeply affected by this reorganizational period.

According to official figures, the losses in the cattle-breeding industry in 1930-33 were as follows: 13,600,000 horses, 13,900,000 cattle, 58,200,000 sheep and goats and 1,200,000 pigs (*Pravda*, January 28, 1934 and *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, No. 2, 1934).

These statistics pertain only to the animal world, not to that of the human being. The human losses were never disclosed either by Stalin himself or by his erstwhile pupil, Nikita S. Khrushchev, when he denounced Stalin at the XXth congress of the Communist Party in February, 1956. Khrushchev tried to place all blame on Stalin, although Stalin was not the only guilty party in this great crime of genocide. Khrushchev and all the other members of the Central Committee were guilty of the crime of genocide in Ukraine, inasmuch as they all were responsible for the ruthless collectivization and the genocide of the Ukrainian people.

In conclusion, that the famine in Ukraine was provoked deliberately so as to break the resistance of the peasantry to collectivization is attested to by the fact that during the famine countless grain elevators, collecting points and train stations were full of wheat, exposed to moisture and rain. The Soviet Russian government not only would not allow the distribution of grain among the starving population, but imposed draconic decrees calling for the execution or deportation of anyone who dared take a few grains of wheat. That there was wheat enough everywhere in Ukraine at that time is again attested to by the Soviet press:

"At the railroad station Kiev-Petrivka there is a huge pile of wheat. During the night of September 2 it rained. Everything rots" (*Proletarska Pravda*, No. 194, 1933).

"At the Tsybukhiv point, in the Odessa oblast, some 180,000 poods of wheat are in the grain silos. Almost all the wheat is under the open sky, and thus is under a very real danger of rotting and destruction . . . In the grain elevators and collecting points of the Harbuzyn rayon a great mass of wheat is exposed to the rain" (*Moloda Guardiia*, No. 194, 1933).

"At the Traktorsky collecting point 20 freight cars of wheat have been standing uncovered for three days under the rain and much of the wheat is flooded by water" (*Moloda Guardiia*, No. 1020, 1933).

"At the yard of the Lubashev grain elevator a few freight cars of wheat were dumped on the ground and covered with straw. The wheat has been drenched thoroughly and now begins to rot" (*Moloda Guardiia*, No. 1016, 1933).

"In the village of Petrovo thousands of poods of last year's wheat were heaped in a pile, while the population of that village was dying from hunger" (*Proletarska Pravda*, No. 1, 1933).

"At the railroad station of Luchyny 1,200 tons of corn have been standing for a long time. The corn is not covered and is being rained upon" (*Proletarska Pravda*, No. 1, 1933).

"At Krasnohrad thousands of centners of wheat have perished. Much of the wheat rots in bales and stacks" (*Visti*, No. 188, 1933).

"In Bakhmach the wheat was thrown on the ground, and the wheat is rotting. At the station of Konotop 51 freight cars of wheat are lying exposed to the sky. The rain has come and destroyed everything. At the 'Victory Collective'

some 10,000 *poods* of potatoes are rotting" (*Proletarska Pravda*, No. 286, *Komunist*, June 27, 1934).

"In Moscow at the station there are 278 freight cars of fruit and vegetables. Everything is being wasted and rots" (*Proletarska Pravda*, No. 194; *Moloda Guardiia*, Nos. 107, 1020 and 1016, 1933).

Comment is unnecessary. The deceitful slogans of Leninism, totally compromised in practical life, are known today not only to "bourgeois nationalists," but to informed workers everywhere, workers who are in the vanguard of the struggle against Russian Bolshevik tyranny and who herald a new awakening of man, conscious of his human dignity and his social and national and political rights.

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TURKIC AND MOSLEM PEOPLES BEHIND THE RUSSIAN IRON CURTAIN

AN OUTLINE OF THE RUSSIFICATION, SOVIETIZATION AND GENOCIDE
OF THE TURKIC AND MOSLEM PEOPLES IN THE USSR

By ISKENDER AKCHURA

EDITOR'S NOTE: Dealing with the plight of the Turkic and Moslem peoples enslaved by Communist Russia, the following article was written by an authority on the subject. A Moslem himself, Dr. Akchura has experienced Russian persecution at first hand. At a time when one Nikita S. Khrushchev is meddling in the affairs of the Arab and Moslem peoples of the Middle East, Dr. Akchura's article provides some fresh ammunition for imaginative Western statesmen to use. The inhuman treatment of the Moslem peoples inside the USSR once again reveals Khrushchev and his unholy clique for what they really are.

THE MOSLEMS BEHIND THE RUSSIAN IRON CURTAIN

The Turkic and Moslem peoples of Turkestan, the Caucasus and the Crimea, by virtue of their geographical situation along the Southeastern boundary of the Soviet Union, are closely connected with the peoples of the countries of the non-communist Middle East: Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Turkestan itself is divided into two principal parts: Eastern Turkestan belongs to Red China, while Western Turkestan is integrated into the Soviet Union.

The bonds of unity among these peoples from ancient times were solidified by a community of national origin, the Turkic language (and the no less popular Persian language), the Mohammedan religion, and a common source of science and arts.

Under peaceful conditions of life and up to the time of the assumption of power by the Communists in Russia, intercourse between the Moslem peoples manifested itself through free trade, exchange of technical attainments, literature and science, and the like. The people living in the frontier zones could freely exchange books and other literature; they could cross and re-cross the border with relative ease and participate in all sorts of social affairs, such as weddings, local bazaars and other meetings. There were even family ties on both sides of the frontier.

But with the coming to power of communism all this abruptly disappeared. As in war, the frontier was put under the control of

special units of the Red Army, and all intercourse with the Moslem peoples outside the USSR came to an end. If in some cases, usually concerning family ties, correspondence was allowed with the outside world, only open postcards with the exact address of the sender were permitted—which incriminating information proved later on to be tantamount to death warrants for those who had dared write.

Inasmuch as the program of Russian communism preaches the "inevitability" of a final and decisive armed clash with the democratic world, the Communist Party kept the Moslem population in constant terror. Every village or town was under the strict surveillance of the NKVD-MVD secret police and the inhabitants were periodically subjected to "purges." Those with any relatives outside the USSR to whom they had written were the first to be punished. Without trial or even a cursory investigation all Moslems suspected of having any connection abroad were summarily deported. The minimum sentence was five to ten years at hard labor in a concentration camp. Although corresponding abroad had eventually been proscribed, nevertheless all those who received postcards or letters from abroad were arrested and sent away, never to return.

As a result of these "purges," which were carried out under the pretext of ferreting out "nationalists" and "enemy spies," the Moslem population dwindled to terrifying proportions. This was done deliberately and systematically for the purpose of Russifying the Moslem peoples and countries. Ethnic Russians in great masses began to arrive and settle among the Moslems. The key positions in all the organs of administration were taken over by the Russians. National Moslem schools were transformed into mixed schools to accommodate the children of the Russian masters.

At the same time the Russians inaugurated a brutal program of Sovietization of the Moslem countries. Islamic religion, like all other religions, was declared an "opiate of the people." Special cadres of communist agitators brought from Russia began to propagate atheism and to ridicule the ancient Moslem mores and religious traditions. The priests and the faithful were subjected to all sorts of chicanery and persecution. All religious mosques were closed up, the premises being used either as club rooms or warehouses, where they were not razed altogether and the material used for other constructions. This "atheistic program" lasted from 1932 to 1937.

Parallel with this bestiality, a total collectivization of agriculture was forcibly imposed upon the Moslem peoples. Opposition, which at times even took the form of armed uprisings, was crushed by the Red terror. Over 30 per cent of the agricultural population

was liquidated: a good number of them were executed, while the majority was deported to various slave labor camps.

ABOLITION OF NATIONAL ALPHABET AND VANDALIC
DESTRUCTION OF MOSLEM BOOKS

In their policy of suppressing the non-Russian nations the Russian Communists have been using both Russification and Sovietization, the twin-brothers of destruction and denationalization. First to fall victim to this policy was the national alphabet of the Turkic peoples. This alphabet, which had been reformed by the addition of Arabic characters during the Russian Czarist rule, was now replaced with a Latin alphabet. But this Latin alphabet was so heavily Russified that the Russified Latin-type literature of one Turkic area could not be understood by the Turkic and Moslem peoples of other areas!

Simultaneously with the introduction of the Latinized and Russified alphabet a vast "purge," or rather "Sovietization," of all existing books in public and private libraries got under way. All the books and periodicals that had been previously published in the Arabic alphabet were declared to be "ideologically untenable" and permeated with "bourgeois nationalism." Since they were thus "anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary," they had to be removed from circulation and the library shelves. Needless to say, destroyed during this process was a great treasure of historical material in the form of rare manuscripts, literary and scientific, and parchment manuscripts which had been kept in museums since the time of independence of many of the Moslem peoples. Although the central authorities of Moscow stated that all such rare historical manuscripts would be removed to the museums of the central cities of the USSR, nobody ever saw them again. This invaluable source material of the Turkic peoples was purposely destroyed by the Russians.

Among the books which the NKVD destroyed because they were "ideologically untenable" were those of a religious and moral character. The books of the Koran and prayer books were confiscated indiscriminately, with only a limited number of the latter being left in the hands of Moslem priests. But with the continuing systematic arrest of the priests (scornfully called "servants of the cult" by the Russians), these as well as all other books connected with the Mohammedan religion were destroyed.

This attack upon religion was pressed with unparalleled brutality and barbarism. As mentioned above, it was the so-called "atheistic *piatiletka*," which began with the issuance by the Soviet gov-

ernment of a special decree on May 15, 1932. The decree called upon the Politburo, the NKVD and the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and all "activists" (spies) as well, to root out all religious sentiment among the people.

The anti-Islamic drive was especially severe in the Moslem countries. The NKVD left no stone unturned in their search for Moslem books. Those Moslems who failed to surrender their Islamic books, were arrested, accused of "sabotage" against the Soviet authority and of "bourgeois nationalism," and by administrative order sent to concentration camps to serve from eight to ten years at hard labor. The older generation, deprived of the books written in the Arabic alphabet and not knowing the Russian language, was automatically cast into the illiterate class.

But ten years had not passed when the communist rulers of Moscow abolished the Russified Latin-type alphabet and introduced the original Russian alphabet, which became compulsory for all the Turkic and Moslem peoples in the Soviet Union. In essence the Russian alphabet is alien to the peculiarities of pronunciation and phonetics of the Turkic language. But even in this field any resistance to acceptance of the Russian alphabet was regarded as sabotage and opposition to the Soviet authority. Punishment meted out to those in opposition ranged from ten-year terms in concentration camps to outright execution by the NKVD.

Here again, all previous editions of books in the Latin type were removed from circulation and were re-published in the Russian, thus submitting to ruthless Russification all branches of Moslem life.

Along with the introduction of the Russian alphabet the Russian Communists began Russifying the Turkic language itself. In every edition of a book or issue of a journal, under a strict communist censorship, Russian words and entire phrases were incorporated into the Turkic text, resulting in a considerable alteration of the national Turkic language.

By transforming the Turkic literature with the introduction of Russian words, phrases and terminology on the one hand, and by eliminating words and terms from the national and traditional Turkic language on the other, the Russian communist "reformers" created considerable difficulties to be overcome on the part of the readers of different generations. For instance, a person who learned to read and write some fifteen years ago even according to the Russified alphabet can hardly understand the present-day Russified literature and language, the disparity is so great.

The implementation of Russification with respect to the Turkic language was dictated by the policies of the Communist Party. As far back as 1930 Stalin presented this directive to the XVth congress of the Communist Party:

It is necessary to enable the national cultures to develop themselves and grow so that they could manifest all their potentialities and create the conditions for the fusion into one general culture, with one general language in the period of victory of socialism in the world . . .

Stalin, who long ago conceived the idea of fusing these non-Russian languages into one general language (Russian), toward that goal employed all means and methods at his disposal. His successor, Khrushchev, continues the nefarious practices of Stalin.

But the resistance of the Moslem peoples against this systematic Russification has been unending, although they have made huge sacrifices in the forms of mass executions and mass deportations to the northern areas of Siberia. At the end of the bloody "Yezhov terror" (1937), the Russians shut all mosques and confiscated all properties belonging to the Islamic religious communities.

RUSSIA'S *Divide et Impera* WITH RESPECT TO THE TURKIC TONGUE

Up to the end of the XIXth century all the Turkic peoples of the Russian empire used a single literary language, the Chagatai. Not only did the khans and emirs of the Turkic peoples use Chagatai in the period of their glory and splendor, the national leaders of the Kalmuck people as well used to write their diplomatic notes and treaties in that language, although both the Kalmucks and the Mongols have their own independent language. In this instance the Turkic cultural influence upon the Kalmucks could be compared to the French cultural influence upon the Russians at the time that Leo Tolstoy wrote his novels, *War and Peace*, *Anna Karenina*, *Resurrection*, and others.

But instead of using the popular and generally accepted Chagatai language, the Russian Communists employed an ingenious method of "divide and rule" by introducing eight different literary languages for the Moslem peoples, taking as a basis the eight different dialects: Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Kara-Kalpak, Azerbaijanian, Bashkir and Tatar. Following the same imperialistic pattern, they created new political bodies which as Soviet Socialist Republics, or Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and *oblasts*, divided the Moslem peoples: the Uzbek SSR, Kirghiz SSR, Turkmen SSR, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, Azerbaijanian SSR, Bashkir and Tatar ASSR.

All books that had been published earlier in the Chagatai language were declared to be permeated with "bourgeois nationalist

ideology" and to be counter-revolutionary, and were taken out of circulation.

DESTRUCTION OF MEMORY OF NATIONAL HEROES AND FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY, VANDALISM ON MUSEUMS AND HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

Many writers, poets, scientists and other leaders of the national liberation movements of the Turkic and Moslem peoples were destroyed by the Russian Communists because they stood in opposition to Russian Communist imperialism and enslavement. But the fruits of their work could not be destroyed, and there remain many silent witnesses of the independent culture and national splendor of the Turkic peoples.

Take, for instance, the theaters in Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Ashkhabad, Stalinabad, Baku and Bakhchiserai (the latter in Crimea) which were built as centers of the Turkic national culture. Some of them to this very day still bear the names of national heroes, like the Alishir Nevaine Theater in Tashkent. The theater possesses the Turkic architectural style and artistic ornament, and its walls are covered with miniatures taken from the manuscript of the Chagatai poet, Alishir Nevaine, which reflect the past glory and grandeur of the Turkic peoples.

In the period of the first decade of Soviet Russian domination plays of local origin were staged in the national theaters. But with the onset of the political campaign against Turkic history and literature and with the Russification program these national plays were soon replaced with Russian plays, either in translation or in the original Russian language. Along with the theaters, also preserved were historical palaces, castles, libraries, fountains, school buildings and the like, all of which attest to the historical independence and political and cultural separateness of the Turkic and Moslem peoples. The Russian Communists have campaigned not only against these historical monuments, but the national heroes as well. For instance, such Turkestanian heroes as Kinesari, Dzankhodza and Sirim were tolerated by the Russians until 1936, but after that date they were declared to be "reactionaries, oppressors of the people and traitors."

The Russian Communists also forbade the printing of such national epic poetry of Turkestan as "Alpamish," "Korkut-Ata," "Manas" or "The Great Campaign"; "Yedige" of the Tatar people and "Chora-Batir" of the Crimean people. From the viewpoint of the Kremlin these national works are "anti-national" and "anti-Soviet." Since these literary treasures glorify the national liberation move-

ments of the Turkic and Moslem peoples, they in essence are both anti-Russian and anti-communist.

The ban and elimination of national heroes from the national epics constitutes only a single landmark on the road of the subversion and falsification of the national liberation movements of this or other Turkic people; of the conquest by Russia of separate Moslem states, of the community of Moslem culture and history, and the like. From what now appears in the latest books of history one readily sees that the historians have become the instrument of Soviet Russian propaganda and the nationality policy of the USSR. For instance, the work, *The History of the Peoples of Central Asia* (but not, simply, *The History of Central Asia*) betrays even in its title a political line of the Communist Party. Both in the title and in the content of the book there is a tendency to ignore both the history of Turkestan as a unique historical process and the historical-cultural community of all the Moslem peoples. The historical name of Turkestan suggests a centuries-long past, which conflicts with the over-all Russian policy requirement in these areas. And yet the books of W. Barthold (Academy of Sciences of the USSR) had been originally titled, *The History of Turkestan in the Pre-Mongol Era* and *The History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan*. Such titles are now regarded as "anti-Soviet" and are outlawed. The falsification of the history of Turkestan and of other Turkic and Moslem peoples has been officially legalized by the communist dictatorship of the USSR.

But even in this harsh nationality policy there are some definite contradictions. For instance, some parts of the Kazakh epic, "Manas" or "The Great Campaign," have been translated into the Russian and published in *de luxe* editions. But the Kazakhs cannot make use of these editions unless they learn Russian, which was undoubtedly the original purpose of the Russians.

With the falsification of Turkic history the Russians declared war on Turkic and Moslem national museums and historical monuments. During the first decade of the communist rule the national museums had been declared "authentic repositories of the cultural attainments of the Moslem peoples." Subsequently, however, the museums were transformed into "museums of the revolution" with the addition of all the communist propaganda trappings. Eventually all the historical treasures and relics pertaining to the history of the Turkic peoples were indiscriminately carted away forever.

In some places the destruction of the historical monuments clearly bore a barbaric character. It is impossible to enumerate all these acts of Russian barbarism, but the inhabitants of such cities as

Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva (Turkestan), Kazan (Idel-Ural), Baku (Azerbaijan), Temirkhan-Shura (the Caucasus) and Bakhchiserai (the Crimea) could attest to the brutal destruction by the Russians of the priceless cultural heritage. Even the mausoleum of Tamerlane, the great Turkestanian conqueror, was subjected to "reconstruction" with the purpose of minimizing its significance as well as to debase the memory of the famed Turkic leader among the people. Many mausoleums of the Crimean khans in Bakhchiserai also were pillaged and destroyed.

The underlying aim in destroying these historical monuments was to demonstrate to the young generation that prior to the Bolshevik revolution there were no cultural or artistic achievements, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party is alone capable of giving the people a culture and progress.

"THE SOCIALIST NATIONS" AND THE GENOCIDE OF THE MOSLEM PEOPLES

To exploit the discovery of new sources of iron ore, uranium and oil (Bashkirostan, Kazakhstan and Tatarostan), the communist leadership of Moscow decided to build a series of new cities. To facilitate this task, it determined to Russify the Turkic and Moslem peoples of these areas. With the construction of the new cities the traditional mode of life underwent a thorough change. In the new cities no special quarters for the Moslem population were erected, and in the final analysis the Moslems were compelled to live together with the Russians. Food rations in places of work were doled out by common kitchens. While their parents were at work, the children were sent to common kindergartens, and as they grew, they went to common schools, attended common clubs and theaters, and so on. These conditions exist in all the national Moslem republics and *oblasts*.

Through this process of Russification and Sovietization the children are detached from their parents early in life and are thoroughly Russified by communist leaders in the kindergartens, schools, clubs and theaters. Under the relentless impact of the Russian communist environment, they cannot but forget their parents and their Turkic language.

This state of affairs often drives the Turkic people to resistance and overt rebellion. In 1944, for instance, the Kazakh workers quit their factory near the city of Taldikurgan ("Turksib," Seme-rechie) in protest against the Russian communist oppression and joined an anti-communist uprising in Dzungaria. (The large-scale

uprising in Kazakhstan is described by Godfrey Lies in his book, *The Exodus of the Kazakhs*, Evans Brothers, 1956, London.)

All the major programs of construction undertaken among the Turkic and Moslem peoples have always been accompanied by a transfer of the local population and the importation of ethnic Russians, their numbers being so calculated that the autochthonous population be in a minority. Then the program of Russification is assured of total success. Once all the key positions are taken by the Russians, we have the "socialist nations" under the leadership of the Russian Communists.

The whole agricultural policy of the Kremlin with respect to the rural population is based on the so-called "political campaigns," and so also aims at the Russification of the conquered peoples. Khrushchev's campaign for the cultivation of "virgin lands" in Kazakhstan and Siberia or his chimeric plan for constructing *agro-gorods*, not to mention other schemes, is also to be thought of as a method of Russification.

The Russification tendencies are evident in all the major "political campaigns" of the Soviet government, as substantiated by the following examples:

(1) The "integration of collective farms" was accomplished by the forceful resettlement of the non-Russian collective farmers into the Russian settlements, and vice-versa. By so doing, the Kremlin established a tendentious situation, in which the Russians found themselves in the majority. They assumed all the key positions in the "integrated collective farms";

(2) The administrative, technical and agronomical personnel in an "integrated collective farm" is always an instrument of the local committee of the Communist Party; the majority, as a rule, are Russians;

(3) With the "integration of collective farms," large industrial brigades were established for the purpose of bringing the organization of labor in agriculture closer to the industrial labor type. These, too, were so organized that the Russians always comprised a majority. The Moslems were forced to use the Russian language and to accept Russian mores and customs;

(4) With the change in the way of life in the "integrated collective farms," the *agro-gorods* and the "virgin lands," the housing facilities were so arranged that the Moslem workers and farmers were forced to live with the Russians under the same roof. For many years they have been wholly separated from the sources of their national culture and environment, and subjected unrelentingly to the process of Russification and Sovietization.

According to Prof. Eugene Pyziur, (*A New Fragment of Soviet Agrarian Policy*, published by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, 1952, New York, p. 48) the "integration of collective farms could not have served the industrial objectives, it was meant for the purpose of social alteration—the destruction of the peasantry as a social group."

But we might supplement this statement by observing that in the non-Russian areas this policy also serves as an efficient method of Russification, which is systematically implemented under the guise of the struggle against "bourgeois nationalism."

Lenin once wrote: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism are two irreconcilable and inimical slogans befitting the two great class camps of the entire world and expressing two policies (more than that: two world viewpoints) in the nationality problem" (V. I. Lenin, *Sochyneniya*, Vol. 20, 4th Ed., p. 10).

Which means that the policy of proletarian internationalism is directly opposed and is intransigently hostile to the liberation movement policy of the Turkic and Moslem peoples.

None other than that "authority" on the nationality problem, Stalin, wrote:

The socialist nations are new Soviet nations, which developed and formed on the foundations of old bourgeois nations after the destruction of capitalism in Russia and the liquidation of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties and the establishment of the Soviet system (J. V. Stalin: *Sochyneniya*, Vol 11, p. 339).

In pursuing the policy of "developing socialist nations," the Russian Communists are determined to suppress the non-Russian nations in the USSR, their cultures, their religion and their separate and distinct entities. In pursuit of this policy every means is considered to be more than merely acceptable, including mass genocide. Through their policy of outright genocide the Russians have destroyed entire peoples of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Among them were the Chechens, Ingush, Karachai, Balkars and Tartars of the Crimea. These small peoples numbered about 1,400,000 persons prior to the liquidation. At least 800,000 of them were exterminated in wholesale murder by the special Soviet security troops known as *Smersh* (NKVD-MVD). The remainder, consisting in the main of women, children and old people, were herded into freight cars and, under most inhuman conditions, sent to the various concentration camps in Siberia and to other parts of the Asiatic mainland.

This act of genocide was perpetrated in the period between 1943 and the middle of 1945, but the official notification of the Supreme Soviet was published only on June 26, 1946, that is, almost

two years after the mass murder of the Turkic and Moslem peoples took place.

Today, both the Crimea and the Caucasus, from the viewpoint of population, present a conglomeration which in "no measure wants to unite with the Moslem world." It does not look toward Turkey, either, as a bridge for the exodus from communism. Similar measures of destruction of the Moslem peoples were undertaken by the Russians with respect to the peoples of Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Idel-Ural, Altai and Siberia.

Those Turks and Moslems who have remained alive are trying to emigrate to other parts of the Soviet Union or to escape abroad, whenever possible, usually with the aid of a Russian alias.

In conclusion, we have to rely on what Lenin defined as "dictatorship":

Dictatorship is a bloody word, expressing an implacable struggle to death of two classes, two worlds . . . This dictatorship applies ruthless, severe, rapid and decisive violence.

That the present rulers of the Kremlin, including Khrushchev, are faithfully fulfilling the precepts of Lenin is eloquently demonstrated by the wholesale destruction of the Turkic and Moslem peoples by the Russians at this very moment.

GUIDING IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

A few months ago this writer had the honor and real privilege of joining an official group on a visit to the Middle East. In every sense of the word the trip was incomparable. The people we met, the discussions we engaged in, and the many vital things we observed, all contributed to the richness and the depth of our experience. The trip could not literally be purchased by a private citizen for even a million dollars. Covering over 23,000 miles by air, land, and water, it included not only several of the Middle Eastern states but also a number of countries which are, strictly speaking, not in the Middle East area. However, the interests of these bordering countries are perhaps more immediately related to turns and changes of development in the Middle East than those of our own country.

The fact that one was fortunate to make a trip of this sort does not, of course, qualify him as an expert on the subject. Indeed, the writer is far from being a specialist on the Middle East. Yet, judging by the insular views and even unbalanced perspectives of some of our acknowledged Middle East experts, particularly where they concern U.S. foreign policy, it seems quite advantageous not to become too engrossed in the details of data flowing out of the Middle East. This does not mean that thinking Americans should not be interested in a variety of ways with the problems and tasks of the peoples of the Middle East in like manner that we are with those of peoples and nations elsewhere. On the contrary, in behalf of our own interests we have definite objectives in the Middle East and the fulfilment of them requires the support of the nations involved. But the observation does mean that we should constantly maintain a clear perspective of the Middle East and its host of problems and difficulties in terms of the global struggle between national freedom and Russian Communist imperialism and colonialism. This primary perspective, based on a rational scale of priority of problems, is frequently lost in the writings of those experts who in their rapturous attachments picture the solutions of Middle East problems as ends in themselves.

As one would expect, each of us on the trip approached the area with an individual set of preconceptions. Actually, to have done otherwise would have meant entering it blindly. These necessary preconceptions were developed in the course of a year's intensive study aided by some of the best minds on the subject. In a thoroughly scientific manner we entered the area with general views that served a number of purposes. One, they enabled us to seek out essentials with minimum of time and effort. In contrast to many American visitors to the Soviet Union, for example, we knew beforehand what to look for. Second, they facilitated a process of question-raising which quickly focussed the issues of any problem. And thirdly, these preconceived views were in essence hypotheses which demanded empirical proofs by direct observation.

In my case the most important preconceptions were as follows: (1) from the viewpoint of U.S. national interest, the Middle East is and will continue to be a secondary area on the field of the current global conflict; (2) the Middle East is nevertheless a crucial and significant area, even more so than the Far East, from which to wage a successful offensive against the imperialist Russian threat to all independent nations; (3) the United States can and should assist in the solution of certain problems in the Middle East, but it would be futile and naïve to hope for a moderately long-run solution of every major problem in the area; and (4) the paramount goal of U.S. policy in the area is to prevent at whatever cost the entrenchment of colonial Russian power in any part of it. It was with these preconceived views that the writer embarked upon an empirical study of close observation at a time immediately prior to the Lebanese crisis and the subsequent Iraqi revolution.

TUNISIA AND NORTH AFRICA

Our first important stop was Tunisia. The country, with its 48,000 square miles, is much like Louisiana in size. Its population of approximately 4 million people consists of over 3 million Moslemic Tunisians, about 180,000 French, and the rest made up predominantly of Italians, Algerians, and Jews. This newly independent country is chiefly agricultural in character, the main crops being wheat, barley, olives, and grapes. It possesses a number of major mining industries in iron, lead, zinc, and natural gas, but its greater potentialities in these and related enterprises await further economic development. To realize such development in more rapid course, Tunisia unquestionably requires foreign aid, the largest contribution to which can come only from the United States.

There are many general and specific factors that enter into the consideration of granting aid to foreign governments for economic development. One paramount factor is that the absorptive powers of an economy must be carefully considered if sound and balanced development is to be sustained. In Tunisia, as almost everywhere else in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, illiteracy is high, poverty is widespread, and capital in the form of national experience and skilled resources is in short supply. In varying degree this is the characteristic pattern one encounters throughout these areas. The pattern sets limits to the amounts of capital that can be prudently injected into most of these economies. In fact, for all these areas the prime element of capital is time—time for training, time for education, time for cumulating experience.

Those politicians and columnists who clamor for the United States to adopt as its prime objective a broad economic and social development program in these areas, are not only unthinking and unrealistic politically but also economically. Such an international New Deal program would lead to inevitable wastes and would hardly contribute to stave off the encroachments of Russian colonialism. As a matter of pointed fact, if the history of forty years of Russian Communist aggression demonstrates anything, it is the truth that healthy and growing economies are in themselves insufficient deterrents against Russian colonial expansion. Historical accidents, political strategy and tactics, and the threat of unleashed military power weigh far more heavily. This observation applies to these areas just as much as it did to Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Looked at more critically, there is a certain unrealistic amount of economic determinism in the position taken by those politicians and columnists who argue that economic and social betterment is a sure guarantee against the inroads of Russian imperialist expansionism. They fail to ask themselves the question that if this were so, then why does Moscow offer its material contributions to many of these countries which, in some instances, have for centuries been prime goals of Russian conquest? The answer to this should be obvious.

To avoid the economic and also political wastes of any international New Deal program, sound foreign aid measures should carefully examine each national economy on its own merits, and in every case a priority of evaluation should be given to political considerations. In the case of Tunisia the situation is really not as involved as some picture it to be. Led by its dynamic and colorful President Habib Bourguiba, the Republic of Tunisia is undoubtedly a focal point in North Africa. With proportioned aid for its internal

development, Tunisia can play a leading role in the solution of the Algerian problem and in the practical realization of a North African federation of Arab states. Even recent rifts between the Bourguiba government and both the Algerian F.L.N. and Morocco would not seriously hamper this.

These broad directions for U.S. foreign policy in the area would satisfy many ends. Contrary to some opinion, such developments would actually contribute to the gainful interests of our French ally in view of the organic economic ties that would persist between such a federation and France. They would also meet the natural urges of Arab nationalism and present another form or stage in the evolution of Arab unity. Moreover, they would create a tremendous impact on the rest of the Arab world and would virtually eliminate some of the existing vulnerabilities in North Africa to indirect Russian penetration. The resulting dynamic stability would provide untold advantages in oil, defensive military posture, and psycho-political strength against the common enemy. It should not be difficult to discern what the alternative to such policy directions, and all its negative consequences, would be.

Before proceeding on to Iraq and other states in the Middle East, a point of considerable value deserves emphasis here. Conversations with Tunisians and other Moslems disclosed a keen awareness of the oppressions to which their brother Moslems in the Soviet Union are being subjected. These expressions of knowledge and sympathetic affinity were, however, of an individual and isolated tenor rather than an organized one. Moreover, they were on a religious plane rather than on the more important level of mutual nationalism. Despite these shortcomings, the Tunisians displayed a greater familiarity with this vital subject in the Soviet Union than our own people assigned to Tunis. There is virtually no effort exerted by the United States Information Service to inform Moslems in North Africa about Russian colonial domination over Moslemic Turkestanians and others in the USSR. This is a serious defect, largely born of ignorance, which one meets with throughout these Moslem areas. Yet concentrated effort on such information, disseminated with meaningful conceptual forms, is one of our most powerful weapons against Russian duplicity and infiltration.

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East is undoubtedly a maze of problems, conflicts, and entanglements. It is worthwhile for us Americans to continually bear in mind that this maze has roots dating back decades and even centuries. Most of the issues in the area well antedate the current

global struggle in which we are engaged. To plunge deeply into this mire of problems and unavoidably lose progressive sight of our primary objective in the region would spell disaster. For an anti-imperialist nation with responsibilities of free world leadership thrown upon it a certain transcendence of thought and attitude is necessary to avert deep sectional involvements and vacillating positions in this environment of flux and change. This is not an easy task, to be sure, but it is the only peaceable course by which the major forces now at work in the region can be channeled in favor of our primary objective.

We landed in Iraq many weeks before the startling revolt. From there it was Saudi Arabia and, later on, Israel. At these three vantage points we felt the pulse of movements emanating from other quarters in the area. Each of these points tells a story in itself to correct some of the unsafe notions harbored by experts with biases in one direction or another. To be pro-Arab or pro-Israel, pro-legitimacy or pro-republican, or pro-military defense or pro-economic development—and we met spokesmen for each grouping with, of course, some cross-sectional ties—usually distorts the picture in some degree of emotional heat. Keeping in mind the chief threat to the area, i. e. the Russian bear to the north, one can view the forces represented by each of these groupings with some objective detachment and prepare tactically for their canalization toward our primary goal. It must be remembered that regardless of rifts between governments and the mistakes that we have made in the past, we still have countless Arab and Israeli friends in all strata of their societies. Difficulties and even dilemmas will constantly haunt us, of course, but if we steadfastly maintain our valid objectives with principle and firm determination and within these broad limits adapt ourselves flexibly to swift changes which should be anticipated in the form of real possibilities, there is no reason why our paramount objective could not be successfully realized.

No, in Iraq, at the time, there wasn't the faintest concrete indication that a revolt was brewing. The country, with its 6.5 million population in an area of 168,039 square miles, like that of California, was bubbling with intense economic activity. According to the premises of our economic determinists, this condition should have conduced to maximum political stability. Much was done economically and socially for general development. Substantial oil revenues were invested in irrigation projects, redistributed land, hospitals, education and the like. The financial condition of the country was excellent and the 60 per cent of the population in agriculture was prospering in staples of barley, wheat, rice and cotton. A political

overturn nevertheless did take place. The nationalist urge for Arab unity did successfully express itself.

Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam, is another example of wealth, social and economic development, and attempted reform. This hereditary monarchy under King Saud ibn Abdul Aziz has a population of 7 million in an area of 618,000 square miles which contains tremendous oil reserves. It is a country of sharp contrasts between the ancient and the modern. Significant development projects have been undertaken but, as elsewhere, illiteracy is rife. The most modern schools and hospitals have been built, but there is a marked dearth of trained personnel to run them. Politically, the situation is a shaky one, and even with an expected shift to a constitutional monarchy the forces of Arab unity will continue to make deep inroads among the Saudis.

For our purposes these two examples stand well above Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria or any other section in the Arab states area of 1,675, 234 square miles to demonstrate the foolhardiness of subordinating political objectives to the economic. The driving force for Arab unity among the approximately 48 million Arabs in the Middle East should have been long ago properly weighed and appreciated. It is truly a cause for wonderment that following the Lebanese call for American intervention several U.S. Senators finally realized that nationalism is a basic force in the Middle East and urged that we support it. Those, including this writer, who have for years advocated this, continue to emphasize that our support of the forces of nationalism be founded on a single standard of morality. Such a view serves multiple purposes, especially in the general area of the Middle East. By clearly supporting both Arab and Israeli nationalism and working toward their harmonious co-existence we would undoubtedly weaken the false Russian appeal which thrives only on division. Concurrent with this, our plain and astute support of the forces of nationalism within the Soviet Union itself—particularly the Moslemic Turkestani, Azerbaijani, and others in reference to this area of free Islam—would completely nullify Russian colonial objectives. This operational view demands that we perceive things in their interrelated totality, but this writer scarcely witnessed such an orientation among our own people in these regions.

In setting these guidelines it should be realized that what is called Nasserism is not conceptually identical with Arab nationalism. It is one of its expressions and Nasser himself is one of its leading symbols. Many Americans share the thought that we have made several grave mistakes in relation to Nasser. These mistakes have forced him to look elsewhere for aid. However, the situation is not

beyond repair. The appeal and popularity of Nasser is far and wide. The dynamism represented by this symbol will bring further changes in the Middle East. But these changes will certainly not take place along linear routes. Even Nasser is subject to the desires and opinions of his own Egyptians, not to mention other Arab pressures in Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Necessarily playing it by ear but always cognizant of our own primary objective, we must be prepared to accommodate ourselves to the inevitable changes toward more integrated Arab unity, one that will be achieved in stages and very likely in different forms. What is of essence is the increasing friendship of the Arab world, including the present United Arab Republic, and the consequent reduction of any possibility of a Russian colony emerging in this region.

A harmonious coexistence between Arab nationalism and Israeli nationalism is by no means an impractical goal. Indeed, it is a necessity. Israel is here to stay, and intelligent Arab spokesmen privately admit it. With proper gestures and mutual accord it won't be long before public Arab acceptance of this fact will be noticed. Of the size of New Jersey and populated by over 2 million people, including some 180,000 Arabs, Israel is one of the most progressive and prosperous countries in the Middle East. Its economy is fairly well balanced and its leadership is highly enlightened. The spirit of its people is vibrant and confident. There can be no doubt that if the independence of Israel were seriously threatened, the people would fight to the last soul. Actually, it would take years for any such Arab threat to materialize, and during this time a peaceful development would serve to obviate the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities. Again with an eye on our primary objective, it is definitely in our interest and in the mutual interest of Arab and Israeli alike that such a development be furthered. The Arab world would gain immensely from a respected, prosperous, and cultured Israel. Israel would gain reciprocally from the cultural and material advancements now in being throughout the Arab world. The party that would be sure to lose is imperialist Moscow.

THE NORTHERN TIER AND INDIA

One of the most significant features of Israeli thinking is its full understanding of the nature of the global struggle. The writer was impressed by ideas along these lines in Iraq, too. He would go so far as to suggest that many American officials and wandering students might learn a great deal about the subject in certain sectors of this part of the world. The brute menace of Russian im-

perialism and colonialism is clearly understood for what it is. The façade of "international communism" is realistically discounted and the centuries-old Russian problem is freely and frankly discussed. None of the misleading vagaries about Marxism, "the Soviet peoples," "Soviet Communism" and the like is permitted to becloud their perception of the real problem and threat.

As one travels in the Muslim countries of the vital "northern tier"—Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—the realism of both official and private leaders, concerning the Russian problem, is refreshing and encouraging. It is ultimately this firm knowledge about the problem and what to expect from the Russian imperialists that provides us with sturdy and loyal allies in these countries. To frustrate the traditional borderlands policy of Russia, which for centuries has used it as a weapon of conquest and empire-building, the independence and internal strength of these nations are indispensable to the United States in realizing its primary objective. In terms of our interest there is a vast difference between some Arab state joining a larger Arab unity and one of these METO partners leaving the Pact or being undermined by Russian subversion. Of course, the former must be watched because of outflanking possibilities. The latter must be prevented at all costs because it would unquestionably open a dike for the Russian inundation. The basic distinction between the two cases is that a solidification of nationalism is involved in one and an endangerment to nationalism emerges in the other.

Each of these Muslim countries has its set of problems. The Kashmir issue, the problem of the five rivers, border disputes, and internal economic difficulties beset Pakistan. The illiteracy rate is high in this Muslim democracy, split between West Pakistan and its 33.8 million and East Pakistan with its 42 million. However, notable economic progress has been achieved, although much remains to be done. The United States is assisting this valuable ally in a proper way and the interests of the two are mutually served. The Pakistani are sturdy fighters. Some of the specimens seen up north and in the Khyber Pass are models for any nation. A close affinity exists between the Pakistani and the enslaved Turkestani just up north in the Soviet Union. With additional resources the Pakistani would have no fear in seeking the liberation of their brothers in the Russian prison of nations. As one high level official told this writer, "You don't have to impress us with this goal. You should sell this to your own government." The bold fact here, as elsewhere, is that sheer ignorance blinds us to the opportunity of reversing for freedom the old Russian borderlands policy.

In the basically agricultural countries of Turkey and Iran similar economic and political problems exist. Cyprus, internal development, the Syrian neighbor, and the existence of Kurd and other minorities present Turkey with actual or potential difficulties. Economic problems characteristic of the area contribute to a political instability in Iran which the Russian influence in the country does not hesitate to promote. The solution of some of these problems naturally requires our proportionate assistance; and both countries are receiving it. However, our guidelines of interest in the area would require more than just ancillary help if, for example, the present regime in Iraq or Moscow itself should show signs of stirring up the Kurds for the creation of a satellite Kurdish state, extending from portions of Iraq through northwestern Iran and eastern Turkey into the Soviet Union. There are about 10 million Kurds, mostly Sunnite Mohammedans, whom Moscow sought to arouse as late as 1945. Approximately one million are in Iraq alone. A venture of this sort would unmistakably be "indirect aggression" deserving of our firmest direct action. The possibility of such a venture is real and would be in tune with traditional Russian policy. It can be best offset by a policy of freedom directed at the submerged nations to the north of the "northern tier." The writer feels quite certain that, as in the case of Pakistan, both Turkey and elements in Iran are prepared to launch in coordinated action a policy of this nature.

The visits to India and later to Greece and Portugal were somewhat marginal concerning the problems of the Middle East. It was, of course, instructive to learn from high sources the problems peculiar to their nations and their views in relation to the Soviet Union and the rumblings in the Middle East. In India it appears that Russian agents are doing a far more effective disinformational job than our own U.S.I.A. is doing an informational one. The impressions certain Indian leaders have of the Soviet Union are hardly worthy of a nation which successfully overcame a foreign colonialism. India is doubtlessly an important and integral part of the free world, but in addition to wheat, credits, and other forms of aid, it is in dire need of a comprehension of Russian colonialism and imperialism within the USSR itself. In Greece and Portugal the writer sensed a deep interest in this fundamental subject. As elsewhere, the two countries have their respective interests and difficulties. However, as to the primary importance of the Russian menace, there is no question of their dedication to its eventual defeat.

The preconceptions stated earlier were more than confirmed by the direct observations of this unique trip. The writer is more than

ever convinced as to their validity. He is more impressed than ever by the necessity for American officialdom to assume an integral view of these situations and developments and to take advantage of the great opportunities afforded by both Africa and Asia. On a scale of priority, the most essential areas of concern and policy for the United States are Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These are the basic sources of insecurity and danger to imperialist Russia. We must never allow ourselves to guarantee these two areas to Moscow so that it would be free to concentrate its weight in any of the essentially secondary areas. On the contrary, girded to the support of nationalism, our policy should be aimed at a combined effort of nationalist forces within and immediately outside the Russian Communist Empire to overwhelm through peaceable means, as concerns any global war, the tentacles of colonial Russian domination. In pursuing such a policy we and our allies need have little fear of the forces of the Soviet Union. With half of them being non-Russian, these forces have always been feared for their unreliability in the act of war by Russia itself. To view these situations clearly and to see them as a whole are our prime requisites.

STATUS QUO "LIBERALS" AND THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

By ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN

Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Laborites in Britain, recently wrote that the Hungarian uprising of 1956 constituted "a disturbing element" in world affairs.¹ Indeed, what happened in East Berlin in 1953, and what happened in Poznan four months before the blood-bath of Budapest, has disturbed not only the dictator of the Soviet Empire, but liberals everywhere who thought that the political, social, and economic revolution of East-Central Europe was here to stay.

Ever since November, 1956, these liberals (who couldn't be less interested in liberty for the captive peoples) have been trying to figure out how to justify the continued presence of slavery in the area. Long opposed to the horrifying idea of liberation of the captive nations, many liberals began also to attack the concept of containment as unnecessarily "rigid" and "inflexible." They have criticized the West for surrounding the Soviet Union, and have asked, How we would like it if the Soviets were in Mexico and Canada?

The theme which the advocates of a permanent world half-slave and half-free now develop is that the Soviets are too strong to dislodge from East-Central Europe, and that we must now, in this terrible world of missiles and nuclear weapons, accept Soviet control of the slave nations. Indeed, one of these *status quo* liberals, Socialist Norman Thomas, suggests that we might have something to gain by letting the Soviets expand even farther to enslave all of Korea and other "relatively small" nations:

How much of our wealth, how many of our sons and our hopes for any sort of future is it worth investing to keep some future Syngman Rhee in power in some relatively small nation? . . . Would Russia be a stronger or weaker enemy for us if, not by subversion but by military conquest or threat

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958, p. 543.

of it, she should acquire the burden of governing the passionate nationalists of industrially backward regions? ²

Mr. Thomas seems to have little regard for "passionate nationalists," who for him are mere pawns in world affairs.

Walter Millis, of the Fund for the Republic, is another *status quo* liberal who not only wants us to accept Soviet control of East-Central Europe and stop talking liberation, but who also refuses to pass judgment on whether or not it is a good thing that the captive nations remain slaves. Millis, the crusader in behalf of Alger Hiss,³ thinks that crusaders in behalf of Eastern Europe are warmongers. The Communist "revolution," he says, has

produced a political-social organization of society which, whether it is good or evil, has demonstrated that it is both viable and powerful.⁴

Millis seems to have a short memory about the viability of the East German regime in 1953 and that of Rakosi and Company in 1956. Let's stop the war against Communism, he urges, and stick to the pursuit of happiness. Above all, let us recognize that the "historical" processes which enslaved East-Central Europe cannot be undone:

We can call off the 'cold war' tomorrow and apply ourselves genuinely to a solution of the problems of competitive coexistence. We can, as C. L. Sulzberger put it in a recent column in *The Times*, forget the war on 'international Communism' and stick to self-defense, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . we must recognize that 'coexistence' means the continued existence of *both* of the two great systems of social and political organization. . . The establishment of Communist regimes in China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and in Central Europe is the result of historic processes which, whether good or ill, cannot be undone . . . We should accept the situation and learn to live with it rather than indulge in counter-revolutionary hopes and propaganda.⁵

It is exciting to imagine what will happen to us once we stop resisting Moscow while Moscow keeps hammering at the door. Sulzberger and Millis, who were fond of attacking isolationism in the Fascist era, are now prescribing an isolationist policy. It would be difficult to imagine these two champions of "competitive coexistence" (whatever that may mean) telling us in 1939 that due to "historical processes" Austria, Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia were now part of the great social and political organization of Fascism (for good or ill) and that we should accept the situation and learn

² "Defense, Disarmament, Diplomacy, and Despair," *New Leader*, January 27, 1958.

³ *Saturday Review*, July 12, 1958, p. 21.

⁴ As quoted in the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, July 14, 1958.

⁵ Walter Millis, "How to Compete With the Russians," *New York Times Magazine*, February 2, 1958.

to live with it. I feel quite certain that if these two advocates of the double standard of political morality had so argued, that their articles would not have appeared in *The New York Times*.

During the process of surveying the literature of the "let's be nicer to the Russians" fraternity, one cannot overlook the gems of Walter Lippmann, whose favorite writer is none other than George Kennan, the Sage of Princeton. Lippmann wants us to "disengage" from the Soviets, although he does not tell us whether they will, at the same time, be so good as to disengage from us. Writing in *Atlantic Monthly*, which likes articles written by the "let's retreat and maybe the enemy will reform" club, Lippmann recently informed his readers that the Kennan program was the only sane one. Indeed, says the one-time boy wonder:

The road which Mr. Kennan pointed out is the only alternative which has some promise of leading to the reunification of Germany and to the national independence of the East European states.⁶

Here is a novel doctrine, as expanded by the quotation that follows: The Free World must withdraw from Europe and respect the "vital interests" of the Soviet Union, all of which will lead to the national independence of the Soviet satellites. Lippmann expands his "be kind to Communism" theme by way of praising the disengagement views of Air Marshal (retired) Sir John Slessor. Referring to the "settlement" of East-West differences which will result from adoption of the Slessor program, Lippmann writes

Such a settlement must be designed not only to protect our own vital interests. It must respect the vital interests of Russia . . . We do not have to prove to ourselves now that the Soviet Union will be moderate and reasonable in negotiations. All that we have to do, and all that we can do, is to work out a program of settlement which a Russian government could find acceptable if that government were moderate and reasonable, if it were protecting its vital interests, but not seeking aggressively to dominate Europe.⁷

One wonders what Russian government Sir Walter has in mind here. Certainly not the Khrushchev regime, nor for that matter the Romanov regimes that preceded it. But it's all very simple, Just "work out a program of settlement" which will be acceptable to the "moderate and reasonable" government that is trying to do you in. That is "all that we have to do."

By way of summation, let us list the chief desires of the *status quo* liberals with respect to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Empire:

⁶ *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1958.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*

1. Call off the cold war.
2. Stick to self-defense, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
3. Recognize that the satellite regimes are here to stay.
4. The Hungarian revolt is a "disturbing element."
5. Any East-West settlement must respect Russia's vital interests.
6. Such a settlement must be acceptable to Russia.
7. It might be a good idea to even let Russia take some more "industrially backward" regions.

Consider for a moment how the liberals would feel if the proponents of liberty for the captive nations were to suggest the reverse of the same seven points, with emphasis on what might be good for the United States rather than what is acceptable to the Soviet Union. Here they are:

1. Tell Russia to call off the cold war.
2. Tell Russia to stick to self-defense, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
3. The satellite regimes are not here to stay.
4. The Hungarian revolt was fine, and suggests the beginning of the end for slavery.
5. Any East-West settlement must respect the vital interests of the United States.
6. Such a settlement must be acceptable to the United States.
7. It might even be a good idea to let the United States liberate some of the captive nations.

Can you imagine the reaction in liberal "let's be kind to Khrushchev" circles to such a program? Why, their indignation would know no bounds! Such a program is "jingoistic," "nationalistic," "bypasses the UN," "inflexible," and shows lack of understanding of Soviet "vital interests." Most importantly, it would not be "acceptable" to the Communist leaders.

I would speculate that the Thomas-Millis-Lippmann coalition is looked upon fondly by Khrushchev, Kadar and Company. For what they advocate leads necessarily to a weakened Free World and a stronger slave world. Nasser, behind whom stands Khrushchev, has undoubtedly been encouraged to take risks in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq precisely because he sees powerful elements in American society urging appeasement. Kadar will restore the AVH and liquidate more Freedom Fighters, and Mao will step up his cry of "Why war over Quemoy and Matsu?" It is an anomaly that at a time when the people of the captive nations throughout the Soviet Empire cry for liberty, liberals in the Free World propose courses of action which will forever deny it to them.

UKRAINIAN ECONOMY — SPOIL OF RUSSIAN OCCUPATION AND VICTIM OF WAR (1930-1954)

By BOHDAN S. WYNAR

In World War II, the Ukrainian lands suffered as a result of military operations gigantic material losses. But the preceding period, the second half of the 30's, was marked also by systematic destruction of the leading representatives of the Ukrainian higher class. Thus inflicted upon the Ukrainians were no lesser losses in the cultural and spiritual spheres. These repressions did not only spare the Ukrainian governmental economic institutions and the various scientific institutes, which were engaged in the study of the possibilities of the Ukrainian economy, but they also affected the broadest circles of the Ukrainian economists who took an active part in the economic life of the country (e. g. the destruction of the widespread net of cooperatives in Ukraine). Thus the Russian officials defined "Vobuyivism" in economy, as well as "Shumskyism" in the political field and "Khvylovyism" in the literary and artistic fields as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist deviations" and decided to root out of Ukraine the traditions of the 20's which were, as we know, also in part the traditions of Ukrainian "national communism."

FULL CENTRALIZATION OF UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

First came changes in the sector of the Ukrainian industry. All-Union control was imposed on the Ukrainian industry; most of the industrial plants were placed directly under the immediate control of the Union organs. In vain the head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, Vlas Chubar, strove at the XIth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, June 5-15, 1930, for the control by the Ukrainian republican government of the Ukrainian enterprises subjected to the Union, and this included the entire heavy industry of Ukraine. Nothing came of the demands of the Ukrainian officials. The process of transferring the Ukrainian industrial plants to Union jurisdiction became more accentuated and the branches of the Ukrainian official bureaus were reduced to the role of regional organs for the execution of the directives of the Russian central planning

machinery in Moscow. Also through the financial reforms introduced at the beginning of the 30's which unified the financial system throughout the entire USSR, the whole economic life of Ukraine was subjugated to the central economic machinery in Moscow with all of the dire consequences. Obviously this could not have been done except by the aid of open terrorism. For this purpose by a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of January 14, 1933, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine, nominally as Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine but actually with the mission of carrying out in Ukraine a fundamental "purge" of the party machinery and also checking the well-known "Ukrainization" begun in the 20's which was beginning to threaten the Russian political influence in Ukraine. At a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine held on November 18-22, 1933, during the height of the famine in Ukraine with its tragic millions of victims, Ukrainian "national communism" was definitely condemned and from that date there ensued an open attack also upon Ukrainian economists who were Marxists but had the courage not to agree basically with the Russifying "general line" of the Communist Party of Ukraine. At this plenum specifically condemned were the "deviations" of A. Shumsky, then People's Commissar of Education. It criticized and later condemned M. Yavorsky, the author of the first attempt in Ukrainian history to give a broad survey of Ukrainian historiography in a Marxist interpretation. Somewhat later Popov, the well-known historian of the Communist Party of Ukraine, was shot. At the same time the Soviet police proceeded to create a series of imaginary and would-be conspiratorial organizations—as members of which they included all the leading Ukrainians of the day. The basic objective of this action was to carry through mass arrests and thus to destroy all potential resistance by those forces which opposed the further Russification of Ukraine. The XIIth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, held on May 18-23, 1934, merely confirmed the aims of Postyshev and excluded from the Central Committee the old Ukrainian Communists. In the new Central Committee elected at this congress over 68 per cent of the members were the minions of Postyshev, and it set as one of its main objectives the struggle against the "Ukrainian nationalist deviation" and included under this formula all the workers of the Ukrainian national camp, especially the Ukrainian scholars and writers. On April 4, 1934, the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences—already shattered in 1931—was liquidated. In place of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, there was created a branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences in Moscow and thereby

liquidated were the independent positions of Ukrainian scholarship. Even before this (immediately after the plenum of the Central Committee in 1933) the activity of M. Hrushevsky had been condemned and the far-flung historical institutes attached to the Academy had been closed.

UKRAINIAN ECONOMIC STUDIES STOPPED

Simultaneously a series of damaging blows was directed at the Ukrainian economic scientific institutions. The Ukrainian Academy of Agriculture was broken up and so was the Scientific Research Institute of Economics and the Institute of the Agricultural Economics. The first blow at the scientific economic institutions was made possible by the liquidation of the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Agriculture. At the same time steps were taken for the liquidation of the Ukrainian scientific geographical institutes. The geographical handbooks of Academician Tutkivsky were taken out of circulation and Prof. Stepan Rudnitsky, the organizer of the Scientific Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, was sent to the Solovki Islands. Ukrainian maps were still published sporadically until 1937-38, and then were replaced by Russified maps. Later came the liquidation of the collaborators of Prof. Rudnitsky and Academician Tutkivsky, and these at the best were reduced to silence (K. Dubynyk, Yu. Platoniv, N. Havrylenko, O. Levytsky, etc.). The same fate awaited the representatives of historical geography (M. Hrushevsky, O. Baraniv, H. Shamray).

A ban was placed on the many statistical works which had been previously published and effectively straitjacketed the Central Statistical Administration by limiting it to the publication of modest statistical reports. It liquidated such valuable statistical publications as the statistical annals *Ukraina (Ukraine)* (1925-29); the non-periodical statistical collection, *Statystyka Ukrainy (Statistics of Ukraine)* (till 1931); it liquidated the solid collection, *Ukraina v Tsyfrakh (Ukraine in Figures)*. The monthly journal of planned construction, *Socialistychna Industriya (Socialist Industry)* (published in Ukrainian and German) ceased to appear. The still serious statistical volume of this publication appeared in 1937 and showed not only a complete lack of objectivity but a no less marked decline in the science of statistics in Ukraine. After this, statistical works on Ukraine were not published by the Statistical Administration, the whole activity of this office being limited to commenting upon the statistical materials published by the All-Union organs. Little space in these was given to Ukraine. Thus by the outbreak of

World War II statistical information on the economy of Ukraine was no longer published; very rare items and compressed data had to be sought in the Soviet press or in the All-Union publications.

The Ukrainian State Planning Committee was greatly limited in its previous competency. More correctly the previous institution was liquidated and the name was given to the regional organ of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. All the works of the Ukrainian State Planning Committee which contained projects for the future were removed from circulation. The ban affected especially such important studies as the works of the Commission on Metals and attempts at the independent regioning of Ukrainian industry and agriculture. The further spreading of a series of valuable works on the Ukrainian cooperatives (by Derzhko, Vysochansky, Dibrova, Pozharsky, Panchenko, etc.) was made impossible. Some leaders of the cooperatives were arrested during the trial of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (1930). At that time A. Bozolovych and M. Botvynivsky were shot. All those Ukrainian agrarian economists who did not completely agree with the practices of the collectivization in Ukraine were especially persecuted. Some Ukrainian agricultural economists were subsequently liquidated, chiefly those who did not feel a pronounced sympathy for the experiments in collectivization in Ukraine. We will mention, for example, the well-known authority on agricultural questions, the author of many works of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS)—Markovych, who was shot in the 30's.

With the liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy in the financial economy there ceased to appear the works of the Ukrainian People's Commissariat of Finance, which among other points showed the role of Ukraine in the All-Union federal budget (*Materials for the Defining of the Role of Ukraine in the All-Union Budget*, in Russian which appeared in yearly editions in the 20's). Until 1928 had appeared a journal, *The Ukrainian Economist*, as the organ of the Economic Council. This in 1931 was changed into the organ of the People's Commissariat of Finances, entitled: *On the Financial Front*, though this survived just a few years longer. Then the Ukrainian People's Commissar of Finances for many years, M. Polozha (author of the well-known work, *The Finances of Ukraine during Ten Years*, printed in the journal, *The Economy of Ukraine*) was shot. Somehow later H. Hrynko, one of the most prominent financial specialists in the USSR, was also liquidated.

At about the same time another casualty was the most important economic journal, *The Economy of Ukraine*, which had appeared first in Russian, then in bi-lingual form and finally in

Ukrainian. With the practical banning of Ukrainian historical science (the liquidation of the historical "school" of Hrushevsky and later of the Marxist M. Yavorsky), all historical works on the national economy of Ukraine encountered the same end. Along with the trial of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," one of the most outstanding students of the economic development of Ukraine, M. Slabchenko, was arrested. He was the author of *Materialy do socialno-ekonomichnoyi istoriyi Ukrainy 19-ho stol.* (*Materials on the Social and Economic History of Ukraine of the XIXth Century*), 2 volumes, Odessa, 1925-27, *Organizaciya ekonomiyi Ukrainy vid Khmelnytskoho do svitovoyi viyny* (*The Organization of the Economy of Ukraine from Khmelnytsky to the World War*), 4 volumes, Odessa, 1922-25, *Hospodarka Hetmanskoyi Derzhavy 17-18 Stol.* (*The Economy of the Hetmanite State in the XVIIth-XVIIIth Centuries*). The Odessa Scientific Historical Center, headed by him, was virtually liquidated. The same fate overtook the Kharkiv Historical Center, headed by Prof. Bahaliy, author of *Narys Istoriyi Ukrainy na socialno-ekonomichnomu grunti* (*Outline of the History of Ukraine on a Social and Economic Basis*), Kharkiv, 1928, and a prominent student of the colonizing processes of Ukraine. In the same way the Kiev Historical Center was broken up where Prof. A. Ohloblyn, a historian and author of several books on Ukrainian factories, was working. He is now living in the United States.

No different fate was accorded to works on the history of commerce in Ukraine. These were withdrawn from circulation, as M. Tyshchenko's *Narys Istoriyi Torhivli Livoberezhnoyi Ukrainy z Krymom v 18-im stol.* (*Outline of the History of Commerce between Left-Bank Ukraine and the Crimea in the XVIIIth Century*), Kiev, 1928; *Narysy zovnishnoyi torhivli Starodubshchyny v 18-im stol.* (*Outlines of the Foreign Trade of the Starodub Region in the XVIIIth Century*), Kiev, 1931. M. Shrah, author of the book, *Zovnishna Torhivla UkSRR ta yiyi Perspectyvy* (*The Foreign Trade of the Ukrainian SSR and Its Perspectives*), and O. Popov, author of *Khlibna Torhivla Ukrainy* (*The Grain Trade of Ukraine*), Kharkiv, 1927, and *Zahalnyi Kharakter Ukrainskoyi Zovnishnoyi Torhivli v Peredvoyenni Chasy* (*The General Character of Ukrainian Foreign Trade in Pre-War Times*), Kharkiv, 1926, were also shot.

Only a small number of individuals were able to adapt themselves to the new conditions. Not all of their earlier works were taken out of circulation but they were forced to revise them fundamentally. An example of this is the case of Academician Vobly, the author of such now excluded and banned books as *Politychna Ekonomiya* (*Political Economy*), Kiev, 1923, *Ekonomichna Geo-*

grafiya Ukrainy (The Economic Geography of Ukraine), Kiev, 1927, and *Stepova Ukraina — Ekonomichno-geografichni Narysy (Steppe Ukraine — Economic-Geographical Sketches)*, Kharkiv-Odessa, 1930.

Thus during the short period of the thirties the autonomy of the economic life of Ukraine was totally liquidated including her economists and students of Ukrainian economic life. The wealth of Ukraine fell into the hands of Moscow, the center of the Russian communist empire.

During the wildest excesses of the Stalinist terror, which was entirely based upon the Russian colonial positions, there was held on May 7 to June 3, 1937, the XIIth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine where out of 115 members of the Central Committee who had been chosen at the last congress after three and a half years only 36 were left alive. At this time V. Chubar, long the head of the government of Ukraine, disappeared. This terror continued and after the XIIIth congress such prominent Ukrainian Communists as Generals Dubovy and Yakir, and party members A. Khvyła and V. Porayko, were arrested.

With the arrival of Khrushchev in Ukraine (1938) there moved in a large number of Russian party men, who helped Khrushchev in his report at the regular XIVth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine to come out with an open attack on Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalism" as the greatest menace to the "building of socialism" in Ukraine.

To speed up the fulfilment of the "new course" the new Central Committee under Khrushchev was composed entirely of his minions. How far the terror penetrated Ukraine can be shown by the fact that there was in the newly-elected Khrushchev's Central Committee only one person from the old Central Committee and just two among its candidates survived; all the others had been destroyed or removed and replaced with the minions of Khrushchev. At this time disappeared the recently rehabilitated G. Petrovsky, V. Zatonsky, I. Kulyk, Yevtushenko and other fanatical Ukrainian Communists; their devotion to the communist cause did not save them.

As a result of the complete destruction of the Ukrainian upper class, including the Ukrainian Communists, the congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, held on May 13-17, 1940, took place in entirely different circumstances. The chief subjects discussed there were the instructions of the All-Union organs in the economic field and much attention was paid to the economic preparation for war. The annexation of the Western Ukrainian lands which took place in September, 1939, avoiding the usual Bolshevik propagandistic

action, aroused no special echo and the speedy outbreak of World War II interrupted a new wave of terror which had begun to drench Western Ukraine along with the coming of the Soviet troops. Ukraine entered World War II with greatly increased economic and industrial resources entirely dominated by Moscow and also with a totally destroyed national-spiritual life which among other things was responsible in no small degree for the impossibility of any wide national uprising at the beginning of World War II. The Nazi regime was a good follow-up to the Soviet Russian terror.

WAR LOSSES OF UKRAINIAN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

During World War II Ukraine suffered greater losses than any of the other Soviet republics, including the Russian. Merely by the ruination of dwellings, 10 million people were made homeless. Thousands of schools, scientific institutions, cultural centers, museums and hospitals were destroyed. About 16,000 industrial plants were ruined and in agriculture 3.5 million horses, 7.5 million cattle and 10 million pigs were killed. The total damage inflicted upon the economy of Ukraine was estimated by Soviet economists at the sum of 285 billion rubles.¹ As a result of military operations an important part of the capital equipment was carried to the eastern regions of the USSR and never returned.² Thus for example, the Kharkiv Tractor Plant, one of the largest in the USSR, was taken to the region of Altai where on its base was built the Rubtsov Tractor Plant; the Kharkiv plant for transport construction was evacuated to the Urals, and also taken to the east was the equipment of the Kharkiv and Novokramatorsky electro-technical and turbine plants and other large Ukrainian construction factories, such as the Voroshilovhrad locomotive plant. About 3,500 freight cars of industrial equipment and raw material were taken from the factories of Zaporozh'ya. From Odessa were evacuated by sea the great tank plant of the October Revolution, the Dzerzhinsky factory and a number of others. The evacuation of the machinery for black metallurgy and the equipment for the mining industry presented great difficulties. So a large part was destroyed on the spot and the mines were flooded. In 1941-42 in the area of German occupation inoperative were 61 dome furnaces, 225 Martens, 174 pig iron

¹ N. L. Lyalikov, *Sovietskaya Ukraina*, Moscow, 1954, pp. 8 and 84

² There were carried off from the evacuated regions of the USSR, including Ukraine, by incomplete count about 1,300 plants, factories, etc. *Ocherki Razvoyn Narodnago Khazyastva UkSSR (Outlines of the Development of the Economy of the Ukrainian SSR)*, p. 457.

plants and 131 coke burning plants.³ In the black metallurgy of Ukraine totally destroyed were 54 dome furnaces, 119 Martens, 101 pig iron plants, 39 pipe plants.⁴ In the Donbas mines were flooded and almost all the mining equipment was destroyed. The Ukrainian machine construction industry suffered from military operations, as noted above. According to the calculations of the Soviet economists the material losses of the Ukrainian light, food and local industry were valued at 1.7 billion rubles, 439.5 million rubles in the ruination of the equipment and 697.2 million rubles for the value of the raw materials taken by the Germans.⁵ In the totals given by Voznesensky, after the withdrawal of the Germans and the occupation of Ukraine by the Soviet troops there remained in the occupied regions of Ukraine as compared with the pre-war status, 17 per cent of the workers and 17 per cent of the industrial plants.⁶ This ordinarily overlooks the fact that the industrial plants evacuated were not returned to Ukraine but continued to function in the eastern parts of the USSR.

Along with the evacuation of the machinery to the east, a certain part of the population of Ukraine was also removed. The party officials (about 90 per cent were evacuated) were the first to be moved, and also the employees of the Ukrainian state institutions. The members of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR were moved and the Academy itself and its Institute of Economics continued to function in Ufa.

It is interesting to note that the works of the Ukrainian economists prepared at this time show certain characteristic features which hint at the transitional nature of the "liberalizing" policy compelled by military operations. Although they were then allowed to prepare some works which indirectly concern the whole of the economy of Ukraine, those works, however, lack a presentation of the then existing conditions. The authors were glad to turn to historical material, and certain data were published on some balanced positions of the economy of Ukraine which had been banned in the pre-war period. An example of such a work is the small monograph of the then Director of the Institute of Economics in the Academy of Sciences, P. A. Khromov.⁷

³ *Razvitie Sovietskoi Ekonomiki (The Development of Soviet Economy)*, Moscow, 1956, p. 48.

⁴ *Ocherki (Outlines)*, p. 448.

⁵ *Ocherki (Outlines)* p. 449.

⁶ N. Vosnesensky, *Voyennaya Ekonomika SSSR (War Economy of the USSR)*, Ogyz, 1948, p. 56.

⁷ P. A. Khromov, *Promyslovist Ukrainy Pered Vitchyznyanoyu Viynoyu (The Industry of Ukraine before the Fatherland War)*, Kiev, 1945.

A further eloquent fact of the attitude of the Moscow government toward the economy of Ukraine is the circumstance that directly after the war the Ukrainian economists were not allowed in separate works to trace the dimensions of the war destruction in the Ukrainian economy. These items were treated in the 50's in connection with the well-known jubilee celebration of the 300 years of enslavement of Ukraine by Russia, when many economic monographs appeared.⁸ Ukrainian economic science in this transitional war period was not accidental. As we know, the process of liberalization of relations lasted a very short time, ending immediately after the war.

SLOW POST-WAR REBUILDING OF UKRAINIAN ECONOMY

The historical toast of Stalin in honor of the Russian people, made on May 24, 1945 at a military banquet in the Kremlin, renewed the pre-war traditions of the Russian political hegemony and actually inaugurated a continuation of open Russian chauvinism in the Ukrainian Republic. Khrushchev confirmed this on October 28, 1945 at a meeting of the party activists when he issued the directives for the central machinery in Ukraine. During 1946 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine issued a series of decrees and instructions for the struggle against "nationalist bourgeois deviations" and well-known Ukrainian scholars and writers were compelled to "repent," on the ground that they had taken advantage of war conditions to commit a series of "deviations." We must note that these "deviations" were not found among the Ukrainian economists, for as we have seen earlier, it was not possible for them to do so because of the Russian saturation of the Ukrainian economic apparatus. We do not know even two or three works which give a direct presentation of the complicated position of the economy of Ukraine. But in spite of the dire straits of the agriculture of Ukraine (the famine of 1946) and the further collapse in the following years, and in spite of the wholly unsatisfactory tempo in the rebuilding of Ukrainian industry, which lagged greatly behind the general economic development of the USSR, we do not notice in Ukraine any reactions or protests against this as with the situation in the 20's when, as we know, the economy of Ukraine was in a more promising position.

⁸ We know in this connection only one work: M. Seredenko, *Vidbudova Promyslovosti Ukrainy (Rebuilding of the Industry of Ukraine)*, Kiev, *Ukrderzhvydav*, 1945.

In the Fourth Five-Year Plan which was devoted to the rebuilding of the war ruins, the capital investments in the whole economy of the USSR amounted to 311 billion rubles and of these 40.7 per cent were assigned to the rebuilding of heavy industry and only 6.5 per cent to light industry. The extent of the capital investment in Ukraine was then 49.5 billion rubles or 15.9 per cent of the capital investments of the USSR. Industry under the republic control received only 5.5 billion rubles of this sum.

This disproportionate distribution of the capital investments lowered markedly the previous percentage of the role of Ukraine in the industrial production of the entire USSR, the more so as the larger part of the machinery taken from Ukraine remained in the East. According to the directives of the new Five-Year Plan Ukraine was assigned the following percentages of Union production: pig-iron—50 per cent; steel—35; coal mining—35; locomotive and boiler building—40; metallurgical equipment—33.9; tractors—22.3; sugar production—68.2—which was the lowest percentage for the industry of Ukraine during the entire history of the Soviet Union. The Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in 4 years and three months. Although in this period the majority of the branches in Ukraine (we stress heavy industry) reached the pre-war level, yet in view of the tremendous war destruction in Ukraine, it was a step backward. At this time the general tempo of the industrial growth of Ukraine was much slower than the industrial growth of the other parts of the USSR, especially the eastern regions. The increase of the production in the different regions of the USSR (1940 as compared to 1955) were: the pouring of pig-iron in the Urals increased 2.6 times, in Siberia 1.2 times, steel production in the Urals 2.7 times, in Siberia 1.7 times. Likewise the production of rock coal amounted in the Donbas for 1950 to 78 million tons (the Ukrainian part of the Donbas, as opposed to 83.8 million tons in 1940 and during this period the production of coal in the Moscow basin increased three times, and in the eastern basins (Kuzbas, Urals, Karaganda) more than twice.⁹

In the post-war years we note some apparent broadening of the constitutional rights of Ukraine. Set up were the ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defense and Ukraine became a member of the United Nations. All these signs of a nominal increase in the sovereign rights of Ukraine were the result of external political

⁹ *Ob itogakh Vypolneniya Chetvertago Pyatiletnago Plana SSSR na 1946-1950 (Details of the Fulfilment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950)*, p. 4.

conditions and the needs of the foreign policy of the USSR as one of the victors in World War II. On January 25-28, 1949, the XVIth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine was held in Kiev and it was basically devoted again to the question of the economic rebuilding of Ukraine. At this moment Khrushchev was transferred to the post of secretary of the Moscow regional committee of the party and L. Melnikov became First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Melnikov gave himself the task of bringing "into order" Western Ukraine where signs of the national Ukrainian life still offered a constant threat to the spread of Russian influence in Ukraine. The party steadily increased its propaganda against the Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists." Along with the attack upon Ukrainian culture there came in Ukraine as throughout the entire USSR the "enlarging" of collective farms which still further strengthened state control in agriculture with all its important consequences.

The regular congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (September 23-25, 1952) introduced nothing new. The basic theme of the congress was the discussion of the economic position of Ukraine at the time and the continuation of the chauvinistic Russian campaign, which definitely established the Russian people as the "leading nation of the USSR." Here we may mention one claim from the speech of Melnikov, that the population of Ukraine was increasing 800,000 a year. In comparing this propagandistic claim with the data published in 1956, we see that by official Soviet sources (Central Statistical Administration) the population of Ukraine (including the Crimea) was 41 million and in 1955 only 40.6 million.¹⁰ Let us add that in the years 1950-1955 Ukraine had no separate republic plan for the development of the economy and all economic plans were brought into Ukraine from the central Soviet planning institutions in Moscow.¹¹ The size of the capital investments also characterizes the stagnation of the Ukrainian economy in this period, for Ukraine received only 15.2 per cent of the total capital investment.

ECONOMIC MATTERS IN THE 300TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PEREYASLAV JUBILEE PROPAGANDA

During 1954 there was held in Ukraine and the entire USSR

¹⁰ *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR, Statystichiskii Sbornik (The Economy of the USSR, Statistical Collection)*, 1956, p. 22.

¹¹ V. Holub, *Konspektyvny Narys Istoriyi Komunistychnoyi Partiyi Ukrainy, Ukrainsky Zbirnyk (Short Outline of the History of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Ukrainian Collection)*, Munich, Vol. 9, pp. 99.

the jubilee prepared during Stalin's lifetime to celebrate the "300 years of the union of Ukraine with Russia." On this occasion the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued the well-known "theses," which set the frame and purpose of this piece of propaganda.¹² These "theses" say:

The union of Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was a legitimate result of the whole past history of the two great brother Slav nations—the Russian and the Ukrainian. It was caused by the development during many centuries of economic, political and cultural bonds between Ukraine and Russia and was in accordance with the dominant interest and hopes of the two peoples.¹³

A whole series of special books and monographs on this theme appeared on the market and all the more important central Soviet journals published articles on it. An important place in these "jubilee celebrations" was assigned to problems of economics. In many articles, pamphlets and monographs the Soviet Russian and Ukrainian economists tried to show the "progressive meaning" of the Treaty of Pereyaslav and to base their theses on suitably selected economic and statistical material. Special attention was paid to the question of the historical connections of the economy of Ukraine and Russia and so they stressed not only their progressive importance in the political sphere but the Soviet economists tried with the help of specially prepared statistical material "to prove" the economic advantages to Ukraine in this union and rejected, of course, the thesis of the colonial position of Ukraine in Soviet times and omitted a large number of indisputable facts.

Beside the articles of Khromov, Virnyk and Myshko, published in the central Soviet journals, we must mention the interesting work (in its synthetic efforts) of the present Director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, O. Nesterenko, *Ekonomichni Peredumovy Vosyednannya Ukrainy z Rosieyu* (*Economic Preconditions of the Union of Ukraine with Russia*).¹⁴ He, like the Russian economist Kaufenhaus, totally ignores the commercial relations of Ukraine before and after 1654, or more accurately, tries to show that the removal of the Ukrainian market from its previous contacts with the economy of the West (the Russian market took over the function) was not only without injury to the economy of Ukraine but also indicates the "progres-

¹² *Tesisy o 300-letii Vozsoyedinienia Ukrainy s Rosiyei (1654-1954)* (*Theses for the 300th Anniversary of the Union of Ukraine with Russia, 1654-1954*), Moscow, 1954.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ In *The Annals of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR*, Vol. XXV, No. 5, for May, 1954.

sive" character of the Czarist trade policy toward Ukraine and employs even historical falsifications.¹⁵ Also, the interest of the Soviet authors was not limited only to the Ukrainian eastern lands, which by their geographical position were compelled to maintain a constant commercial contact with Russia. A. I. Kozachenko in his work, *Zvyazki Zapadnoyi Ukrainy z Rosiyyu do poloviny 17-go stol. (The Relations of Western Ukraine with Russia up to the Middle of the XVIIIth Century)*, Kiev, 1955, tries to show the existence of broadly constructed trading routes between the Western Ukrainian lands and Muscovy in the XVIIIth century, although all students of the economic history of Eastern Europe know well that the economic connections of the Western Ukrainian lands with Russia in the XVIIIth century did not exist.

Thus the Soviet authors are trying to prove theses establishing the economic help of Russia and the economic dependence of *all* the Ukrainian lands upon Russia and to transfer them to the economic situation in the present-day Soviet Union.

Exceptional note in this respect must be made of a collective work of Soviet authors, *Ocherki Rasvitiya Narodnago Khazaystva Ukrainskoi SSR (Outlines of the Development of the Economy of the Ukrainian SSR)*, Moscow, 1954, which is the last word in Soviet science on the Ukrainian economy. In it the Soviet authors treat the Ukrainian economy as an integral part of the Russian extensive economic complex and try in view of the present political tendencies to apply the new periodization of the economic history of Ukraine and stress basically the political side of the process. Referring the reader to the general work of Prof. Glovinsky, who discusses this in detail,¹⁶ we wish only to remark that such a broad propaganda for the "union of Ukraine with Russia" as is being carried on now in the USSR, including the "jubilee gift" by the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic of the non-Russian Crimea to Ukraine, by force of circumstances must awaken the interest of world opinion and the contemporary political camps and turn the attention of Western scholars to a deeper research into the historical processes of the last centuries in Eastern Europe and Ukraine.

¹⁵ B. B. Kaufenhaus, *Ekonomicheskie Svyazi Ukrainy s Rosiyei v kontse 17-go i nachale 18-go Stol. (The Economic Relations of Ukraine with Russia at the End of the XVIIIth and the Beginning of the XVIIIth Centuries)*, *Vozsoyednennie Ukrainy s Rosiyei (Union of Ukraine with Russia) (1654-1954)*, Moscow, 1954.

¹⁶ E. Glovinsky, *Sovietska Kontseptsiya Rozvytku Narodnoho Hospodarstva Ukrainy, Ukrainsky Zbirnyk (The Soviet Concept of the Development of the Economy of Ukraine, Ukrainian Collection)*, Book 8, Munich, 1957.

IDEALISTS, DUPES OR EDUCATED FOOLS

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Only a few weeks before the fall of Czarism in 1917, the Imperial Russian government published in New York the first number of a new periodical, *The Russian Empire*, to remove misunderstandings between the United States and Russia. In the preface attention was called to the mutual lack of knowledge. The Americans knew of the Russians only that Cossacks went around killing Jews and that wolves ate travellers on the outskirts of the great cities. The Russians knew of the Americans that Indians scalped people in the cities and skyscrapers were built in three days.

Conditions have changed but the same abundance of misinformation persists. The regime of the Provisional Government easily convinced the American people that with the elimination of the Czar Russia would become, without trouble or convulsions, a peaceful member of the free world in prosecuting World War I and that the attempts of the non-Russian peoples to win their independence were the work of German propaganda. Then when the Communists took control of the government and the American mood changed, we had such grotesque caricatures ascribed to the Soviet government as the decree of the Anarchists of Saratov on the nationalization of women. This was widely distributed and a conspicuous Soviet sympathizer welcomed it as so extreme that its character would make friends for the Soviet regime among the conservative and idealistic and highly moral classes of the American people.

That utterly fantastic document was undoubtedly an aid in the growth of pro-Communist sentiment among the American intellectuals of the twenties and when the Soviet regime moved further along the line of puritanism in the thirties, it actually detached the sympathies of some of those progressive elements that had favored the wildest ideas expounded by the lunatic fringe of Communism which were condemned by Lenin in his efforts to secure a powerful machine for the spreading of Communist influence. On the other hand the revelation that the responsible Soviet leaders had given up some of their wildest notions served to convince many that the stories of Soviet atrocities were grossly exaggerated.

We have the same confusion in regard to Soviet Russian inventiveness and mechanical skill. There has never been any doubt that some of the Russian artisans and craftsmen were remarkably able. That was the text of Leskov's *Flea* where an illiterate Russian peasant smith was able, without a magnifying glass, to put almost invisible fetters on a German-made mechanical flea. The myth of Soviet incapacity for mechanical devices and scientific thought was maintained despite the world applause for such scientists as Mendelejev, etc., and it was only fostered by Stalin's insistence that everything in the modern world had been a Russian invention.

When reports first appeared of Soviet nuclear and atomic studies, the world easily jumped at the conclusion that the Russians were merely using the results which they had obtained by espionage and bribery. When they launched their first *Sputnik* on an astonished world, the pendulum swung the other way; the very same people who had been relying on Russian incapacity now went to the opposite extreme and saw Soviet science and education as far superior to anything that had been achieved in the free world, something that was almost unattainable for the free world. Thus they fell into the trap which had been cleverly prepared by Khrushchev, etc. and began to urge in sheer self-defense a "peaceful coexistence," even though in Khrushchev's own definition, it was merely to exist until Moscow was ready to denounce it and lure them to their doom. It will require hard and consistent work on the part of the authorities and the wiser intellectual leaders to restore the balance and to allow the Americans to evaluate correctly Soviet advances and Soviet defects, and even then we shall be sorely tempted to go to the opposite extreme and again miscalculate our deadly enemy.

This is an interesting phenomenon. The American people have learned to calculate a fairly accurate program of progress for the countries of Western Europe, even though they have been tempted to draw hastily conclusions in various fields of endeavor—but they are not alone in this. Undoubtedly the most glaring error in all the relations between the Russians and the Americans lay in the Russian failure to see if they had crossed the whole of Siberia in a century on foot and horseback to reach the Pacific Ocean and penetrate Russian America (Alaska), the Americans and the British could by the same means make their way across North America and appear on the Pacific coast. Yet apparently that was the case, and the Russians were annoyed to no end to find that new people kept arriving by land on that Pacific shore which they hoped to use for turning the Pacific Ocean into a Russian lake.

Yet in no sphere has the confusion of thought in the American mind been greater than in that of the racial composition of Russia-USSR. In their appeals to the American people, even the highest authorities of the United States have glibly used the word "Russia" whether they were speaking of the Russians proper or of that mass of submerged nationalities that were included in the Russian Empire and are now pseudo-independent republics in the USSR. Again and again it has been pointed out that the Russians proper formed only about 40 per cent of the population of the Russian Empire. The United States government has recognized that some part of these non-Russians were Poles, Finns, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. It has dealt with the independent states of those peoples but when they were overrun by the Russians (even though in some cases we have continued to recognize their legitimate government and peoples), statesmen and people in general have continued to think of them as Russia and Russians. Those who knew otherwise have not been resolute in bringing to popular attention and in imprinting upon the popular mind the fact that *the Russian Empire meant the reign of the Czar over millions of non-Russians and that the Soviet Union means the domination of those same millions by a Moscow Russian-dominated Communism*. In fact it is safe to say that in the field of national understanding we shall make little progress until we learn to put first things first and to identify the Russians not with the Soviet Union but with its dominating political organism, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the basic principality of Muscovy from which the Czars set out to conquer the world.

Thus we can see that during the past years and especially since the question of Soviet-American relations became acute, the American people, through their misunderstanding of conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union and of the definite qualities of the Russian people, have deliberately left the initiative in the hands of their enemies. It is not enough to claim that this has been the result of the work of the Communists or even of the Russia-Firsters who have seen the indivisibility of Mother Russia as the one goal toward which they must strive. The fault goes deeper and it is up to the American people to find that fault and to rectify it.

When we begin to search for that fault, we at once come upon some startling phenomena. The Soviet Union and the Russian Communists from their first pronouncements after taking over the government of the Russian Empire in 1917 proclaimed to the world that they were repudiating as hopelessly bourgeois all standards that civilization had developed during the thousands of years that

it had existed in any form. They repudiated faith in God, the family in its known forms, private property, faith between governments, even objective truth, which was true only for a given stage in the judgment of the leaders of the Communist Party. They repudiated any belief in a policy that was not opportunistic in the crassest and most literal sense and they have kept their word in that as in nothing else. They have signed non-aggression pacts without number and they have found ways and means for breaking all of them, if only on the specious argument that these pacts were made by bourgeois governments and did not represent the will of that progressive body of the population, the Communist Party, which directly obeyed and carried out the will of the Russian masters in the Kremlin.

Do the American intelligentsia and statesmen yet realize the consequences of that policy? Khrushchev can declare that revolution cannot be exported and that the Soviet Union desires coexistence. He does so with the assurance that the full exercise of democratic rights in a free state gives the Communists unlimited opportunity to carry on their propaganda for destructive purposes until such time as they can pounce upon the regime, overthrow it and install a Communist system without consulting a majority of the voters. It is thus the decision of the Communists that really represents the will of the people, no matter how few in number the Communists may be. The efforts of the United States Supreme Court to protect the so-called rights of convicted Communists suggests that that august body has never faced the consequences of a challenge which denies not particular institutions but the very unwritten and unspoken foundations upon which the government of the United States is based.

Far too many of the churchmen in the country are so resolved to see the good in the average citizen under the Russians that they are willing to find excuses for the ecclesiastical stooges of the Soviet regime. They may talk of the faith and piety of the Russian Church in the catacombs and then, without casting a single look at conditions, they extend invitations to those ecclesiastics who have made their peace with the atheistic regime, have received high rewards for "patriotic" work from Stalin and his henchmen, listen to their parrot-like appeals for coexistence and brotherly love and have no ear or consideration for the millions of martyrs that have died for keeping the faith under Communist rule or misrule. They hope that conditions have changed because Khrushchev or the Patriarch of Moscow speaks a few kind words for peaceful coexistence. This is following with a vengeance Lincoln's statements that

he hoped to be on God's side when some one remarked in the Civil War that he hoped that God was on his side.

It is but a short step from this attitude to the appreciation, an acceptance, even though grudging, of the Soviet attitude toward peace and the United Nations. No one disputes that the people of the world want peace, and this is intensified by the weapons of overwhelming destructive power that have been developed since the explosion of the first atomic bomb. The arsenal of the future weapons now includes atomic and hydrogen bombs, intercontinental missiles and other implements which as yet have not been revealed to the general public. A realization of their power and possibilities has impressed upon the leaders of the world the necessity of forming some international organization which could preserve peace and prevent a recurrence of the holocausts of World War II. Yet what is the lesson of the United Nations? The Soviet Union, though a founding member along with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia, treats the United Nations as a propaganda center while Communist China thinks it intolerable that a nation which has fought against the United Nations should not be admitted to it as a peace-loving state without making peace. The Soviet vetoes have long paralyzed positive action for peace by the Security Council. The Soviet Union has disregarded the voice of the General Assembly, when that suits its own purposes, and asserts that it can do so with impunity inasmuch as it does not speak with the voice of Communism, i. e. the Kremlin and its Russian masters.

Such a possibility never entered the heads of the statesmen who met together with Stalin and talked over the basic ideas of the organization before it took written or permanent shape. The idea that a singer of the original declaration would try to wreck it and prevent its functioning seemed incomprehensible to the world, and so effective measures for the disciplining or expelling of one of its major states were not provided. Today such are badly needed with no obvious method of introducing them. Aware of this, Moscow blithely uses the United Nations as a sounding board for its propaganda for peace on its own terms.

Khrushchev does not want war but victory for himself and ruin for his adversaries, the non-Communist world. That plain fact has not sunk into the minds of many of the most sincere supporters of the United Nations who still believe that if Khrushchev talks peace and dares or pretends to dare to risk war, the West and the United States must be prepared to avoid crossing him. They must realize that his talk is insincere, they must look at his record and however much they desire peace themselves, they must draw up

and make stick an indictment of Communism and the Russian Communist regime, even if Khrushchev rattles the sword and detonates the atomic bomb. They already have enough proof of Moscow's intentions without going out of their way to wait for him to give them further evidences of the gap between Communism and freedom. There are the independent governments set up within the Russian Empire, the Ukrainians and others; there are the Baltic Republics; there are the satellite states. There are the Asian lands over which he is spreading his protective shield until he can absorb them more completely. Yet too many Americans are urging self-restraint and finding apologies for the Soviet Union in the suspicion and backwardness of the Russian mind, in minor flaws in the actions of the West, in anything that can serve to allow them to castigate themselves and not to speak clearly with the voice of their own consciences.

We could go further into almost any field of human activity, into the attitude toward diplomatic personnel, the question of travel and of exchange of information, the question of radio broadcasts, of payment for translations. Everywhere there is one standard for the Soviet Union and the Communists and another for the United States and the free world and there are far too many voices raised to equate the evils of the two sides and to vindicate those ideas which are sponsored by Khrushchev.

Yet this raises still a further question. When Lenin first proclaimed that he was establishing a government of the workers and peasants, there was naturally a certain response among part of the laboring classes of this country. Then a surprising thing happened—the organized labor movement of the United States of its own accord saw through the fallacies and pseudo-argumentation of the Communist leaders. No one will dispute that there are still certain Communists to be weeded out at the present time, but by and large organized labor, the mouthpiece of those classes for whom the Soviet Union pretends to speak, is that part of the American body politic freest from their influence.

The same is true of the colored population in the United States. In the beginning the Soviet Russian propaganda won a certain response among them but their leaders very soon realized that it was easier for the Negroes to secure their rights in the United States than it was to embark upon an unknown course and risk all that they had gained. Since then and even during the depression communist work among them has met with the minimum of response and their leading converts have not been among the masses but again among the intellectual and artistic leaders, who have

detached themselves from the mass of their fellows, even though they have retained their admiration.

Thus on every score those classes of the population of the United States who theoretically were the most open to the blandishments and the propaganda put out by Moscow have realized the hollowness of the Soviet claims. They have thrown the weight of their influence on the side of progress and of social justice and have retained a firm hold on the American beliefs and way of life as it has been developed under the great ideas of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. This is not said in any sense of self-righteousness but with a realization that mankind with all of its struggles has throughout the centuries developed along the upward road and that the new ideas which arose and were exemplified in the efforts of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev to obtain control of the world are not in any sense a corrective of the old but rather a perversion which has proved costly to all who have been lured by it into following its mirage into the swamps of slavery.

This raises again that strange question as to why so many of the best informed people in the country are the most lukewarm in their opposition to the menace that is daily becoming more threatening? Why are those classes of people who are on many counts the most determined to build a better world unaware of the connotation of all the events going on around them? In the twenties there was a wave of Communism among the semi-intellectuals and to some extent the college students, the immature. But time cured the majority of these of their infatuations, even though there remained a small residue who were so deeply entrapped or so deluded that they could not pull back. The number of these was sharply reduced in the thirties and the vast majority of those left were the persons who were so appalled by the rise of Hitler that they could not see that the Communists were an equal or greater menace and could not believe that when it suited the interest of Communists, they would gladly come to an understanding with the Nazis for their mutual profit, since each group knew that it was only waiting to double-cross its "trusted friend."

Today there is not even the semblance of that idealism that dominated the sympathizers or some of them in the twenties and the thirties. The full evils of the Stalinist regime are everywhere recognized; there is only a forlorn hope that Khrushchev may be sincere but no one really believes it in his heart. There is only the feeling that somehow, some way, sometime, the cause of freedom must triumph, that somehow the Soviet Union by some concessions must be induced to agree to bring peace to the Middle East, that

somehow the West must not dare to denounce the Soviet Union to its face lest the overwhelming might of Soviet arms in their new evaluation spread ruin and disaster throughout the world. People are trying to believe that after the example of Hungary and after the lesser disturbances in Poland and Yugoslavia, the people behind the Iron Curtain are solidly supporting the Moscow regime under any and all circumstances. They believe that somehow they themselves can save the world without taking the offensive and accepting the risk that that implies.

It is a question of nerve and the combination of the overall ignorance and the iron discipline in the ruthless jungle of the Kremlin serves to make it possible for Khrushchev and his friends to threaten to their heart's content. Their control of the weapons and munitions makes it unlikely that any effective opposition can rise against them or will rise in the future until the ring in the Kremlin breaks and the structure is shattered or there is more than moral support from outside. This is different from the situation in the free world where the statesmen have to listen to the will of the people. All this is common knowledge in the United States.

Yet no definite answer, no definite program is forthcoming. For all practical purposes and despite abundant and pious speeches, the United States is still engaged in the old policy of containment, of meeting the Soviet threat when and where it appears, whether in the military, financial or educational field. The policy of the government is divided between a strict adherence to legal and diplomatic methods in the most correct and old-fashioned sense of the word and a willingness to change these methods to meet a present threat. It has proclaimed a doctrine of liberation but it looks askance at any action that is designed to implement it in any sphere. It rather waits for the Russians to make a move and then endeavors to counter it without shifting the point of attack to assault one of the thinly held outposts of the Soviet position and seeking thus to find an opportunity to penetrate more deeply and inflict counter damage in return.

The United States is still seeking to base its entire policy on the United Nations in its present form and to act strictly in accordance with those concessions which it has given the Soviet Union at the various international conferences. It realizes that those agreements do not practically exist today by virtue of the Soviet actions but it still shrinks from any attempt to invalidate them in the light of changed conditions. If this is the official policy, we can scarcely blame individuals for translating it into their own point of view. Yet over it all is the insistence that in this era of the common

man, we must think of the individuals behind the Iron Curtain as having those views which their communist masters ascribe to them. We deny to them in the name of peace and idealism the right to have spokesmen of their own choosing and in our thoughts we are torn between the danger of World War III and the still greater danger that the Russians can nibble away the free world piece by piece until the final morsel is within their range to swallow.

What is needed is a sober estimation of the power of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federated Republic and a careful estimate of the aid that it can bring to itself from all the separate Soviet republics, their satellites and the nations without its range of influence. It must study how best to tear apart the entire artificial construction with its lies and intrigues and not wait for the Soviet system to fall of itself and its inherent contradictions.

Until then the United States and the citizens lay themselves open to a bitter question. Does their idealism deserve the name of idealism? Is it a support of something in which they sincerely believe? Or are they so ignorant that they refuse to use their eyes and their ears and merely listen to the siren words of peace from Khrushchev? Are they the plain dupes of Khrushchev or are they in the full sense of the word educated fools who possess abundant knowledge but are utterly unable to draw correct inferences and who are content with the siren appeals of Khrushchev and who tremble at his threats?

Now with the renewed signs of the ranting Khrushchev and his minions at the General Assembly, the United States must plan a counter-offensive, not only to protect the Arab world against itself and its infiltrators but to strike into the country of the enemy and confront Khrushchev with such proof of his brutality and duplicity that he cannot deny it.

Over a century and a half ago, the Russian historian Karamzin declared in support of the imperial Russian regime: "Uncivilized peoples love liberty, civilized peoples love order, and there can be no order without autocracy." The United Nations must decide whether it can and will enforce a democratic order or a Russian Communist autocracy as the only form of world association possible. The United States and the free nations must come to the same decision and despite the appeals of the neutralists they must resolve on one course and carry it through even if it means the formation of an opposing Communist League in the Kremlin. Then and only then can we truly define the position of the free world as both realistic and idealistic and capable of offering some valuable hope to the world, oppressed and free alike.

MYKOLA SKRYPNYK AND THE PRESENT SITUATION IN UKRAINE

By YURIY BOYKO

At the Fourth Plenum of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine, an address was made by one of the old veterans of Ukrainian literature of the 20's, Andriy Klochchya, who had succeeded in saving himself from the mad Stalinist terror which, like a destructive hurricane, had raged through Ukrainian literature in the last decade before World War II. Accidentally saved then, A. Klochchya also survived the postwar drives against "Ukrainian nationalists in literature" and the struggle against cosmopolitanism. He emerged shaken but alive at the Fourth Plenum of the Union of Writers in the capital of Ukraine. The address of Klochchya was symptomatic. Among other things, he said:

Why at our Plenum has no one spoken of the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine in 1925-1927? These resolutions, this collective wisdom of one of the detachments of the great Communist Party expressed in concrete national conditions the line of the Party in its struggle for partyness, the Lenin line of struggle for the party quality in literature. These resolutions must now be brought into our scientific life. (*Literaturna Hazeta*, Kiev, February 22, 1957).

What was the subject and what resolutions was Klochchya speaking of when he said that they reflected the line of the party in "concrete national conditions?" Who was the inspirer and organizer of these unique national conditions?

Those years were the years of the great influence of Mykola Skrypnyk on all Soviet cultural policy in Ukraine. Later, he was cornered by Stalin and driven to suicide, but then he was a helper and a comrade of Lenin and in fact worked out and emphasized the principal resolutions in the national cultural policy in Ukraine and revealed himself as a National Communist.

It was Skrypnyk who at the Xth Congress of the CP(b)U made a speech on the "Task of Cultural Construction in Ukraine"; this speech was at the bottom of the resolutions of the Xth Congress.

The Kharkiv party resolutions of this period were directed especially toward the struggle against Ukrainian nationalism, which was then

accepted by the National Communists of the time as a menace to the Soviet regime. The resolutions first of all directly attacked the ideas of Khvylovy, who had passed from the communist position to a nationalist one as a method of spiritual, cultural and political separation from Moscow. To Skrypnyk this position was alien and hostile. An internationalist in principle, he wanted to believe that the independent development of Ukraine could be secured on the basis of a close political union with Communist Russia. In calling for the closest possible political union with the latter, Skrypnyk and his supporters still fostered their own path toward Socialism which they regarded as a full and unlimited development of Ukrainian culture.

The resolution of the June Plenum of the Central Committee, CP(b)U, in 1926 announced:

The Party stands for the independent development of Ukrainian culture, for the manifestation of all the creative forces of the Ukrainian people. The Party stands for the broad use of Ukrainian socialist culture, which is being built, from all the values of world culture, for a definite break with the traditions of provincial limitation and slavish imitation, for the creation of new cultural values fit for the creative power of a great class.¹

A decree of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U in 1927, although it spoke of the desirability of forming an All-Union Society of the literary organizations of the republics, yet warned against "all national claims or pretensions to hegemony or the reduction of the independent cultural creation of every people."²

As is known, the Stalinist period ruthlessly crushed these aspirations. Russian hegemony led the other nations into cultural slavery and imitation. The national cultures were transformed into provincial variations of the great central Russian super-culture. These were made to work by the shedding of the blood of the disobedient, those who insisted upon the right to their own culture. Executions and exiles decided the demands to the advantage of Russia and Stalin.

So it was only necessary for the first breezes to fan the incomplete relaxation when voices once again sounded from the tribune of the Soviet discussion in Kiev and called for a return to the past. As voices, they were very cautious—but quite insistent. They did not try to rehabilitate Khvylovy. It was clear to them that Khvylovy had finally taken his position on the other side of the barricades and that his uncompromising position against Moscow would not admit of any rehabilitation under Soviet conditions. But there have been other victims of Stalinism. Among the

¹ A. Leytes and M. Yashek, *Ten Years of Ukrainian Literature*. Kharkiv, 1928, p. 307.

² *Ibid.*, p. 310.

dead they were looking for men who found their place in communist reality in the time of Skrypnyk, like I. Mykytenko, M. Irchan and V. Pidmohylny.

The name of Skrypnyk, too, has been brought out of forgetfulness. The third number of the journal, *Questions of History*, edited by I. Oslikovska and A. Snegov, contains a defense of Skrypnyk as an "old worker in the Bolshevik Party and the Ukrainian Soviet government." His approach to the national question is not stressed. Oslikovska and Snegov show that Skrypnyk was against the separation of Ukraine from Russia. Everything else is less important and the rehabilitators are ready to speak about the rest as "special errors in the nationality policy." But today they have no desire to speak about these "mistakes." On the contrary, there are signs that the Ukrainian bureaucracy is trying silently and cautiously to come back to the position of Skrypnyk.

Not so long ago at the All-Union Congress of Writers, M. Bazhan sharply attacked the fostering of Russian great-powerism in literature. The workers in the field of culture constantly refer in their addresses to the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. This is not new; it is what was permitted by Stalin during the war. But what yesterday was a tactical maneuver of Moscow is today a slogan which people are beginning not only simply to repeat but to provide a basis for. Today this slogan is becoming a basis for the claims of the communist leaders in Kiev.

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Mykola Skrypnyk belonged to the Leninist guard which from the very beginning formed the Bolshevik Party and which carried on its shoulders the weight of establishing and strengthening the Soviet government. In 1897, at the age of 25, Skrypnyk accepted Marxism as his philosophy and from then on connected his life at first closely with the Social Democrats and then with Bolshevism. He became a professional revolutionist. The Czarist government arrested him six times and exiled him, but four times he escaped from exile. Once during a flight he had to travel 1,200 kilometers by boat and to go far on foot. He showed his inexhaustible energy by often changing his place of exile and in different parts of the Russian Empire performed the responsible tasks of the revolutionary underground. Even then his unconquerable person was known by the Social Democrats in Ukraine, but he was also an organizer of revolutionary activity in St. Petersburg. In 1913 he was a member of the editorial staff of *Pravda* and after the February Revolution he held the key position of head of the Central Soviet of the Factory and Plant Committees of Petrograd. This made him important during the October Revolution, when he became a member of the Military Revolutionary

Committee. Soon Lenin sent him to Ukraine, where he was to head the Bolshevik camp to combat the Ukrainian national movement.

In December, 1917, the Bolsheviks organized in Kiev a Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The vast majority of this Congress did not follow the Bolsheviks but they were for the Ukrainian National Parliament and Government—the Central *Rada* and its Secretariat General—and branded the Bolsheviks as saboteurs and Russian imperialists. Then the small group of Bolshevik delegates left the Congress, proclaimed themselves the “legal” Congress and chose from among their number a Soviet government for Ukraine which was to have its seat in Kharkiv. From the first moment this government rested on the bayonets of the Russian Red Guards, which were sent by Lenin from Moscow and Petrograd.

Skrypnyk was in this government and for a certain time was its head. A Ukrainian in origin, known for his national membership, he interpreted service to his people as service to Bolshevism. He became the head of the political machinery (*Narkom*, or People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR), which by terror stifled the Ukrainian national revolution. His observation of the heroism of the national struggle for liberation from a vantage point did not shatter his loyalty to Lenin but left a tragic chasm in his soul.

He wanted to remain true to the theoretical doctrines of Bolshevik internationalism, which the Russian Bolsheviks never carried out consistently. Yet in the first period of its existence as a state he took the creation of the Ukrainian SSR seriously, treating it as a state on a par with the RSFSR. This caused him many difficulties in the party both in Ukraine and Russia.

As an orthodox Communist, after the triumph of the Soviet government in Ukraine, Skrypnyk paid a great deal of attention to the combatting of those currents of political thought that he considered as manifestations of a deviation toward Ukrainian nationalism. Thus he opposed the UKP (Ukrainian Communist Party), which existed until the end of 1924 alongside the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine.

The UKP believed that every political approach to Moscow carried with it the danger of subordination to Russian imperialism. Hence the UKP wanted to join the World Union of Socialist Republics or something which would transcend the borders of the former Russian Empire, and until the Soviet system passed the boundaries of Russia, the UKP wanted to defend the independent existence of Soviet Ukraine. It called for an independent foreign policy and its own Ukrainian army. In its efforts to justify its existence, the UKP appealed to the Comintern with a request that it be considered a component part of the international

Communist movement. Its opponent and investigator who accused the UKP of bourgeois rascality was Skrypnyk.

A resolution of the Comintern of December 24, 1924, liquidated the UKP. This was fair. The Comintern approved the union of the UKP and the KP(b)U with the proviso that only those who were "reliable" could be taken in. This "reliability" was to be determined by a committee with equal representation from both parties. In liquidating the UKP, the Comintern felt it necessary to make some concessions to their demands. Thus it approved the demand that in the plans of the Comintern for the future, Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina would be included in the Ukrainian SSR and it promised that the eastern ethnographic Ukrainian lands which were in the RSFSR (the southern part of Kursk, the Voronizh region and the Kuban) would likewise be added.⁵ These resolutions no one afterward ever thought it worthwhile to mention. Only Skrypnyk spoke of them and oriented himself to the task of carrying them out. By the irony of fate the one-time accuser of the UKP assumed the task of executing part of the bequest of that party. The *Ukapists* were soon broken up and disappeared from the surface of Soviet life, but some of them for some decades held prominent posts. The majority of the *Ukapists* had come from the Ukrainian Socialist parties and so the danger hung over them of being accused of being bourgeois. But the old and well-known Skrypnyk could allow himself to defend their ideas with one correction: with a confession of faith in the internationalism of the Russian Bolsheviks, even when life had thrown him into the struggle against Russian Communist chauvinism.

In 1925 there commenced in Ukraine the literary discussion which was destined soon to become political. The leader of the literary life, the talented writer Mykola Khvylovy, entered upon a struggle for literary quality and declared war on the stupid Soviet ideologizing in literature. He called for broad efforts, broke with provincialism and, most important, declared aloud that Ukrainian literature had "as quickly as possible to flee" from the influences of Russian literature. The task of Ukrainian writers was to go and study in Western Europe, to the proletarian, bourgeois, every form, to take over from Europe its eternal, uneasy pathos of Faustian endeavors. The young Ukrainian nation would find in the splendid Greco-Roman art of antiquity a powerful source for itself and, enriched by the world's spiritual treasures, would become the head of the Renaissance of the Asian peoples.

This complex of ideas provoked a great storm. Thunders of accusation of being bourgeois and nationalist were hurled at Khvylovy.

⁵ M. Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, Vol. II, DVU, 1929. Article "On the UKP" ("*Ukapisty*").

The blows against Khvylovy were somewhat softened because he was defended by a member of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, the *Narkom* (People's Commissar) for Education of the Ukrainian SSR, Shumsky. Shumsky emphasized the authority of Khvylovy and the significance of his position.

On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared his solidarity with the views of Khvylovy as expressed in the article, "Moscow Sluts." This position of Shumsky aroused a storm of condemnation by the party leaders. Pressure was put upon Shumsky to condemn Khvylovy "in a Bolshevik manner," but he remained inflexible. Shumsky was accused of the crime that he, as editor of *The Red Path*, had developed Khvylovism on the pages of his journal, that he had not noticed the actual proletarian leadership in the Ukrainian cultural process and believed that the party was being led by pitiable "Little Russians." (In the eyes of Shumsky, Skrypnyk particularly was such a "Little Russian.")

In the heat of the struggle against the majority in the Central Committee, Shumsky said: "I renounce nothing in my past." Then he was reminded that in 1920, on the eve of his entrance into the CP(b)U, in a speech he had characterized the Communist Party of Ukraine as an organization of occupants.⁴ Since Shumsky did not repent, he was thereupon transferred to party work away from Ukraine, to Moscow, where he later was physically annihilated.

Yet it became clear that the banishment of Shumsky was condemned in the ranks of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, and as a result the Moscow and Kharkiv leaders remained in a quite embarrassing and troublesome situation. In this connection the Party was compelled to adopt some cautious tactics toward the Ukrainian nationalist elements and to concentrate the main blow against Shumskyism, leaving Khvylovy to be dealt with later. On his part in this struggle, Skrypnyk wrote: "I actually had to be the first among us to make an open statement against the deviations of Comrade Shumsky, and that at a time when at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U I had to carry on a very serious struggle against Shumskyism in Western Ukraine and that at a time when at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U there were only four men who were then maintaining the correct Leninist line."⁵

At this time Khvylovy was in temperament breaking loose from his antagonists and rapidly evolving in his creative ability. He wrote, for example, the novel, *Woodsnipes*, which actually contains a program for a voluntarist Ukrainian nationalism, hostilely disposed to Russia. After its publication, the first part of the novel was removed from circulation

⁴ *Ibid.*, "Khvylovists or Shumskists."

⁵ M. Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 102.

by the police and the author had to destroy with his own hand the continuation of it. A wide campaign was launched to condemn the author, a campaign which finally led him to suicide.

The influential voice of Skrypnyk rang out several times passionately and insistently in the discussion against Khvylovy. From this Skrypnyk emerged as the theoretician of the nationality problem.

The development of nations under the capitalistic system—asserted Skrypnyk—came about through the struggle between them, from clashes and the assimilation of the weaker nation by the stronger. In the Soviet system—in Skrypnyk's mind—the development of nations proceeds through their common friendship. The mistake of Khvylovy, said Skrypnyk, is that he does not understand this and transfers the national relationships of the capitalistic world to the Soviet reality.⁶

Skrypnyk would have been ready to recognize the correctness of Khvylovy if the latter had barred "separate rascally currents in Russian literature." But Khvylovy reacted against Russian literature as a whole and did so because it was Russian. This was nationalism. So Skrypnyk adopted an openly hostile attitude toward the conception of Khvylovy. Yet the position of Skrypnyk cannot be identified with that of the apologists of Russianism, who savagely attacked Khvylovy and preached at the same time the indiscriminate subordination of Ukrainian literature to the influences of the Russian. In fighting Khvylovy, Skrypnyk also attacked Romanovsky, an apologist for Russianism. The view of Romanovsky as to the need of help from Russian literature was denied by Skrypnyk, who replaced it with the need for mutual help.

If Comrade Romanovsky says that the Russian literary currents can claim the role of the leader over Ukrainian literary currents, he entertains a totally mistaken view. There cannot exist such a relationship between the contemporary Russian and Ukrainian literatures that one should act as an independent factor in the creation of cultural values and the other agree that it needs help in its development.⁷

In reviewing the century of the development of the modern Ukrainian literature Skrypnyk stated that for some decades Ukrainian literature had been more closely connected with the Western European currents than with the Russian. "These facts," he said, "must be acknowledged and certain conclusions drawn . . . We cannot truthfully recognize the significance of the dominant influence of Russian literature on Ukrainian literature. We must recognize that the modern Ukrainian literature has its roots in its own past history."⁸

⁶ M. Skrypnyk, "On the Theory of Two Cultures," *Komanist*, June 3, 1926.

⁷ M. Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, Vol. II, *DVU*, p. 133.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-141.

Skrypnyk took a deep interest in questions of Ukrainian culture. He devoted great effort to overcoming the historical consequences of the semi-colonial role of Ukraine under the Czars. He expended a great deal of energy in the Ukrainization of the state machinery, press, schools and theatre. This became his special care when in 1926 he was named Ukrainian *Narkom* (People's Commissar) for Education. By his instructions Ukrainian printing houses constantly increased the percentage of Ukrainian books at the expense of the Russian. With his view of Ukraine as a sovereign state, he tried to give Ukrainian culture that support which would insure its honorable position in the family of world cultures. He founded an All-Ukrainian Association of Marxo-Leninist Institutes (*VUAMLIN*) and wanted to transform them into a special center of Marxist thought separate from that of Moscow, and he placed especial emphasis on their solving the nationality problem. Likewise Skrypnyk worked in the organization for the issuing of a *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*. This great work was intended to clear the field of scientific information from the Russian great-power conception; and it was possible to do this only because of the influence of Skrypnyk. It was done, for example, on the history of Old Ukrainian literature, on the question of the national authorship of literary monuments of the Xth-XVIIIth centuries. About this Skrypnyk wrote:

The true understanding of this question was obstructed by the remains of the old views of the old Russian historiography, the view of the uninterrupted historical process from the old Kievan state through Moscow-Suzdal to the old Petersburg. It was possible on the basis of general historical considerations to deny this historical and literary conception and to acquire a practical recognition of the principle by which all monuments down to the second half of the XVIIIth century were counted as belonging either to Russian or Ukrainian literature depending upon the territory on which these monuments were composed. Thus the *Song of Ihor's Expedition* was counted as Ukrainian literature.⁹

Skrypnyk's faith in proletarian internationalism was subjected to great tests, and in spite of the good will of its possessor, it did not withstand vicissitudes of life. The Russian nationalistic element made its appearance in various strata of Russian society both in Moscow and in the Russian population in Ukraine. Russian nationalism permeated the Party and used international slogans as a disguise, in its reliance upon the unconscious nationalistic moods of the Russian Party members.

At the XIIth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1923, Skrypnyk appealed in vain for sincerity in the solution of the nationality problem. He demanded that slogans should correspond to practice, that they should cease to be empty phraseological chattering. He adopted a

⁹ M. Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, DVU, Kharkiv, 1930, p. 43.

critical attitude to the report of Stalin at this Congress. When Stalin made his assertion of the danger from both sides, the nationalism of the believers in the Russian great state and the nationalisms of the other nations, Skrypnyk expressed his doubts as to the correctness of this statement. In Skrypnyk's mind, this formula favored the development of Russian nationalism, for it did not hint at this as the basic danger.¹⁰ Stalin was compelled to put on a good front and to admit that he basically shared the position of Skrypnyk.

Skrypnyk put forward the question of using the Ukrainian language in cultural work among the Ukrainians in the Red Army. He stated:

The army still is a tool for the Russification of the Ukrainian population and all the populations of other races.¹¹

Yet Skrypnyk did not succeed in carrying out this measure.

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The years passed. The expected internationalism of the Russian Communists did not make itself felt. This embittered Skrypnyk and compelled him to think about using, for the triumph of his line, those difficulties which Stalin had in his struggle with the oppositions.

Especially painful was the experience of Skrypnyk in the case of those Ukrainian districts and regions within the RSFSR. He wanted to protect the seven million Ukrainians in the RSFSR from Russification. But his power as Ukrainian *Narkom* of Education did not reach them. In his struggle with the bureaucrats and chauvinists he had to use his authority as a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and a member of the Presidium of the Comintern. With great difficulty he succeeded in establishing in the RSFSR 500 Ukrainian schools and two technical institutes, but the program was constantly threatened. This led Skrypnyk to a loss of his self-restraint and his final intention to cut the knot with one swing:

We could not imagine the possibility among us [in the Ukrainian SSR—Y. B.] of such a stubborn, long and, we must say, cynical disregard for the interests of the national minorities as there was with respect to the Ukrainian population for long years in the Kursk *gubernia*, the Tahanrih region and the Kuban.¹²

The question of the annexation to Ukraine of those adjoining territories of the RSFSR with a Ukrainian population is a pressing question in need of solution.¹³

¹⁰ *XIIIth Congress of the RCP(b)*. Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1923, pp. 525-526.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² M. Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, II, 1929, pp. 329-330.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

In Moscow there was no thought of seriously considering this demand of Skrypnyk. But the situation was still complicated for Stalin; at the beginning of 1929 he had not yet definitely overcome his opponents in the Kremlin and it was important for him to prevent the formation of a national opposition in Ukraine. Hence he decided to make a broad gesture of reconciliation. A delegation of Ukrainian writers went to Russia. As the spokesman for Ukrainian Soviet opinion, it was to have a conversation with Stalin on the prospects of national cultural development. On this occasion Skrypnyk (June 11, 1929) wrote an article in the Moscow *Izvestia*, expressing the certainty that brotherly relations between nations is a Soviet reality. Yet the article did not lack sharp notes of challenge to Russian chauvinism.¹⁴

The Ukrainian delegation behaved radically in Moscow. It gave Stalin a number of striking examples of Russian great-power chauvinism in decisive sectors of cultural construction; it showed how waves of chauvinism were coming from Russia into Ukraine and ruining the Ukrainian cultural process. It put before Kaganovich and Stalin a number of cardinal questions. When Kaganovich limited himself to appropriate generalities, Stalin had to make far-reaching promises in the name of the Party. These were an assurance of a liberal policy in the field of literature, and freedom of subject matter and styles, the assurance that Moscow was for the carrying out of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian cities and the statement that there would for a long period be a development of national cultures, that the formation of a single proletarian culture was a question of the distant future, and that such a culture would be neither Russian nor German nor French nor English nor Ukrainian but something as yet unknown. Stalin carefully separated the Party from open expressions of Russian chauvinism in the field of culture.¹⁵

This was only a gesture intended to pacify the Ukrainians. It contradicted the thoughts of Stalin in his well-known letter about Khyvylovy. There Stalin called Russia the fatherland of the working people of the entire world and from it drew consequences for the cultural sector. In February, 1931, in his address he even spoke about strengthening Russia through industrialization and he definitely took the national point of view in his survey of the past of Eastern Europe.

He needed peace with Skrypnyk only for a definite period, and the clarity with which Skrypnyk and his followers put forth their demands meant to Stalin that he would have to settle accounts with Skrypnyk in the very near future, exactly as he had done with the rightist and leftist oppositions.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

¹⁵ A. Khvyła, "The Meeting," *Journal Krytyka*, December, 1929, No. 5.

The moment to settle accounts came in 1933. In 1932-1933 Stalin had pacified the Ukrainian villages by an artificially organized famine. He obligated the Communists of Ukraine to shake out from the village into the state elevators all the grain, even the seed stock. The Central Committee of the CP(b)U, realizing the catastrophic results of such procedures, showed no desire to carry out the plan completely. Skrypnyk was one of those who protested. "They have swept away everything from us," he said at a Party conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich. But all such protests were useless. The one thing that could have saved the Ukrainian Communists at that moment was their own armed forces. But deluded by the international brotherhood, they were not then thinking about arms.

In January, 1933, the nominee of Stalin, Postyshev, arrived in Kharkiv with unlimited powers. He assumed the task of destroying Skrypnyk. In February, 1933, Skrypnyk was removed from the People's Commissariat of Education and given a less responsible task in the State Plan of the Ukrainian SSR. This was a heavy blow but it was only the beginning. The true reprisal was to begin with the destruction of the moral and political authority of the one-time companion of Lenin. On July 4, 1933, a reconsideration of the theoretical and practical activity of Skrypnyk was organized. In accordance with the instructions of Postyshev, the selected speakers told how Skrypnyk by his authority had shielded not only Party deviationists but also counter-revolutionary nationalists and had granted them leading posts in the cultural sector. Petty, envious persons, who had risen thanks to Skrypnyk, now to save their own skins, poured out endless accusations against him. They ridiculed Skrypnyk for venturing to challenge Stalin, who was a real genius and the true theoretician of the nationality problem. On July 7, there was held a meeting of the party activists of Kharkiv at which Skrypnyk was to repent his errors. But the veteran of communism did not wish to repent. Instead, he ended his life by suicide.

On November 19, 1933, at a renovated Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, Postyshev said:

The discovery of the nationalist deviation of Skrypnyk gave us the opportunity to purge the various sectors of socialist construction and especially the construction of Ukrainian socialist culture from Petlura, Makhno and other nationalistic elements. Here we have done an enormous work. We need only say that at this time we have purged more than 2,000 persons of the nationalistic elements; from the system of the *Narkomos* (Commissariat of Education) more than 300 scientific and editorial workers. From eight central Soviet institutions alone we have thrown out more than 200 nationalists who were in charge of sections and sectors. From two systems alone—the cooperatives and the grain deliveries—we have thrown out more than 1,000 nationalists and White Guards.

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Today the shadow of Skrypnyk is rising above the expanse of Ukraine. From the other side of the gloom it is stretching out its hands to the Ukrainian Party elite, as once Hamlet's father called upon his son to take vengeance. Today that vengeance was so far inflicted on the closest collaborators of Stalin—Molotov and Kaganovich.

The present position of National Communism is very different from what it was in 1933. National Communism has its bastion in Yugoslavia and Poland. Its giant support is Communist China. Objectively it is accepting the rebirth of National Communism in Ukraine. But National Communism can attract only those elements which are unable to break with communist doctrinarism. The halfway measures of Ukrainian National Communism cannot satisfy the wider circles of the Ukrainian people.

Not in vain do the people still keep alive the ideas of an uncompromising nationalism, which through a complete break with Moscow hopes for the realization of the Ukrainian state ideal. But National Communism is the order of the day. Whether it succeeds in continuing, only the future can tell.

BOOK REVIEWS

INSIDE RUSSIA TODAY. By John Gunther. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957, 1958, pp. XXIV, 550.

It is a very difficult thing to write an adequate review of this book which is written in the style and manner familiar to the American public from John Gunther's other works. The author is a well-trained and careful reporter, and to give an impression of completeness and of explanation, he has drawn upon a large number of authorities on Russia-USSR, past and present. As a result most of his statements on the general situation in the USSR are remarkably accurate and astute and yet side by side with these are surprising omissions and even glaring errors in points that are often given correctly in the usual encyclopedias.

Basically this is one of the books that urge peaceful coexistence. As the author says, (p. XLX) "It is high time that we in America accept the facts of life, and, no matter how distasteful and repugnant we find Soviet institutions, adjust ourselves to the necessity of having to live in a world side by side with them." Also, it is our duty "to try to understand something of the nature of the Russian people," whom he seems to admire "in spite of their bleak totalitarian surroundings."

We cannot say that the author is unduly disposed to idealize either the Russians or the Communist regime and his final chapter on "Peace, Coexistence, and the United States" is good, although he does lean over backwards in his belief that we should realize more clearly why the Russians feel as they do toward the United States. In fact, there is an underlying idea that starting from different goals and using different methods, the development of Russia and the United States shows more similarities than either would like. This is an old observation often made since the time of the Toqueville in 1835, and it does have a certain basis, although not necessarily as much as Mr. Gunther seems to imply.

On the other hand his views as to the present state of the government, art, culture, literature and science, based upon his observations and the accounts of the immediate past, are excellent and deserve careful consideration from every American. The traditional idea that there could be no technological or artistic development in a totalitarian state is clearly wrong, for as the experience of every culture has shown, an educated class can be trained in a more unutterable brutality than that of the uncouth savage. This promises to be one of the unrecognized dangers in the Soviet system of education and it cannot be disproved by Dudintsev's novel, *Not By Bread Alone*.

Gunther's observations on culture in its broadest aspects refer almost entirely to Moscow and Leningrad, even though he speaks of the lively cultural life in Kiev and Ukraine. Thus he remarks, "Some of the ablest writers in the Soviet Union are Ukrainian, like Alexander Korneichuk, the leading dramatist" (p. 418), but he mentions no other Ukrainian authors. At the same time that he states

that Gogol and Repin were Ukrainians, he has a grotesquely incorrect note on Shevchenko (p. 422) when he says that "after twelve years in Siberia as a political exile, he returned to Kiev, where he died" (Shevchenko died in Petersburg). Apparently he shows no conception of the fact that there is a definite something called a Ukrainian culture and literature which has produced its own masters and characteristics outside of the general Russian pattern and yet on almost the same page he can stress that the spirit of Kiev is very different from that of either Moscow or Leningrad.

With the same confusion, he states that "Ukrainian history goes way back; this was the first eastern Slav state, and the cradle of Russia. It was taken in turn by the Tatars, the fiercely marauding Lithuanians and the Poles" (p. 417). Later, "Then the Tatars came, and Russia, so to speak, moved north" (p. 421). In the same way, he says: "Another well-known tomb is that of Kochubei and Iskra, colonels in the service of Peter the Great. They were betrayed by a Cossack chief named Mazepa, during the war against Charles XII of Sweden, and, by error, were executed. Pushkin and Byron both wrote poems about the episode" (p. 424).

In short, his attitude on Ukraine seems to be that of the young man whom he cites: "I think of myself as a Ukrainian who believes in socialism for all of the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine" (p. 422). Yet he seems to imply on p. 420 that Lviv is really a Polish city and that the "Russians took Ruthenia without any ethnic justification and added it to Ukraine."

Yet with all this on p. 169, in discussing the structure of the Soviet Union, Gunther says: "The nationality problem was, from the beginning, given extraordinary priority by the builders of the Soviet system, if only because the population of Russia was not less than 57 per cent non-Russian in 1917. Russians were, though the fact is hard to believe, an actual minority in their own country." Lenin knew full well that something must be done, as soon as possible, to recognize the position and claims of the non-Russians, and build a cohesive multi-national structure, if only to make Russia itself stronger. . . . His conception of a Soviet 'Union' was strictly in accordance with his basic hypothesis. He thought in terms of gradually expanding concentric circles of Communist power, with Russia as the core. The creation of various Soviet republics, their progressive 'admittance' to the Union, and the fiction that all this was voluntary, rose inevitably out of the master plan."

Yet again on p. 419, he says: "So far as things that count are concerned—government, politics, industry, agriculture—the Ukraine is as thoroughly Russianized today as it was under the Czars. Does Ukrainian nationalism exist? Of course. There must be millions of Ukrainians who would like to have a country of their own, to be independent, but this does not mean that they are not loyal citizens now." Was this proved in World War II, when the Ukrainians surrendered in masses and many fought in the UPA?

The national problem is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union. It is the most difficult subject to study impartially, for the agents of the central regime with all their double talk and chicanery make it almost impossible for the average visitor to form an impartial opinion and on the other hand the friends of the old regime, the Russia-firsters, are equally opposed to an adequate study of the problem. Yet it is the crux of the relations between the USSR and the free world, for Moscow is trying to bring satellites and neutral states into the same position as the non-Russian Soviet republics. The liberation of one

means the liberation of all but the United States government has not yet seen fit to accept this obvious truth.

The treatment of the national question is perhaps the weakest side of this very interesting volume. Mr. Gunther is at his best in describing the events and the thinking of Moscow and the Russians in the limited sense. He has given an interesting and popular book but it is by no means the last word or the final study of Russia-USSR even at the present time. Russia is indeed a riddle in an enigma. Yet with its defects, if the reader can grasp the idea that Russian Communism is the implacable enemy of the free world and can realize that no final reconciliation or peaceful agreement is possible, his work may be of value and may serve to destroy some of the obvious misconceptions which the West has long cherished to its own confusion.

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CLARENCE A. MANNING

IN QUEST OF FREEDOM: 1918-1958. By Walter Dushnyck. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, 1958, pp. 96.

The political and cultural basis for a Ukrainian Nation evolved in the 9th century when an independent Ukraine, under the original name "Rus," became the focal point for Eastern European affairs down to the middle of the 12th century. Soon afterwards, the Tartar invasion (c. 1240) served as an effective catalyst in uniting the Ukrainian people against their invaders and in breaking any Ukrainian ties with the Muscovites, or real Russians. In subsequent periods, the struggle of the Ukrainian people for national self-determination have elicited the admiration and sympathy of all who have a basic understanding of this problem.

The pre-20th century history of Ukraine has been dealt with extensively by many authors who extol the brave contributions of such known Ukrainian figures as Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Ivan Mazepa, Taras Shevchenko and others. Few contemporary writers, however, have surveyed intensively the 20th century conflicts which led to the realization of another independent Ukraine in 1918.

Mr. Dushnyck, noted author and analyst of Eastern European affairs, expounds, with vivid and balanced perspective, the complex political events which took place in Ukraine before, during, and following the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic. As a brief starting point the author goes back to the Battle of Poltava in 1709, at which time Ukraine lost her independence. The author shows that despite subsequent Russian attempts at eradicating Ukrainian aspirations for freedom, these did not destroy the Ukrainian national ideal and the desire for freedom. Instead, they only succeeded in giving this oppressed nation more determination to break away from Russian imperialistic domination.

This fact is further attested to by the author in his description of the great rebirth of Ukrainian culture which occurred in the 19th century, with such literary figures as Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko emanating as the most salient exponents of Ukrainian ideals for freedom and independence. "It was Shevchenko who asked in one of his poems: 'When will we receive our Washington, with a new and righteous law?'" (p. 9); and of Franko, the author states, "His great literary heritage and his passionate devotion to the interests of the poor and exploited peasants and workers . . . greatly enhanced the Ukrainian national development and the general cause of liberation." (p. 11). The Czarist regime not only refused to recognize these movements but, in typical

Russian style, even went so far as to deny the existence of a Ukrainian people.

One of the points which the author brings out clearly is that much of the misunderstanding which exists in the Western World today regarding Ukraine, is based on official propoganda which did not stem from Russian Communism, but had as its root, Russian Czarism. This was evidenced by the campaign which was launched by the Czarist regime early in the 20th century to wipe out of existence any distinct Ukrainian heritage, and to convince the world that Ukrainians and Russians were one and indivisible. Particularly was this true during World War I when, as the author puts it, "The Russians exerted every effort to prove that as a people the Ukrainians were a fiction and that the entire Ukrainian movement was of German fabrication" (p. 17). The author shows that these propoganda moves had little effect on the organization of Ukrainian independence movements. On the other hand, the Central Powers were influenced by such Russian techniques, and decided to further the cause of Ukrainian independence as a tool for their own ends. They gave little real aid, however, to Ukrainian liberation movements, except in verbal pronouncements.

The major portion of Mr. Dushnyck's book deals with the organizational framework of political and military groups in Ukraine before and during World War I, which eventually succeeded in inciting the Ukrainian National Revolution and in establishing the Ukrainian National Republic. Some of the most descriptive passages in the book center around the almost miraculous rise of these groups after the fall of Czar Nicholas II early in 1917. In St. Petersburg at this time, for example, thousands of Ukrainian soldiers united under the leadership of Simon Petlura to urge the Russian Provisional Government to restore autonomy and cultural privileges to Ukraine, long suppressed by Russian Czardom (p. 25). Later these military groups, working closely with political groups in Ukraine, established a central organ in Kiev to unite all revolutionary activities in one body, the *Rada*.

Mr. Dushnyck dramatically portrays the orderly manner in which the *Rada* proceeded, despite the unstable conditions in Moscow at the time, and he shows that the Ukrainians resorted to more drastic measures only when milder demands were ignored or refused by Moscow.

In the meantime, the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution brought more hardships to the Ukrainian people. The author describes these conditions well in such passages as: "The disappearance of a strong central government in Russia galvanized the growth of Ukrainian nationalism up to the point of separation (from Russia). There was a political vacuum, which the *Rada* of necessity tried to fill, but the task of building up a strong and stable Ukrainian government, amid the unbelievable chaos, hunger, Bolshevik agitation and economic collapse, was extremely difficult, if not impossible" (p. 46).

Despite these conflicts, however, there did emerge a Ukrainian Republic on January 22, 1918 which was recognized almost immediately by the Central Powers in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. Ukraine resorted to this recognition, according to the author, as a measure to prevent Bolshevik domination of Ukraine. Despite this, however, he shows that Ukraine received little assistance from these Powers and had to rely, for the most part, on its own diminishing resources in thwarting the Bolsheviks and, for a time, the White Russians and the Poles. To make matters worse, the Allied Powers were aiding the latter foes of Ukraine, and this was a further obstacle which eventually contributed to the forced subjugation of Ukraine to Russian Communist imperialism.

Most of what has been reviewed thus far concerns events which took place in "Great Ukraine." Much valuable information is also included in the work regarding Western Ukraine's struggle against the Poles during this same period, and the subsequent union of Great Ukraine with Western Ukraine in January, 1919.

One wonders, when studying this section of the book, whether the author is or is not sympathetic with the course of events which took place during this period. Simon Petlura, portrayed as the gallant head of the Directorate of Ukraine, suddenly seems to become unpopular to Western Ukraine by having formed an alliance with Poland's Pilsudski, against whom Western Ukraine was fighting at the time, to combat the Red and White Russians. While the author is clear as to the reaction of the people in Great Ukraine in this matter—"this alliance with Poland elicited little support among the Ukrainian people . . .," (p. 70)—he does not give enough insight into the motives behind Petlura's actions for the reader to form a critical evaluation.

The concluding portion of this work capsules the events which occurred from 1921 to 1957 in which Ukraine, under the yoke of Russian Communist imperialism continued the struggle to wrest herself from traditional Russian domination. As the author clearly describes it, this fight continues to the present day, for, in his words, ". . . the forces that raised the Ukrainian nation to freedom forty years ago are by no means gone. The yearning for freedom was not and never will be extinguished in the hearts of this valiant people" (p. 72).

For the student interested in obtaining an introduction to the effects of traditional Russian imperialism and duplicity on a captive nation in the USSR, this book is well worth reading. An excellent bibliography and index is included to aid the reader in a further study of the problem. That the issue of the non-Russian nations in the USSR has grown in the understanding and knowledge of the American people these past few years, there can be no doubt. In the universities, in Congress, and in many executive agencies a deepening interest is being shown in this vital subject.

It is by no means an easy subject for the American student or observer to grasp. Yet, despite this, much progress has been made and the importance of Ukraine and the several other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR to the national security interest of the United States is being increasingly realized. A process of this sort takes time, but one often wonders whether there is sufficient time. In reality, works of this sort contract the time factor by engrossing the avid interests of more and more people. There just cannot be too many of them.

National Educational Association

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THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF U.S.S.R.—What Everyone in the Free World Should Know about Russia. By Vano Jan Nanwashvili. American Council for Independent Georgia, 1956, Boston, Mass., p. 342.

Those who find "Russia" an enigma, others who cannot comprehend the gyrations and zig-zags of Muscovite foreign policy, and the many who naively trust in "human nature" as the basis for a truly peaceful coexistence with the Russian Communist Empire might well turn to this work for the solution of their pressing intellectual problems on this and related subjects. In a number of respects this is an unusual and striking presentation. The author himself is of

Georgian ancestry, i.e. from the historic Georgian nation in the Caucasus. He was trained in the military officers' school in Tiflis during the independence of Georgia in the period of 1918-21; he fought in the Georgian-Russian War in 1921; and later he was associated with many military staff schools in Europe and elsewhere. The work amply reflects the extensive military background of the author.

The approach of this scholarly treatment to the vital problem of Russia is not, however, purely military. On the contrary, it engenders a synthetic methodology, much like Admiral Mahan's classics on naval power. With remarkable coherent effect the work combines the political, the ideologic, the historical, and the military into one of the most accurate and telling expositions of the Russian problem which this reviewer has yet read. It is replete with rich historical insights into the problem and its military observations concerning the forces under Moscow deserve the most careful and sober thought on the part of our strategists. In fact, the author's repeated and justified stress on the congenital unreliability of the armed forces of the USSR is a thesis which this reviewer has been expounding in different military circles for over a year. He elaborates on this at length and quite convincingly within the totalist framework of analysis set up in the book. With some revision and editing the work, in permanent published form, would be most useful at our staff schools.

In showing the sources of strength and weakness of the USSR this paper-covered treatise sets forth in absorbing detail what many advanced writers on the Russian problem have consistently claimed, namely, that to understand the nature of this problem, it is to the history of the Russian nation, rather than to Marxism and the like, that the serious student must turn. The writer does just this to explain and demonstrate why the West "does not know its adversary at all." This patent ignorance on the part of the West is obviously a negative source of strength for Moscow. Drawing cautiously on historical parallels and lessons, the author effectively casts the present struggle in terms of the age-old contest for empire and domination of the Euro-Asian continents. He shows, for example, how official propaganda prior to World War I stressed the necessity for large states and groupings, which were exemplified by the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and yet all collapsed except for the revival of the Russian Empire in its present primary form known as the Soviet Union. There was scarcely any recognition of the subjugated nations encompassed by these empires. Today, Western propaganda repeats the same mistake in relation to the USSR.

According to the author, the United States, with its unique traditions and nature, is a natural leader in behalf of the freedom and independence of all the subjugated nations, especially those in the USSR. Largely because of ignorance and with no experiential feeling toward national subjugation, it has as yet failed to assume such leadership, even for its own maximum strategic advantage. With abundant examples and an impressive display of them, the writer is quite right that we Americans fail to comprehend the nature of the cold war. He contends that the cold war waged by "Russia" against the United States and the West goes back to the middle 30's rather than to only 1945. Actually, a real case could be made out for the year 1918 when Russian imperialist colonialism was on the march again in the form of ideologic communism. The potential threat to the West was already in being. In the work itself this is alluded to by observations on the significance of the Pilsudski-Petlura episode in 1920.

From chapter seven on the reader is exposed to real, fundamental insights into the centuries-long Russian problem. As the author accurately puts it, it is an age-old tradition of the Russian state that "expansion during time of peace has led to political success and territorial growth"—the paradox of it all being "struggle during peace time, peaceful conquest." In short, the current techniques of Russian Communist infiltration and subversion are not the original fruits of Leninism but rather the fashioned modes of traditional Russian diplomacy and politics. Leninism itself is a flower of this long tradition. This is clearly and pungently shown historically, going all the way back to the reign of Ivan the Terrible and his long siege and eventual conquest of Kazan in 1552. What Secretary of State Dulles calls "indirect aggression" in the Middle East is in reality an old Russian way of international life, contributed to and developed by Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine II. It is little wonder, as the author states, that "today the Bolshevik system recognizes only those rulers in Russian history who accomplished the greatest conquests. The only monarchs who were forgiven by the Bolsheviks and were reckoned among the Red saints are Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine II, exactly those who achieved the greatest conquests" (p. 175).

Against this kind of detailed and living background, the official policy of the West begins to look pallid and even absurd. The policy is aimed at fighting Bolshevism alone. It is a dangerous illusion which arbitrarily, out of ignorance, ignores "the history of four centuries of aggression which have extended that state (Russia) from the Pacific to the center of Europe." The writer is perfectly correct that this formula "makes it difficult to recognize the real opponent. It prevents an evaluation of his real power, his military potential, and his political structure." Moreover, he's on sound ground when he concludes that, as a consequence of this illusory policy, "the West is losing itself in local matters and scattering its forces and its abilities in patching up the successive breaks." One need only glance at the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America for the truth of this conclusion. However, in the eyes of this reviewer, the situation is not as hopeless and desperate as this work seems to suggest in parts. The fact is that in many influential American circles today the strategic importance of the subjugated nations is being increasingly understood. The issue is more of time and extent of such understanding than one of complete ignorance.

The book contains perspectives and ideas which most Americans will find challenging and thought-provoking. It is little recognized, for example, that the West was spared for at least twenty-five years the pressures of the Russian menace by virtue of the success of the combined forces of Poland, Ukraine, and White Ruthenia over the Russian Communists in 1920. The real unanimity of position taken by all types of Russian political parties, prior to 1917 and after, against national self-determination is another worthwhile example of food for thought. This is particularly important for those American agencies which persist in aiding Russian emigres who are professedly anti-communist but are at one with the Russian Communists when it come to the preservation of the "eternal" Russian Empire. The examination of the intrinsic relationship between Russia's historic totalitarianism and its imperial conquests is also most refreshing and illuminating. Mr. Nanwashvili is again on *terra firma* when he observes generally that "Even a superficial glance at the history of Russia will clearly show that without a totalitarian system such aggressive action and rapid ter-

ritorial growth would be impossible" (p. 204). These are only a few of the many intellectually engaging points in this work.

This valuable contribution to Western thought about Russia does require, however, some revision and expansion. It must be carefully edited, since there are too many misspellings, short sentenced paragraphs and the like. There are also several conceptual errors. For instance, on page 3 the USSR is referred to as a nation, although this contradicts the author's very thesis and other usages. Another, on page 80, Czechoslovakia is also erroneously depicted as a "nation." With these changes and more documentation this work would be of tremendous service on the American scene. It would undoubtedly offset much of the drivel on communism and the Soviet Union which is flowing at present from our Russian institutes and similar quarters.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

KATORGA. An Aspect of Modern Slavery. Bernhard Roeder. Translated by Lionel Kochan. Preface by David Floyd, Heinemann, London-Melbourne-Toronto, 1958. Pp. 271, 21s.

This new book, *Katorga*, just published in English by William Heinemann Limited of London, will undoubtedly prove to be a weighty and serious addition to the already vast bibliography on the Russian slave labor system in our times.

The author, Bernhard Roeder, is a former officer of the *Wehrmacht*, with university studies to his credit in Munich, Berlin and Cambridge. During World War II he was severely wounded on the Eastern front, and upon the defeat of Germany he settled in the Soviet zone and became active in the Christian Democratic Party. When the German Democratic Republic (communist) was established by Moscow, he entered its Ministry for Foreign Affairs. But early in 1950 he was arrested and sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. He spent over five years in Vorkuta and the Urals until the granting of amnesty, upon which he along with many other German prisoners, was released and returned to Germany. At present Author Roeder is working in the administration of the West Berlin Senate.

Roeder's *Katorga* has all the characteristics of an important and informative book. No horror tales are to be found in it, but there is horror in the understatement. For over five years the author lived the life of a *katorzhnik*, a man condemned to slavery in the company of a great array of other political prisoners who formed a microcosm of the modern Soviet slave empire. Among his companions were intellectuals, scientists, officials, Ukrainian insurgents, Ukrainian priests and peasants and a great number of political deportees from other non-Russian countries of the USSR: Byelorussia, the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Basically, the book deals with the vast slave labor camp population, which was anti-Russian and dynamically rebellious.

A substantial part of Roeder's *Katorga* is devoted to his experiences in slave labor camps and his symbiosis with the various nationals, among whom Ukrainians constitute the overwhelming majority. Here Author Roeder confirms the observations of other author-returnees from the USSR, such as Dr. Joseph Scholmer, Dr. F. Varcony and others, that the great majority of the slave camp population consists of Ukrainians. Many of them, Roeder writes, are young Ukrainian insurgents who fought during World War II against both the Russians and the Germans. He relates what they described to him: the

unbearable life of terror and persecution which they knew under the Soviet Russian regime, and then their disappointment when the Germans, instead of helping them to achieve their long-hoped-for independence, turned against them and took up where the Russians had left off.

In discussing the strikes and rebellions in the slave labor camps which erupted after the death of Stalin in 1953, Roeder points out that Beria and his lieutenants tried to ease slave camp life by relaxing the rules and regulations. In many camps the guards and security troops refused to fire on the prisoners, some even joining the ranks of the strikers. He writes that many Ukrainian prisoners, as well as those of other nationalities, hoped that they would be released, especially when the communist press in Ukraine unleashed violent attacks upon Russification policies and the suppression of the Ukrainian language. But these hopes were ill-founded; Khrushchev, with some minor deviations, has followed in the main the line of Stalin.

Author Roeder has no doubt that the population of the slave labor camps is to a man rigidly against the present regime and for the establishment of free and independent states by the now oppressed nations of the USSR.

He is not, however, of the same opinion with regard to the Russians themselves. Roeder's Maxim Ivanov, the young engineer whom the police had thrown into camps, is very contemptuous of communism and the Communists; nevertheless, he finds it possible to defend the Soviet system and laud the Soviet state.

"You must get used to the idea," he says, "that the Soviet Union is today the second world power and may in the future be the first. You can destroy the Soviet Union only if you destroy mankind . . ." And for that glory of "greatness of Communist Russia" he and his ilk are ready to sacrifice everything in order to "save mankind" from "capitalist oppression."

Maxim Ivanov of *Katorga* may or may not represent the majority of the Russians, but there is no doubt that the elite of the present Russian leadership feels the same way. In a country where there are no democratic traditions and where for the past forty years tyranny exerted an iron grip, it is indeed possible that the regime may buy further leases of life by means of small concessions and by sensational achievements, such as *sputniks*.

No less important and significant are the concluding pages of Roeder's *Katorga*, in which he discusses the present policies of Khrushchev with respect to the free world. Author Roeder warns against the much-driven policy of "peaceful coexistence," which is the main argument of Khrushchev against his opponents in the Kremlin. He writes that Khrushchev, in a sense, is even more dangerous than Stalin, because he has switched to a more "reasonable" line in foreign policy and thus has succeeded in convincing many neutralist and uninformed statesmen of the West that the Kremlin wants to live peacefully with the rest of the world. Such is hardly the case, Author Roeder asserts.

He cautions the West never to lose sight of the final objective of Communist Russia's foreign policy, adding:

"We must now try to identify the real, constant aims and specific methods of Soviet foreign policy behind the friendly smile of *detente* worn nowadays by Soviet statesmen. Since Russia, in 1480, shook off the Tartar yoke, two tendencies have formed the unchanging basis of Russian foreign policy: expansion eastwards and advance towards the West in search of the open sea—the Baltic, the Black Sea and, by way of Istanbul, the Mediterranean. During the process,

short periods of expansion have alternated with long periods of stagnation, in a rhythm typical of Russian history . . ."

He concludes that a strong and healthy free world should not fear Communist Russia, inasmuch as inside the USSR there seethe powerful centrifugal forces which are likely to explode at any major involvement of Moscow in a foreign war.

Bernhard Roeder's book is an excellent source of fresh ideas of how to look on what the Russians are doing today in the Middle East and in Quemoy. It merits a good press and the attention not only of the average American citizen, but especially of those of our leaders in the government who are charged with the formulation of our Soviet policies on a global scale.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

ČESKOSLOVENSKÁ TRAGÉDIE (The Tragedy of Czechoslovakia), Jak bylo bolševizováno Československo. By Miloslav J. Brouček. Published in Germany, pp. 422. Copyright 1956 by M. J. Brouček.

The author subdivides the book into four principal parts: The First World War, Between Two World Wars, the Second World War and After the Second World War.

Author Brouček has succeeded in collecting important and compact material, on the basis of which he avers that the principal leaders of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, Masaryk and Benes, in the years 1917-1918 favored the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Prof. Masaryk, who at the time of the revolution was in Kiev and thus saw it with his own eyes, in a memorandum to the American government counselled the Allies to "recognize the government of the Bolsheviks in Russia." Along the same lines the author portrays the work of Benes in Paris after World War I. Both statesmen supported the "armed neutrality" of the Czechoslovak military units in Ukraine and later on in Russia, as far as the Bolshevik revolution was concerned.

The trend toward the left in the Czechoslovak state the author sees also in the fact that at the helm of the new state were the Socialist parties. This trend was influenced by the considerable success of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia in the elections at that time. Even when a coalition of the Agrarian, Catholic and Socialist parties came into power, the development of foreign policy under the leadership of Benes proceeded along the line of a *rapprochement* with Moscow. This was especially pronounced in 1934-1935 when Hitler or Nazi Germany appeared on the political horizon.

Regrettably, the author perhaps unwittingly omitted a basic fact, namely, the traditional Russophilism of the Czechs and Slovaks. Russophilism had been cultivated by them for generation after generation, under various guises and forms, and the warnings and caution voiced by such statesmen as Havlicak-Borovsky fell flat, finding no response whatever. Both the Czechs and Slovaks were uncritically enraptured by the idea of Slavic romanticism propagated by Czarist Russia, and later by Communist Russia whenever it was convenient to do so. By the practical application of these slogans of Moscow both the peoples, the Czechs and the Slovaks, now have to suffer in "coexistence." The author also failed to underscore the important role of General Stefanik, a Slovak, in the liberation movement of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Brouček comes to the conclusion that Czechoslovakia was far too taken up by a pro-Soviet orientation in its foreign relations, which eventually weakened any confidence that the foreign countries might have had in Czecho-

slovakia. If the methods and objectives of the Russian Bolsheviks in Moscow were not known to the leading statesmen of Czechoslovakia, the methods and objectives of the Communist Party in their own state could not have been unknown to them—the Communists in every foreign country have always been true spokesmen for the interests of Moscow. "Not Masaryk, but Lenin" was the slogan of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1934, when they ran Gottwald against President Masaryk for the post of the presidency.

In the chapter on World War II and the post-war period until 1948 the author has assembled a great deal of good material not only on the activity of Benes but also on his colleagues, who, incidentally, are now for the most part in the "Free Europe Committee." In no uncertain way the author demonstrates that the Sovietophile policy of Benes did not originate during World War II and did not end with the war. Unfortunately, the author has omitted a great array of foreign sources accessible to him.

A special chapter is devoted to the problem of Carpatho-Ukraine (Fodkarpatska Rus). Here the author does not analyze the legal and constitutional basis of incorporation of the country into Czechoslovakia in 1919, nor does he take into account the expression of the will of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine during the twenty years of the existence of Czechoslovakia. We believe that Carpatho-Ukraine was not a *res nullius* but a political unit of Czechoslovakia, whose forms were legalized by the constitution and sanctioned by international law, and which possessed its own legal and political development, both prior to the attainment of autonomy in 1938 and after that date. One cannot overlook the Ukrainian character of that country and the historical desire of its population to be united with the Ukrainian mainland.

Carpatho-Ukraine was united with the Ukrainian SSR (and not with the USSR, as the author erroneously writes) on the basis of an agreement between the then free Czechoslovakia and the USSR. This agreement was ratified by the Czechoslovak Parliament and counter-signed by President Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, and published in the official journal of laws and decrees. Czechoslovakia voluntarily and unilaterally crossed out the St. Germain Treaty, and as a result renounced any legal claims deriving from this treaty.

The Czechs and the Slovaks, as well as other Slavic peoples, may not have had an ample opportunity to acquaint themselves with the methods and objectives of "brotherly and Slavic Moscow," on which they relied so frequently with high hopes in past history. Now the experience gained in the hard school of life undoubtedly should have a marked influence upon the development of their political thought in the future. But both the Czechs and Slovaks should take into consideration the circumstance that despite the political changes that might take place in the future in Europe, their countries would be steadily exposed to the danger of aggressive action on the part of the stronger neighbors.

It would, therefore, seem imperative for the author, who is preparing the publication of his book in English, not only to dwell upon the development of that country in the past, but also to provide new political concepts based on: (a) the experience gained with respect to Russian political objectives; and (b) the geographical situation of the country as to be seen with a new structure of forces in Central Europe after the fall of Russian Bolshevism and the establishment of new independent states therein.

An intelligent elaboration of new, real and healthy ways for the further political development of the Czech people in the future might provide a fruitful answer to the author's query: "What next?"

VIS.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FORIGNE PERIODICALS

"THE SOVIET EMPIRE: PRISON HOUSE OF NATIONS AND RACES."

Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., 1958.

As a further addition to the expanding literature on the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, this brochure is most welcomed in behalf of growing American understanding of this subject. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, under the chairmanship of Senator Eastland from Mississippi, is to be highly complimented for this substantial act of public service. This report was prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Its subtitle indicates that it is primarily a study in genocide, discrimination, and abuse of power. A careful reading of it shows that the authors were determined to hew a factual study.

For Americans who are more or less unfamiliar with the plight of the captive nations in the USSR, this work is a compact and informative introductory study. To the greatest extent it summarizes essential factual data in more original sources. For data on Russian genocide of the non-Russian nations, on Russian-made famines, discrimination, and many forms of abuses, the report relies heavily on the original and spectacular output of the select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and similar sources. It provides interesting population statistics on the Soviet Union, but not altogether to good advantage. An uninitiated reader would be taken somewhat aback by the multiplicity of so-called ethnic groups in the USSR. The population statistics could have been meaningfully analyzed in terms of national political entities, but this was not done. Similar criticisms along the lines of interpretative thought, as against the mere factualism of the report, could be made.

The one glaring defect of the report is its failure to interpret realistically and with political meaning many of the facts presented. This was no short-coming in the results of the Select House Committee referred to above. For example, Senator Eastland's excellent introduction and the body of the report allude to Lenin's espousal of the doctrine of national self-determination. It is properly indicated that Lenin and his followers really didn't believe in this basic principle and actually manipulated it for their attainment of centralist political power. Fine, this is a fact. But the significance of the fact is lost completely by its isolated presentation, which is a general characteristic of the report. Advanced students of the subject know that the significance of this Leninist maneuver lies squarely on the attendant fact that all other Russian political parties, including Kerensky's, were at least honest in openly denying the principle and its application. Many, many more of such examples may be cited. The fundamental reason for this marked failure of the report is due to the fact that it is presented really in an historical vacuum. Consequently, in

terms of political meaning and purpose, there is a deep strand of unrealism about it. Despite the Russian hand in the genocidal and discriminatory game—not to mention the imperialist and colonial game—the reader is constantly confronted by the authors with a diabolical phantom called “the Soviets.”

This basic unrealism about the report shows itself in the conceptual mis-constructions and contradictions running throughout it. The title, for instance, features “The Prison House of Nations . . .” Yet, quite erroneously, both from a quantitative as well as a qualitative viewpoint, these imprisoned non-Russian nations are characterized as “national minorities,” “ethnic groups” and other misleading nomers. At the very outset, on page one, a conceptual confusion faces the reader in the assertion that “Soviet Russia, like Czarist Russia, is, however, a multinational state consisting of ethnic groups variously estimated from 177 to more than 200.” A clear thinker would state that, as it was from the very start in 1917, Soviet Russia is the RSFSR and that its empire, the Soviet Union, is like Czarist Russia. The alert reader will meet with similar confusions in later parts of the report.

Notwithstanding these and other defects in the report, the brochure does serve a useful purpose. It certainly suggests that much more work must be done officially in this field. As every educator knows, this takes time, gestation, and stages of development.

“RUSSIA'S BORDERLAND EXPANSION PROGRAM,” by Włodzimierz Baczkowski, *Soviet Total War*, House Document No. 227, Part 2, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1956.

This compact and superbly written article is undoubtedly one of the chief contributions to this study of the House Un-American Activities Committee. It is scholarly, factual, sound in understanding, and plainly reasonable in its conclusions. The essay explains the nature of traditional Russian expansionism and in a most remarkable way connects the so-called nationalities policy of Moscow with its policies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. It represents another solid contribution to American public enlightenment on the most fundamental issues in the current world struggle. Such enlightenment has fortunately been on the increase, and we expect this author to cultivate this field more extensively in the near future.

The writer makes his essential point at the very start when he says that for centuries “the evolution of Russia's territorial expansion was marked by a two-phase process: first, conquest and absorption of her borderlands, followed by acquisition of new contiguous territory. Then the sequence was repeated.” He clearly distinguishes Western overseas colonialism from the territorial aggrandizements of Moscow. It is shown that the previous overseas possessions of Russia (Alaska till 1876, 50 islands in Oceania until the 19th century, parts of New Guinea) were not maintained. Instead, the Russian method of territorial expansion is like that of China. Showing the application of this method, the author develops many interesting points and facts. The early imperialism of Red Moscow is described in sufficient detail. The two autonomous governments in Turkestan in 1917 (Olash Orda in Orenburg and the Autonomous Government of Kokand) were overwhelmed by it. The conquest of Armenia in December 1920, of North Caucasia in 1919, Azerbaijan in April 1920, Georgia in 1921 and so forth, is interestingly developed.

Russian imperialist interests in the Middle East are also nicely elucidated. These interests are often furthered through ethnic affinities of those already

under the heel of Moscow. For example, about 3 million Azerbaijani are in the USSR, and directly to the south in northern Iran reside about 4 million Azerbaijani. Among the latter, Russian agents create pressure on the Iranian government for their union with the Azerbaijan SSR. The Kurds serve another example. Most of them live in Eastern Turkey and also in Iran, Iraq and Syria. The political group, the Hoybun, proclaimed an independent Kurdistan in 1927 with Diarbekir in Turkey as its capital. This failed, but Moscow supported Kurdish revolts in these areas and also the ephemeral Kurdish Republic of Mohabad in 1945. Other examples are cited, too. As the author puts it, "Today the USSR relies upon a policy of minority self-determination, which she denies to peoples already conquered, in order to disrupt the internal affairs of nations lying beyond her southern borders." The importance of this for a far-seeing American foreign policy is that this process can be effectively put into reverse.

"SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY," by Walter Kolarz. *Soviet Total War*, House Document No. 227, Part 2, Washington, D. C., September 30, 1956.

The increasing importance of the subject of the non-Russian nations in the USSR is further evidenced by the appearance of this article. Some of the material in the article is standard matter in the field, but the analyses and interpretations offer new and different slants. The article contains many forceful and convincing views. It also embraces a number of weaknesses as to factual accuracy and political judgment. Nonetheless, it is an important piece of writing which is made available to the American mind which, generally, continues to be unaware of the immense opportunities provided by the non-Russian nations in the USSR during this period of the cold war.

The writer rightly maintains that "It is a misconception of Russian history to consider it primarily as an urge towards the sea." It all started when Ivan the Terrible captured Kazan on October 2, 1552. This event led to the eventual establishment of the Russian Empire and also "determined the future direction of Russian expansion." This liquidation of the Tartar Khanate of Kazan later enabled Peter to reach the Baltic and Catherine II the Black Sea. In the writer's view the idea of "mobile frontiers," not the urge to the seas, dominates Russian geographical and political thinking. His interpretation, however, is somewhat superficial, namely that this crops up from a psychological reaction whereby "to ban the menace of a new Genghis Khan, the Czar of Moscow had become Genghis Khan." More reasonable would be his desire to simply become another Khan.

Moreover, his conception of some evolution of a "Russian people's imperialism" derived from the people's desire to flee from oppression is almost pure rationalization. Their characteristic slavishness has not only practically insured the continuance of oppression but has also been a major medium for Czarist imperialist adventures. The writer's knowledge of Cossack history appears defective, too. The early Cossacks, down to the time of Peter the Great, were Ukrainian and were not engaged in the imperialist adventures he speaks of. The writer attempts to justify his conception above on the basis of the government lagging behind the people's imperialism.

The sections devoted to the liquidation of national cultures, the distortion of non-Russian languages, and fallacies of Moscow's statistics on population, literacy, and economics are particularly good. Although the writer sees

Moscow's policies toward the non-Russian nations in the USSR as a world problem, his interpretations again are not as solid as those presented by other students and scholars of the subject. Despite his qualifications, the comparisons made between the USSR and the U.S.A. as melting-pots of races are not at all logically grounded. The former is characteristically an empire, the latter is not.

"RUSSIAN COLONIALISM AT THE BRUSSELS EXPOSITION," a commentary. *La Libre Belgique*, Brussels, Belgium, August 21, 1958.

One of the most highly regarded newspapers in Europe, *La Libre Belgique* has published a very significant article on the colonial Russian exposition at the World's Fair in Brussels. Reminding its readers that according to the Constitution of the Soviet Union the non-Russian nations in the USSR are supposed to be "sovereign and independent," the paper points out that "what is glaring is the absence at the fair of the non-Russian nations of the USSR, an absence, incidentally, willed by the Russians, mainly for political reasons." Yes, their coats of arms appear at the entrance. But where are their books, their arts, in their own languages? Because of its size and importance Ukraine is used as an example. "If a visitor . . .," the article continues, "wanted to ask in the Soviet pavilion about Ukrainian books, they would look at him with suspicion, nay, even with irritation." The article points out also that a large portrait of Taras Shevchenko appears with only his name and no explanation, and is in with portraits of Russians. "A person not acquainted with Ukrainian literature—and this is true of most visitors—will take Shevchenko for a Russian writer," it rightly observes. The paper then contrasts what "colonial" France, Belgium and others have displayed at the fair.

"FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE," excerpts. *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, "Prolog" Research and Publishing Assn., New York, N. Y., August 1958.

This important organ presents essential excerpts from captive Ukrainian publications which give a fairly good indication of the tenor and tempo of events among the subjugated non-Russian nations in the USSR. Continuing with the subject of observances pertaining to the fortieth anniversary of the C. P. in Ukraine, it furnishes much significant material in this respect. The one striking quality of the addresses and essays quoted on this occasion is political obeisance of an almost artificial kind. Moscow must be adulated. One address stresses that the "Ukrainian people cannot conceive of their culture without the culture of the Russian people." On the next line it does not hesitate to point out that Russian culture "absorbed all the best from Ukrainian culture." Amidst the usual drivel about "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," another takes advantage of the event to repeat often the terms "Ukraine's freedom and independence." It would appear that messages are being relayed to the free world.

L.E.D.

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