Iran Must Work to Rebuild Confidence

If there is one goal in which governments of all kinds have found
common purpose, it is halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

The bedrock of global efforts to establish a credible system for preventing
their proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More
states have signed this Treaty than any other. Full compliance is essential
for international security and the effectiveness of the multilateral system.

Two and a half years ago, Iran was forced to admit to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it was building secret installations to
enrich uranium and to produce plutonium, which could be used to
produce material for such weapons. It was and still is building ballistic
missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. Iran appeared to be
challenging the non-proliferation system.

Subsequent investigations showed that, in the IAEA’s words, “Iran’s
policy of concealment … resulted in many breaches of its obligations”.
They gave rise to serious concern that Iran’s nuclear programme may not,
as it claims, be for solely peaceful purposes. Under the IAEA’s rules,
Iran should have been reported to the United Nations Security Council
two years ago.

We decided instead to find a way forward that would give Iran an
opportunity to dispel concerns and prove that the aims of its nuclear
programme were entirely peaceful. The IAEA’s Board of Governors
agreed to delay a report to the Security Council to give the European
initiative a chance.

At the heart of our initiative was a proposal that Iran should restore
confidence by suspending all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities while we discussed mutually acceptable long-term
arrangements. The IAEA Board adopted unanimously six successive
resolutions asking Iran to suspend these activities.

In November 2004, Iran finally agreed to move ahead on this basis. The
‘Paris Agreement’ set out the framework for talks. It offered the prospect
of not just a long-term solution to the nuclear issue, but also a stronger
relationship between Europe and Iran, including co-operation on political
and security issues and in economic and scientific fields.

The stakes were high then and they still are. If the process succeeds, the
non-proliferation system will emerge with its authority enhanced. But if
Iran continues on its path, Central Asia and the Middle East, one of the
world’s most volatile areas, may well be destabilised. Other states would
be likely to enhance their own capabilities. The NPT will be badly
damaged, as will the goal of creating a WMD free zone in the Middle
East, a cause to which we are committed. This helps explain the wide
support we have had.

Last month, Iran decided to defy the international community by
restarting uranium conversion at its plant in Isfahan, a unilateral step
halting our talks.

Iran claims it is doing no more than enjoying its right to make peaceful
use of nuclear technology, in accordance with the NPT. Iran wants to
paint this as a dispute between the developed and developing world.

These arguments do not stand up. No-one is trying to stop Iran from
generating electricity by nuclear power. We do not question Iran’s – or
any country’s – rights under the NPT. This is why in August we have
offered Iran, as part of a long-term agreement, support for its civil nuclear
programme. But with NPT rights go very clear obligations, and there are
serious grounds for concern that Iran’s nuclear ambitions may not be
exclusively peaceful.

For nearly two decades Iran hid enrichment related and reprocessing
activities which, if successful, would enable it to produce fissile material
for a nuclear weapon. Only since 2002, as the extent of its undeclared
activities has been uncovered, has Iran admitted to them, and then only
under the pressure of IAEA investigations. Iran initially denied having
enriched any nuclear material, but was found to have done so using two
separate processes. Iran also claimed it had no outside help for its
centrifuge enrichment programme. But it was found to have worked with
the same secret network that helped Libya and North Korea develop
clandestine nuclear weapons programmes.

There is no economic logic to the facilities at the centre of the dispute, at
Isfahan and Natanz, if they are, as Iran claims, solely to produce fuel for
nuclear reactors. Iran does not have any nuclear power station in which
the fuel it says it wants to produce could be used. It has only one under
construction, for which Russia is contracted to supply fuel for ten years
and has offered to supply fuel for the lifetime of the reactor, which can
only work safely with Russian fuel. Iran has no licence to make the fuel
itself, nor is there any economic rationale. We have offered to work with
Iran so it has assurances of supply in the event of a procurement problem.
31 countries in the world have nuclear power reactors – the great majority
without developing a fuel cycle industry, demonstrating that this
capability is not critical to a civil nuclear industry.

We have pursued talks in good faith. But as well as breaking the Paris
Agreement by resuming suspended activities, Iran rejected, without any
serious consideration, detailed proposals for a long-term agreement that
we presented last month. These were the most far-reaching ideas for
relations between Iran and Europe presented since the 1979 Iranian
revolution and would provide the foundation for a new relationship based
on co-operation.

At the United Nations in New York last week, we publicly and privately
restated our willingness to work with Iran in political, economic,
scientific and technological areas and readiness to explore ways to
continue negotiations. We went out of our way to avoid public comment
which might raise tensions, despite Iran’s breach of the Paris agreement.
But in his speech to the General Assembly on 17 September, President
Ahmedinejad gave no hint of flexibility, talking of a ‘nuclear apartheid’
and insisting that Iran would exercise its right to develop fuel cycle
technology, regardless of the concerns of the international community.

The spotlight is now on the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna to
respond. Mohammed El-Baradei’s latest report concludes that “after two
and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran’s full
transparency is indispensable and overdue”. The proliferation risks if
Iran continues on its current path are very great. We hope all members of
the international community will remain united. Collectively, we are
responsible for meeting the challenge.

Philippe Douste-Blazy

Joschka Fischer

Javier Solana

Jack Straw