Statement by the President of the Security Council (Cheonan)

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Investigation result on the sinking of Republic of Korea
ship Cheonan

I. Overview

1. The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group conducted its investigation with 25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22 military experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts, constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sweden. The Group is composed of four teams — scientific investigation, explosive analysis, ship structure management and intelligence analysis.

2. We provide the results obtained by the Korean and foreign experts through an investigation and validation process undertaken with a scientific and objective approach.

3. The results obtained through an investigation and analysis of the deformation of the hull recovered from the seabed (see attachment 1) and evidence collected from the site of the incident are as follows:

The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group assesses that a strong underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a homing torpedo below and to the left of the gas turbine room caused the Republic of Korea ship Cheonan to split apart and sink.

II. Basis of the assessment

4. The basis of our assessment that the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack is as follows:

(a) Precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull (see attachment 2) indicates that:

(i) A shockwave and bubble effect caused significant upward bending of the Centre vertical keel, compared with its original state, and the shell plate was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented;

(ii) On the main deck, fracture occurred around the large openings used for maintenance of equipment in the gas turbine room, and significant upward deformation is present on the port side. Also, the bulkhead of the gas turbine room was significantly damaged and deformed;

(iii) The bottoms of the stern and bow sections at the failure point were bent upward. This also proves that an underwater explosion took place;

(b) Through a thorough investigation of the inside and outside of the ship, we have found evidence of extreme pressure on the fin stabilizer, a mechanism to reduce significant rolling of the ship; water pressure and bubble effects on the bottom of the hull; and wires cut with no traces of heat (see attachment 3). All these point to a strong shockwave and bubble effect causing the splitting and the sinking of the ship;

(c) We have analysed statements by survivors of the incident and a sentry on Baekryong Island:

(i) The survivors made a statement that they heard a near-simultaneous explosion once or twice, and that water splashed on the face of a port-side lookout who fell from the impact;

(ii) A sentry on the shore of Baekryong Island stated that he witnessed an approximately 100-meter-high “pillar of white flash” for 2-3 seconds. The aforementioned phenomenon is consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect;

(d) Regarding the medical examination of the deceased service members, no trace of fragmentation or burn injury were found, but fractures and lacerations were observed. All of these are consistent with damage resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect;

(e) The seismic and infrasound wave analysis result conducted by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources is as follows:

(i) Seismic wave intensity of 1.5 degrees was detected by 4 stations;

(ii) Two infrasound waves with a 1.1 second interval were detected by 11 stations;

(iii) The seismic and infrasound waves originated from an identical site of explosion;

(iv) This phenomenon corresponds to a shockwave and bubble effect generated by an underwater explosion;

(f) Numerous simulations of an underwater explosion show that a detonation with a net explosive weight of 200-300 kg occurred at a depth of about 6-9 m, approximately 3 m left of the centre of the gas turbine room;

(g) Based on the analysis of tidal currents off Baekryong Island, the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group determined that the currents would not prohibit a torpedo attack.

III. Conclusive evidence

5. As for conclusive evidence that can corroborate the use of a torpedo, we have collected propulsion parts, including a propulsion motor with propellers and a steering section from the site of the sinking. The evidence matched in size and shape with the specifications on the drawing presented in introductory materials provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes (see attachment 4). The marking in Hangul (Korean alphabet), which reads “1 (or No. 1)”, found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo (see attachment 5). The above evidence allowed the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group to confirm that the recovered parts had been made in North Korea.

6. Also, the aforementioned result confirmed that other possible causes raised for the sinking, including grounding, fatigue failure, mines, collision and internal explosion, played no part in the incident.

IV. Conclusions

7. The following sums up the opinions of Korean and foreign experts on the conclusive evidence collected from the incident site: hull deformation; statements of relevant personnel; medical examination of the deceased service members; analysis of seismic and infrasound waves; simulation of underwater explosion; and analysis on currents off Baekryong Island and collected torpedo parts.

8. The Republic of Korea ship Cheonan was split apart and sunk owing to a shockwave and bubble effect produced by an underwater torpedo explosion.

9. The explosion occurred approximately 3 m left of the centre of the gas turbine room, at a depth of about 6-9 m.

10. The weapon system used is confirmed to be a high explosive torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250 kg, manufactured by North Korea.

11. In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task Force, comprising five States including the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, and operating since 4 May, are as follows:

• The North Korean military is in possession of a fleet of about 70 submarines, comprising approximately 20 Romeo class submarines (1,800 tons), 40 Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget submarines, including the Yeono class (70-80 tons)

• It also possesses torpedoes of various capabilities, including straight running, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes, with a net explosive weight of about 200 to 300 kg, which can deliver the same level of damage that was delivered to the Republic of Korea ship Cheonan.

12. Given the aforementioned findings, combined with the operational environment in the vicinity of the site of the incident, we assess that a small submarine is an underwater weapon system that operates in these operational environment conditions. We confirmed that a few small submarines and a mother ship supporting them left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack.

13. Furthermore, we confirmed that all submarines from neighbouring countries were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident.

14. The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on 15 May, which include the 5 x 5 bladed contrarotating propellers, propulsion motor and a steering section, perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes. The marking in Hangul, which reads “1 (or No. 1)”, found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo. Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages. The CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea utilizes acoustic/wake homing and passive acoustic tracking methods. It is a heavyweight torpedo with a diameter of 21 inches, a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight of up to 250 kg.

15. Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the clear conclusion that the Republic of Korea ship Cheonan was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine. There is no other plausible explanation.

Letter dated 8 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I send this letter to you with regard to the recent development of a grave situation with regard to the Korean peninsula.

On 20 May 2010, the United States and the south Korean authorities released the “investigation result” that forcibly linked the sinking of the south Korean warship Cheonan with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea straight away totally rejected the “investigation result” and clarified its position that it had nothing to do with the incident, proposing to dispatch to the site of the incident its own inspection group of the National Defence Commission to conduct an objective evaluation of the “investigation result”.

It would be very useful to remind ourselves of the ever-increasing international doubts and criticisms, going beyond the internal boundary of south Korea, over the “investigation result” from the very moment of its release.

As days go by, the objective and scientific military analysis and the environment surrounding the incident reveal that the incident is a fabricated scenario, purely for the political and military purposes of the United States.

The key to resolving the case lies in that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which is the victim, takes an opportunity to verify and evaluate the “investigation result” on a scientific ad objective basis.

It is imperative for the Security Council not to step into the same situation in which it was once misused as a tool of high-handedness and hegemony of the United States by giving legitimacy to its armed invasion into Iraq, based on a single word of lies of Powell, United States Secretary of State, in February 2003.

The Security Council is duty bound to adhere strictly to the principles of respect for the sovereignty and impartiality of United Nations Member States, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Security Council is an organization with the securing of global peace and security as a lifeline in its mission. If the Security Council, as an organization with such a mission, has a genuine wish for peace and security on the Korean peninsula, where a touch-and-go situation is being created due to the Cheonan incident, it should take measures that can lead the United States and south Korea to receive the inspection group of the National Defence Commission as already proposed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the victim, to help verify the “investigation result”.

By doing so, the Security Council should give utmost priority to bringing to light the very truth of the incident, on an impartial and objective basis.

In case the unilaterally forged “investigation result” is put on the agenda of the Security Council and opened to debate without the verification of the directly victimized party, it will be more than clear that the sovereignty and security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is infringed upon, and by then no one would dare imagine how serious the consequences would be with regard to peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

On this occasion I would like to enclose herewith a copy of the answer by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea dated 4 June 2010 and request you kindly to circulate the present letter and the attached answer by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry as a document of the Security Council.

Answer by the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the question put by the Korean Central News Agency on 4 June regarding the United States and its followers’ attempt to refer the case of the sinking of the warship Cheonan to the Security Council, linking it with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

As already clarified by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the “results of the investigation” into the case announced by the United States and the south Korean authorities are a sheer fabrication. If they are true, there will be no reason for them to refuse to receive the inspection group of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as already proposed by it to have their “results” confirmed objectively.

The key to the solution of this case is for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as the victim, to inspect and verify the “results of the investigation” of the United States and the south Korean authorities.

To begin with, the “investigation group” cooked up by the south Korean authorities under the manipulation of the United States is a vague entity which does not conform at all to international standards. The military authorities have the final say and some foreigners are said to have been involved in the group, but it was not made public in the least by what procedures and processes they were chosen as its members and whether all of them signed the “results of the investigation” or not. This was the reason why the south Korean authorities were compelled to put up the deformed name “joint civilian-military investigation group”, something unprecedented in the world, instead of formally naming it an international investigation team. They are now trying to cool down the international criticism that the “results of the investigation” are doubtful, by inviting experts of individual countries which are not the victims of the case.

The Security Council should not follow the precedent in which its forum was stained by the United States with its lies about Iraq. It is important for the States members of the Security Council to pay primary attention to objectively probing the truth of the case and pass a right judgement of their own if they do not wish to see the Council abused again as a tool for high-handed and arbitrary practices of the United States. In case this issue is referred to the Council, it should take measures, before anything else, to ensure that the United States and south Korea receive the inspection group of the National Defence Commission as already proposed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and have the “results of the investigation” confirmed by it.

It will become irrefutably evident that the United States and its followers are seeking an ulterior purpose if they refer the case to the Security Council only with their unilateral “results of the investigation” while avoiding objective confirmation about its truth.

Then, the United States and the Security Council will find nothing to say even if the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea responds with toughest measures as it did in the past, and they will never escape from their responsibility for having blocked denuclearization and triggering a conflict on the Korean peninsula.