The United States wishes to bring to the attention of the Security Council recent incidents of Iranian activity in defiance of paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

On 12 June, the United States became aware that Iran had launched a space launch vehicle, but that the vehicle failed to accomplish its mission of placing a satellite into orbit. In addition, on 21 June, Iran launched a Simorgh space launch vehicle, but the launch did not successfully place a satellite into orbit. Paragraph 3 of annex B states in the relevant part that “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology”. Although they are not ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles incorporate technologies that are virtually identical to, and interchangeable with, those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The phrase “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” in paragraph 3 of annex B includes Missile Technology Control Regime category I systems. By definition, ballistic missile systems designed to be category I systems, which are those capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Therefore, launches of space launch vehicles, which rely on technology interchangeable with that of category I ballistic missiles, are an activity that the Security Council has clearly called upon Iran not to undertake.

We once again urge the international community to hold Iran to account for its actions. Iran’s further development of ballistic missile technology contributes to regional tension and poses a threat to international peace and security. When Iran defies the Security Council repeatedly without consequence, it undermines the fundamental credibility of the Council.

In addition, the Security Council must continue to insist on full implementation of the binding measures in resolution 2231 (2015) that restrict outside support for Iran’s ballistic missile programme.  All States Members of the United Nations have an obligation under that resolution not to supply, sell, or transfer to Iran certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology absent advance, case-by-case approval from the Council.  They also may not provide Iran with any technology, technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, or related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology absent advance, case-by-case Security Council approval.

We ask that the Secretary-General take Iran’s actions as described in the present letter into account in his upcoming report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We also ask that you circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield