“Iran, Al-Qaeda and the Nuclear Threat”

Part I
On September 12, 2001, the majors of the Iran Revolution Guards gathered in Teheran and started a meeting reciting a verse from the Koran: “He who fights Allah, will see Allah fight him”. General Ayahi applauded the terrorist attacks in the United States. He asked his friend - the head of the Qods Battalion, responsible for the murders and attacks abroad - whether Iran had something to do with that. His friend answered with a simple “hey,-you’d-better-not-know-it” smile
It was only on October 26, 2001 that Paul Wolfowitz found out through a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) agent that Al Qaeda members were going to Iran to get official documents there that allowed them to travel to Europe and then to the U.S. If the Deputy Secretary of Defense was not warned before, it was because the report that had been just sent to him was in direct conflict with the rooted convictions of the U.S. Intelligence Service. Those ideas could be rated as “Concept”. According to such ideas, Teheran quit all terrorist actions since Jatami’s election in 1997. Also, according to this “Concept”, Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists never act together. Consequently, the news agencies set out to deny all the reports that affirmed the contrary.
Actually, Iran and Al Qaeda have worked together since 1992 - the year where Teheran created a training center in Sudan. Afterwards, Iran got closer to Ayman al-Zawahiri - an Egyptian linked to Al Qaeda. Then, Iran was used to access Afghanistan and as a meeting place with the Iraqi service.

Part II
One week before the Research Commission on the 9/11 Attacks handed in its report, its director Philip D. Zelikow summoned all the members of the Commission to a singular meeting. A series of documents regarding the links between Al Qaeda and Iran was presented to each one of the members. The authors of the report understood that if it was published without taking into account such elements, their work would lose credibility. Consequently, they arranged an urgent meeting. However, the CIA had told them once and again that there was no link at all between Iran and Bin Laden. In the end, the Commission dedicated only two pages to the issue. They could have done more, considering the importance of the case.
The “Concept” blindfolded the U.S. Information Service. The disturbing thing is that the United States has evidence of the links between Iran and Al Qaeda through Hezbollah’s Imad Mugniyeh. However, this man is not mentioned in the final report, for lack of time.

Part III
U.S delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Board of Governors Jackie Sanders was losing patience. We were in Vienna during Thanksgiving weekend, and, although the IAEA was witnessing once more Iran’s inappropriate behavior, no sanction was decided against this country. It was the sixth time, since Mohammed El Baradei had been participating in the Agency’s direction, that this had approved a resolution condemning Iran’s attitude, but that was all. His British counterpart Peter Jenkins said to Sanders’ assistant Christopher Ford that the Europeans had an agreement with Teheran and that they must be relied upon.
After Mohammed El Baradei explained again that Iran, despite having promised to stop enriching uranium, had continued to do so, it was the German delegate Friedrich Groning’s turn to affirm that they had to trust Europe. Sanders could no longer keep his temper and asked why Europe had to trust Germany knowing that Germany was Iran’s major trading partner. On that same day Der Spiegel was disclosing that Iran had a secret nuclear program. In January 2005, the Iranian authorities admitted the facts and that the building material was originally from Germany.
However, Baradei made every effort so that they forgave Iran, thus undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the credibility of his own Agency.