“A constitution in the eyes of complex dilemma”

The most evident mistake of the constitution -to guarantee that the resistance won’t have problems to recruit more combatants over the next years- has to do with Article 108 which has no clause stating that no foreign power will be authorized to maintain bases in the Iraqi soil. This clause is the absolute sine qua non for ending the Sunni rebellion and bringing peace back to the Moqtada al-Sadr’s militias. Without such a clause, violence won’t be eliminated. .
This omission is not surprising for the United States has no intentions of making a total withdrawal in the mid term. All statements issued make reference only to a “reduction” of troops, that is, to diminishing the number to an acceptable figure (for the Americans) between 20 000 and 30 000 men entrenched in half a dozen bases with facilities that can not be ignored by those who have suffered the traffic jam caused by the massive convoys carrying construction materials.
This fact has placed the new Iraqi leading team in a new dilemma. Since it can not survive without a massive American presence, it can not demand the withdrawal of the troops; but as long as it does not do it, millions of Iraqis will consider it illegitimate, no matter the elections or constitutions.
Another thing is oil and economy. During its year of direct control of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer issued certain “regulations” that privatized the great state-run companies, authorized foreign societies to have 100% of a society (with the exception of oil), gave foreign companies the same privileges which the local ones had and authorized the transfer of profits to other countries without any restriction or tax. The constitution does not mention these “regulations;” and consequently, they’ll likely become laws by nobody’s vote. In addition, apart from Article 23 on territorial property, there’s no restriction preventing foreign companies from owning 100% of what they want in the country, including oil. Some articles do state that oil is a community property or arrange the distribution of its product between Kurdish and Shiite regions where oil is abundant and the Sunni regions where it’s very limited –but nothing prevents the Iraqi “people” from ceding this community property.
Therefore, this constitution has mechanisms that allow an important American control upon Iraq, even in the future, through sinuous ways. Articles 25 and 26 make this control stronger by including in the constitutional text Iraq’s obligation to create a program of structural reforms based on a model that, according to the very same World Bank has already caused economic disasters in other countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Iraq, however, should do it if it wants to get the reduction of the debt contracted by Saddam and some funds for the reconstruction of the country.
Whereas million of Iraqis say that the American military and the Anglo-Saxon multinational companies have the real power in Iraq –and this constitution does not do much to convince them of the contrary-; the suffering of the country and of its inhabitants won’t disappear.