"The Iraqi Revolt Differs From Previous Ones"

As Sun Tzu taught us, victory in battle demands that one know their opponent. This is the knowledge which we lack about Iraq to confront the insurrection.
In some respects, the Iraqi insurrection is identical to those that preceded it in the twentieth century. As all insurrections, its failure or success will depend on people’s capacity to mobilize the population’s support. And there’s an even more important element - history reminds us that once an insurrection has reached critical proportions, decades can lapse before it can be quelled. Also, as has happened in other insurrections, the insurrectionists use horrible methods to intimidate the population and cast blame on the government.
However, this rebellion is different, since there is a mixture of religious passion with political radicalism. Contrary to what happened in the twentieth century, the insurrectionists don’t have the support of one power-but, rather-are part of a world insurrection whose members are united by Islam and form part of Al Qaeda. They are able to hit outside of their territory. In fact, this revolt gathers together three different groups: Jihad members, old supporters of the Baath Party and those in support of the Sunni control. These three groups are not directed by a central control. The three have a nihilistic objective: the destruction of Iraqi’s new government.
The good news is that an insurrection of this type is not able to "to triumph;" the bad news is that it is difficult to defeat a disorganized network. Their defeat or victory will depend on three factors: the Iraqi government’s will, the Shiite population’s reaction and the maintenance or not of the financial support on the part of Syria and Saudia Arabia.